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ABSTRACT 
 
The story of cross-border collective redress in the EU is a story of confusion and missed 
opportunities: on the one hand, collective redress mechanisms are heterogeneous and 
often lack efficiency. On the other hand, studies show that important obstacles refrain 
cross-border litigation, such as the costs of proceedings and language differences. 
Although the European institutions have attempted to regulate collective redress, the 
persistent lack of political consensus has delayed the enactment of a binding legislative 
act.  
In light of the above, the present research project offers a theoretical framework for the 
analysis of cross-border collective redress actions in the EU. Its goal is to offer an 
appropriate forum, which facilitates the start of those actions.  
This thesis is divided into two parts: the first one describes and analyses the structural and 
procedural aspects of collective redress mechanisms adopted by EU Member States. The 
second part then deals with jurisdictional questions generated by cross-border collective 
redress actions. The last Chapter of this work suggests the creation of a specific forum 
for collective redress through the reform of the European private international law rules 
on jurisdiction. 
	
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
« Pour atteindre la vérité, il faut une fois dans 
la vie se défaire de toutes les opinions qu'on a 
reçues, et reconstruire de nouveau tout le 
système de ses connaissances. » 
René Descartes 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. Object(ives) of the Research Project 
1. In the wake of globalisation and the rise of new technologies, international 
commercial activities around the globe have intensified. It is increasingly common for 
companies to offer products or services abroad, and for consumers to shop in other States. 
Within the European Union (hereafter, EU or the Union), this internationalisation process 
is further enhanced by the market integration policy. In this vein, the EU has undertaken 
various measures in order to foster consumer confidence and stimulate cross-border 
activities. This is justified since consumers represent fundamental players of the internal 
market. In particular, their activities constitute more than half of the European gross 
domestic product (GDP).  
2. Simultaneously, the desire to engage in cross-border commerce has created new 
kinds of abusive behaviours. Henceforth, illegal practices may affect numerous 
consumers around the globe. Additionally, damages are often dispersed and low. 
Typically, inflated prices stemming from European-wide cartels may affect a high 
number of victims domiciled in distinct Member States. Mass accidents like plane crashes 
or shipwrecks generate multiple damages on victims from many different countries. 
Finally, a company selling products or services internationally and whose Terms and 
Conditions contain unfair terms can affect clients from all over the world. Despite the 
increasing frequency of international commercial interactions involving consumers, the 
development of effective procedural vehicles that would enable them to enforce their 
rights is slow.  
3. Therefore, a private enforcement gap persists, which is especially visible in 
cross-border consumer disputes. This gap can be characterised by a difference between 
the theoretical possibilities to obtain redress drafted by the legislator and the reality 
experienced by consumers in daily life.1 As a result, the European institutions have taken 
                                                
1 This difference has been highlighted in the Green Paper on Access of Consumers to Justice and the 
Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the Single Market COM(93) 576 final, 5. 
  2 
various legislative measures in order to solve this problem. For example, the Small 
Claims Procedure2 was enacted and the use of Alternative Dispute Resoultion 
mechanisms (hereafter, ADR) in consumer matters is encouraged. It is believed that these 
measures should boost consumer confidence and facilitate cross-border trade. 
Additionally, collective redress too represents an interesting instrument that may fulfil 
the above-mentioned enforcement gap. Thanks to this procedural tool, the resources of 
the judicial power are spared. Furthermore, the collectivisation of proceedings is 
beneficial to the defendant who does not have to face a multiplicity of trials in different 
Member States. In other words, the defendant is able to achieve closure. As for victims, 
they can reach important economies of scales by bundling their claims, as the costs 
generated by the proceedings are spread among them.  
4. The notion of collective redress covers different situations: on the one hand, 
this instrument enables consumers to bundle their individual claims. On the other hand, 
collective redress also encompasses actions seeking the protection of consumer general 
interests. Often, representative entities like consumer associations or public authorities 
are entrusted with the task of defending those interests, such as the preservation of the 
environment against air pollution, or the protection of market conditions against the use 
of unfair terms. For the sake of this work, we consider that collective redress covers both 
types of actions. When those actions are coupled with an ADR mechanism, they are also 
taken into consideration. However, collective redress actions in the arbitration field fall 
outside such scope. Finally, although we differentiate the American class action device 
from European forms of collective redress for comparative law purposes, we include the 
class action model within the notion of collective redress. The adoption of a broad notion 
of collective redress to start our research project enables us to undertake an exhaustive 
analysis of the different procedural instruments adopted in all Member States of the EU. 
Naturally, the concept of collective redress, if introduced in a specific legislative act, may 
be defined in a more restrictive manner. 
5. Today, many countries around the globe have adopted some kind of collective 
redress mechanism. Notably, the most accomplished system is the class action device of 
the United States (hereafter, US). Canada and Australia have implemented a similar 
                                                
2 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing 
a European Small Claims Procedure [2007] OJ L199/1. 
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instrument, which includes some nuances. In the European Union, however, Member 
States decided to follow their own path and have adopted heterogeneous collective redress 
instruments. Hence, their lack of interoperability. Unfortunately, a large majority of these 
mechanisms suffer from efficiency problems, which may be due, either to their inherent 
structure, or to external factors, such as lack of funding.  
6. Despite the above, European measures have only fostered cross-border 
litigation and access to justice in a limited manner. Proof of said fact is that consumers 
often renounce to protect their rights –either judicially or extra-judicially. This is typically 
the case when their harm is only a minor amount, so that going to court is unthinkable. 
Furthermore, collective redress actions entailing international components generate 
additional difficulties: for example, issues of applicable law may appear if claimants of 
different States are involved in collective redress proceedings; notice to members about 
the existence of a collective redress action might be costly and difficult to achieve where 
consumers’ identity is unknown; finally, the question of recognition and enforcement of 
collective redress judgments and settlements is still surrounded by legal uncertainty, 
especially if proceedings are opt-out based or punitive damages are allocated. 
7. Taking those elements into account, we suggest that private international law 
is well-positioned to tackle the above-mentioned issues and foster access to justice. 
Therefore, our work aims at facilitating the start of cross-border collective redress actions 
in the EU, through the application of appropriate private international law rules on 
jurisdiction. Even though questions regarding applicable law or recognition and 
enforcement are important, we believe that rules on jurisdiction should be clarified first, 
since they directly affect access to justice. In light of the above, our work focuses on 
Regulation 1215/2012 (hereafter, BRIbis or the Brussels Regulation recast),3 which is 
applicable in commercial and civil cases. Since the scope of this Regulation is relatively 
broad, cross-border collective redress actions should very often fall under it. 
8. Heretofore, jurisdiction has turned out to be a problematic question: in the 
absence of a supranational authority to address cross-border collective redress cases,  
overlapping proceedings, forum shopping and confusion dominate. The traditional two-
                                                
3 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ 
L351/1. 
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party-proceedings paradigm, on which the Brussels regime is based, does not match 
collective redress that involves a plurality of parties. However, the recast of the Brussels 
Regulation did not take the opportunity to tackle jurisdictional issues regarding cross-
border collective redress. Due to the patent unsuitability of the BRIbis to collective 
redress actions, centralisation of the dispute in a single forum is often not possible. Even 
when private international law allows it, many barriers to litigation in courts located 
abroad still impede the bundling of claims or the defense of general interests in a unique 
location. The options attempting to fix this misalignment are regrettably partial. 
Therefore, the last Chapter of our research project suggests that a specific forum for 
collective redress actions should be created. 
9. In substance, our work primarily concentrates on consumer matters. However, 
the delimitation of this field of law is not easy. Usually, the boundaries of consumer law 
rely on the notion of “consumer”. Therefore, we could rely on the definition provided by 
the BRIbis at Article 17, which states that a consumer is a natural person acting out of the 
scope of his profession. Nevertheless, the use of collective redress as an instrument to 
repair harms to general interests does not perfectly fit the notion of “consumer”, since no 
individual victim can be identified in those cases. Somehow, general interests transcend 
the concept of consumer, which seems to require the individualisation of the damage. 
Therefore, our research project initially adopts a broad material scope that covers 
consumers at large. Our analysis also makes specific references to investors, even if these 
actors fall out of the scope of Section 4 BRIbis. Our proposal for a specific forum 
regarding collective redress actions will eventually suggest a more precise delimitation 
of the material scope. 
10. We acknowledge that the use of collective redress in competition law matters 
would have been an interesting question for our research project to tackle. Nevertheless, 
the appropriateness of a jurisdictional ground depends, among other things, on the 
equilibrium between parties’ rights and the potential need for protection of the weakest 
party. In light of this, the situation of both, the claimant and the defendant, is an important 
factor to determine where the best place to initiate proceedings is. However, actors 
involved in consumer and competition law cases are different: in particular, competition 
law infringements are not restricted to consumers but rather affect a broader range of 
victims such as SMEs and even large corporations. In this case, the procedural balance 
  5 
between parties is different than in consumer disputes. Furthermore, the determination of 
a forum also depends on the equilibrium between public and private enforcement. 
Conversely to the consumer law field, the role of the European Commission in 
competition law notably reinforces public enforcement. In light of the above, we believe 
that jurisdictional questions surrounding collective redress actions in the competition law 
field should be the object of an independent investigation. The result might well be that 
players in this field of law should be able to litigate in the same forum that we propose in 
the last Chapter of this thesis. Be that as it may, an autonomous assessment is needed.  
II. Structure of the Research Project 
11. Our research project is divided into two parts: the first one focuses on the 
structural and procedural aspects of collective redress mechanisms adopted by Member 
States. The second part then deals with jurisdictional questions generated by cross-border 
collective redress actions. The content of the four Chapters that compose the thesis can 
be summarised as follows: 
12. Chapter I. Since the 1970s, Member States have implemented different 
collective redress instruments, which vary depending on geography, times, and policies. 
This result makes difficult for theoreticians to offer a harmonious definition of collective 
redress that could be valid for the whole Union. Thereupon, we considered appropriate to 
build up the concept of collective redress by comparing it to a clearly-designed and 
documented scheme, that is: the US class action. The purpose of this exercise is to set up 
the boundaries of collective redress by using the American device as a mirror. 
Furthermore, the solutions adopted by the US legislator in order to tackle some procedural 
issues triggered by class actions will constitute a source of inspiration for the last Chapter 
of our thesis. 
Therefore, the first Chapter of this research project thoroughly analyses and 
describes the US class action. Specifically, our work puts the spotlight on the structural 
features of this device. It is an efficient mechanism that may serve as a model for other 
States. The negative consequences linked to the use of class actions are equally interesting 
to observe. Historical considerations underline that the creation of the class action device 
is consistent with the American culture and legal environment. It has been and still is a 
powerful tool, which fosters access to justice. 
  6 
13. Chapter II. The structure of Chapter II is twofold. The first part compares 
European collective redress mechanisms with the US class action. Our research shows 
that most Member States took the US class action as a “counter-model” because they 
feared the abusive use of this procedural device. As a result, they often drafted collective 
redress tools, which possessed distinctive structural features compared with the American 
class action. This has undeniably created efficiency issues that subsequent reforms have 
tried to solve. Today, the “fear” towards the US class action has therefore lost power.  
Additionally, Chapter II compares the structural architecture of collective redress 
mechanisms among themselves. In order to achieve this comparative exercise, we have 
designed a Table that collects most collective redress instruments adopted by Member 
States. The result of this work is available in Annex II. We then sorted those mechanisms 
out and created four categories of collective redress instruments that predominate in the 
EU, namely the representative model, the Dutch model, the class action model and the 
test case model. These categories serve as the basis for our analysis in Chapter III. 
Then, the second part of Chapter II presents the many studies commissioned by 
the European Union regarding collective redress. Eventually, the Commission issued a 
non-binding Recommendation in 2013, which establishes common principles that 
collective redress mechanisms should follow. It would not be surprising if the European 
institutions re-launched the debate and tried to enact a binding legislative act on this topic. 
However, opponents to collective redress have raised many objections that question the 
implementation of this device in the EU. In this context, Chapter II examines two of these 
objections, namely the competence of the Union to undertake a legislative measure and 
the potentially superior role of ADR.  
Chapter II concludes that a private international law approach would appropriately 
deal with cross-border obstacles that impede consumers to start collective redress actions 
abroad. Conversely, we call into question the effectiveness of a legislative measure 
aiming at harmonising national procedural laws. 
14. Chapter III. This Chapter first provides a kind reminder on the functioning of 
relevant provisions of the BRIbis, which are likely to apply to cross-border collective 
redress cases. Both the case law rendered by the ECJ, as well as manuals of private 
international law stemming from different Member States support our explanations. 
Although the provisions of the Brussels regime are well-known, they provide us the 
necessary theoretical background to ground our analysis in the second part of Chapter III.  
  7 
Said part analyses how European private international law rules on jurisdiction 
apply to the four categories of collective redress mechanisms described in Chapter II. 
Where possible, we used judgments rendered by national courts in collective redress cases 
entailing an international component. Nevertheless, this has been a tricky exercise, since 
these actions are not widespread and no register catalogues them.  
Chapter III observes that the current private international law rules on jurisdiction 
do not fit collective redress. In particular, only some rules enable claimants to centralise 
their claims in a single forum, namely Articles 4 and 7(2) BRIbis –to a certain extent. We 
note that cross-border litigation is still rare and that even when consumers or their 
representatives –such as consumer associations– want to start litigation abroad, they face 
significant hurdles. In order to reinforce evidence regarding the difficulties that consumer 
associations face when they have to litigate abroad, we drafted a questionnaire, whose 
results are available in Annex III. The answers that we received confirmed our previous 
analysis: proceedings hardly ever start in another Member State. 
15. Chapter IV. The last Chapter of this thesis first analyses whether the available 
jurisdictional grounds of the BRIbis –Articles 4 and 7(2) BRIbis– may provide an 
appropriate forum for collective redress actions. Additionally, we examine whether the 
different proposals for reform might alternatively bring some coherence to the current 
private international law landscape. Specifically, we assess proposals drafted by private 
organisations and the literature, as well as the solutions adopted by national legislators. 
We conclude that neither the BRIbis nor those proposals offer a suitable option to 
determine where collective redress actions could be started. In particular, we argue that 
they do not offer sufficient access to justice.  
 Alternatively, Chapter IV suggests that a specific forum for collective redress 
actions should be created. In order to propose such a forum, we rely on the fundamental 
principles of the private international law discipline. Furthermore, we take into account 
the policy objectives pursued by the EU. Our objective is to draft a realistic and easy-to-
implement proposal that fosters access to justice. Besides, such a proposal should not 
alter the rights of the defendant. In order to convince the reader that the specific forum 
we propose is valuable, we compare it with competing solutions. We then present some 
specific elements that would have to be clarified in case our proposal is adopted. 
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16. From a quantitative perspective, we tried to balance both parts of the thesis: 
each of them represents approximately a half of the thesis. However, giving each Chapter 
an equal number of pages would be unreasonable. In particular, the first Chapter of the 
thesis, which offers a primer on US class actions, is instrumental to the rest of our 
research. Therefore, it is justified to make it shorter. Additionally, because private 
international law questions compose the heart of this research project, it contains a 
slightly higher number of pages, in comparison with the first part of this thesis. Finally, 
we chose to write this work in English for accessibility purposes. As a result, the style of 
citation had to be coherent with this decision. This is why we took the widely-accepted 
editorial style of the Journal of Private International Law as a reference.  
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INTRODUCCIÓN 
I. Objeto y Objetivos del Proyecto de Investigación 
1. Nuestra época se caracteriza indudablemente por un incremento de las 
actividades en el ámbito del comercio internacional derivado de la globalización y del 
uso de las nuevas tecnologías. Como resultado, se registra un crecimiento exponencial de 
la oferta de productos en mercados extranjeros y de adquisiciones en Estados vecinos. A 
su vez, la política de integración derivada de la creación de un mercado interior europeo 
fortalece el proceso de internacionalización. En este contexto, la Unión europea (UE) ha 
adoptado medidas con el fin de reforzar la confianza de los consumidores en el mercado 
y estimular sus actividades transfronterizas. Dichas medidas se justifican por el papel 
fundamental de los consumidores en la UE: conviene destacar que sus actividades 
representan más de la mitad del producto interior bruto (PIB) europeo. 
2. Al mismo tiempo, la intensificación del comercio internacional ha dado lugar a 
nuevos tipos de comportamientos abusivos lo suficientemente potentes como para afectar 
a un gran número de personas. Los daños provocados por dichos comportamientos suelen 
ser dispersos y de poca cuantía. Por ejemplo, la inflación de los precios por la presencia 
de carteles suele perjudicar a numerosas personas domiciliadas en distintos Estados. 
Igualmente, accidentes aéreos o naufragios pueden causar muchas víctimas. Finalmente, 
la presencia de cláusulas abusivas en las relaciones contractuales suele alcanzar muchos 
consumidores. Desgraciadamente, el derecho procesal ha tardado en asimilar los cambios 
del mercado: por tanto, son pocos los instrumentos procesales suficientemente 
desarrollados para proteger apropiadamente los derechos sustantivos de los 
consumidores.   
3. En consecuencia, existe un denominado “private enforcement gap”, que es 
especialmente visible en los conflictos internacionales en materia de consumo. Esta 
brecha en la aplicación de los derechos nace de la diferencia entre la posibilidad teórica 
de obtener reparación de daños en un tribunal, tal y como lo prevé la ley, y la realidad. 
Por ello, las instituciones europeas han intentado remediar este problema a través de 
medidas como la adopción de un proceso europeo para las demandas de escasa cuantía o 
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incentivando del uso de las ADR. Se supone que estas medidas fortalecen la confianza de 
los consumidores en el mercado y facilitan el comercio transfronterizo. Así mismo, las 
acciones colectivas –o, en palabras de la UE, “recursos colectivos”– representan un 
instrumento procesal capaz de asegurar la aplicación de los derechos. Tal instrumento 
preserva los recursos del poder judicial a través de la colectivización de las demandas y, 
por la misma regla, abaratan el coste de un procedimiento judicial para las víctimas, pues 
se reparte tal coste entre todas ellas. En cuanto al demandado, éste no tiene que litigar en 
foros distintos, al contrario, puede solventar sus conflictos en un único foro. 
4. Conviene subrayar que la acción colectiva abarca distintos mecanismos: por 
una parte, este tipo de acciones permite la acumulación de numerosas demandas 
individuales. Por otra parte, se refiere también a acciones que persiguen la protección de 
un interés general, como la preservación del medio ambiente o la protección del mercado 
contra del uso de las cláusulas abusivas. A menudo, la defensa de estos intereses se asigna 
a asociaciones de consumidores o autoridades públicas. En el marco de esta tesis doctoral, 
ambos tipos de acciones se consideran acción colectiva. Asimismo se aplica cuando un 
procedimiento ADR precede tales acciones. Sin embargo, las acciones colectivas 
arbitrales quedan fuera del ámbito de la tesis. Finalmente, aunque distinguimos la acción 
colectiva estadounidense de los denominados recursos colectivos en el seno de la UE, 
consideramos que los modelos basados en la acción colectiva se incluyen en la noción de 
“recursos colectivos”. Para empezar, este proyecto de investigación admite una noción 
amplia de los recursos colectivos, lo que permite un análisis exhaustivo de todo tipo de 
mecanismos de acciones colectivas adoptados por los Estados miembros de la Unión 
europea. Sin embargo, esto no impide la adopción de una definición más estricta en caso 
de que se promulgue una ley sobre recursos colectivos. 
5. Hoy en día, son muchos los Estados que poseen algún instrumento que permita 
la colectivización de las demandas o la defensa de intereses supraindividuales. La acción 
colectiva estadounidense es, sin duda, el mecanismo el más pulido, si bien es cierto que 
Canadá y Australia también gozan de un instrumento procesal relativamente similar. Por 
el contrario, los Estados miembros de la UE han seguido un camino distinto, pues sus 
mecanismos de acciones colectivas se caracterizan por su gran heterogeneidad, lo cual 
deriva en una falta de interoperabilidad. Además, la mayoría de los mecanismos 
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mencionados son relativamente ineficaces, por razones vinculadas a su propia estructura 
o por factores externos, como la falta de financiación. 
6. Ahora bien, las medidas europeas destinadas a reforzar la resolución de 
controversias en un contexto internacional y garantizar el acceso a la justicia no han sido 
especialmente exitosas. Prueba de ello es la frecuente renuncia de los consumidores a la 
defensa judicial o extra-judicial de sus derechos. Típicamente, la poca cuantía de los 
daños disuade la interposición de procedimientos judiciales. En lo que se refiere a las 
acciones colectivas, éstas generan problemas adicionales: por ejemplo, la implicación de 
víctimas domiciliadas en distintos Estados miembros puede dificultar la determinación 
de la ley aplicable a la demanda colectiva. Igualmente, la notificación de la existencia de 
una acción colectiva resulta compleja cuando las victimas están geográficamente 
dispersas y su identidad se desconoce. Finalmente, el proceso de reconocimiento y 
ejecución de las sentencias o acuerdos colectivos todavía es incierto, sobre todo si la 
acción siguió las pautas de un sistema opt-out o si se asignaron daños punitivos. 
7. A la luz de estos elementos, el presente proyecto de investigación sugiere que 
el derecho internacional privado es capaz de solucionar los problemas descritos 
anteriormente y garantizar el acceso a la justicia. En particular, se pretende facilitar la 
iniciación de procedimientos colectivos en la UE, a través de la aplicación de normas de 
competencia judicial internacional apropiadas. Aunque las cuestiones relativas a la 
determinación de la ley aplicable y del reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones o 
acuerdos judiciales sean fundamentales, no afectan directamente el acceso a la justicia. 
En este contexto, este trabajo se centra en el Reglamento 1215/2012 (RBIbis) relativo a 
la competencia judicial, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones judiciales en 
materia civil y mercantil, cuyo ámbito de aplicación abarcará la gran mayoría de las 
acciones colectivas, dada su amplitud.  
8. Hasta la fecha, y en ausencia de una autoridad supranacional, la determinación 
del tribunal competente para gestionar acciones colectivas ha sido problemática. Por 
consiguiente, en la actualidad dominan los procedimientos concurrentes, el fórum 
shopping y la confusión. Lo anterior se explica, en parte, por la falta de adecuación de las 
acciones colectivas al paradigma tradicional en virtud del cual un demandado se suele 
enfrentar a un demandante en el proceso civil. Aun así, la versión revisada del 
Reglamento de Bruselas no ha aprovechado la oportunidad de regular estas acciones. A 
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la luz de este desajuste, la defensa de las demandas o de intereses supraindividuales en 
un foro único es improbable. Aunque lo permitiera el derecho internacional privado, 
numerosos obstáculos seguirían frenando la interposición de procedimientos colectivos 
ante los tribunales de otros Estados miembros. Desgraciadamente, las propuestas que 
pretenden solucionar este problema suelen aportar soluciones parciales. Por ello, el último 
capítulo de la tesis doctoral sugiere la creación de un foro “a medida” para las acciones 
colectivas transfronterizas. 
9. Desde un punto de vista sustantivo, este proyecto de investigación se centra en 
materia de consumo. Como este campo es de difícil delimitación, es posible determinar 
sus límites en base a la noción de “consumidor”. En virtud del artículo 17 RBIbis, un 
consumidor es una persona que concluye un contrato para un uso que pueda considerarse 
ajeno a su actividad profesional. Sin embargo, la acción colectiva que protege un interés 
general no parece adecuarse a esta definición, pues no implica ninguna víctima individual. 
De cierto modo, el interés general trasciende la noción de consumidor que implica la 
individualización del daño. A raíz de estas consideraciones, la tesis doctoral adopta una 
definición intencionalmente amplia del derecho de consumo. Por consiguiente, conviene 
incluir a los inversores en su marco, aunque éstos no se encuentren amparados por la 
Sección 4 RBIbis. Nuestra propuesta final, que consiste en la creación de un foro “a 
medida” para las acciones colectivas, delimitará el ámbito de aplicación material de 
manera más precisa. 
10. Admitimos que hubiera sido interesante incluir las acciones colectivas en 
materia de derecho de la competencia dentro del ámbito de la tesis que aquí se presenta. 
Sin embargo, la idoneidad de un foro para tales acciones depende, entre otras cosas, del 
equilibrio procesal entre las partes en el litigio y de la necesidad de proteger a la parte 
débil. Ahora bien, la posición de las partes puede ser distinta en materia de protección de 
los consumidores o de competencia: en particular, violaciones de normas de derecho de 
la competencia no sólo afectan a consumidores, sino también a Pymes y a veces incluso 
a grandes empresas. En este caso, puede que el equilibrio procesal entre las partes sea 
diferente. Además, la determinación del foro adecuado también depende de la dosis de 
“public” y “private enforcement”. Concluimos, por tanto, que el análisis de la 
competencia judicial internacional debe de ser independiente. Puede que los actores en 
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este ámbito necesiten un foro idéntico al que presentamos en el último capítulo de esta 
tesis. Sea como fuere, un examen autónomo es necesario. 
II. Estructura del Proyecto de Investigación 
11. La tesis doctoral se divide en dos partes: la primera examina los aspectos 
estructurales y procesales de los instrumentos de acciones colectivas implementados por 
los Estados miembros. La segunda parte del trabajo trata las cuestiones de competencia 
judicial internacional generadas por tales acciones. El contenido de los cuatro capítulos 
que componen este proyecto de investigación se resume a continuación. 
12. Capítulo I. Desde los años setenta, los legisladores nacionales han adoptado 
diferentes mecanismos de acciones colectivas según la geografía, la época y sus objetivos 
de política legislativa. En este contexto, no se puede ofrecer una definición armoniosa de 
la acción colectiva a nivel europeo que sea aplicable en todo el territorio europeo. Por 
consiguiente, pareció apropiado aclarar el término “recurso colectivo” comparándolo con 
un instrumento claramente establecido y documentado, i. e. la acción colectiva 
estadounidense. El objetivo de este ejercicio es la construcción de una definición de la 
acción colectiva en la UE utilizando el dispositivo estadounidense como espejo. Además, 
las soluciones implementadas por el legislador norteamericano en respuesta a ciertos 
problemas procesales inspirarán nuestra propuesta final. 
El primer capítulo de la tesis estudia la estructura de las acciones colectivas 
norteamericanas. Se trata de un mecanismo eficiente que puede servir de modelo a otros 
Estados. Los efectos negativos que derivaron del abuso de este mecanismo son 
igualmente interesantes de observar. El aspecto histórico demuestra que la acción 
colectiva es coherente con la cultura y el sistema legal estadounidenses. Es un instrumento 
procesal potente y capaz de proporcionar acceso a la justicia. 
13. Capítulo II. La estructura del capítulo II es doble: la primera parte compara 
las acciones colectivas europeas con las norteamericanas. Nuestras búsquedas arrojan luz 
sobre los temores de los Estados miembros que adoptaron modelos de acciones colectivas 
estructuralmente opuestos al instrumento estadounidense con el fin de impedir la 
repetición de abusos cometidos en el otro lado del Atlántico. Desgraciadamente, 
problemas importantes de eficiencia resultaron de lo anterior, y reformas posteriores 
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intentaron encontrar soluciones. El temor a la acción colectiva “made in US” pierde 
fuerza paulatinamente. 
A continuación, el capítulo II compara la arquitectura de los mecanismos de 
acciones colectivas en Europa. Para facilitar este ejercicio comparativo, la Tabla incluida 
en el Anexo II recoge los instrumentos de acciones colectivas implementados en la 
mayoría de los Estados miembros. Concretamente, ordenamos dichos instrumentos según 
su estructura y creamos cuatro modelos de acciones colectivas, i. e. el modelo 
representativo, el modelo holandés, el modelo de acción colectiva y el procedimiento de 
caso piloto. Dichos modelos son predominantes en la UE y servirán de base a nuestro 
análisis en el capítulo III. 
La segunda parte del capítulo II presenta y resume los estudios sobre acciones 
colectivas publicados por la Unión europea. La Comisión terminó por adoptar una 
Recomendación non-vinculante en el año 2013, cuyo objeto consiste en establecer 
principios comunes aplicables a todos los mecanismos de acciones colectivas en el 
territorio europeo. Es probable que las instituciones europeas vuelvan a tratar sobre la 
necesidad de un texto vinculante que regule las acciones colectivas. Sin embargo, quienes 
se oponen a la acción colectiva presentan esencialmente dos objeciones: por un lado, 
impugnan la competencia de la Unión para amparar una normativa vinculante, y por otro, 
consideran que las ADR representan un método superior de resolución de conflictos. 
Para concluir, opinamos que el derecho internacional privado tiene la capacidad 
de tratar de forma apropiada los obstáculos que dificultan la interposición de 
procedimientos colectivos en otro Estado miembro. Por el contrario, ponemos en tela de 
juicio la efectividad de una medida por la cual los mecanismos de acciones colectivas 
serían objeto de armonización.  
14. Capítulo III. El capítulo III empieza con un recordatorio sobre el 
funcionamiento de las disposiciones del RBIbis que supuestamente se aplicarían a las 
acciones colectivas transfronterizas. Fundamentamos nuestras explicaciones con la 
jurisprudencia del TJUE y manuales de derecho internacional privado procedentes de 
distintos Estados miembros. A pesar de que las normas del Reglamento sean bien 
conocidas, nuestro recordatorio proporciona un marco teórico sobre el cual se basa el 
análisis de la segunda parte del capítulo III. 
Dicha parte examina como las reglas europeas de competencia judicial 
internacional se aplican a los cuatro modelos descritos en el capítulo anterior. Siempre 
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que sea posible, nos referimos a sentencias nacionales relacionadas con acciones 
colectivas transfronterizas. Sin embargo, este ejercicio ha sido dificultado por la escasez 
de la jurisprudencia y la ausencia de un registro que catalogue estas acciones. 
En definitiva, el capítulo III constata la falta de ajuste entre las reglas de derecho 
internacional privado y las acciones colectivas. De hecho, sólo unas cuantas disposiciones 
permiten centralizar las demandas en un foro único: estas son los artículos 4 y 7(2) 
RBIbis. Además, observamos que la litigación internacional es escasa. Aun cuando los 
consumidores y sus representantes –como las asociaciones de consumidores– desean 
iniciar un procedimiento colectivo en otro Estado, se enfrentan a múltiples barreras. El 
cuestionario que redactamos con preguntas dirigidas a las asociaciones de consumidores, 
cuyos resultados se pueden consultar en el Anexo III, evidencian este hecho. Las 
respuestas que recibimos confirman que las acciones no se suelen interponer en otro 
Estado. 
15. Capítulo IV. El último capítulo de la tesis doctoral analiza en primer lugar si 
las disposiciones del RBIbis –los artículos 4 y 7(2) BRIbis– ofrecen un foro apropiado 
para las acciones colectivas transfronterizas. Además, examina si las distintas propuestas 
de reforma presentadas por la doctrina, los organismos privados y los legisladores 
nacionales establecen un cuadro teórico más coherente para los aspectos de derecho 
internacional privado. Desgraciadamente, ni el RBIbis, ni las propuestas de reforma 
suministran una solución satisfactoria, pues no garantizan suficientemente el acceso a la 
justicia. 
Alternativamente, el capítulo IV apuesta por la creación de un foro específico para 
las acciones colectivas. Para realizar esta tarea, nos apoyamos en los principios 
fundamentales de derecho internacional privado y los objetivos de política legislativa de 
la UE. Nuestro propósito es crear una propuesta realista y fácil de implementar que, 
además, garantice el acceso a la justicia. Se debe agregar que dicha propuesta no puede 
afectar los derechos del demandado. Con la intención de fortalecer el valor de nuestra 
propuesta, la comparamos con modelos competidores. Finalmente, listamos y 
describimos los elementos que tendrían que depurarse en caso de que nuestra propuesta 
se adopte. 
16. Desde el punto de vista cuantitativo, intentamos equilibrar las distintas partes 
de la tesis, con lo cual cada una de ella represente aproximadamente la mitad del trabajo. 
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Sin embargo, los cuatro capítulos no pueden razonablemente poseer el mismo número de 
páginas. Por ejemplo, el capítulo I, dado su carácter instrumental para el resto de la tesis, 
es cuantitativamente menos importante. Además, las cuestiones de derecho internacional 
privado forman el nucleo de este proyecto de investigación, y por tanto, nos parece 
legítimo que tenga un número de páginas un poco más elevado. Finalmente, decidimos 
redactar la tesis doctoral en inglés por motivos de difusión, de modo que tuvimos que 
seleccionar un método de redacción adecuado. Consecuentemente, hemos elegido las 
pautas del Journal of Private International Law para citar las fuentes bibliográficas. 
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CHAPTER I  
BACK TO THE ORIGIN: THE US CLASS ACTION 
17. The American class action is considered as the precursor of all modern 
mechanisms of collective actions. Because of its years of experience, some state that the 
US class action constitutes a reference system upon which other collective private 
enforcement systems should rely.4 This does not mean that national legislators should 
merely mimic the American device or transplant it, as it stands, into their legal order. 
However, the study of this instrument is a mandatory step for anyone who wishes to 
understand the private enforcement of collective rights. In light of this, our research 
project naturally starts with an analysis of the US class action. This exercise serves 
different purposes. 
18. To start with, a look at the abusive exploitation of the US class action explains 
the European deep-rooted antipathy against the American device. For example, the 
European Commission publicly stated that “any measures for judicial redress need to be 
appropriate and effective (…). Therefore, they must not attract abusive litigation (…). 
Examples of such adverse effects can be seen in particular in ‘class actions’ as known in 
the United States. The European approach to collective redress must thus give proper 
thought to preventing these negative effects and devising adequate safeguards against 
them”.5 So much so, that the Commission recommends Member States to adopt collective 
redress procedural tools with opposite structural features than its American homologue.6 
                                                
4 J López Sánchez, El sistema de las class actions en los Estados Unidos de América (Editorial Comares, 
2011), 1-2 (“se presenta como una primera referencia para determinar las pautas sobre las que debe 
construirse el régimen de la tutela jurisdiccional colectiva. Esto no significa que deban ser entendidas como 
el norte hacia el que deba encaminarse toda reforma, pero sí que son paso obligado para el estudio de las 
formas colectivas de tutela”). See also, L Carballo Piñeiro, Las acciones colectivas y su eficacia 
extraterritorial – Problemas de recepción y transplante de las class actions en Europa (De conflictu legum. 
Estudios de Derecho Internacional Privado, 2009), 23. 
5 European Commission, Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress COM(2013) 
401 final, 3. 
6 Whereas the US class action is based on an opt-out system, allows punitive damages, gives any claimant 
standing to sue, and permits contingency fees, the European Commission recommends the adoption of 
collective redress instruments based on an opt-in system (an opt-out-based instrument is possible only in 
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In this sense, the Commission’s recommendations are “more reactive than proactive”.7 
Nevertheless, we argue that the fear generated by the US class action is often exaggerated. 
The distinct and specific features of the US legal system indicate that an abuse of 
collective redress actions in Europe is rather unlikely.  
Therefore, the US class action has served as a basis for the construction of many 
national collective redress instruments in Europe: sometimes as an example,8 sometimes 
as a counterexample.9 In light of this, certain procedural choices, which have been made 
at the national level, become understandable if one surveys the American device’s 
functioning. Furthermore, because Member States adopted heterogeneous collective 
redress instruments, it is difficult to provide a uniform definition of such a concept. 
Consequently, the term “collective redress” becomes easier to grasp when compared to a 
well-known procedural tool that has been and can be investigated. Chapter II of this 
research project takes that reality into account by defining European collective redress 
mechanisms in comparison to the US class action. 
Besides, the reaction of the US legislator to the procedural complexities generated 
by class actions represents a valuable information for the creation of future collective 
redress tools, as other States may apprehend the emergence of similar difficulties.10 In 
other words, because foreign legal orders may benefit from the American system’s 
expertise and maturity, they do not start from scratch: they can build up on the US 
experience by extracting the best of the American class action and avoiding its 
deficiencies. 
Finally, a look at inter-state jurisdictional issues in class action proceedings will 
support our analysis of European private international law questions in the next Chapters. 
As we explain below, class actions involving defendants and victims from different states 
generated important jurisdictional concerns that both, the legislative and the judicial 
powers have attempted to resolve as they arose. The solutions given to those problems 
                                                
exceptional cases) that ban punitive damages, limit standing to sue, and restrict funding possibilities. 
Compare Rule 23 of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure examined below and the Commission 
Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law (infra; 
II.B.2.b.). 
7 SI Strong, “Regulatory Litigation in the European Union: Does the U.S. Class Action have a New 
Analogue” (2012) 88 (2) Notre Dame Law Review 959. 
8 For example, in the Netherlands, Portugal, Norway and Sweden. 
9 Most notably in France and Germany. 
10 HL Buxbaum, “Class Actions, Conflict, and the Global Economy” (2014) 21 (2) Indiana Journal of 
Global Legal Studies 587. 
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constitute an important source of inspiration for the development of appropriate private 
international law rules on collective redress on the other side of the Atlantic. 
19. That being said, we now turn to the analysis of the US class action. Chapter I 
first describes the core features of the US class action, as well as the legal environment 
that surrounds and influences its development (infra; I.). The second part of this Chapter 
focuses on fundamental preliminary questions, namely the suitability of a class action in 
comparison to alternative instruments and the selection of the appropriate forum (infra; 
II.). Following this, we enter into details and examine Rule 23 of the Federal Rules on 
Civil Procedure, which codifies the federal class action system (infra; III.). Then, we put 
the spotlight on selected procedural consequences that the certification of a class action 
triggers. In particular, we make comments on the opt-out system, the effects of a class 
action judgment or settlement and the allocation of costs and attorney’s fees (infra; IV.). 
We end up this Chapter with a conclusion (infra; V.). 
I. A Primer on Class Actions 
A. The Basic Features of the American Legal System 
20. Class actions, as any procedural instrument, do not evolve in a vacuum. In 
fact, the development of procedural law is tightly linked to the political, economic and 
social context in which it is implemented. In light of this, it appears appropriate to start 
this Chapter with a survey of the US legal system. As we explain below, the American 
legal environment explains the existence and the current form of the class action device. 
In particular, two specific features of the US legal system influence the development of 
class actions: the federal structure of the judiciary system and the litigation culture. 
21. To start with, the United States’ judiciary organisation is based on the 
federalist model:11 accordingly, the fifty states of the United States, as well as the federal 
government have their own court system.12 Pursuant to Article III of the US Constitution, 
                                                
11 Federalism is the result of Americans’ distrust in the concentration of power in the hands of a few. 
Historically, the rejection of the British domination, coupled with the existing disorder among colonies –
partly due to the great diversity of the American population– created an antagonistic social situation: the 
need for a government and stability on the one hand, and the desire to remain free on the other. Federalism 
and reliance on litigation are the direct result of this opposition (SN Subrin and MYK Woo, Litigating in 
America – Civil Procedure in Context [Aspen Publishers, 2006], 8-11). 
12 LJ Silberman et al., Civil Procedure: Theory and Practice (Wolters Kluwer, 4th edn, 2013), 2. 
  20 
it is for Congress to establish the federal court system. Since 1891, the judiciary federal 
power is a pyramidal organisation composed of three levels: district courts are the 
tribunals of first instance, circuit courts hear cases on appeal and the US Supreme Court 
reviews decisions of the federal courts of appeals, as well as certain questions decided by 
the highest state courts.13 As regards the state judiciary organisation, it is rather 
heterogeneous given that each state can establish courts as it deems convenient. However, 
some similarities can be pointed out: every state has a bunch of first instance courts –
often called inferior courts– and appellate courts, as well as a supreme court.14 
22. The federalist context that characterises the US judicial organisation 
influences the class action device: indeed, the dual court system means that class action 
plaintiffs will often have more than one forum available to bring their lawsuits. As a 
result, forum shopping and parallel litigation are general features of the American legal 
system.15 For the sake of this investigation, special attention is given to multistate class 
actions –i. e. actions that involve the legal order of various states–, as they trigger 
questions comparable to the ones generated in European cross-border collective redress 
cases.  
23. Another consequence of federalism is the regulation of civil procedure, both 
at the federal and state level. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, 
harmonise the procedure in federal courts.16 Even though states have the power to draft 
their procedural rules, their design has either been influenced by the Field Code17 or the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, procedural rules at both levels essentially 
look like each other. Because the United States is a common law system, specific attention 
must also be given to case law.  
24. As far as the class action device is concerned, this means that it is regulated at 
both, federal and state levels. Therefore, different procedural rules apply to the class 
                                                
13 JB Oakley and VD Amar, American Civil Procedure: A Guide to Civil Adjudication in US Courts 
(Kluwer Law International, 2009), 37-41. 
14 Ibid, 41-43. 
15 This often triggers strategic forum selection, as we further explain below (infra; II.B.2.). 
16 The full text is available on the website of the Legal Information Institute of Cornell University Law 
School, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp. 
17 The American judicial system inherited the division between common law and equity courts from the 
British. These courts usually applied different rules of procedure. In 1848, the state of New York enacted 
a Code of Civil Procedure –the Field Code– that merged and simplified the common law and equity 
systems. Today, the influence of the Field Code is still palpable in many states (see Oakley and Vikram, 
supra n 13, 25-26; Subrin and Woo, supra n 11, 43-57). 
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action suit depending on the forum chosen. At the federal level, the class action procedure 
is regulated in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.18 As for states, most of 
them have decided to closely follow the federal model.19 For this reason, this work will 
principally focus on the federal procedure and set aside local specificities. Additionally, 
this work will make reference to the most important case law that influenced the 
development of the class action device.  
25. Furtheremore, the United States has been relying on litigation as a powerful 
tool of accountability and enforcement of rights. In this State, parties and their counsel20 
are responsible for establishing the facts, frame the dispute and present the relevant 
evidence.21 Conversely, judges are usually passive. This dispute resolution system based 
on lawyer-dominated litigation is often called “adversarial legalism”.22 
Because the adversarial model essentially rests upon lawyers, an active market 
has developed around the legal profession. Today, American lawyers are described as 
“entrepreneurs”, due to their central role in litigation and the legal system in general.23 
According to Coffee,24 entrepreneurial litigation is the result of the unique American 
conception of justice on the one hand, and important legal developments that took place 
in the nineteenth century on the other –like the development of the American rule on costs 
and contingency fees. As a result, the lawyer was, and still is, perceived as the guardian 
of citizens’ rights. Eventually, US courts adopted essential doctrines, which became the 
pillars of entrepreneurial litigation. Among them: (1) the acceptance of contingency fees; 
(2) the adoption of the “American rule” on costs; and, (3) the development of the 
“common fund” doctrine25 (infra; §§ 97-99). The predominant role of attorneys further 
increased when these obtained the right to litigate in protection of a public interest and 
thus, to supplement public enforcement. This refers to the “private attorney general” 
institution.26  
                                                
18 The text of this provision is reproduced in Annex I. 
19 TD Rowe, “State and Foreign Class-Action Rules and Statutes: Differences From –And Lessons For?– 
Federal Rule 23” (2007) 35 (1) Western State University Law Review 101. 
20 We use the terms “counsel”, “attorney” and “lawyer” interchangeably. 
21 S Sherry and J Tidmarsh, Essentials Civil Procedure (Aspen Publishers, 2007), 34-38. 
22 RA Kagan, Adversarial Legalism – The American Way of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003), 9, 15. 
23 GC Hazard and M Taruffo, American Civil Procedure – An introduction (Yale University Press, 1993), 
87-88. 
24 JC Coffee, Entrepreneurial litigation: its rise, fall, and future (Harvard University Press, 2015), 9-29. 
25 Ibid, 11-12.  
26 Ibid, 14. 
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26. Within the class action system, the plaintiff’s attorney is also considered as a 
private attorney general in the sense that he defends the interests of a community.27 At 
the same time, the private attorney general faces severe criticism: in the class action 
system, for instance, the lack of control from the representative plaintiff over the attorney, 
combined with the lack of alignment of their interests, often encourages lawyers to satisfy 
greedy ambitions at the expense of the class.28  
B. Definition and Characteristics  
27. The US class action29 is a procedural tool whereby a representative plaintiff30 
litigates on behalf of similarly-situated members –forming a class– before a court. The 
bundling of analogous claims in a single suit enables courts to solve tens, hundreds or 
even millions of cases at once. When potential claimants are numerous and their factual 
and legal situation is similar enough, then the opportunity to try a myriad of claims all at 
once becomes interesting for all participants: for plaintiffs because the aggregation of 
their claims divides the costs of bringing a lawsuit, and thus makes access to court 
possible. Moreover, opt-out based class actions represent an interesting way to 
compensate rational apathy; for defendants because thanks to class actions, they avoid 
the financial burden of litigating multiple individual claims in different locations; and for 
the judicial power that spares its resources. Typically, the class action is considered an 
adequate procedural vehicle in the following illustrative examples: consumers oppressed 
with unauthorized charges sue telecommunication companies in order to recover their 
money; employees subjected to systematic race discrimination bring a suit against their 
employer; investors who purchased overvalued stock due to misleading information start 
litigation against the company; purchasers of a defective product sue the company liable; 
                                                
27 For more explanations on the different types of private attorneys general, see WB Rubenstein, “On What 
a ʻPrivate Attorney Generalʼ Is – and Why Does it Matter?” (2004) 57 (6) Vanderbilt Law Review 2142-
2155. 
28 See JC Coffee, “Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter 
is Not Working” (1983) 42 (2) Maryland Law Review 230-236, who presents the different factors that 
cripple adequate private enforcement by the private attorney general. 
29 The definition and description of the American class action is a compilation of different sources: R 
Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems – A Comparative Perspective (Hart Publishing, 
2004), 3; WB Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions (Eagen, West, 5th edn, December 2016 update), para 
1:1, available on WestlawNext; JM McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions: Law and Practice 
(Thomson West, 13th edn, October 2016 update), para 1:1, available on WestlawNext. 
30 We use the terms “representative plaintiff,” “class representative,” “named plaintiff,” or simply 
“representative” interchangeably.  
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and patients injured by the effects of a prescribed drug bring a lawsuit against the 
manufacturer.  
28. Usually, extensive research of specialised law firms precede the filing of a 
class action:31 these firms scrutinise the news and examine reports in search for the next 
successful case. In broad outline, law firms will look for cases involving “large-scale, 
uniform harm, preferably one in which the harm per person is too small to justify 
individual lawsuit”.32 Attorneys play a primary role in class actions not only for their 
investigative and legal skills but also for their financial support.33 Ordinarily, attorneys 
only get their investment reimbursed if the class action succeeds. This makes the business 
highly risky but the rewards for class counsels take that risk into account. The financial 
incentives built up by the procedural system push lawyers to undertake class actions. 
However, they also create potential conflicts of interest between the class and their 
attorney.  
29. Once the class action is lodged, a specific procedure tailored to multi-party 
litigation is triggered. As previously mentioned, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules on Civil 
Procedure governs cases at the federal level. This provision sets up different kinds of 
class actions according to the remedies sought,34 establishes the conditions for the group 
of claimants to proceed as a class and details the procedural specificities applicable to the 
class action.  
30. From a structural perspective, the class action is led by a representative 
plaintiff –usually selected by the class counsel– who represents similarly-situated 
members and litigates on their behalf. The representative must be a plaintiff whose factual 
and legal situation share similarities with the rest of the class. As for remaining class 
members, they are automatically bound by the court’s final judgment without 
participating in the class action. This is at odds with the procedural principle whereby a 
person cannot be bound by the outcome of proceedings in which he/she did not take part.35 
For this reason, the American class action has been highly criticised, mostly by foreign 
                                                
31 Like Milberg LLP, The Mills Law Firm or Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein. 
32 B Anderson and A Trask, The Class Action Playbook (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2012), 73. 
33 For an overview of the profession in the United States, see Subrin and Woo, supra n 11, 25-36, especially 
33-36. 
34 Under Rules 23(b)(2) and (b)(1)(A), claimants seek injunctive or declaratory relief. As for Rules 23(b)(3) 
and (b)(1)(B), they allow claims for damages. These categories are further detailed infra; III.A. 
35 WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 1:1. McLaughlin, supra n 29, para 1:1. 
  24 
legal professionals. Often, absent members ignore the existence of a class action, but their 
apathy nevertheless triggers a change in their legal position. As the saying goes, silence 
means consent. This result is quite puzzling: how could someone change his legal 
situation or be bound by a decision without lifting a finger?  
31. With this in mind, some safeguards must necessarily be put in place in order 
to protect absent class members, who will not have their day in court but will nevertheless 
be submitted to the preclusion effect of the class action judgment or settlement. This goal 
is achieved if members are offered appropriate notice and in some cases, a right to opt-
out. The rationale of the notice requirement is to inform these members about the 
existence of the class action and the legitimacy of the right to opt-out is to allow members 
to start an individual action if they want to. The opportunity to opt-out is normally 
provided when the class is not perfectly cohesive, this means that dissimilarities between 
claimants still subsist and justify the set-up of an opt-out regime. 
Finally, although a class action may theoretically end up with a court’s judgment, 
it has to be emphasised that, most of the time, parties settle.36  
1. Rationale: Judicial Efficiency and Access to Justice 
32. There are two driving forces behind the class action device: judicial efficiency 
and access to justice. To begin with, the bundling of similar claims into a single lawsuit 
spares judicial resources and thus, contributes to judicial economy. This was the 
predominant virtue attached to the class action device according to legal professionals of 
the 19th century.37  
33. Furthermore, class actions have the power to foster access to courts. Indeed, 
thanks to class actions the costs of proceedings are divided among all the members of a 
class. In light of this, it becomes interesting for small value claimants38 to litigate. Put it 
differently, class actions improve access to justice for claimants who would otherwise not 
                                                
36 See for example HM Downs, “Federal Class Actions: Diminished Protection for the Class and the Class 
and the Case for Reform” (1994) 73 Nebraska Law Review 684, who concludes that “a study of all class 
actions in the Northern District of California from 1985 to 1993 reveals that over 80% were resolved by 
settlement”; Kagan, supra n 22, 109. 
37 Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra n 24, 53; A Homburger, “Private Suits in the Public Interest in 
the United States of America” in A Homburger and H Kötz, Klagen Privater im öffentlichen Interesse, 
Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung, vol 68 (Metzner, 1975), 24. 
38 Also called negative value claimants. These are plaintiffs whose claims are worth a very small amount 
of money. 
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have access to court if they were required to litigate on an individual basis. Notably, this 
objective was at the heart of Rule 23 in its 1966 version: in Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 
the court highlighted that “the policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to 
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this 
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth 
someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor”.39 In light of this, the class action device has 
been used as a vehicle to enforce public interests and civil rights in particular. From the 
1960s onwards, class actions for injunctive relief were brought in order to impede 
desegregation practice in public schools,40 improve prisoners’ life conditions, as well as 
child welfare agencies services,41 or refrain employment discriminations.42  
Some consider that the social context of the 1960s in the United States put pressure 
on the legislative power to provide more efficient and accessible enforcement tools. This 
led the American legislator to reform the class action device in 1966.43 In particular, the 
call of the black society for more equality, the distrust of consumers in the fair and 
transparent functioning of the market, and the rise of environmental protection 
movements primarily influenced a proposal for change.44 However, the most sceptical 
declare that the reform of 1966 was essentially technical. In this vein, the objective was 
to improve the wording of the provision and clarify certain issues more than to respond 
to a social demand. As Miller states, “the draftsmen conceived the procedure’s primary 
function to be providing a mechanism for securing private remedies, rather than deterring 
public wrongs or enforcing broad social policies”.45  
34. Yet, it has to be emphasised that access to justice and judicial efficiency do 
not always go hand in hand. An uncontrolled desire to vindicate all possible claims that 
would otherwise not be litigated if they had to proceed on an individual basis can 
                                                
39 Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir 1997). 
40 See for example, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954). 
41 See for example, Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 929 F.Supp 662 (DC New York 1996). 
42 For an overview of areas where civil rights class actions were brought see J Greenberg, “Civil Rights 
Class Actions: Procedural Means of Obtaining Substance” (1997) 39 Arizona Law Review 575-586. 
43 Notably, the US legislator got rid of the three categories contained in the previous version of Rule 23 that 
were difficult to interpret and distinguish. Instead, the new provision provides a new tripartite structure that 
is still in force today. 
44 SC Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action (Yale University Press, 1987), 
240-245.  
45 AR Miller, “Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the ʽClass Action 
Problemʼ” (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review 669. 
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overburden courts and create backlogs.46 In this case, efficiency would be relatively 
diminished at the expense of other valuable cases. Citing Professor McGovern, Rabiej 
presents this problem in an illustrative and interesting way: “History teaches that when 
Rule 23 is amended to make it more efficient, more persons will participate in class 
actions. Professor Francis McGovern (…) characterizes the ironic consequence of 
enhancing a litigation procedure as the ʻfreeway effectʼ. If you build a better highway, 
more drivers will be drawn to it, creating more congestion. The analogy to automobile 
congestion is apt. If you build a better Rule 23 to make class actions more efficient, more 
litigants will be attracted to it, expanding the courts’ workloads and the judiciary’s 
administrative burdens”.47 Additionally, an enhanced access to justice could threaten 
defendants with unmeritorious claims, i. e. claims that are weak on the merits. Therefore, 
some balance between efficiency and access to justice must be achieved.  
2. Functions: Compensation and Deterrence  
35. The class action is a powerful procedural tool that forces potential wrongdoers 
to internalise the cost of their unlawful conduct. It can be said that the threat of class 
action proceedings acts as the sword of Damocles over defendants’ head. In the United 
States, the deterrence effect of class actions replaces, or at least, complements public law 
enforcement and sanctions that cannot alone discourage harmful social conducts.48 As the 
Supreme Court stated: “The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a class 
wide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government”.49 In other words, class actions impose market 
discipline.  
36. However, because class actions are frightening in terms of costs and stakes, 
some argue that they put unjustified pressure on the defendants who are “forced” to 
settle.50 In this sense, class actions may lead to blackmail settlements. This can be 
explained by the tremendous financial consequences that such actions trigger. For 
                                                
46 K Dam, “Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict of Interest” (1975) 4 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 49-54.  
47 JK Rabiej, “The Making of Class Action Rule 23 – What Were We Thinking?” (2005) 24 Mississippi 
College Law Review 327-328. 
48 WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 1:8. 
49 Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 US 326, 339 (1980). 
50 C Silver, “We’re Scared to Death: Does Class Certification Subject Defendants to Blackmail?” (2003) 
78 (4) New York Law Review 1357-1430.  
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example, the defendant is required to bear the cost of extensive discovery, he/she is 
exposed to tremendous damages, and the length of trial usually calls for an important 
investment of time and money in order to prepare a strong defence. Additionally, the opt-
out mechanism greatly increases the scope of the class, as absent members are 
automatically bound by the court’s decision. In other words, while in separate individual 
proceedings the defendant has the same at stake than each plaintiff, class actions raise the 
bet and oblige the defendant to risk a lot of money in one shot. However, others argue 
that the possibility for defendants to settle without paying punitive damages and admitting 
any liability undermines the deterrent effect of class actions.51 
In reaction to this, Judge Posner, in the leading case In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Inc., used the settlement pressure experienced by the defendant as argument in order to 
refuse the case to proceed as a class action (decertification).52 In this case, a group of 
haemophiliacs were contaminated by HIV, after using defendant’s blood supply 
previously infected by the virus. Victims brought some three hundred lawsuits –in state 
and federal courts– representing around four hundred claimants. The United States 
District Court of Northern Illinois certified a class containing a portion of the 
haemophiliacs infected by HIV. The defendant responded by writing a petition of 
mandamus53 in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner, writing for 
the majority opinion, granted the writ of mandamus and ordered the decertification of the 
class. In support of his decision, Judge Posner essentially stated that defendant facing 
class proceedings was threatened with bankruptcy, while it would not be the case if 
individual lawsuits were brought. Moreover, separate proceedings are preferable than a 
class action when defendant is faced with high value claims. The Rhone-Poulenc decision 
has been highly criticised. In our opinion, the most striking argument against the Court 
of Appeals’ reasoning is that no legal basis or precedent case law supports its theory.54 
Indeed, nothing in Rule 23 allows a court to deny certification –or decertify– a class on 
the basis that defendant is under pressure to settle.  
                                                
51 LS Mullenix, “Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action Rule” 
(2014) 64 Emory Law Journal 420-421. 
52 The class was first certified –i. e. allowed to proceed as a class– in the United States District Court of 
Northern Illinois (Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410 [DC Northern Illinois 1994]) and 
then decertified –i. e. not allowed to proceed as a class– by the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit (In 
the Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 [7th Cir 1995]). 
53 A writ of mandamus is “a writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by a lower 
court or a governmental officer or body, usu(ally) to correct a prior action or failure to act” according to 
BA Garner (ed), Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson Reuters, 9th edn, 2009). 
54 A Kanner and T Nagy, “Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New perspective on Class Action Settlements” 
(2005) 57 Baylor Law Review 687. 
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37. Compensation is the other objective of the class action. However, depending 
on the type of action, compensation is not always a priority. Typically, the function of 
class actions composed of small value claimants is to deter unlawful conducts. In these 
cases, compensation only plays a secondary role.55 Ultimately, the compensatory function 
of class actions has been called into question.56 Among other things, it is alleged that 
greedy attorneys often pocket large fees and leave class members with almost nothing. 
Unfortunately, there is few empirical research on this topic because the information is 
difficult to obtain and compile. However, a recent investigation undertaken in this field 
by Professors Fitzpatrick and Gilbert draws positive conclusions on the compensation 
role of class actions.57 The authors gathered data over 15 federal consumer class actions 
(most of them were actions for damages). In particular, they compared the average pay 
out consumers received in comparison with the amount of their damages. The results 
show that many class members received compensation representing up to 65% of their 
actual damage, which is promising. In light of this, empirical evidence demonstrates that 
“a majority of class members received a fair return on even small expected damages”.58  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 BT Fitzpatrick, “Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?” (2010) 158 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 2047. 
56 Mullenix, supra n 51, 418-420. 
57 BT Fitzpatrick and RC Gilbert, “An Empirical Look at Compensation in Consumer Class Actions”, 
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No 15-3 and Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No 
15-6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2577775.   
58 Ibid, 21. 
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II. Pre-Certification Questions 
A. Class Action and its Alternatives 
38. Once a potential class action case is identified, plaintiffs’ lawyers must first 
examine if class action is the most adequate procedural vehicle to litigate said case. The 
appropriateness of other instruments like joinder, multi-district litigation, consolidation, 
or ADR procedures should also be considered. For example, if the potential class is 
composed by less than twenty members all domiciled in the state of California, then 
joinder might appear as being the most suitable tool. Through joinder, each claimant 
keeps control over the proceedings.59 When pending trial cases present a common issue 
of fact or law, the court may discretionarily decide to consolidate suits mostly for 
efficiency purposes. For example, when the testimony of a witness is useful for various 
cases, consolidation enables the court to hear him/her only once.60 Additionally, 
consolidation is an interesting tool to avoid inconsistent judgments.61 As for Multi-district 
litigation (hereafter, MDL), it is a procedure whereby dispersed cases from different 
federal districts are transferred to a single court for pre-trial management efficiency 
purposes.62 In principle, MDL is appropriate for complex cases presenting common issues 
of fact or law. The transferee court is able to rule on questions like pre-trial discovery or 
jurisdictional issues.63  
39. Plaintiffs’ lawyers must then consider the potential use of ADR procedures 
and arbitration in particular. Recently, arbitration providers in the United States have 
reduced arbitration costs in order to make this system attractive for consumer and 
employment matters.64 In this vein, individual arbitration proceedings have gained 
advantages that now directly compete with the judicial system.65 Besides, the relatively 
                                                
59 RH Klonoff, Class Actions and Other Multi-Party Litigation in a Nutshell (Thomson West, 3rd edn, 
2007), 370. 
60 Klonoff, supra n 59, 408. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Klonoff, supra n 59, 412. 
63 Klonoff, supra n 59, 414. 
64 For example, see the fee schedule of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) included in the 
Consumer Aribtration rules, available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=latestreleased. 
65 Regarding this debate, see, among many others, ME Budnitz, “The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer 
Arbitration” (2004) 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 150-156; CR Drahozal, “Arbitration Costs and 
Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence” (2008) 41 (4) University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
813-841; T Eisenberg and E Hill, “Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical 
Comparison” (2004) Dispute Resolution Journal 44-45; MB Farmer, “Mandatory and Fair? A Better 
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recent transplant of class actions into the arbitration playfield has been hotly debated,66 
as these institutions possess different and sometimes even contradictory characteristics: 
while arbitration facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings67 the mix of class action 
with arbitration sacrifices arbitration’s informality and “makes the process slower, more 
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass”.68 A more in-depth examination 
of this topic is provided below (infra; § 188). 
40. Ordinarily, attorneys resort to class actions when a large number of victims 
share common issues of fact or law. Usually, when damages are high, a class action may 
not be appropriate because individual specificities will often predominate. Moreover, if 
stakes are high, plaintiffs could be reluctant to transfer their decisional power to a 
representative. Indeed, they often prefer to keep control over their case. 
B. Jurisdiction 
41. If the class action is the best procedural tool to “drive” the substance of the 
case, the next step consists in drafting the complaint. At this point, important questions 
arise.69 For example, lawyers must clearly delineate the scope of the class and carefully 
select the defendant(s). Additionally, they have to choose the plaintiff who will represent 
the whole class. One of the most important questions at this time of the litigation process 
and for the sake of this research project is the selection of the forum where the class action 
suit has to start. In this context, inter-state jurisdictional questions are interesting to 
                                                
System of Mandatory Arbitration” (2012) 121 Yale law Journal 2352-2360; HM Kritzer and JK Anderson, 
“The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and 
Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts” (1983) 8 (1) The Justice System Journal 6-
19; TJ St Antoine, “Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks” (2008) 41 (4) University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 790-796; DS Schwartz, “Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness” (2009) 84 
(3) Notre Dame Law Review 1247-1341; JR Sternlight, “Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?” 
(2005) 57 Stanford Law Review 1648-1658; PB Rutledge, “Whither Arbitration?” (2008) 6 The 
Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 556-560. 
66 When the Supreme Court issued the Green Tree v. Bazzle judgment (539 US 444 [2003]), many perceived 
that class actions and arbitration were compatible in the eyes of the Supreme Court. However, said Court 
later clarified its previous case law in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (563 US 333 [2011]) by explicitly 
validating the use of class action waiver clauses in consumer contracts. As a result, in an attempt to solve 
the uncertainty surrounding consumer arbitration –including class arbitration–, the Arbitration Fairness Act 
has been regularly submitted to the US Congress –the last time being in 2017. This legal text would 
essentially consist in an amendment of the Federal Arbitration Act forbidding pre-dispute agreements 
concluded with consumers.  
67 AT&T Mobility LLC, supra n 66, 334. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Anderson and Trask, supra n 32, 76-94. 
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analyse since similar problems may occur between the Member States of the European 
Union.  
42. Consequently, the next paragraphs include an excursus on US jurisdictional 
rules (infra; 1.). Then, particular questions regarding jurisdiction in class actions are 
highlighted (infra; 2.). We end up the sub-section with some comments on the Class 
Action Fairness Act (hereafter, CAFA), which partially reformed the US jurisdictional 
system (infra; 3.). 
1. A Primer on Jurisdictional Rules in the US 
43. Rules that establish jurisdiction in the United States are quite different than 
the ones available in the European Union. To start with, each State enjoys a two-tier court 
system and thus, two types of rules on allocation of jurisdiction are available: one at the 
state level and the other one at the federal level.70 This bunch of rules is not exclusive but 
concurrent.71 
44. Federal and state courts have jurisdiction over a case if they possess personal 
jurisdiction against the defendant (in personam) or his property (in rem or quasi in rem).72 
Specifically, state courts have general in personam jurisdiction over residents, people 
present in the State’s territory, as well as people who consent to the court’s jurisdictional 
power, just to mention a few connecting factors. Alternatively, a state court may have 
jurisdiction over absent defendants who have minimum contacts (long-arm statutes) with 
the territory.73 This jurisdictional power may be specific, meaning that a single act 
affecting the state can constitute a valid ground for a court to establish jurisdiction, or 
general, inasmuch as the defendant entertains systematic and continuous contacts with 
said state.74 In this case, any cause of action may be raised against the defendant. 
Furthermore, state courts might have in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the 
defendant’s property. On the one hand, in rem cases aims at determining the ownership 
                                                
70 J Fleming, GC Hazard and J Leubsdorf, Civil Procedure (Foundation Press, 5th edn, 2001), 57-60.  
71 WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 6:3. 
72 Our explanations regarding the different types of jurisdictional connecting factors (in personam, in rem 
and quasi in rem) stem from different sources: RD Freer, Civil Procedure (Wolters Kluwer, 3rd edn, 2012), 
42-49; FE Scoles et al., Conflict of laws (West Group, 3rd edn, 2000), 281-297; Subrin and Woo, supra n 
11, 71-97. 
73 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945). 
74 WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 6:26. 
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over a property erga omnes; on the other hand, in quasi in rem cases, jurisdiction is linked 
to a certain property pertaining to the defendant and the effect of a judgment is limited to 
the parties involved in the proceedings. It is important to underline that only in personam 
jurisdiction creates a personal obligation on the defendant. Conversely, the defendant’s 
liability in in rem or quasi in rem cases is limited to the property thanks to which 
jurisdiction is established. In all cases, the Due Process Clause (Fourteenth Amendment 
of the US Constitution) limits the states’ power to assert personal jurisdiction.  
45. As for federal courts, their personal jurisdiction is based on state rules on 
jurisdiction.75 This means that the federal courts of Massachusetts have to look at state 
provisions in order to examine if a Massachusetts state court could potentially have 
jurisdiction over a specific case. If the answer is yes, then federal courts have personal 
jurisdiction too.  
46. Then, state courts possess original subject matter jurisdiction over all potential 
cases.76 Specifically, this means that state courts have jurisdiction on any matter that has 
not been “taken over” by Congress. However, it is useful to mention that some specialised 
courts exist at the state level that have limited subject matter jurisdiction.  
47. As for federal courts,77 according to Article III, § 2 of the US Constitution, 
they have subject-matter jurisdiction in nine situations of which we mention the most 
important: diversity citizenship –this is when the dispute involves parties from different 
states and is worth more than $ 75.000– and the existence of a federal question –that 
refers to cases which arise under a federal statute, like securities or antitrust disputes. 
48. As far as class actions are concerned, significant questions on jurisdiction arise 
in multistate class proceedings. These are class actions involving parties from different 
states of America. However, not all situations are problematic: for example, when the 
defendant is headquartered in the state were a nationwide or single-state class action 
starts, courts will not face any particular issue in asserting jurisdiction since residence 
establishes a strong link with a state’s territory. More challenging is the situation where 
a non-resident defendant faces a nationwide class action in a given forum. As we 
explained in the above paragraphs, a state court is only able to base its jurisdictional 
                                                
75 Scoles et al., supra n 72, 316. 
76 WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 6:3. 
7777 Scoles et al., supra n 72, 320; WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 6:2 
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power on a long-arm statute. In other words, jurisdiction may only be asserted if the 
defendant has minimum contacts with said state. This type of jurisdiction may be specific 
or general. In case a specific jurisdictional power exists, it might be difficult for courts to 
acquire jurisdiction over claims that did not take place on the state’s territory and affect 
victims located in a sister-state or even abroad.  
49. For example, such a situation arose in the Daimler case,78 where Argentinean 
residents brought a class action suit in the District Court for the Northern District of 
California against DaimlerChrysler AG, located in Stuttgart (Germany). Plaintiffs alleged 
that an Argentinean subsidiary of the company violated various US laws by kidnapping, 
torturing, detaining or killing its employees during the “Dirty War” in Argentina. 
According to plaintiffs, the District Court had general jurisdiction over the defendant 
based on the Californian long-arm statute.79 To be more precise, they argued that the 
Californian subsidiary of Daimler, namely Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC incorporated in 
Delaware, distributed cars in California and hence, entertained significant contacts with 
said state. 
In this vein, general jurisdiction would allow any plaintiff to present any claim in 
the District Court of California. Along the same line of reasoning, general jurisdiction 
would also enable nationwide class actions against a non-resident defendant, supposing 
that he/she has tight contacts with said state. However, the US Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari, rejected this far-fetched interpretation, as it considered that it violated 
the Due Process Clause. Citing its previous case law, the Supreme Court explained that 
“[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) 
corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State 
are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum 
State”.80 In the case at issue, however, the Supreme Court conclude that Daimler’s 
contacts with California were too slim for general jurisdiction to be allocated to the courts 
of that state.81 
                                                
78 Daimler AG v. Bauman et al., 571 US ___ (2014). 
79 See Section 410.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
80 Daimler, supra n 78, 754. 
81 Due to the result of the Daimler case, other theories attempt to reinforce jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants for claims, which arise outside a given state territory. These are explained by WB Rubenstein, 
supra n 29, para 6:26.  
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50. Another challenging situation occurs when multistate class actions involve 
plaintiffs from different states of America. At first, it was unclear whether the criteria 
regarding personal jurisdiction over the defendant –like presence on the territory or 
minimal contacts– should equally apply to plaintiffs.82 In Shutts,83 the Supreme Court 
held that the due process protection provided to defendants should not be the same for 
plaintiffs, as the burden placed on them is not the same. For instance, contrarily to the 
plaintiff, the defendant “must generally hire counsel and travel to the forum to defend 
itself from the plaintiff's claim, or suffer a default judgment. The defendant may be forced 
to participate in extended and often costly discovery, and will be forced to respond in 
damages or to comply with some other form of remedy imposed by the court should it 
lose the suit. The defendant may also face liability for court costs and attorney’s fees”.84 
Because out-of-state absent class members do not face such a burden, they can be 
attracted in the court of another state under more lenient conditions.85  
51. Now, would the situation differ if plaintiffs located in foreign States –like in 
a Member State of the European Union– participated in an American class action? US 
courts have dealt with this particular question. Overall, the rule is as follows : if it is likely 
that the courts of the foreign State of which class members are citizens will recognise the 
US class action judgment or settlement, these members are included in the class.86 
Conversely, if the foreign courts would probably not recognise the outcome of a US class 
action, then foreign class members are excluded from class proceedings.87 Usually, the 
superiority requirement of Rule 23 is the ground defeating transnational class actions.88 
The rationale behind the above-mentioned principle is the fear to submit the defendant to 
                                                
82 BA Winters, “Jurisdiction over Unnamed Plaintiffs in Multistate Class Actions” (1985) 73 (1) California 
Law Review 181-211. 
83 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985). 
84 Ibid, 808. 
85 Scoles et al., supra n 72, 437-438; Klonoff, supra n 59, 186-189. 
86 Note that American courts use the words “recognition” and “preclusion” interchangeably, which is 
confusing since those terms refer to different concepts. However, Wasserman clarifies that US courts 
usually analyses whether a judgment or settlement wil be recognised abroad and set aside questions 
regarding their preclusive effect (R Wasserman, “Transnational Class Actions and Interjurisdictional 
Preclusion” [2011] 86 [1] Notre Dame Law Review 315-316). 
87 L Sandstrom Simard, “Foreign Citizens in Transnational Class Actions” (2011) 97 (1) Cornell Law 
Review 88. 
88 MP Murtagh, “The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Requirement and Transnational Class Actions: Excluding 
Foreign Class Members in Favor of European Remedies” (2011) 1 Hastings International and Comparative 
Law Review 6; Sandstrom Simard, supra n 87, 89. 
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re-litigation in case foreign claimants are not satisfied with the outcome of a US class 
action.89  
52. This principle has been first established in Bersch90 where a US citizen 
litigated against IOS –incorporated in Canada–, alleging that the firm violated US 
securities laws. The named plaintiff represented a class including mostly European 
litigants. The Court of Appeals ruled that “while an American court need not abstain from 
entering judgment simply because of a possibility that a foreign court may not recognize 
or enforce it, the case stands differently when this is a near certainty”.91 Here, experts’ 
reports demonstrated that a US judgment would not be recognised in England, Germany, 
Switzerland, Italy, and France, even if proper notice and the right to opt-out was sent to 
the foreign class members.  
53. Various arguments are often advanced in order to prove that Member States’ 
courts may not recognise an American judgment or settlement:92 in particular, issues 
regarding the opt-out nature of the American class action device are often raised as a 
barrier to recognition pursuant to public policy grounds.93 Then, some Member States 
submit the recognition and enforcement of class action judgments or settlements to the 
control of US courts’ jurisdictional power. However, many express that such courts might 
                                                
89 Murtagh, supra n 88, 8-9; R Mulheron, “The Recognition, and Res Judicata Effect, of a United States 
Class Actions Judgment in England: A Rebuttal of Vivendi” (2012) 75 (2) Modern Law Review 185. 
90 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2nd Cir 1975).  
91 Bersch, supra n 90, 996-997. After the Bersch judgment, the likelihood of recognition was softened: to 
be more specific, the “near certainty” requirement was replaced by a probability test. In In re Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, 242 F.R.D. 76 (DC Southern District of New York 2007), the DC 
stated that “[w]here plaintiffs are unable to show that foreign court recognition is more likely than not, this 
factor weighs against a finding of superiority and, taken in consideration with other factors, may lead to the 
exclusion of foreign claimants from the class. The closer the likelihood of non-recognition is to being a 
ʻnear certainty,ʼ the more appropriate it is for the Court to deny certification of foreign claimants” (95). 
Relying on expert declarations regarding the potential recognition of a class action judgment, the District 
Court certified a class encompassing claimants from France, England and the Netherlands (105) 
(Wasserman, supra n 86, 313-314). This approach was confirmed in In re Alstom SA Securities Litigation, 
253 F.R.D. 266 (DC Southern District of New York 2008). 
92 For an interesting analysis of the question in the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, and Germany, 
see T Arons, “Recognition of US Class Actions or Settlements in Europe” (2015) 3 European Company 
and Financial Law Review 462-487.  
93 S Bariatti, “Recognition and Enforcement in the EU of Judicial Decisions Rendered Upon Class Actions: 
The Case of U.S. and Dutch Judgments and Settlements” in F Pocar et al. (eds), Recasting Brussels I, Studi 
e Pubblicazioni della Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale 76 (CEDAM, 2012) 321-323; 
I Buschkin, “The Viability of Class Action Lawsuits in a Globalized Economy - Permitting Foreign 
Claimants to Be Members of Class Action Lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts” (2005) 90 (6) Cornell Law 
Review 1579-1580; GW Johnson, “Rule 23 and the Exclusion of Foreign Citizens as Class Members in 
U.S. Class Actions” (2012) 52 (4) Virginia Journal of International Law 971; Murtagh, supra n 88, 7-8; A 
Pinna, “Recognition and Res Judicata of US Class Action Judgments in European Legal Systems” (2008) 
1 (2) Erasmus Law Review 40-59. 
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not extend jurisdiction so as to reach European absent class members.94 At least, doubts 
are allowed. Finally, the allocation of punitive damages under the US legal system might 
threaten the recognition and enforcement of class actions judgments or settlements 
abroad.95  
2. Strategic Forum Selection and Parallel Litigation 
54. Because of the two-layered US court system, it is common that various courts 
at different levels simultaneously have jurisdiction over a similar case.96 Criteria used to 
establish jurisdiction are often elastic and let judges a discretionary margin of 
interpretation. As a result, the opportunity for “forum-shopping” in the United States is 
high. Moreover, because procedural and substantive laws are diverse, selecting the right 
forum is a fundamental strategic step. 
Depending on the nature of a case, various fora could be available to attorneys 
and victims willing to bring a class action lawsuit. Because each conflict is unique, class 
counsels have to investigate which court could best match their case. In the following 
paragraphs, we examine some of the elements guiding attorneys’ choice of forum.97 When 
two or more state courts have jurisdiction to rule on a case, attorneys will usually look at 
the political environment, the presence of judges with particular expertise, the substantive 
state law in force, and other state specificities.98  
                                                
94 S Bariatti, supra n 93, 324-325; Buschkin, supra n 93, 1579; R Mulheron, supra n 89, 197-210; A Pinna, 
supra n 93, 56-59; M Requejo Isidro and M Otero Crespo, “Collective Redress in Spain: Recognition and 
Enforcement of Class Action Judgments and Class Settlements” in D Fairgrieve and E Lein (eds), 
Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford University Press, 2012), 320-322, but see the recent 
enactement of Article 47 of the Law on International Cooperation in Civil Matters (Ley 29/2015, de 30 de 
julio, de cooperación jurídica internacional en materia civil) as well as the interesting comments of F 
Garcímartin, Reconocimiento en España de las class actions extranjeras: el nuevo artículo 47 LCJI, 
(04.09.2015) Almacén de Derecho, available at http://almacendederecho.org/reconocimiento-en-espana-
de-las-class-actions-extranjeras-el-nuevo-articulo-47-lcji/ and F Gascón Inchausti, “Reconocimiento y 
ejecución de resoluciones judiciales extranjeras en la ley de cooperación jurídica internacional en materia 
civil” (2015) 7 (2) Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional 169-170. 
95 S Bariatti, supra n 93, 323-324; Buschkin, supra n 93, 1578-1579. 
96 GP Miller, “Overlapping Class Actions” (1996) 71 New York University Law Review 527. 
97 An interesting study shows that leading arguments influencing attorneys’ choice of a particular forum 
are: the predisposition of courts to rule in favour of a party; the source of law (state or federal) supporting 
class claims; and the connection of members to a certain State (TE Willing and SR Wheatmann, “Attorney 
Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does it Make?” [2006] 81 [2] Notre Dame 
Law Review 611-612). 
98 For example, California is well known for its arsenal of provisions protecting consumers’ rights. 
Therefore, starting a class action lawsuit against a telecommunication company in this State could be a 
favourable forum, if available. Furthermore, class counsels could take advantages or avoid some important 
state specificities: for instance, Mississippi has no class action procedural rule; Illinois does not impose any 
superiority requirement for damages class actions; South Carolina does not allow negative value class 
actions; and in some States, the burden to pay costs of notice relies on defendant contrarily to federal rules. 
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55. This automatically generates questions regarding the emergence of parallel or 
duplicative proceedings. First and foremost, it has to be underlined that no statute rules 
parallel litigation. Instead, US courts have developed rather flexible instruments that 
foster coordination and coherence. In such a context, class action proceedings may 
overlap in different scenarios. 
56. In the first place, when different class actions are brought in federal courts, 
relatively effective tools enable courts to coordinate them. The most obvious one is the 
centralisation of pre-trial issues in the MDL Panel in order to avoid inconsistencies and 
waste of resources.99 In the second place, federal judges might prefer to simply coordinate 
their proceedings.100 Finally, federal courts also have the power to enjoin the start of 
parallel and overlapping proceedings in other federal courts by issuing injunctions.101  
57. However, when various class actions are pending in both, federal and state 
courts, the injunction system is limited –federal courts can only preclude the filing of 
future actions in state courts.102 Instead, federal judges may decide to stay or dismiss the 
case.103 Alternatively, removal in federal courts is another potential instrument that 
fosters centralisation of actions and hence, limits the emergence of duplicative actions.104 
As we explain below, thanks to the Class Action Fairness Act, removal is facilitated. 
Notably, evidence shows that federal and state judges sometimes use informal 
communication tools in order to coordinate their cases.105 Finally, state courts may decide 
                                                
In case a plurality of federal courts have the competence to hear the case at stake, counsels will pay special 
attention to judicial predisposition and judges’ expertise. Sometimes, attorneys may have the choice to go 
to state or federal courts according to the nature of the case. Statistically, cases remain in state courts when: 
local judges show favourable predisposition towards the attorney’s client; claims are essentially based on 
state substantive law; and a large majority of claimants reside within the territory of a single State. On the 
contrary, counsels will be inclined to shift to federal courts if they identify a judicial predisposition towards 
their client, claimants come from various States, and claims trigger federal questions of law (Anderson and 
Trask, supra n 32, 76-82; Rowe, supra n 19, 101-126; Willing and Wheatmann, supra n 97, 612-613). 
99 Manual for complex litigation (4th edn, 2004), para 20.13, 219-227, available at 
http://www.classactionlitigation.com/library/mcl4.pdf. 
100 Ibid, para 20.14, 227-228. 
101 EF Sherman, “Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation” (1987) 62 (3) Indiana Law Journal 518-527. 
102 Ibid, para 20.32, 238; Miller, supra n 96, 531-532; Sherman, supra n 101, 528-533; CA Wright and AR 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure (Wright & Miller) (Thomson Reuters West, April 2017 update), para 
4212, available on WestlawNext. The converse situation, whereby a state court would enjoin pending 
federal proceedings is unlikely to happen. 
103 Manual for complex litigation, supra n 99, para 20.32, 238-239; Miller, supra n 96, 528-529. 
104 Miller, supra n 96, 530-531. 
105 Manual for complex litigation, supra n 99, para 20.313, 235-238. 
  38 
to stay proceedings pending before them when a similar class action has started in a 
federal court.106 
58. Lastly, pending class actions in different state courts is the most interesting 
situation, as it triggers similar questions than the ones that could potentially appear 
between various EU Member States. Here, state courts may suspend proceedings when a 
sister-state court must rule on a similar case.107 Then, injunctions are also possible 
although this instrument seems to be relatively unfriendly, since it obliges out-of-state 
courts to refuse jurisdiction over a case.108 
59. In all cases, US courts can always deny certification of a class when it overlaps 
with a similar action pending in another court. This possibility is examined under the 
superiority requirement.109  
3. The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on Jurisdictional Questions 
60. The introduction of CAFA110 in 2005 altered strategies regarding forum 
selection to a certain extent. The purpose of this law is to eliminate abusive conducts 
affecting the rights of both, plaintiffs and defendants, that have been contaminating the 
class action. However, it is commonly acknowledged that CAFA is beneficial for 
defendants inasmuch as they usually prefer to go to federal courts, which are deemed to 
treat motions for certification more scrupulously.111 Thanks to CAFA a new diversity 
standard to bring class action suits in federal courts was adopted (Section 1332 of the US 
Code).  
61. Henceforth, plaintiffs’ flexibility for choosing the most favourable forum is 
limited. Indeed, this legislation gives federal courts original jurisdiction on class actions 
encompassed in its material scope. Alternatively, defendants may transfer a state class 
action to federal courts (removal) if they deem convenient. As a result, plaintiff attorneys’ 
                                                
106 Miller, supra n 96, 532-533. 
107 Ibid, 521-522. 
108 Ibid, 523-525. 
109 Sherman, supra n 102, 510-517. 
110 The full text of the Class Action Fairness Act is available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-
congress/senate-bill/5/text. 
111 Anderson and Trask, supra n 32, 104; In their study, Willing and Wheatman (supra n 97, 615-618) 
exposed that defendants’ preference for federal courts over state courts is dominantly guided by the 
following factors: attorneys and clients general preference for federal courts and the stringency according 
to which the court usually examines class certification. 
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strategies shifted with the introduction of the CAFA: prior to that, counsels were usually 
looking for the most advantageous state court –also called judicial hellholes. This gave 
rise to abuses since local courts sometimes apply the law inconsistently, tend to favour 
resident plaintiffs over out-of-state defendants, and are subject to political bias.112 
Besides, the general rules on diversity applicable at that time hindered the defendant´s 
removal of the case to federal courts because of their strict conditions:113 first, complete 
diversity was required. This means that a case might be removed to a federal court only 
if all named plaintiffs were from a different State than all the defendants. Second, the 
amount of the controversy had to be higher than 75.000 dollars per claimant. These 
conditions could be circumvented by class counsel with no particular trouble if, on the 
one hand, he/she selected a named plaintiff domiciled in the same State as the defendant 
and, on the other hand, caped the amount sought by claimants.114 In order to re-establish 
the procedural equilibrium between the parties, CAFA shifted the original jurisdiction 
rule and facilitated removal for cases entering into its material scope.  
62. Today, when a case presents diversity elements, it is foreseeable that the 
defendant will remove the case to federal courts because the conditions for removal are 
easier to fulfil. Specifically, any suit that fulfils CAFA’s requirements, but is nevertheless 
filed in state courts can be transferred to federal courts if:115 (1) the class includes at least 
100 members; (2) minimal diversity exists; (3) and, the aggregated amount in controversy 
exceeds 5 million dollars. It must be clarified that there is minimal diversity when at least 
one member of the class comes from a different State than one of the defendant. Then, 
the amount in controversy corresponds to the amount of all the claims put together. 
Additionally, Section 1146 of Title 28 of the US Code states that any defendant willing 
to remove a case to federal courts must “file in the district court of the United States for 
the district and division within which such action is pending”. This implies that plaintiffs’ 
counsel is “tied up” to the federal court of the district in which the lawsuit is originally 
brought. In light of this, when class counsel senses that the case will be removed, he/she 
should consider filing the suit directly in federal court in order to have a chance to select 
                                                
112 See the report submitted by Mr. Specter from the Committee on the Judiciary on the Class Action 
Fairness Act 2005 (02.28.2005), 4-5, available at https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/109th-
congress/senate-report/14/1. 
113 McLaughlin, supra n 29, paras 2:2 and 2:4. 
114 These strategic moves are encompassed under the concept of “artful pleading”. See A Andreeva, “Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga is Finally Over” (2005) 59 University of Miami Law 
Review 394-398; Klonoff, supra n 59, 216. 
115 Klonoff, supra n 59, 214-215. 
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the most appropriate forum.116 In this situation, attorneys will take into account the 
substantive law applicable to the case and the presence of expert judges.117 Finally, it has 
to be highlighted that CAFA sets up some exceptions to the general rule explained above, 
when the case possesses a strong connection with a given state.118 
III. Class Certification 
63. Certification is the nucleus of class action litigation.119 This step will either 
drop the class action procedure down or give a powerful leverage to the class against the 
defendant who will feel an important pressure to settle. From a procedural perspective, 
the class representative bears the burden to prove that all conditions for certification are 
met. At the federal level, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes 
common requirements that plaintiffs must fulfil if they want to proceed as a class (infra; 
B.). Depending on the type of class action (infra; A.), additional requirements must be 
fulfilled (infra; C.).  
A. The Tripartite Structure of Rule 23 
64. To begin with, Rule 23(a) sets forth four prerequisites that any potential class 
has to meet for its certification motion to be granted by a court. According to this 
provision, the class must be so numerous as to make joinder impracticable (numerosity); 
must present common issues of fact and law (commonality); be adequately represented 
by a lead plaintiff (adequacy of representation) whose claims are typical of the members 
of the class (typicality). Then, Rules 23(b)(1), (2) and (3) list three class action categories 
and their specific requirements. These class action types may be classified according to 
the remedies that they provide: first of all, injunctive or declaratory relief –Rule 23 (b)(2) 
and (b)(1)(A)– is often sought in cases involving civil rights or institutional reforms. 
                                                
116 HM Erichson, “CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers” (2008) 156 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1611. 
117 Ibid, 1612. 
118 Klonoff, supra n 59, 218-221; McLaughlin, supra n 29, para 12:6. In particular, Section 1332(d)(3) of 
the US Code states that when more than one third but less than two thirds of the class members are citizens 
of the forum state and the defendant is also domiciled in said state, then the federal court may decline 
jurisdiction after considering various factors. For example, jurisdiction might be rejected where an interstate 
interest is at stake or where the law of the state where the class action suit has been filed is the only one to 
apply to the whole class. Section 1332(d)(4) of the US Code obliges the court to decline jurisdiction in 
certain cases. Notably, when –more than two– third of the class members, as well as the primary defendants 
are domiciled in the forum state, jurisdiction has to be rejected. 
119 Klonoff, supra n 59, 136. 
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Examples of these particular suits cover discrimination or pollution allegations, and suits 
aiming at preventing some government action.120 The specificity of these class actions is 
that their priority consists in maintaining coherence in the defendant’s interest.121 As a 
consequence, if the polluting nature of a certain product used by the defendant is to be 
assessed, this question should be resolved uniformly, so that the defendant is not in the 
position of having to comply with contradictory judgments. In order to guarantee this 
consistency, class action suits under Rule 23 (b)(2) and (b)(1)(A) do not allow members 
to opt-out of the class.122 Logically, if no opt-out is possible, no notice to absent members 
is required.123 For this reason, these specific suits are called “mandatory” class actions. 
Second of all, claims seeking monetary compensation –Rule 23(b)(3) and (b)(1)(B)– 
include two different cases: on the one hand, Rule (b)(1)(B) concerns the particular 
situation in which defendant has limited funds and thus, is not able to satisfy all the class 
members’ claims.124 One can think about a defendant in situation of insolvency and whose 
assets are not sufficient to reimburse all creditors. Under normal circumstances, the first 
litigants would obtain full monetary compensation while late claimants would be left with 
nothing. As a result, the law states that no opt-out mechanism is available in order to 
protect the subsequent or late litigants from receiving no compensation at all.125 Thanks 
to the mandatory nature of the limited fund suit, a pro rata distribution among the whole 
class is possible.126 On the other hand, Rule 23 (b)(3) class actions will proceed only if 
the judge finds that common issues of fact or law predominate and that a class action is 
the superior means to solve the conflict at stake. These additional requirements elevate 
the threshold of class certification. Class actions related to mass torts, securities fraud or 
misrepresentation, financial harm in employment matters, antitrust and consumer fields 
are usually brought under the (b)(3) category. 
                                                
120 NM Pace, Class Actions in the United States of America: An Overview of the Process and the Empirical 
Literature, National Report, 9-10, available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/USA__National_Report.pdf. 
121 Ibid, 10. 
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124 The specific requirements imposed by Rule (b)(1)(B) are developed by case law (specifically, see Ortiz 
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65. It has to be underlined that these class action categories may “overlap”. For 
example, plaintiffs may seek injunctive relief –pursuant to Rule 23 (b)(2) or (b)(1)(A)– 
and compensation for their damage –according to Rule 23 (b)(3)– at the same time. In 
this case, the class action is called “hybrid” as it concerns two of the above described 
categories. Therefore, what requirements should be imposed on these actions? The 
answer is not pacific.127 However, it seems that courts usually prefer to certify the whole 
class under the (b)(1) or (b)(2) category as their requirements are not as stringent as the 
ones of (b)(3) class actions for plaintiffs.128  
B. Prerequisites under Rule 23(a) 
66. We now turn to examine in detail the requirements for certification that any 
class action must fulfil. 
67. Numerosity. Numerosity requires the class to be composed of a plurality of 
claimants. The assessment of such a condition is not mathematical, but has to be assessed 
on a case by case basis. From a quantitative point of view, no magic number acts as a 
bottom-line for certification.129 However, the opportunity for litigants to join their claims 
is a good indicator: if litigants are able to aggregate their suits through the mechanism of 
joinder, then a class action may not be indispensable in order to guarantee claimants their 
day in court. To put it differently, class certification becomes desirable if joinder is 
unmanageable –but not necessarily impossible– because of the high number of claimants. 
This will be the case if members are geographically widespread or cannot be individually 
identified without difficulty.130 Qualitatively speaking, various factual circumstances 
influence numerosity. For example, one should take into account the geographical 
dispersion of the members of the class131 or the particularly modest amount of each 
claim.132 When subclasses are set up, they must also fulfil the numerosity requirement.133  
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68. Commonality. For the commonality requirement to be satisfied, at least one 
question of fact or law must be common to the class.134 Furthermore, at least one of the 
common issues at stake must be central to the case.135 This last condition is nothing but a 
certain type of predominance.136 When cases present questions of fact and law that are 
common, then single adjudication of similar claims is preferable than a myriad of 
individual suits for judicial efficiency purposes.137  
69. One cannot approach commonality without examining the Wal-Mart v. Dukes 
decision rendered by the US Supreme Court.138 This decision concerns a class of one and 
a half million of women who alleged gender discrimination against their employer. In 
particular, the class sought injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages and back 
pay against Wal-Mart, whose local managers allegedly exercised a discretionary power 
on pay and promotion policies favouring men over women and thus, violating the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.139 In this case, the Court ruled that common questions of fact and law 
were not present. According to Justice Scalia –writing for the majority opinion–, plaintiffs 
failed in their attempt to demonstrate that Wal-Mart’s management applied a corporate 
policy generating gender discrimination.140 Indeed, claims could “stick” together only if 
plaintiffs would prove the existence of a uniform and automatic discrimination policy on 
behalf of the defendant.141 The Wal-Mart Court ruled that too many disparities were 
present in the case at stake for the class to be certified.142 
It is commonly acknowledged that the Wal-Mart decision enhanced the threshold 
of the commonality requirement: pre-Wal-Mart, this standard was easy to meet. However, 
in Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court imposed a heightened burden of proof on plaintiffs 
regarding commonality:143 in particular, the violation of a similar law provision that 
harmed members of the class is not a sufficient proof for commonality purposes.144 
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Additionally, the class must demonstrate that it suffered the same injury. This would be 
the case if the same manager imposed a discriminatory policy in a similar manner to the 
class.145 
70. Typicality. As Rule 23(a)(3) states, typicality requires the representative 
plaintiff to have claims and defences that correspond to the ones of the class, so that 
proving her case simultaneously proves the case of the entire class. However, perfect 
similarity of claims and defences is not necessary: small factual disparities or differences 
in the amount of damages claimed does not strike down typicality.146 The rationale of the 
typicality requirement is to align the interests of the named plaintiff with the ones of the 
class. Indeed, “if the representative’s case were stronger than the typical class member’s, 
it would be unfair to the defendant to generalize the class relief based on that claim; if it 
were atypically weak, it would be unfair to the class to have its fate tied to such a 
sample”.147 For example, the representative plaintiff will be atypical if unique –or 
individually targeted– defences might be raised against him.148 This could consequently 
distract the court from common and typical issues and forces named plaintiff to spend 
time on litigating its own interests rather than the ones of the entire class.149  
71. Standing to Sue and Adequacy of Representation. A plaintiff is able to 
represent the interests of a class if: (1) he/she has standing to sue; (2) he/she is a member 
of the class; and (3) he/she adequately represents absent class members. While the first 
requirement stems from Article III of the US Constitution and is a mandatory step for 
every kind of lawsuit, Rule 23(a) incorporates the last two conditions. 
72. In order to have standing to sue, the named plaintiff must first have suffered 
an injury in fact, this means a violation of a protected interest.150 Then, he/she has to show 
the causal link existing between the alleged injury and an unlawful conduct.151 Finally, a 
favourable judgment must result in redress of the injury caused to plaintiff.152 It must be 
highlighted that absent class members do not have to prove that they have standing to 
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sue.153 In light of this, contrarily to what happens in the European Union, entities such as 
consumer associations in principle cannot act on behalf of the class if they did not suffer 
any injury.154  
73. From federal Rule 23(a), it can be inferred that the potential named plaintiff 
has to be a member of the class.155 This requirement is logical since the representative 
plaintiff has to protect the interests of the class and the judgment or settlement that will 
result from his/her case will be applicable to absent members. Therefore, a certain degree 
of similarity is necessary and expressed by the condition of affiliation to the class. The 
same can be inferred from the commonality and typicality requirement.  
74. Finally, the named plaintiff must adequately represent the interests of absent 
class members. Contrarily to the commonality and typicality requirements, adequacy of 
representation is a subjective test, whereby a court examines if the representative plaintiff 
is likely to represent the interests of the class, or will rather be distracted by selfish 
concerns.156 In light of this, the court must detect if potential conflicts of interests between 
the representative and the class exist. There will generally be an inadequate representation 
when: representative plaintiff suffers from a current injury while some members of the 
class might suffer from a future injury;157 part of the class seeks enforcement of an 
agreement while some members do not want it to be enforced;158 a shareholder and 
director brings a class action on behalf of all the shareholders of a company, which 
allegedly violated federal securities laws.159  
75. Adequacy of representation plays a fundamental role within the class action 
system, as it expands the preclusion effect to absent class members which are not formally 
parties to the class action. In fact, adequate representation is a sine qua non condition for 
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class members to be bound by the outcome of the class action: indeed, because unnamed 
plaintiffs will not have their day in court, but will nevertheless be bound by the class 
judgment or settlement, due process requires that absent members are adequately 
represented and, in certain cases, that they are duly notified their right to opt-out.160  
76. Besides regulating the relationship between the named plaintiff and class 
members, adequacy of representation also mandates class counsel to be adequate. The 
rationale behind class counsel’s adequacy is that he/she represents clients who were not 
able to appoint him. Therefore, courts have to make sure that the attorney in charge of the 
class action is able to defend absent members’ interests (Rule 23(g)(4)). It is important to 
note that because class counsel represents the class, the named plaintiff cannot 
discretionarily fire class counsel and the case cannot be settled by the latter’s approval.161 
If no counsel fulfils the requirements of Rule 23(g), then the court has discretion to decide 
whether to dismiss the case or to examine whether other candidates could be fit for the 
job.162 According to Rule 23(c)(1)(B), class counsel has to be appointed at the time of the 
certification. 
77. In principle, the adequacy of class counsel is presumed. Consequently, courts 
will usually focus on the elements that could negatively put into doubts the attorney’s 
capacity to lead the class action case.163 Among other things, the counsel’s lack of 
knowledge of procedural or substantive law aspects of the case, as well as a lack of 
experience could call into question his/her adequacy. Courts will also look at the 
attorney’s resources to finance the class action, the quality of his/her briefings and the 
timeliness of motion practice, and the existence of potential ethical violations. Then, 
courts must examine if conflicts of interest affect the relationship between the class 
counsel and the class –including the named plaintiff. This will be the case if class counsel 
pretends to represent various sub-classes with different interests or works for the same 
clients in two different class suits, which enables him/her to gain experience from the first 
lawsuit at the detriment of the class. Regarding the relationship with the class 
representative, class counsel should not have any close relationship with him/her, as it 
could impede him/her to effectively monitor class counsel.  
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78. The increasing focus on class counsel’s adequacy highlights the decreasing 
practical role of the named plaintiff in the class action system. In fact, it is acknowledged 
that class counsel is the “true” representative of the class. On the contrary, it appears that 
the representative is “at best a volunteer, and at worst a solicited puppet of the class 
lawyer”.164  
C. Rule 23(b)(3) 
79. Rule 23(b)(3) regarding class actions for damages imposes two additional 
requirements for certification purposes.  
80. Predominance. The predominance requirement is neither defined by Rule 23 
nor by case law.165 As a result, courts have been applying this criterion in a different 
fashion. Overall, predominance requires courts to weigh the common issues of a dispute 
and compare them with individualised ones.166 Specifically, the assessment of 
predominance is twofold: first of all, factual predominance exists when the members of 
the class present similar evidentiary issues.167 This will not be the case if plaintiffs must 
individually prove a certain chain of causation, have to demonstrate reliance or have 
affirmative defences that differ from the rest of the class.168 Second of all, legal 
predominance will often be challenged if different state laws apply to members’ claims 
litigated in a federal court. In this situation, if the various legislations cannot be uniformly 
applied, then the predominance test fails.169  
81. Superiority. In a class action suit for damages, the court must examine if the 
class action device is the most efficient and fair procedural tool to “drive” the case. Rule 
23 establishes some elements that courts have to take into account in order to assess the 
superiority requirement. These factors are not mandatory conditions, but rather 
guidelines. To start with, courts must inquire into the individual plaintiffs’ interest to 
control litigation. Ordinarily, when the value of a claim is high, each claimant has an 
interest in litigating his/her case on a separate and independent basis –or through 
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joinder.170 On the contrary, negative value suits are usually appropriate for aggregation 
through Rule 23. The second factor establishes that the presence of parallel individual 
lawsuits challenges the superiority requirement. Indeed, if some plaintiffs decided to 
bring their own lawsuit, this means that individual proceedings might be the best way to 
litigate the case at stake.171 Then, courts must assess the appropriateness of aggregating 
claims in a single forum. For example, the geographical dispersion of claimants, evidence 
and witnesses, as well as the applicability of various state laws plead against 
superiority.172 Lastly, the manageability of a potential class action has to be explored. 
This includes difficulty to give notice, logistical problems that the application of different 
state laws may trigger, and the processing of the information for a jury trial in case there 
is one.173 
82. The application of this requirement –along with commonality and 
predominance– has been challenged with the rise of mass tort cases between the 1970s 
and the 1990s,174 which threatened courts by their magnitude. In such a context, the US 
civil justice system experienced great difficulties in finding the appropriate procedural 
tool capable to “drive” these cases to litigation. When courts faced the first class action 
mass tort suits, their reaction was somewhat sceptical. Specifically, courts denied 
certification on a regular basis arguing that mass tort litigation did not fit the class action 
device and that common issues did not predominate. Indeed, they argued that the 
individualised issues that characterized mass tort cases made it inappropriate to use Rule 
23.175 In light of this, during the first decades following the 1966 reform, mass tort cases 
where simply consolidated or aggregated for pre-trial purposes under the multi-district 
litigation mechanism. Needless to say, these two instruments were relatively inadequate 
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for mass tort litigation.176 In the 1980s, however, courts were forced to capitulate due to 
their inability to tackle the increasing number of mass tort suits.177 In light of this, 
important mass tort suits proceeded as class actions during this period. Among others, 
cases related to exposure to asbestos and Agent Orange178 were certified, as well as a 
class composed by women victims of the Dalkon Shield device. Concerned about the 
excesses generated by mass tort litigation, a complex reform of Rule 23 started at the 
beginning of the 1990s.179 Eventually, a provision for interlocutory appeal, namely Rule 
23 (f), which enables parties to contest an order granting or denying of certification was 
adopted.  
D. Settlement Classes 
83. The American system has a strong policy favouring the resolution of disputes 
through settlement, as it means savings in costs, time and judicial resources.180 The fact 
that most of class action cases settle confirms the success of such a policy goal. Besides, 
it is not uncommon that cases settle before plaintiffs even move for certification.181 In 
this context, courts have been developing a new practice: they have been certifying cases 
for settlement purposes only.  
84. The legal system contained in Rule 23 establishes a twofold regime applying 
to settlements that occur either after, or concurrently with class certification. In those 
cases, Rule 23(e) requires courts to review the parties’ agreement and examine if it is 
“fair, reasonable and adequate”. If these conditions are fulfilled, the settlement is then 
notified to absent members, disregarding the kind of lawsuit brought. Rule 23(b)(3) 
members are offered an opportunity to opt-out. It is useful to mention that when too many 
members opt-out of the settlement, then the defendant often preserves a contractual right 
to cancel the whole transaction. Indeed, closure allows the defendant to protect himself 
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against repetitive subsequent litigation. If settlement arises at the time of certification, 
then courts will usually require parties to perform a single certification and proposal of 
settlement notice. Hearings are combined as well.182 
85. In light of this, questions arise regarding settlement classes concluded before 
certification: on the one hand, one may advocate the application of Rule 23(e) to “early 
birds”. On the other hand, it could be convenient to apply the more stringent requirements 
of Rule 23(a) and (b) to certification of classes for settlement purposes. While judgments 
dealing with settlement classes firstly opted for the first approach, later case law 
challenged this solution: in In re General Motors Corp.,183 the Third Circuit held that 
settlement classes should meet Rule 23(a) conditions in order to be approved by the court. 
Moreover, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,184 the Supreme Court added that Rule 
23(b)(3) requirements –apart from manageability– should also be met by the settlement 
class.  
Certainly, the application of stringent requirements to settlement classes hinders 
the conclusion of agreements between parties. Nevertheless, we argue that the solution 
upheld by the Supreme Court is desirable as it better protects absent class members’ 
rights. The reasoning goes as follows: classes that are certified for settlements purposes 
only under lenient requirements may never be litigated if they do not fulfil Rule 23(a) 
or/and (b) conditions. If this is the case, it is doubtful that the negotiations leading to 
settlement will be held at arm’s length.185 As the defendant knows that there is no viable 
alternative to settlement, his/her power of negotiation is strengthened. In this vein, 
defendant could settle the case for peanuts. To sum up, without the threat of an actual 
class action, the playing field is not levelled and plaintiffs’ counsel may not be in a 
position to get a good deal for the whole class.  
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86. In light of this, the settlement phase is a fertile ground for collusion.186 
Specifically, collusion arises when both defendant and class counsel –sometimes named 
plaintiff is also involved– conclude a settlement favourable to them but prejudicial to 
absent class members. In practice, collusive techniques result in cheap settlements and 
protection from future potential lawsuits for defendants and high fees for class counsel.187 
Some examples of collusion practices involve reverse auctions,188 the inclusion of future 
claimants within the class,189 coupon settlements,190 and clear sailing agreements.191 
87. These types of agreements take place due to the convergence of various 
factors: first, class settlement information greatly escapes from courts’ control.192 It may 
be difficult for judges to determine if a settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate 
because this agreement is concluded under non-adversarial conditions. Furthermore, it is 
commonly acknowledged that courts have an incentive to clear their already crowded 
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dockets. In this vein, judges may be tempted to accept settlements situated on the 
borderline of fairness. Then, class counsel is able to control the negotiations as he/she 
deems fit because of the named plaintiff’s lack of incentive to monitor him/her. Most of 
the time, the cost of supervising class counsel will outweigh the value of representative 
plaintiff’s claim. Lastly, when attorneys’ fees are based on a percentage of recovery 
approach, conflicts of interest between counsel and the class may appear. In this case, 
attorneys are inclined to settle quickly in order to optimise hourly return and avoid the 
risks that an unsuccessful trial would incur.193  
IV. Post-Certification Steps 
A. Notice and Opt-Out Rights 
88. Together with opt-out rights, notice is an essential tool of the class action 
mechanism. It serves two fundamental purposes:194 first, people who do not opt-out of a 
class after having been adequately notified are presumed to consent to a court’s 
jurisdiction. Second, notice expands the res judicata effect of a judgment on all absent 
class members even though these did not participate in the trial. In this vein, the 
legitimacy of class actions rests on representation, adequate notice and the right to opt-
out. Notably, notice is required when: (1) a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3); or (2) 
a settlement has been reached.  
89. In the first place, Rule 23(c)(2) sets up a two-tiered regime for notice to absent 
class members in accordance with the type of relief sought: for (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, 
the court “may direct appropriate notice to the class”. As for (b)(3) classes, the “best 
notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all 
members who can be identified through reasonable effort” is required. It is readily 
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apparent that notice to class members pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) imposes more stringent 
requirements than for injunctive and declaratory relief or limited fund actions. That can 
be explained by the fact that (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions do not provide for an opt-out 
mechanism and therefore, the justification of notice is sensibly lessened. In this vein, 
notice to class members represents a mere occasion to monitor proceedings and assure 
adequacy of representation.195 The opportunity, the form and the content of notice in 
mandatory class action suits is left to the discretion of the court. In any event, however, 
courts rarely notify (b)(1) or (2) class members when costs outweigh its benefits.196 In 
contrast, damages class actions require that individual notice is given to identifiable 
members in order to offer them the opportunity to opt-out of the class.197 If identification 
is impossible through reasonable effort, then the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances should be delivered. This last requirement encompasses publication of 
notice in local newspapers within the geographical area of potential class members, on 
specific Internet websites, and in consumer or financial magazines.198 The content of 
notice to classes under Rule 23(b)(3) is detailed in Rule 23(c)(2)(B). Importantly, notice 
has to be written in an understandable and clear fashion for laypersons. Lastly, we 
highlight that the costs incurred by the notice requirement is in principle borne by 
plaintiffs in the two regimes explained above.199 
90. In the second place, Rule 23(e)(1)(B) states that the court must “direct notice 
in a reasonable manner” to class members that would be bound by a settlement taking 
place after certification. This provision is applicable to all categories of class actions –
(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). The Manual for Complex Litigation clarifies that settlement 
notice must be delivered in a similar way than notice for certification.200 Furthermore, 
courts may refuse to approve the settlement if parties did not offer absent members a 
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the costs on him. Typically, this will be the case if, in a consumer class action, the defendant possesses a 
register of all its customers and it would be easy for him to send them notice together with bills or other 
routine documents. However, because this practice could be prejudicial to the defendant and violate his 
rights under the First Amendment, imposing notice costs on defendant must be the utlima ratio (Manual 
for Complex Litigation, supra n 99, para 21.312, 296). 
200 Manual for Complex Litigation, supra n 99, para 21.312, 294. 
  54 
second opportunity to opt-out of the class.201 This will generally be the case when the 
information provided changed since the certification of the class and the right to opt-out 
after certification notice expired. In this case, parties should be able to reassess their desire 
to be part of the class or not.202 
B. Effect of Class Action Judgments and Settlements 
91. Among the many effects that class action judgments and settlements trigger, 
issues regarding their binding effects are the most important ones. Since the American 
system possesses flexible rules on jurisdiction that may generate parallel proceedings, 
defining the preclusive effect of judgments or settlements is vital. As we already 
mentioned, US jurisdictional rules are rather concurrent than exclusive. Questions arise 
when a party to a class action subsequently starts individual proceedings in order to defeat 
the previous ruling and obtain a different outcome. The court hearing the posterior suit 
has to examine to which extent the preclusion effect of the first class action judgment or 
settlement bars plaintiff or defendant from re-litigating a claim or issue. We will first 
comment on the preclusion effect of judgments and then we will bring up some issues 
specifically related to settlements. 
92. General theory on preclusion establishes that a court’s decision has a binding 
effect on parties.203 Consequently, these cannot re-litigate their case. The rationale of this 
solution is simple: if parties could continuously go back to court, judicial resources would 
be wasted, inconsistent judgments could be rendered and the defendant would be obliged 
to dedicate his/her time and resources to litigate the case repeatedly.204 The concept of 
preclusion has two components: first, claim preclusion –or res judicata– forbids parties 
to a judgment to engage in subsequent litigation over causes of action205 that already have 
been litigated or could have been raised in a prior judgment.206 As for issue preclusion –
                                                
201 The first opportunity to opt-out is offered when the class is certified. 
202 Manual for Complex Litigation, supra n 99, para 21.611, 312-313. 
203 Fleming, Hazard and Leubsdorf, supra n 70, 675-676. 
204 DL Bassett, “Just Go Away: Representation, Due Process, and Preclusion in Class Actions” (2009) 5 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1097. 
205 The scope of this term is difficult to frame. It can be approximated to “claim” or “demand”. The 
Restatement Second of Judgments –which is a source for interpretation published by the ALI– offers some 
guidance by stating that that the cause of action or claim “includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction” (cited by Fleming, Hazard and 
Leubsdorf, supra n 70, 687-688). 
206 Fleming, Hazard and Leubsdorf, supra n 70, 675-676. 
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or collateral estoppel–, it bars re-litigation of a case’s specific issue even if the cause of 
action is different.207 There are two different forms of collateral estoppel: it is mutual 
when parties to the second proceedings are identical and non-mutual when one of them 
did not take part in the initial lawsuit.208 In the class action context, even if absent 
members are technically not parties to a court’s judgment, they are considered as such for 
the purpose of preclusion, unless they opt-out.209 There are two ways for class members 
–who did not opt-out– to challenge the preclusive effect of a judgment: first of all, the 
lack of adequate notice neutralizes preclusion;210 second of all, class members will be 
bound only if their interests were adequately represented.211 With this in mind, we now 
turn to examine the most controversial issues presented to US courts regarding the 
preclusion effect of class action judgments. 
93. To start with, courts have been confronted with cases in which members who 
opted-out of a previous class action then tried to benefit from a favourable initial 
judgment in subsequent proceedings.212 In other words, they tried to “free-ride” on the 
class action suit. In this context, the question is whether non-parties can benefit from the 
binding effect of the class action through non-mutual collateral estoppel. Conversely, 
defendants have tried to use favourable class judgments against opt-outs on the same 
basis.213 Although the judicial trend is to reject the possibility to claim issue preclusion 
in those cases, some courts have allowed it.214  
94. Another question is whether a federal court’s denial of class certification 
constitutes a final judgment barring future class litigation in state courts. If the answer is 
negative, then plaintiff’s counsel could file various class actions in different state courts 
having jurisdiction –and there will be numerous potential fora if the case has a nationwide 
scope– until one judge finally certifies the class. This issue has been parsimoniously 
resolved by lower courts: while some of them consider that “class members” are not 
bound by a denial of certification, as they are not parties to a class, others have rejected 
                                                
207 Fleming, Hazard and Leubsdorf, supra n 70, 676. 
208 Klonoff, supra n 59, 232. 
209 Hansberry, supra n 158, 40.  
210 Klonoff, supra n 59, 229-230; Philipps Petroleum, supra n 84. 
211 Klonoff, supra n 59, 229-230. However, this author exposes that some federal courts have been reluctant 
to review state courts’ analysis of the adequacy of representation standard through collateral estoppel. 
Wright and Miller, supra n 102, para 4455. 
212 Klonoff, supra n 59, 232-233; Wright and Miller, supra n 102, para 1789. 
213 Klonoff, supra n 59, 232. 
214 Klonoff, supra n 59, 233; Wright and Miller, supra n 102, para 1789. 
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subsequent certification on grounds of comity.215 In 2011, the US Supreme Court ruled 
that a denial of certification issued by a federal court should not bar the filing of a 
subsequent class action in a state court, although the class represented and the allegations 
were the same.216 The Supreme Court concluded in this manner, since distinct procedural 
laws applied to the case. Additionally, the representative plaintiffs were not the same in 
the federal and the state class action.  
95. As far as class action settlements are concerned, two kinds of effects may 
impede relitigation: release and claim preclusion.217 Release is a contractual abandonment 
of certain claims by the parties.218 The consequence is that they cannot re-litigate them in 
subsequent proceedings. Through this mechanism, parties are able to achieve a broader 
closure than in class action judgment, since they can even agree on elements that cannot 
be litigated in court.219 When a court approves a class action settlement, it issues a 
judgment that entails a preclusion effect. In this context, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
settlement concluded at the state level that involves state and federal claims could not be 
ignored by federal courts.220 In other words, the conclusion of an agreement in state courts 
may obstruct the start of a federal class action, given its preclusion effect. 
C. Costs and Fees 
96. In the United States, the general principle regarding costs, referred to as the 
“American rule”, states that each party has to bear her own attorney’s fees.221 According 
to this principle, the winning party is only entitled to recover part of her costs –these are 
court filing fees, expert fees, and discovery costs among others– under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1).222 Contrarily to the “English rule”, under which the losing party 
has to cover the winner’s costs, the US policy over cost distribution among parties makes 
litigation more attractive for plaintiffs: even if claimants lose their case, they do not face 
the risk of having to cover their adversary’s costs. On the negative side of the balance, 
however, because counsels’ fees are particularly high in the United States, the American 
                                                
215 Anderson and Trask, supra n 32, 271-272; Klonoff, supra n 59, 237-239. 
216 Keith Smith, et al. v. Bayer Corporation, 564 US (2011). 
217 McLaughlin, supra n 29, para 6:29. 
218 Ibid. 
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220 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 US 367 (1996). 
221 SC Yeazell, Civil Procedure (Aspen Casebook Series, 8th edn, 2012), 316-317. 
222 Freer, supra n 72, 9-12, 193. 
  57 
rule might bar claimants, whose claim is strong but small, from having access to justice.223 
It must be underlined that sometimes, attorneys’ fees are paid by the defendant when a 
fee-shifting statutes exists, this is, a rule of law obliging the losing party to reimburse 
attorney’s fees to the counter-party, which is an exception to the American rule.224  
97. The class action device generates some specific issues regarding the payment 
of costs and fees: theoretically, only the representative plaintiff should be held liable to 
pay the attorney’s fees in her quality of party to the proceedings. However, one senses 
that this result would be unfair because absent class members benefit from the class 
judgment. In this context, it is reasonable to infer that they should help to finance the 
attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the common fund doctrine, which is predominantly applied 
in class actions, fixes this unsatisfactory situation. It is another exception to the American 
rule. Pursuant to this doctrine, lawyers who create a fund that benefit a group of absent 
litigants are entitled to extract a fee from it. Otherwise, third-beneficiaries would be 
unjustly enriched if they could escape from paying attorney’s fees for the work that has 
been performed.225 Another issue is the fact that absent class members cannot directly 
negotiate an agreement on fees –also called retainer agreement– like in individual 
litigation. As a result, the legislation on class action imposes on courts a duty to assess 
the reasonableness of the fees awarded to class counsel in order to protect the class 
according to Rule 23(h).226 
98. As regards the appropriate methodology to calculate fees coming from a 
common fund or otherwise, Rule 23(h) does not offer any guidance. Traditionally, two 
methods are used in order to calculate those fees: (1) the lodestar method; and (2) the 
percentage of the fund method. Under the lodestar method, attorney’s reasonable hours 
spent on the case are multiplied by an hourly rate. Then an upward or downward 
adjustment is done in order to take into account either the complexity of the case, the risks 
and the quality of the lawyer’s services or, on the contrary, the waste of time and the 
                                                
223 Kagan, supra n 22, 123, 239; Yeazell, supra n 221, 316-318. 
224 Yeazell, supra n 221, 335-336. 
225 Silberman et al., supra n 12, 1053; WB Rubenstein, supra n 29, para 15:53; McLaughlin, supra n 29, 
para 6:24; Klonoff, supra n 59, 277. 
226 Rule 23(h), which refers to Rule 54(d)(2), sets up the procedural steps regarding the allocation of 
attorney’s fees. Specifically, said provision requires class counsel to ask for fees through a motion that has 
to enunciate the provision on which the request is based; the amount sought including time records and 
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inadequacy of the documents just to mention a few factors.227 As for the percentage 
method, it attributes attorneys a percentage of the damage award. In practice, a percentage 
of 20-30% is usually acceptable depending on the specificities of the case.228  
99. Consequently, court intervention in order to control the fairness of class 
counsel’s fees limit parties’ autonomy to conclude an agreement on this matter, previous 
to litigation. In particular, it has to be highlighted that, for this very reason, contingency 
fees agreements cannot be concluded in class action cases. However, the application of 
the common fund doctrine shares many similarities with this scheme.229 In both cases, the 
principle of “no win no pay” applies. Similarly, the attorney is paid out of the parties’ 
recovery. 
100. In this section dedicated to financial aspects of class actions, a word should 
be said about punitive damages, which “provide plaintiffs in civil procedures with 
additional monetary relief beyond the value of the harm incurred”.230 This type of remedy 
is available where substantive law permits it. Typically, in personal injury cases, punitive 
damages are allowed. Their primary objective is to deter potential wrongdoers from 
violating the law.231 Conversely to what people usually think, the combination of class 
actions and punitive damages is not so common and US courts tries to limit them.232  
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V. Conclusion 
101. The first Chapter of this research project described the structure of the US 
class action, as well as the specific environment surrounding this device. In particular, 
class actions impose a certification stage that the class must win in order to proceed as 
such; the process relies on two main actors, i. e. the representative plaintiff and the class 
counsel; the device is opt-out based; the system encourages parties to settle; and strong 
financial incentives have been adopted in order to foster the private enforcement of 
collective rights. It has to be highlighted that the modern structure of the American class 
action as we know it today is the result of a long process of procedural adaptations. 
Indeed, the scope of Rule 23 has been successively expanded and restricted over decades, 
depending on social needs. 
Sometimes considered as a shining knight,233 its ability to offer a form of relief 
for the “smaller guys”234 has been welcomed. For example, the class action’s potential 
for access to justice was particularly valued at the time of the 1966 reform. Some other 
times, the class action device has been depicted as a “Frankenstein monster”235 because 
of the abuses that it generated. For example, it has been said that class actions expose 
businesses to excessive economical pressure. Coupled with mass tort cases, the device 
has dangerously overburdened courts with cases unfit to proceed as classes. This situation 
encouraged the legislator to “jump in”. As a result, Rule 23 (f) on interlocutory appeals 
was enacted. Furthermore, the entry into force of CAFA regulated coupon settlements, 
which had triggered collusive behaviours in the past. Finally, historical judgments also 
refrained the abuse of class actions like the famous Wal-Mart case.  
As we explain in Chapter II, most European collective redress schemes possess a 
relatively different structure. Our analysis in Chapter I helps us to highlight and explain 
those differences.  
102. Furthermore, this Chapter has put the spotlight on the jurisdictional 
complexities that class actions generated. The first fundamental question that US courts 
had to deal with was the extension of their jurisdictional power over absent class 
                                                
233 This wording was used by Professor Miller in one of his influential papers (see supra n 45). However, 
the author mentions that the “paternity” of this term must be attributed to Chief Judge Lumbard in the Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin decision (391 F.2d 555, 572 [2d Cir 1968], CJ Lumbard dissenting). 
234 This wording was used by Benjamin Kaplan, quoted by ME Frankel, “Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's 
Point of View” (1966) 32 Antitrust Law Journal 299. 
235 See supra n 45. 
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members. This question was solved by the Supreme Court in Shutts.236 Then, although 
the centralisation of class actions in a single forum –for example in the state of 
incorporation of the defendant– is possible, parallel litigation governs in practice. Indeed, 
forum shopping and duplicative proceedings are consequences of federalism. In this 
context, courts have developed flexible coordination tools in order to bring coherence to 
the legal system without attacking states’ sovereignty. Additionally, this Chapter 
highlighted that inter-state class actions generate jurisdictional issues too. Specifically, 
when a class action starts in a state with no general jurisdictional power, it might be 
difficult for the courts of that state to centralise claims of plaintiffs whose damage 
occurred in another state.  
The US experience regarding jurisdictional issues will inspire the construction of 
our proposal in Chapter IV. 
                                                
236 Phillips Petroleum, supra n 83. 
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CHAPTER II  
COLLECTIVE REDRESS MECHANISMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
103. Collective redress schemes in Europe take different shapes and assume 
distinct functions. Early on, Member States allowed certified entities, such as 
representative consumer associations, to bring actions for the protection of consumers’ 
general interests. Thereafter, this type of instrument crystallised in Directive 2009/22/EC 
on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests (hereafter, Directive 
2009/22/EC, or the Injunctions Directive).237 Subsequently, the rise of globalisation 
increased the international traffic and simultaneously created a fertile ground for 
widespread violations. At that time, Member States primarily perceived collective redress 
as an interesting management tool capable of tackling large-scale damages.  
104. At the European level, collective redress is perceived as a potential candidate 
to improve access to justice. As a result, the Union has tried to boost its implementation 
in Member States. Nevertheless, the prospective intervention of the EU in this matter is 
challenged: on the one hand, its competence to regulate collective redress pursuant to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union238 (hereafter, TFEU) is contested. On 
the other hand, according to collective redress opponents, the European Union has not 
demonstrated that this instrument is indispensable in order to ensure private enforcement. 
Similarly, collective redress also defies European private international law rules. 
Unfortunately, this question has not received much attention from the European Union. 
It is interesting to note that few cross-border collective claims have been registered until 
today. 
                                                
237 Directive 2009/22/EC of 23 April 2009 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests 
(codified version) [2009] OJ L110/30. Note that a former version of this Directive was adopted in 1998: 
Directive 98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests [1998] OJ 
L166/51. 
238 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47. 
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105. In light of this, Chapter II is divided into two sections: the first one 
investigates the development of collective redress schemes in the Member States (infra; 
I.). As we announced in Chapter I, the structure of European collective redress 
mechanisms should be understood in comparison with the US class action. Although 
these mechanisms greatly vary from one Member State to another, we suggest that it is 
possible to categorise them according to their common features. As a result, we have 
organised collective redress instruments into four representative categories. These 
categories will guide our private international law analysis in Chapter III. The second 
section of this Chapter provides an overview of the work that has been carried out by the 
European institutions in this field (infra; II). As we explain below, the lack of political 
consensus and the procedural complexities that collective redress generates refrained an 
incisive legislative measure. Moreover, it is not clear whether the Union has the 
competence to legislate and whether any intervention is desirable at all. In this sense, 
opponents to collective redress believe that ADR alone should be a sufficient dispute 
resolution mechanism. We thoroughly investigate these questions below.  
I. Developments of National Collective Redress Mechanisms  
106. Our research starts with general aspects of collective redress, namely the 
definition of the concept, its purposes and functions (infra; B. and C.). Then, we examine 
more detailed aspects of national collective redress mechanisms by presenting their 
common structural characteristics (infra; D.). This could be achieved thanks to an 
exhaustive timeline listing all the collective redress instruments adopted by national 
legislators until today (infra; A). Our analysis demonstrates that even though these 
instruments are heterogeneous, they share significant similarities too. We end up this 
section with a classification of collective redress instruments into four categories that 
supports and facilitates our analysis in Chapter III (infra; E.). 
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A. Chronological Overview 
107. A look at all the collective redress mechanisms adopted by Member States 
so far shows that the law-making activities regarding this procedural tool have been 
relatively constant since the end of the seventies. Besides, the following timeline reveals 
that Member States usually possess various instruments of collective redress. Although 
these legislative efforts are certainly positive, many national collective redress tools 
remain defective. In order to remedy these deficiencies, different reform processes have 
taken place since 2012. Interestingly, we observe that those reforms often follow similar 
patterns: for example, they usually extend the scope of application of collective redress,239 
include ADR mechanisms,240 and increasingly rely on opt-out based systems.241 
Furthermore, we notice that national legislators often engage in a comparative law 
exercise in order to improve their own mechanism.242  
108. Thanks to the Table below, we have elaborated the following comparative 
analysis: to begin with, we compare national collective redress instruments of Table 1 
with the US class action in order to shed light on the essential differences that separate 
both devices – we name it comparison ad extra. Then, we compare collective redress 
instruments with each other in order to extract their common features – we name it 
comparison ad intra. This exercise achieves three goals: define collective redress as 
clearly as possible, establish its essential features and build up the four predominant 
collective redress categories mentioned below (infra, E.). 
 
 
                                                
239 For example, this is the case of the French Action de groupe, whose scope has been broadened in 2016 
in order to encompass actions related to health, discrimination, environment and data protection. 
Interestingly, a reform started in Italy in 2015, whose purpose is to introduce the class action (Azione di 
classe) in the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (Articles 840-bis and ff.). 
240 This is the case of the French Action de groupe that is coupled with a mediation process and the Belgian 
Action en réparation collective that includes a negotiation phase. 
241 Typically, the Dutch WCAM procedure. Additionally, some Member States recently adopted hybrid 
systems of participation combining opt-out and opt-in mechanisms. This is the case of Belgium and the 
United Kingdom. The later adopted a collective action for competition law infringements (Section 47B of 
the Competition Act). 
242 For example, in Belgium, one of the proposals to introduce collective redress was based on the Dutch 
WCAM (S Voet, “Consumer Collective Redress in Belgium: Class Actions to the Rescue?” [2015] 16 
European Business Organization Law Review 124). 
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Table 1: List of collective redress mechanisms organised in a chronological order243 
Entry into Force Mechanism Member State 
1975  Action exercée dans l'intérêt collectif des consommateurs (FR) 
1978  Group action for the protection of general interests (FI) 
1979  Verbandsklage (AT) 
1983  § 227 Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (AT) 
1989  Acção popular (PT) 
1992     Action en représentation conjointe  (FR) 
1994  Collective action  (NL) 
1999 Verbandsklage (enactment of § 28a KSchG) (AT) 
2000  GLO and representative action (GB) 
2001   Acción colectiva para la defensa de derechos e intereses de los 
consumidores y usuarios  (ES) 
2002 Verbandsklage (DE) 
2003 Action for the protection of general consumer interests 
2003  Group proceedings (SE) 
2005  WCAM  (NL) 
2005 Action to protect consumers’ interests (IT) 
2005 KapMuG (GE) 
2007  Class Action (FI) 
2008 Class Action (BG) 
2008 Legal Services Act (DE) 
2009 § 502 Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (AT) 
2010 Azione di classe (IT) 
2010  Group proceedings (PL) 
2012 Amendment of the Azione di classe (IT) 
2012 Reform of the KapMuG (DE) 
2013  Reform of the WCAM  (NL) 
2014 Reform of the Acción colectiva (ES) 
2014 Action en cessation (BE) 
2014 Action en réparation collective (BE) 
2014 Action de groupe (FR) 
2016 Action de groupe (scope extended) (FR) 
 
                                                
243 Table 1 only encompasses collective redress instruments that are still in force today. Besides, our Table 
takes into account the last codified version of the provisions or laws that enact such instruments. For 
example, although the Action en cessation was available in Belgium before 2014, Table 1 refers to its last 
codification in the Economic Code. Furthermore, Table 1 does not take into account unaccomplished 
collective redress reforms. When a collective redress instrument was the object of many legislative 
modifications, which did not significantly alterated its substance (such as the German Verbandsklage), we 
did not mention it in Table 1, since it would be burdensome and would not provide relevant information 
regarding the evolution of the collective redress action in question. For more information regarding our 
methodology, see our explanations in Annex II. 
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B. Collective Redress: A Concept with Fuzzy Boundaries 
109. Logically, this Chapter should start by definining collective redress. 
However, collective redress is a concept whose boundaries are fuzzy. Both, scholars244 
and European institutions, have given different meanings and shapes to this device.  
In particular, the European Union’s definition of collective redress has been 
evolving over time. In a Public Consultation paper of 2011,245 the Commission primarily 
adopted a relatively broad definition of collective redress, which included very different 
models. According to this document, collective redress is defined as a “broad concept 
encompassing any mechanism that may accomplish the cessation or prevention of 
unlawful business practices which affect a multitude of claimants or the compensation 
for the harm caused by such practices. There are two main forms of collective redress: by 
way of injunctive relief, claimants seek to stop the continuation of illegal behaviour; by 
way of compensatory relief, they seek damages for the harm caused. Collective redress 
procedures can take a variety of forms, including out-of-court mechanisms for dispute 
resolution or, the entrustment of public or other representative entities with the 
enforcement of collective claims”.246 According to Hess, this “umbrella definition” 
covers many different types of collective redress instruments like group litigation, model 
case-litigation, actions brought by ombudsmen or consumer organisations, collective 
settlement based on opt-out mechanisms, skimming-off actions and injunctions against 
unlawful practices.247  
                                                
244 For example, D Fairgrieve and G Howells, “Collective Redress Procedures: European Debates” in D 
Fairgrieve and E Lein (eds), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford University Press, 2012) 17-
18 reserve the term “class action” for the US device and distinguish between group actions and collective 
redress depending on their function: while the first is a mere management tool, the second possesses 
regulatory powers; As for C Hodges, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal 
Systems, Studies of the Oxford Institue of European and Comparative Law vol 8 (Hart Publishng, 2008), 3 
he includes ADR mechanisms into the concept of “collective redress”; CI Nagy, “Comparative Collective 
Redress from a Law and Economics Perspective: Without Risk There is no Reward!” (2013) 19 (3) 
Columbia Journal of European Law 470 uses the terms “class action” “group proceedings”, “collective 
proceedings or actions” and “collective redress” interchangeably; Finally, A Nuyts, “The Consolidation of 
Collective Claims Under Brussels I” in A Nuyts and NE Hatzimihail (eds), Cross-Border Class Actions: 
The European Way (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2014) 69 makes a difference between “group 
actions”, whereby a number of claimants aggregate their claims in one proceedings, “representative 
actions” that involve the intervention of a representative entity and the “class action” model where a 
claimant act on behalf of a group of victims. 
245 European Commission, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress SEC(2011) 173 final. 
246 Ibid, 3. 
247 B Hess, “Collective Redress and the Jurisdictional Model of the Brussels I Regulation” in Nuyts and 
Hatzimihail, supra n 244, 59. 
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Two years later, however, the Commission released its Recommendations on 
common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the 
Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law.248 In this 
document, it sharpened its previous definition of collective redress by excluding some 
mechanisms from its scope.249 Interestingly, Hodges noted a change of terms since the 
start of debates regarding collective redress: indeed, the EU would have purposely 
embraced the notion of collective redress in order to distinguish this procedural tool from 
US class actions.250  
110. As for Member States, they have often implemented collective redress 
mechanisms under imprecise labels. This certainly adds greater difficulties to this already 
complex landscape: for example, the Spanish legislator created a collective redress 
system named class actions (acciones colectivas) but this mechanism does not permit one 
claimant to sue on behalf of a group like in the US class action. Similarly, the French 
group action (action de groupe) does not allow a group of victims to sue on behalf of 
similarly situated persons. In fact, only accredited associations have standing to sue under 
this scheme.  
111. In case the European Union plans to regulate collective redress, a clearer 
frame would have to be adopted for this concept, depending on the scheme(s) the Union 
wishes to promote. For the sake of this section, our objective is to provide an exhaustive 
overview of the existing collective redress mechanisms in the EU. This justifies the 
adoption of a broad definition. Accordingly, this work covers all instruments which aim 
at bundling various individual and homogeneous rights, as well as tools which permit the 
defence of general interests. Furthermore, this concept embraces both claims for 
injunctive and compensatory relief. This notion will be more strictly delimited once our 
analysis of national instruments is done. Such delineation is carried out in Chapter IV 
(infra; Chapter IV, II.) 
                                                
248 European Commission, Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted 
under Union Law [2013] OJ L201/60. 
249 This point is discussed in detail later in this Chapter (infra; II.B.2.b.). 
250 C Hodges, “Collective Redress: A Breakthrough or a Damp Squib?” (2014) 37 Journal of Consumer 
Policy 72. 
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C. Goals and Functions of Collective Redress 
112. As mentioned earlier in this work, the modern version of the US class action 
was adopted for both management and access to justice considerations. Its objective is to 
offer compensation and deter prospective unlawful behaviours. We also highlighted that 
these goals and functions are not static: they might vary according to policy objectives or 
the nature of the actions brought (supra; §§ 32-37) in the European continent, although 
the categories representing the goals and functions of collective redress are essentially the 
same, the landscape is sketchier.  
113. To start with, the reliance on litigation as an enforcement tool is not uniform 
among the Member States. Indeed, some of them rely much more on public authorities in 
order to protect certain interests, which transcend the mere individual sphere.251 To the 
extent that some call into question the necessity of collective redress instruments where 
efficient public enforcement prevail.252 However, some influent scholars have 
demonstrated that private and public enforcement are useful complements rather than 
alternatives. For the sake of this research project, and since this debate is not closed yet, 
we assume that the development of both disciplines is not mutually exclusive. 
114. Turning to the the function of collective redress instruments in the EU, it 
often consists in providing access to justice. This trend is also reflected at the European 
level. For example, in a Communication of 2013, the European Commission 
acknowledged that “whereas it is the core task of public enforcement to apply EU law in 
the public interest and impose sanctions on infringers to punish them and to deter them 
from committing future infringements, private collective redress is seen primarily as an 
instrument to provide those affected by infringements with access to justice”.253 In other 
words, the Commission attributes different policy goals to public and private 
enforcement. This situation differs from the US, where the class action is able to generate 
access to justice and deterrence at the same time.  
                                                
251 This is the case of Nordic States for example. 
252 C Hodges, “Collectivism: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Public and Private Models for Regulating 
Consumer Protection” in van Boom and Loos, supra n 289, 218-219. 
253 European Commission, Communication: Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective 
Redress COM(2013) 401 final, 10. 
  68 
115. At the national level, from the 1970s until the 1990s, Member States 
essentially drafted collective redress mechanisms that were capable of protecting 
consumer interests at large. These interests, which we will refer to as “general interests” 
for the sake of this research project, cannot be individualised.254 The procedural tools 
drafted by Member States mainly consisted in actions for injunctive relief and standing 
to sue was mainly attributed to either, consumer associations or public bodies.255 
According to Garth and Cappelletti, the enactment of such instruments was part of a 
movement towards access to justice.256 Today, access to justice is still an argument that 
motivates national legislators to adopt collective redress instruments. This is especially 
true where small-value claims are involved.257  
Thereafter, however, many Member States adopted collective redress actions for 
damages in order to tackle the rise of mass damages. For example in Germany, the 
KapMuG was adopted after the Telekom case;258 the Spanish collective redress scheme 
followed the rapeseed oil scandal;259 the Italian class action appeared after the Parmalat 
case;260 and the DES case is at the origin of the adoption of an out-of-court collective 
redress procedure in the Netherlands.261 Therefore, it appears that collective redress 
actions for damages were primarily considered as a case-management tool and access to 
justice seem to have played a secondary role, at least in those Member States.  
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116. As regards the goals of national collective redress mechanisms, they depend 
on the protected interests. For example, an instrument that aims at protecting the general 
interests of consumers at large –such as air pollution or the presence of unfair terms in a 
trader’s Terms and Conditions– would probably pursue an objective of deterrence more 
than compensation. This is easily understandable since in those cases, the harm can hardly 
ever be individualised. However, the Evaluation Study on the effectiveness and efficiency 
of collective redress mechanisms in the European Union262 acknowledges that the 
potential deterrent effect of collective redress actions is limited, especially where 
instruments lack efficiency or where damages awarded do not correspond to the illegal 
gain obtained by a given wrongdoer.  
Therefore, some mechanisms aim at compensating victims for their damage. In 
our opinion, the English Group Litigation Order –hereafter, GLO– and the German 
KapMuG fall under this category. Both instruments allow individual claimants to record 
their claims in a register. Then, a court rules on the common issues that those cases entail. 
Once this task is done, individual proceedings continue independently. Nevertheless, it is 
hard to clearly delineate whether a given mechanism pursues one goal or the other, given 
that a nothing impedes collective redress schemes to pursue both objectives 
simultaneously. 
D. Structural Aspects 
117. This sub-section studies the structural characteristics of national collective 
redress mechanisms pursuant to the following parameters: participation (infra; 1.), 
standing to sue (infra; 2.), certification criteria (infra; 3.), costs and financing (infra; 4.) 
and the role of ADR (infra; 5.). As our research shows, collective redress does not 
resemble the US class action. Most of the time, Member States have equipped their device 
with structural features, which are poles apart from its American counterpart. 
Unfortunately, these choices have led to efficiency problems that national legislators 
gradually solve through reforms. In this sense, the process of evaluation and corrections 
of collective redress’ weaknesses through reforms resembles what the American 
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legislator has done in order to reach a certain equilibrium between access to justice and 
procedural efficiency, without hindering the rights of the defence.  
1. Participation: Opt-In, Opt-Out and Automatic Membership 
118. Under the opt-in system, victims have to manifest themselves if they wish to 
be bound by a collective decision or a settlement.263 Despite that, opt-in participants do 
usually not technically become parties to the proceedings.264 The opt-in system has the 
advantage to respect parties’ willingness to sue and makes the size of the collective claim 
foreseeable for the defendant.265  
Nevertheless, opt-in collective actions might not include all victims and thus, the 
exposure of the defendant could dramatically shrink.266 Another negative aspect of the 
opt-in regime is that it implies an important investment of financial and administrative 
resources in order to spot potential victims and organise the group.267 Similarly, this 
system creates an additional burden for courts that have to take all individual aspects of 
the claims into account.268 Besides, it is unsure that the participative attitude required by 
an opt-in system remains efficient where psychological and economic barriers refrain 
victims from manifesting themselves and becoming part of the collective proceedings. In 
this sense, an opt-in based instrument might not sufficiently promote access to justice.269  
The Consumer Association v JJB Sports PLC270 case, illustrates the shortcomings 
of an opt-in collective action. The facts can be summarised as follows: in 2007, the British 
consumer association Which? sued JJB Sports under Section 47B of the Competition Act 
1998. The original version of this provision states that a specified body may bring an 
action before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, which comprises consumer claims filed 
or continued on behalf of at least two individuals.271 In order to be included in the 
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proceedings, victims must opt-in. In the case at stake, the lawsuit brought by Which? 
followed a sanction imposed by the Office Fair Trading, which fined several companies 
who entered into price-fixing agreements. Due to this unlawful practice, the consumer 
association estimates that around one million replica football T-shirts were sold at an 
artificially high price.272 In January 2008, judicial proceedings came to a stall when 
parties reached a settlement, whereby the defendant would pay “damages to affected 
consumers of between £5 and £20 per shirt”.273 The settlement was concluded on behalf 
of only 130 victims.274 Due to the difficulties to gather victims and the costs relating 
thereto, this claim is the only one that has been brought so far under Section 47B of the 
Competition Act 1998.275 Today, many collective redress schemes follow the opt-in 
approach. 
119. As for the automatic membership model, it establishes that members are 
encompassed in the collective action without any possibility to get excluded. The 
American experience shows that the interest of the defendant not to have to comply with 
potentially contradictory decisions dictates such a system. In Europe, automatic 
membership applies predominantly when a general interest is at stake. For example, this 
is typically the case when an environmental organisation initiates proceedings against an 
industrial company whose activities pollute the air of a given geographical area. In this 
context, an action seeking injunctive relief would usually not allow consumers either to 
opt-in or to opt-out.276 However, if the organisation wins the case, all people living in the 
polluted area would benefit from this judgment.  
120. Lastly, according to the opt-out system, people are included in a collective 
action, unless they manifest their intention not to be bound by the decision or the 
settlement. Although this system is feared by some, because of its potentially 
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unconstitutional character and the abuses it may trigger,277 quite a few Member States 
have adopted an opt-out regime, i. e. Bulgaria, The Netherlands, and Portugal. Others 
have implemented an innovative solution whereby opt-in and opt-out participation 
schemes coexist (hybrid system). For example, in Norway, Section 35-7 of the Dispute 
Act 2005 states that opt-out proceedings may be ordered by the court where “amounts or 
interests (…) are so small that it must be assumed that a considerable majority of them 
would not be brought as individual actions” and the claims “are not deemed to raise issues 
that need to be heard individually”. The rationale is to offer access to justice to victims 
when an opt-out collective action is the only available means to obtain redress. Similarly, 
Belgium, Denmark and Norway have adopted a hybrid system but different criteria apply 
in order to determine whether courts should let the action proceed under the opt-in or opt-
out regime. In these States, however, no abusive litigation or harm to businesses has been 
registered.278 This certainly demonstrates that an opt-out regime by itself cannot trigger 
abusive litigation. In reality, abuses stem from other elements of the legal environment 
like attractive rules on costs and funding, as well as the presence of favourable substantive 
laws.279  
121. One of the potentially problematic elements of the opt-out model is that it 
contradicts the right to be heard, given that absent members of a collective action would 
eventually be bound by a decision without having participated in the proceedings.280 This 
argument is partially true: indeed, if absent victims are adequately notified and thus, are 
offered an opportunity either to intervene or to get out of the collective action, then we 
argue that their right to be heard is preserved. In this vein, Ervo makes an interesting 
remark: she states that an opt-out system coupled with adequate notification better 
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respects the right to be heard than a collective redress judgment that would only bind opt-
in members but could nevertheless create a precedent or be used as evidence in future 
proceedings.281 Moreover, when the conflict involves small-value claims, the opt-out 
nature of the system cannot take away the right to be heard, since the alternative to 
collective proceedings would be no day in court at all.282  
Similarly, the opt-out regime is meant to infringe the right of disposal, given that 
members are dragged into collective proceedings.283 As adequate notice and opt-out 
provide an “exit door”, this argument cannot be validly accepted. Taken seriously, this 
would also mean that automatic membership violates the right of disposal, as well as the 
right to be heard. However, this model is permitted in the European Union.  
On the positive side of the balance, an opt-out regime offers access to justice to 
small-value claimants and fights against rational apathy.284 Thanks to this mechanism, 
victims’ negotiation power is enhanced. Furthermore, opt-out collective redress allows 
defendants to obtain closure and avoid the cost of litigating the same cases several times 
in distinct locations.285  
122. These participation schemes generate various issues from a civil procedure 
perspective: to start with, the status of absent parties is unclear. Sometimes they are 
considered as parties to the proceedings –this entails the respect of certain procedural 
rights, like the right to present evidence –, and sometimes they are not qualified as such. 
For example, under the Italian azione di classe that is based on an opt-in system, absent 
members do not have the right to participate in collective proceedings or to intervene.286 
Their role is purely passive. Interestingly, in Sweden, although absent members are not 
parties to collective proceedings, they may de facto be considered as such under certain 
circumstances: for example, this will be the case for questions related to lis pendens, 
joinder –of pending cases or other related group actions–, rules on evidence, and other 
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matters submitted to general rules of civil procedure.287 An absent member can also 
intervene and exercise the right to appeal. The second issue concerns res judicata. In 
principle, res judicata only binds parties to the proceedings. However, in collective 
redress proceedings, the judgment or the settlement covers absent members, who are not 
parties. The American experience has shown that admitting an ultra partes effect 
challenged the traditional rules of civil procedure. 
2. Standing to Sue 
123. Under traditional litigation standards, the question of who should have 
standing to sue is relatively straightforward, since the holders of the rights and obligations 
usually are also the parties to the proceedings. Nowadays, however, modern society has 
to face new situations, which challenge the institution of standing to sue: the first case 
refers to violations that affect numerous victims individually, and the second one 
concerns harms to general interests, which affect a community and cannot be 
individualised. Because these types of damages go beyond a single person’s harm, one 
may wonder who should have standing to sue in order to obtain redress. The United States 
and Member States of the European Union have built up different rules on standing to sue 
in response to this problem.  
124. In the United States, Rule 23 allocates standing to any party of the class who 
has standing to sue and adequately represents absent class members. In this case, the 
representative plaintiff litigates in his own name as regards his personal claim, but on 
behalf of absent class members. In some cases, when some sub-classes must be formed 
in order to ensure that all victims are represented, various plaintiffs can take the role of 
representative. On the contrary, associations only have standing to sue when they seek 
the enforcement of its members’ rights.  
125. In many Member States in Europe, however, individuals do not have 
standing to sue in collective redress actions. They usually impose strict criteria on 
standing and reserve it to specific entities. Most of the time, these entities have not 
suffered any damage and thus, do not have any claim against the defendant. However, 
national provisions on standing to sue are quite heterogeneous: some countries allocate 
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standing to individuals; others reserve it to specific private entities such as consumer 
associations; and some only make it possible for public authorities to bring collective 
actions. It is worth mentioning that the test case model that is described below (infra; 
E.3.) does not use any intermediary or representative claimant. Therefore, the comments 
we make here are not applicable to this model, which resembles more joinder than class 
action. 
126. The allocation of standing to sue to a great range of actors, including 
individuals, is a policy choice that favours access to justice. Indeed, the probability that 
one of these actors decides to sue is bigger than if standing is limited to a reduced group 
of players. This decision also hinges on the interests that are to be protected. However, 
there might be some practical obstacles to the actual use of standing to sue. Continuously, 
we present three models that have been widely adopted in Member States, and we detail 
the kind of drawbacks that each of these actors may face.  
127. First of all, some Member States have given individuals standing to sue in 
collective proceedings, on the model of the US class action. As we mentioned earlier, this 
solution fosters access to justice, as any victim has the right to initiate a collective action. 
For example, Article 140-bis of the Italian consumer code states that consumers and users 
have the power to bring collective actions in order to defend homogeneous individual 
rights. They can also mandate an association to litigate on their behalf. In practice, 
however, no individual usually takes the lead to initiate collective proceedings. This can 
be explained by the enormous financial risks that the representative faces: indeed, in case 
the claimant loses at trial, the loser-pays principle would make them liable to reimburse 
the defendant’s costs.288  
In this context, if the representative claimant does not benefit from a financial 
incentive, like a risk premium, it is unlikely that he/she would litigate. Besides, because 
other victims prefer to free-ride on the actions of a representative claimant, then 
everybody may wait for others to act. This creates a situation of apathy that eventually 
leads to no litigation at all. This is particularly obvious in an action for injunctive relief: 
imagine that a neighbour initiates proceedings against an industrial firm that pollutes the 
air and creates a danger for people’s health. If the judge condemns this firm to reduce 
contamination, then this is beneficial for all the neighbours who were suffering from this 
                                                
288 R Mulheron, supra n 29, 437-438. 
  76 
unlawful conduct. However, the claimant is the only one who faces the cost of litigation 
and the risk to lose at trial. This situation could for example be remedied if a financial 
incentive were offered to the claimant, given that his/her active attitude would benefit a 
large number of people.  
128. Second of all, entities such as consumer associations play an important role 
for consumer protection. Hence, many Member States allocate them standing to sue in 
order to defend consumers’ interests. For instance, consumer associations are particularly 
valuable actors in cases involving small-value claims, given the predominance of rational 
apathy.289 However, these entities usually have to comply with strict requirements in 
order to benefit from standing to sue in a collective redress action. Such requirements 
may hinder access to court to consumer associations, but they allow the legislator to 
control the flow of claimants willing to start judicial proceedings. This may equally 
constitute a shield against abusive litigation.  
For example, article R.811-1 to 7 of the French Consumer Code (hereafter, FCC) 
establishes the conditions that consumer associations must fulfil in order to be able to 
start collective proceedings (certified entities). According to this provision and in order 
to be certified, an association must have a year of existence; have no professional activity; 
actively defend consumer interests; and be representative –this is measured according to 
the number of affiliated consumers. On its website,290 the National Institute of Consumers 
(Institut National de la Consommation) informs that currently 15 consumer associations 
are accredited at the national level. In our opinion, this number is quite low for a territory 
as big as France. In light of these considerations, it can be inferred that, in France, 
litigation is reserved to relatively big and experienced associations. In particular, ad hoc 
entities cannot be built up for the purpose of initiating collective proceedings, given that 
a year of existence is required. Some additional obstacles may indirectly influence the 
effective exercise of standing to sue. These obstacles are essentially financing, access to 
information, and gathering potential participants in an opt-in based collective action. 
While questions of financing are dealt with below, the next lines focus on information 
and gathering of participants.  
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Because consumer associations do not suffer any damage, victims must 
collaborate and provide them with relevant information about their harm. In competition 
law, this problem is even more serious as the information is usually retained by the alleged 
wrongdoer and consumer associations have limited access to evidence.291 Therefore, the 
building up of arguments and gathering of evidence might be complex. As regards 
grouping of potential participants, the French joined representative action (action en 
representation conjointe) can be taken as an example: pursuant to Article L.622-1 to 4 of 
the Consumer Code, two or more consumers can mandate an accredited association to 
commence proceedings on their behalf. Therefore, this specific collective action is based 
on the opt-in system. However, under this particular scheme, the consumer association 
can only attract other potential participants through the written press. No other advertising 
means are permitted by French law. As a result, the absence of adequate means to capture 
opt-in claimants is one of the causes that explains the inefficiency of the joined 
representative action. Some studies affirm that this procedural tool was used five times in 
ten years of existence.292 In light of these considerations, the French legislator decided to 
adopt a group action (action de groupe) that aims at overcoming these difficulties.  
129. Third of all, some Member States give public authorities the power to bring 
collective redress actions. This is the case of the Nordic countries and can be explained 
by the traditional importance of public authorities in solving consumer disputes.293 In 
particular, Section 6 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act of 2002 enables a public 
authority –basically, the Consumer Ombudsman and the Environmental Protection 
Agency– to initiate a collective action on behalf of consumers. The mechanism is based 
on the opt-in system and either injunctive relief or compensatory damages can be sought. 
In Norway, public authorities are also attributed standing to sue on top of individuals and 
private organisations or associations. As regards Finland, the Consumer Ombudsman has 
the exclusive right to bring collective proceedings on an opt-in basis. Thanks to this 
restrictive scope of standing, the government wants to avoid abuses of the collective 
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action.294 Nevertheless, it must be highlighted that no group action has been registered in 
Finland. The reasons for this are unclear: while some argue that the threshold for bringing 
this type of action is too high, others explain that the presence of a group action within 
the Finnish legal order has a powerful deterrent effect, hence the absence of cases.295 The 
potential problems with the attribution of standing to sue to public authorities are their 
lack of expertise with litigation and their possible acquaintances with political powers.296 
3. Certification Criteria 
130. Generally speaking, Member States do not enjoin certification criteria to 
their collective redress mechanisms. Most of them are not familiar with numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, superiority and adequacy of representation. However, their 
unfamiliarity is not absolute: indeed, some Member States adopted certification criteria 
that look like the ones contained in Rule 23. The most striking example is perhaps the 
case of Nordic countries, which “mimic” most of the certification conditions of Rule 
23.297 To be fair, it has to be highlighted that, although many Member States have not 
adopted specific certification criteria, most of them do require a certain degree of 
commonality between class members’ claims. For example, in Italy, the legislator 
explicitly requires claimants to possess homogeneous rights in order to proceed as a 
class.298 In Germany, pursuant to the KapMuG, a higher court has the ability to rule on 
common issues of fact or law. 
131. Then, it has to be pointed out that adequacy of representation is usually not 
a flexible condition. The criteria that serve to assess the representative nature of a given 
claimant are rather static –in the sense that it is allocated by the law, disregarding the 
nature of the dispute. Therefore, this result departs from the American solution. The only 
counter-example may be found in the Netherlands, where Article 7:907(3)(f) of the Ducth 
Civil Law Code states that the court may call into question the validity of a collective 
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settlement if “the foundations or associations (…) are not sufficiently representative with 
regard to the interests of persons on whose behalf the agreement has been concluded”. 
4. Costs and Financing  
132. In the previous Chapter, we explained the financial aspects surrounding the 
American class action device. In this context, it should be highlighted that the common 
fund doctrine helps the class to finance class actions, given that it makes the financial 
burden fall back into the class counsel. Additionally, the “American rule” regarding costs 
applies. Besides, we observed the fundamental role of judges in assessing the 
reasonableness of attorneys’ fees. Taken together, these factors provide significant 
incentives for parties to litigate. Furthermore, the litigation culture, coupled with high 
financial stakes sometimes leads parties to collude.  
133. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, things are different: to start with, 
there is no adversarial legalism –at least not as it stands in the US– and a large number of 
Member States forbid contingency fee agreements and limit third-party funding. 
Moreover, punitive damages are not available and the loser-pays principle is the 
predominant rule regarding costs.299 These legislative choices significantly limit 
incentives to sue and thus, may affect the effectiveness of collective redress mechanisms. 
This is quite unfortunate, given that appropriate pecuniary incentives have the power to 
fight rational apathy and foster access to justice.300 In any case, it is important to strike 
the right balance between the protection of the defendant from blackmail or unmeritorious 
claims on the one hand, and proper financial incentives to sue on the other. In principle, 
national legislations on collective redress do not contain any provision regarding costs 
and funding. Hence, most of the time, general rules of civil procedure apply. This means 
that a large majority of collective redress schemes follow the loser-pays principle.  
134. The loser-pays rule –also called cost-shifting or the English rule– on costs is 
a cardinal principle of civil litigation in Europe. According to this concept, the losing 
                                                
299 C Hodges et al., The Costs and Funding of Civil Litigation – A Comparative Perspective (Hart/CH Beck, 
2010), 17, 25-27. 
300 L Visscher and T Schepens, “A Law and Economics Approach to Cost Shifting, Fee Arrangements, and 
Legal Expense Insurance” in M Tuil and L Visscher (eds), New Trends in Financing Civil Litigation in 
Europe – A Legal, Empirical, and Economic Analysis (Edward Elgar, 2010), 8-9. 
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party has to reimburse the recoverable costs of the winning counterpart.301 Even though 
this principle represents a shield against unmeritorious claims, it may equally act as a 
disincentive to litigate, given that the financial risk is higher.302 As a result, some Member 
States soften the loser-pays rule in specific circumstances. For example, under the 
Portuguese popular action scheme, the representative claimant does not bear any costs if 
the case is –partially– successful.303 If the claimant loses at trial, it only bears between 10 
and 50% of the defendant’s costs. The judge has discretionary power to rule on this 
matter. It should be emphasized that the intermediary involved in collective proceedings 
is usually the only person liable to for costs.304 In a few Member States, however, costs 
are divided among all the members of the collective suit.305 This is the case for 
instruments which require the active participation of the members (opt-in) or their 
inscription in a register, like in Germany and England. 
135. Notably, we have found evidence that the claimant usually has to bear the 
costs related to notification about the existence of collective redress proceedings, as well 
as the right to opt-in or out. However, it is possible to recover those costs in case the 
claimant succeeds in court. For example, Article 695 and 696 of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure states that the expenses generated by the notification of acts abroad are 
recoverable by the winner. However, this means that in a collective redress action, the 
consumer association must take into account that such costs may not be covered by the 
defendant. Similarly, although Article 15 of the Spanish Law on Procedure does not 
mention it, the costs to advertise the existence of the collective redress action fall on the 
claimant. In this case too, costs of notification are recoverable if the claimant wins in 
court (Article 241(1)(2) of the Spanish Law on Civil Procedure).306 
                                                
301 These costs usually encompass court costs, witness and expert related expenses, and lawyers’ fees (C 
Hodges et al., supra n 299, 18). 
302 BEUC, Litigation Funding in Relation to the Establishment of a European Mechanism of Collective 
Redress (February 2012), part IV, available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2012-00074-01-e.pdf; L 
Visscher and T Schepens, supra n 300, 13-14; S Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004) 429. 
303 Article 20 of the Law nº 83/95 of 31 August. 
304 European Commission, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress supra n 262, 
65; R Mulheron, Costs and Funding of Collective Actions – Realities and Possibilities, Research paper for 
submission to the European Consumers’ Organisation (BEUC) (February 2011), 84-89. 
305 European Commission, Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress supra n 262, 
65. 
306 F Gascón Inchausti, Acciones colectivas e inhibitorias para la protección de los consumidores en el 
proceso civil español: el papel de las asociaciones de consumidores (2005), 17, available at 
http://eprints.ucm.es/. 
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136. As far as funding is concerned, there are various methods to finance litigation 
in Europe –including collective suits.307 The accessibility to these funding mechanisms 
may overcome restrictive rules on costs and immunise the claimant against financial risks. 
However, Member States seem to be reluctant to fully liberalise the market of litigation 
financing. Besides, they have taken different approaches towards the regulation of this 
particular matter. Nevertheless, the rest of this section attempts to provide a general 
overview of the available funding mechanisms in the EU. It must be highlighted that each 
of these mechanisms is not always present in all States. In the next lines, we mention two 
of them. 
137. The first method to fund litigation is through contingency fee agreements. 
Under this scheme, lawyers assume the burden to finance judicial proceedings. In case 
they are successful at trial or if the dispute is eventually settled, their fees represent a 
percentage of the amount recovered. If they lose the case, lawyers are not entitled to get 
any fee –no cure, no fee.308 Contingency fee agreements are an interesting way to finance 
litigation, as claimants do not have to cover their lawyer’s fees if they are unsuccessful at 
trial. In this sense, these agreements promote access to justice.309 On the contrary, 
opponents argue that these contingency fees are unethical.310 In particular, as lawyers 
acquire a pecuniary interest in the dispute, conflict of interests might develop. In light of 
the above, the Code of conduct for European Lawyers, at Article 3(3), as well as a large 
                                                
307 A first pecuniary source that may finance litigation are public funds coupled with self-financing. In 
particular, an investment of the State in judicial proceedings may be justified when general interests are at 
stake. For example, in Germany and Austria, consumer associations are mainly financed by public funds. 
Specifically, the Verein für Konsumenteninformation (VKI), the major consumer association in Austria, is 
able to fund its activities –including litigation– thanks to member fees and publications on the one hand, as 
well as an annual subsidy from the government on the other. Additionally, the Austrian entity is able to 
raise third-party funding in order to cover the costs of collective proceedings (this information is available 
at https://www.konsument.at). An alternative public means to finance litigation is legal aid. The negative 
aspect of this funding method is that legal aid is equally subject to budget constraints and is not available 
for organisations such as consumer associations (S Voet, “The Crux of the Matter: Funding and Financing 
Collective Redress Mechanisms”, in B Hess et al., supra n 279, 214). However, legal aid may be provided 
to individual victims who are part of collective proceedings (see the example of the Dexia case in I 
Tzankova, “Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons From the Netherlands”, (2012) 8 Journal of Law 
Economics and Policy 579-581). In the competition law field, an interesting solution has been proposed in 
order to overcome scarcity of public funds: this is, allocating part of the fines imposed in case of 
competition law violations to entities that have standing to bring collective redress suits (BEUC, supra n 
302, part I). Finally, insurances can shift the financial burden of litigation on third-parties. In particular, 
After the Event (ATE) and Before the Event (BTE) Insurances can be taken out. The use of contingency 
fees and third-party funding is discussed in the next paragraphs. 
308 R Mulheron, supra n 304, 92. 
309 M Faure et al., “No Cure, no Pay and Contingency Fees” in Tuil and Visscher, supra n 300, 39-41. 
310 Ibid, 37-39. 
  82 
majority of Member States, prohibit the use of contingency fees agreements.311 
Nevertheless, restrictions of budgets for legal aid and market conditions incentivised 
some States to mitigate this strict prohibition. An interesting example is the British 
Conditional Fee Agreement (CFA), which was implemented to make justice 
affordable.312 Under a CFA, 313 the lawyer who succeeds at trial or reaches an agreement 
with the counterpart is paid an ordinary fee, which might correspond to the actual costs 
incurred by the lawyer or an hourly fee. Then, an uplift –or a success fee– is usually added 
on top of this. It might constitute a percentage of the ordinary fee. If the claim does not 
succeed, no fee is payable. The difference between a contingency and conditional fee 
agreement is that the uplift in a conditional fee agreement is not related to the amount 
adjudicated or settled.314 
138. Another recent and interesting form of third-party funding appeared in the 
competition law field: the assignment of claims to special purpose vehicles (SPVs). For 
example, Cartel Damage Claims (hereafter, CDC) is a Belgian service provider whose 
purpose is to enforce competition law claims.315 More precisely, victims who suffered a 
competition law offense transfer –or sell– their claims to CDC. Then, the special purpose 
vehicle brings proceedings against the wrongdoer. If successful, CDC returns a portion 
of the damage award to the victims. Thanks to the assignment of claims technique, the 
Belgian service provider is able to pool resources and obtain funding from third-parties. 
As for victims, they are able to shift the burden and the risk to litigate on CDC.316 
Although this model has been relatively successful in competition law claims,317 it is 
doubtful that this technique could be used for small-value claims in consumer law, for 
                                                
311 According to a comprehensive study on litigation costs and funding of 2010, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
and Spain allow contingency fee agremments. As for Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, 
they either permit these agreements under certain conditions or impose several limitations. Finally, Poland 
and Sweden accept contingency fee agreements only in the context of collective redress actions (C Hodges 
et al., supra n 299, 132-133). 
312 SE Keske et al., “Financing and Group Litigation” in Tuil and Visscher, supra n 300, 77. 
313 R Mulheron, supra n 304, 92; M Faure et al., supra n 309, 36. 
314 W Emons, “Conditional versus Contingent Fees” (2007) 59 (1) Oxford Economics Papers 1, available 
at https://www.researchgate.net. 
315 For further information on the functioning of CDC, see SE Keske, Group Litigation in European 
Competition Law – A Law and Economic Perspective (Antwerp 2010), 233-234; T Reher, “Specific Issues 
in Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions Brought by Multiple Claimants in a German Context” in M 
Danov et al. (eds), Cross-Border EU Competition Law Actions (Oxford 2013), 161-162; and the firm’s 
website http://www.carteldamageclaims.com.  
316 A Pinna, “The assignment and securization of liability claims” in Tuil and Visscher, supra n 300, 118. 
317 In a paper of 2012, C. Veljanovski found that seven follow-on cartel damage claims had been litigated 
until then (C Veljanovski, “Third-party Litigation Funding in Europe”, Journal of Law, Economics & 
Policy 8 [2012], 431-433). 
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two reasons: first, the assignment of claims requires the active participation of consumers, 
given that they have to transfer their claims to an entity. Therefore, the usual rational 
apathy that characterises the attitude of small-value claimants may not be overcome. 
Second, the value of the claims may be too low to attract third-party funding.318  
5. The Role of ADR  
139. Parties to the American class action usually settle. As earlier mentioned, 
different factors may push parties to come to an agreement, the most convincing one 
being the financial risk that class proceedings represent. Therefore, negotiation is part of 
the class action system. Other ADR methods are equally available to parties but are 
independent from any class proceedings. It is worth underlying that class arbitration may 
occur in the United States. However, as we further explain below (infra, IIC1.a.), this 
possibility has been limited by recent judgments of the Supreme Court. In Europe, the 
fusion of collective redress with some kind of alternative dispute resolution system is 
increasingly common, probably due to the promotion of non-contentious means to solve 
conflicts at the European level.319 Usually, ADR schemes are implemented into the 
collective redress procedure.320 Alternatively, other autonomous ADR mechanisms 
remain available to consumers. In order to illustrate this point, the rest of the section 
develops some recent examples of collective redress mechanisms, which associate an 
ADR scheme. 
140. First of all, the Dutch legislator enacted an out-of-court settlement procedure, 
on the model of the US class action. According to this mechanism, parties negotiate an 
agreement that they submit to the Amsterdam Court of appeal, which will declare its 
binding effect over absent parties if all legal requirements are fulfilled. In other words, 
parties seek a declarative action regarding the validity of their settlement. It has to be 
underlined that this negotiation phase is independent from any judicial proceedings. 
Besides, no collective redress action for damages is available in the Netherlands.  
                                                
318 BEUC, supra n 302, part III. 
319 Proof of that fact is that the EU enacted important legislations in the field of ADR, such as Directive 
2013/11/EU of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC [2013] OJ L165/63; Regulation (EU) No 
524/2013 of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC [2013] OJ L165/1 and Directive 2008/52/EC of 21 May 
2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters [2008] OJ L136/3. 
320 Like in France and Belgium. 
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141. Second of all, in France, the new action de groupe integrates a mediation 
phase, pursuant to Articles L.623-22 and 23 FCC. According to those provisions, a 
certified consumer association can participate in a mediation process with the alleged 
wrongdoer. If an agreement is reached, it is submitted to the judge who has the power to 
make it binding. Then, the terms of such an agreement are made public to potential 
victims who can choose to opt-in or not. It is not clear what the solution should be in case 
parties are not satisfied with the conditions of the agreement and would have preferred 
the judicial action to continue.321 
Similarly, in Belgium, parties can negotiate an agreement out-of-court or after 
having filed an action in court.322 During this negotiation phase, parties may require the 
start of a mediation process, but this is not mandatory. The homologation of an agreement 
between parties is applicable to all victims. In order for parties to exercise their right to 
opt-in or out, the outcome of the mediation process has to be published, which is at odds 
with the principle of confidentiality that governs mediation.323 
E. The Four Categories 
142. Hereafter, a classification of the collective redress tools available in the EU 
is provided. In particular, we regroup these tools into four categories: the representative 
model (infra; 1.); the class action model (infra; 2.); the test case model (infra; 3.); and the 
Dutch model (infra; 4.). The rationale of this classification is to facilitate our assessment 
of private international law questions in the next Chapters of this work. In light of the 
above, we have created four models of collective redress, which have different impact on 
international rules on jurisdiction. Thanks to this technique, we rationalise our research 
and concentrate on predominant collective redress models.  
Our categorisation of collective redress mechanisms has applied the following 
methodology: we took our the above-mentioned list that chronologically indexes all the 
existing collective redress instruments as a basis (supra; I.A.). We then analysed the 
structure of all instruments using a template. The result of this work is available in Annex 
                                                
321 L'action de groupe à la française : parachever la protection des consommateurs, Information Report 
(05.05.2017), available at https://www.senat.fr/rap/r09-499/r09-49917.html. 
322 For an interesting presentation of the Belgian mediation system in the context of collective redress, see 
A de Bandt, “La négociation et la médiation dans le cadre de l’action en reparation collective” (2014) 6 
Revue de Droit Commercial Belge 591-605. 
323 Ibid, 604. 
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II. Finally, we classified collective redress mechanims into four categories according to 
their common features.  
1. The Representative Model 
143. Pursuant to this model, a person other than a consumer brings collective 
proceedings against a wrongdoer. In particular, this person could either be a private entity, 
such as a consumer association, or a public authority, for instance, the Consumer 
Ombudsman. In any case, this person acts as a representative of a group of victims. For 
now, we set aside the question to know whether the representative acts in its own name 
and on behalf of third parties, or in its own name and own behalf. Private or public bodies 
may seek injunctive or declaratory relief, as well as monetary compensation. Similarly, 
they may defend distinct interests –collective or general.324 When the types of remedies 
and interests have a different impact on private international law solutions tackled in 
Chapter III, these are highlighted. 
2. The Class Action Model 
144. The Class Action Model resembles the American class action device in the 
sense that it enables a single individual to litigate on behalf of a group of victims. 
Importantly, this model only takes into account representative claimants who are 
considered as consumers under European law. It has to be highlighted that private 
international rules on jurisdiction offer a protective forum at the place of certain 
consumers’ domicile but not all of them. Besides, the representative claimant must have 
a claim against the defendant. Otherwise, they fall under the scope of the representative 
model described above.  
3. The Test Case Model 
145. Under the test case procedure, a court receives a multiplicity of similar 
claims. For procedural efficiency purposes, it usually picks up a case and solves common 
issues, while suspending related individual proceedings. Once the competent court rules 
on these common issues, individual proceedings are retaken and solved according to these 
                                                
324 The distinction between those interests is explained supra n 254. 
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findings. Sometimes the model requires all victims to bring a claim, while sometimes a 
subscription in a register is sufficient to manifest one’s willingness to be part of the 
collective proceedings. Therefore, this model is based on an opt-in system. The most 
relevant feature of a test case procedure from a private international law perspective is 
that all the members of the collective action are claimants. For this reason, this model 
looks like a group action in which several claimants bring a collective suit together. As a 
result, the comments that we make when assessing the competence of the tribunal in a 
test case procedure are, mutatis mutandis, applicable to the group action. In light of the 
above and because the group action is not widespread among the EU, we do not further 
examine this mechanism. 
4. The Dutch Model 
146. The Dutch Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade (hereafter, WCAM) is 
a unique model and one of the most successful ones, at least as far as private international 
law is concerned. Even though only a bunch of cases have been tried under this model, 
these were significant. At the same time, the Dutch WCAM generates fundamental 
questions that challenge current private international law rules on jurisdiction. Therefore, 
this model deserves our attention. Pursuant to this scheme, one or various consumer 
associations start negotiations with an alleged wrongdoer on behalf of the victims they 
represent. These negotiations occur out of any court proceedings. Once parties reach a 
settlement, they present it to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over WCAM procedures. If the Court deems that the content of the settlement 
is fair, it declares it binding for all represented but absent parties. These are notified of 
their right to opt-out. The most important feature that characterises this procedure from a 
private international law perspective is the use of an out-of-court dispute resolution 
process with the subsequent initiation of declarative proceedings. 
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II. The Role of the European Union 
147. Consumer collective redress has been under the European Union’s scrutiny 
since 2007. The interest of the European institutions –and in particular the Commission– 
for this procedural tool increased as the private enforcement gap enlarged. In light of this, 
the many reports published in this field attest to the Union’s willingness to implement 
collective redress within its territory. Indeed, collective redress is an instrument that has 
the ability to improve access to justice. Yet, it seems that the lack of political consensus 
at the supranational level has hampered the enactment of any binding instrument on 
collective redress. Besides, we have spotted some inconsistencies, which indicate that this 
device might not be fully understood and we consider that impact assessments, as well as 
empirical data on this topic are missing. 
148. In light of these considerations, the first part of this sub-section begins with 
a chronological overview and a short summary of the documents released by the 
European Union regarding collective redress (infra; A.). The second part then, analyses 
the European Union’s approach towards collective redress from 2007 until today (infra; 
B.). We dedicate special attention to the last instrument drafted by the Commission –the 
Recommendation of 2013. Finally, we turn to examine two important arguments that 
opponents to collective redress make, which are the superior role of ADR in order to solve 
consumer disputes (infra; B.1.) and the lack of competence for the EU to legislate (infra; 
B.2.). These critiques must be assessed because in case they hold true, they would 
certainly block any intervention of the Union or at least call into question its legitimacy.  
A. Chronological Overview 
149. As we announced earlier, this section presents all the studies, initiatives and 
impact assessments published by the European Union on collective redress in a 
chronological order. More precisely, a timeline first gives the reader a broad overview of 
all the above-mentioned documents, and then, a short summary is provided for each of 
them. Most of the work performed on the topic of collective redress has been carried out 
or ordered by the European Commission. Therefore, the large majority of the documents 
we present are available on its website.325  
                                                
325 http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm. 
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We extracted important information from those documents, which will impact and 
support our analysis in the next Chapters of this research project. To begin with, studies 
commissioned by the European Union keep us updated on the funtionning of procedural 
enforcement tools, as well as the behaviour of market players. Notably, those studies 
identify some obstacles to the start of proceedings abroad and the deficiencies that vitiate 
certain procedural tools. Then, the last documents released by the Union make clear that 
the main objective at the core of measures regarding collective redress is access to justice. 
Finally, we extracted important critiques towards the adoption of collective redress 
mechanisms that have the potential to refrain the regulation of collective redress at the 
European level in the future.
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Timeline 
2007 • EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 
• Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer 
Redress Other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial 
Proceedings 
• Leuven Brainstorming Event 
2008 • Consultation on the Draft Consumer Collective Redress 
Benchmarks and Workshops 
• Study Regarding the Problems Faced by Consumers in 
Obtaining Redress 
• Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective 
Redress Mechanisms 
• Green Paper 
2009 • Qualitative Eurobarometer 
• Feedback Statement of the Green Paper 
• Consultation Paper: Discussion on the Follow-up to the 
Green Paper 
2011 • Consultation Paper: Towards a Coherent Approach to 
Collective Redress 
2012 • EU Parliament Resolution: Towards a Coherent Approach to 
Collective Redress 
• European Consumer Agenda 
2013 • Recommendation of the Commission and Communication 
2017 • Assessment Regarding the Implementation of the 
Recommendation 
 
150. The EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 - Empowering Consumers, 
Enhancing their Welfare, Effectively Protecting Them.326 In this document, the 
Commission acknowledges the important role that consumers play in the functioning of 
the internal market, as their consumption represents 58% of EU’s Growth Domestic 
Product (GDP). However, the exponential integration of retail markets and the rise of e-
commerce generate a new reality that the current fragmentation of the internal market 
                                                
326 European Commission, EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 - Empowering consumers, enhancing 
their welfare, effectively protecting them, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee COM(2007) 99 final.  
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must overcome. In order for consumers to adapt to the rules of the game, their rights 
should be correspondingly updated. In light of the above, the Commission suggests that 
actions consolidating consumers’ information, confidence and redress have to be 
undertaken. Among other aspects, the enforcement of EU law and cooperation between 
public authorities must continue. Regarding consumer redress, the document mentions 
that the EU will consider taking action on collective redress in consumer and antitrust 
matters. 
151. An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternative Means of Consumer Redress 
Other than Redress through Ordinary Judicial Proceedings (the Leuven Study).327 This 
2007 study was commissioned by DG SANCO to the Study Centre of consumer 
Law/Centre for European Economic Law of the University of Leuven. The objective of 
the report is to investigate how alternative means of consumer redress other than 
individual court proceedings practically work for end-users. Specifically, five 
mechanisms are studied: (1) direct negotiation; (2) mediation and arbitration; (3) small 
claims procedures; (4) collective actions for damages; and, (5) injunctive relief. For the 
sake of this work, we focus on chapter V of the report, which deals with collective redress 
actions for damages.328 According to the Leuven Study, these actions encompass three 
different models: (1) the group action, according to which various victims bring their 
claims into a single action; (2) the representative action, whereby one representative 
claimant brings proceedings on behalf of other victims; (3) the test case procedure, where 
a case brought by one claimant will then serve as a landmark judgment to solve similar 
cases. The report puts the spotlight on an interesting fact, which is that collective redress 
actions, together with direct negotiation are deemed to be the most adequate mechanism 
for conflicts involving small-value claims. Then, chapter V includes the risks and benefits 
of collective redress actions. On the positive side of the balance, the report acknowledges 
that collective redress has the ability to reduce costs for all parties, foster access to justice, 
deter unlawful conducts and provide judicial economy. On the negative side of the 
balance, the Leuven Study worries about the start of unmeritorious claims, the 
overwhelming of courts with complex actions, and the misalignment of financial 
incentives that may lead to abuses. Finally, the document presents the different 
                                                
327 The Study Centre for Consumer Law/Centre for European Economic Law, supra n 264. 
328 We set aside the conclusion of the Leuven Study regarding injunctive relief since its content overlaps 
with the two reports on Directive 2009/22/EC, which are dealt with in different locations of this thesis 
(infra; §§ 168, 212, 415). 
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characteristics that collective redress actions mechanisms possess. Specifically, it deals 
with questions regarding availability, scope of application, rules on standing, procedural 
features, cross-border disputes, and rules on costs. 
152. The Leuven Brainstorming Event.329 The purpose of the Leuven event was to 
gather information on collective redress through a dialogue between the Commission and 
relevant stakeholders in order to create an adequate framework for the device. The 
introductory speech of Commissioner Kuneva illustrates this point: “I feel that I need to 
examine how prevalent the problem of consumers still refraining from enforcing their 
rights is – and whether I can do anything further about it. Collective redress, both judicial 
and non-judicial, could be an effective means to address this problem. I must stress, 
however, that unless I am convinced that there is a strong and pressing case for it, I do 
not intend to take any action at European level”.330 This event is part of the Consumer 
Policy Strategy that aims at fostering consumer confidence in the internal market.  
From the feedback statement, we observe that two blocs of opinions stand out: on 
the one hand, some –mostly consumer representatives– underline that the fragmentation 
of the internal market regarding methods of redress fosters the unequal protection of 
consumers among the EU and thus, affects their confidence. This is particularly visible 
in cross-border cases where consumers are not always able to obtain redress. On the other 
hand, others –mostly business representatives– express their doubts regarding the need of 
collective redress. Besides, some stakeholders invoke the US class action in order to 
demonstrate that the adoption of collective redress could have disastrous effects on 
companies. Finally, the role of ADR was discussed and the question of funding was 
pointed out as one of the major problems affecting the functioning of national collective 
redress mechanisms.  
153. Consultation on the Draft Consumer Collective Redress Benchmarks and 
Workshops.331 The benchmarks put in place by the Commission are general principles 
that any collective redress mechanisms should respect. Specifically, claimants should be 
able to bundle their claims thanks to an adequate information networking when individual 
action is not possible. Then, from a financial perspective, access to justice should be 
                                                
329 A summary of the Leuven brainstorming event is available on the Commission’s website supra n 325. 
330 The speech of Commissioner Kuneva is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/redress_cons/docs/kuneva_leuven_speech290607.pdf. 
331 The Feedback Statement on the Benchmark Consultation and the Workshops is available on the 
Commission’s website supra n 325. 
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affordable for consumers. Furthermore, the monetary award has to be adequately 
distributed among the parties involved in collective proceedings. However, the “loser 
pays” rule and the prohibition of punitive damages should be maintained, so that the 
defendant is not economically overburdened. Along these lines, collective actions should 
have a certain deterrent effect but no unmeritorious claim should be encouraged. From a 
procedural perspective, the length of proceedings must be reasonable and the use of out-
of-court mechanisms boosted.  
Subsequently, the Commission organised a workshop in order to discuss with 
stakeholders about these benchmarks. The results show that consumer representatives 
usually agree with the Commission’s benchmarks. However, they often regret the too 
general nature of the vocabulary employed. They would have welcomed more precisions 
on certain benchmarks. As for business representatives, they regard collective redress 
sceptically: they call into question its need and argue that the efficiency of current 
procedural instruments should first be examined. Alternatively, they advocate a collective 
redress model that integrates a previous mandatory out-of-court procedure. The industry 
considers that funding techniques have to be limited, punitive damages prohibited and the 
“loser pays” rule respected. Besides, compensation should only be paid to claimants, 
excluding representative bodies. Finally, safeguards must be put in place in order to 
prevent unmeritorious claims and skimming-off procedures should only be ordered by 
public authorities. Overall, legal practitioners and academics usually agree with business 
representatives, although they sometimes adopt a more nuanced approach. 
154. Study Regarding the Problems Faced by Consumers in Obtaining Redress 
for Infringements of Consumer Protection Legislation, and the Economic Consequences 
of such Problems.332 This study conducted by Civic Consulting of the Consumer Policy 
Evaluation Consortium (CPEC) contains two reports: the first one (the main report) 
assesses the issues faced by multiple consumers in obtaining redress against the same 
wrongdoer –referred to as mass claims/issues. The second report presents the results of 
discussion groups held in Austria, France, Italy and Portugal in which citizens were asked 
about their experience in resolving disputes through either individual action, collective 
                                                
332 Civic Consulting of the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium (CPEC), Study regarding the problems 
faced by consumers in obtaining redress for infringements of consumer protection legislation, and the 
economic consequences of such problems (2008), available on the Commission’s website supra n 325. 
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action or ADR procedures. We will only focus on the main report as it integrates the 
conclusions of the discussion groups.  
Overall, litigation costs is perceived as the most important barrier to obtain 
satisfactory redress. Additionally, when conflicts have a cross-border nature, the 
difficulties that consumers experience are similar to the ones existing at the national level 
but in an amplified way because of their international component. Specifically, several 
hurdles impede consumers to bring collective redress proceedings: (1) the unavailability 
of consumer collective redress mechanism; (2) the limited standing to sue; (3) the lack of 
financial resources; (4) the limited –human and financial– resources of consumer 
organisations; (5) the lack of expertise of intermediaries; (6) the lack of expertise of 
judges in managing the collective action; (7) the difficulties to inform potential claimants 
about the collective actions; (8) the difficulties in awarding and distributing the 
compensation. The economic analysis points out that collective redress mechanisms, as 
well as ADR procedures –especially where special ADR instruments for consumers are 
available– are particularly fit for low or medium value claims. As for individual 
proceedings, they are often reserved to high value claimants. However, it appears that 
both, collective redress and ADR, often lack incentives, which makes them less 
appealing.  
155. Study on Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress 
Mechanisms.333 The following study was elaborated by Civic Consulting in association 
with Oxford Economics for the Commission. It comprises three reports: the first one is 
the main report and summarises the overall results of the research; then, the second report 
assembles country studies that set forth the structure of collective redress tools in 13 
Member States; as for the final report, it contains information on national case-law 
involving collective suits. It is interesting to note that on the 326 cases gathered, only 
10% were of a cross-border nature.  
For the sake of this work, we only synthesize the results of the main report, which 
can also be divided into three parts. First, in order to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collective redress, the report analyses the length of proceedings, the cost of 
collective redress for consumers or their representatives, as well as businesses, and the 
                                                
333 Civic Consulting (Lead) and Oxford Economics, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union, main report part I (2008), available on the 
Commission’s website supra n 325. 
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added value of such a tool in comparison with other procedural devices. The conclusions 
are as follows: although collective suits can slow down the litigation process –because of 
the complexity of the collective suit or the lack of efficiency of the judicial system–, the 
length of proceedings is still reasonable compared to individual litigation. Then, the costs 
related to collective actions are usually low or inexistent for consumers. However, the 
representative claimant will often have to bear the financial risk of litigation. In this 
context, the report highlights that an opt-in based system increases the cost of finding the 
claimants and joining them together, which makes this procedure unattractive for low-
value cases. The risk of having to pay the defendant’s costs is a further disincentive to 
sue for intermediaries but represents a safeguard against unmeritorious claims. 
Additionally, it seems that collective redress does not generate unreasonable costs on 
businesses. Rather, collective redress tends to decrease defendant’s costs, given that they 
do not have to defend themselves in various individual proceedings and different courts. 
Besides, Member States reported that no business went bankrupt because of a collective 
suit. Finally, collective redress is an added value in all judicial systems in which it exists: 
importantly, this instrument offers access to justice to small-value claimants and 
generates significant media coverage that constitutes an incentive for businesses to settle.  
The second part of the report examines whether consumers suffer a detriment 
when no collective redress mechanism is available to them. It estimates that consumers 
might suffer a detriment of 2.1 million Euros per annum, although this should be 
interpreted carefully. This figure is hypothetical as it is based on the results observed in 
Member States, which do have collective redress mechanisms and do not take into 
account a potential lack of efficiency or effectiveness. In any case, the report concludes 
that the consumer detriment is modest.  
The last part of the main report emphasises that different approaches to collective 
redress do not seem to hinder cross-border commerce between Member States and do not 
lead to distortions of competition.   
156. Green Paper on consumer collective redress.334 The Green Paper starts by 
emphasising the lack of confidence affecting consumers within the European market. Part 
of this lack of trust comes from the unavailability of efficient mechanisms to obtain 
redress. Indeed, according to some studies, 76% of consumers say that it is important for 
their confidence to be able to bring a cross-border claim before their courts and applying 
                                                
334 European Commission, Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress [2008] COM(2008) 794 final. 
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their national law. High costs, lengthy proceedings and the risk of litigation are additional 
barriers that hinder consumers from obtaining compensation. Accordingly, the Special 
Eurobarometer on Access to Justice states that 18% of consumers questioned would 
surely not go to court for less than 500 Euros.335 The same proportion of consumers would 
go to court only for claims worth more than 1,000 Euros.  
In this context, the EU already set up mechanisms to improve the enforcement of 
European law: the ADR Directive fosters out-of-court settlements; the Injunctions 
Directive allows listed consumer associations or public authorities to bring cross-border 
suits seeking injunctive relief; and the CPC Regulation consolidates public enforcement. 
However, it appears that these instruments are not sufficient. Specifically, collective 
redress mechanisms adopted so far by the Member States are only partially efficient. As 
a result, the Commission suggests that additional actions should be undertaken in order 
to help consumers to get their harm repaired. The Green Paper further specifies that no 
distinction between national and cross-border situations should be made, since national 
and foreign consumers are affected in the same way by illegal practices. Furthermore, 
any measure must provide access to justice to consumers but simultaneously protect 
defendants against unmeritorious claims.  
There are four different options to be examined in order to address the current lack 
of redress within the EU: (1) The first proposal consists in maintaining the status quo, 
whereby the Commission would wait and see the capacity of both the Mediation Directive 
and the Small Claims procedure to fill the current enforcement gap; (2) Through the next 
suggestion, the Commission recommends Member States to cooperate. Specifically, they 
would be required to open up their collective redress mechanisms to foreign consumers 
and entities; (3) The third solution consists in a mix of different measures, namely the 
improvement of ADR mechanisms, coupled with the expansion of the Small Claims 
procedure to collective actions in national and cross-border cases, as well as the guarantee 
that businesses have an efficient internal complaint-handling system. As for very low 
value claimants, they are encouraged to resort to public authorities in order to enforce 
their rights; (4) The last measure would ensure the existence of judicial collective redress 
procedure in all the Member States through a binding or non-binding instrument. 
                                                
335 European Commission, European Union Citizens and Access to Justice, Special Eurobarometer 195 
(Summary) (2004), 11, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm. 
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157. The Feedback statement336 that summarises the responses to the Green Paper 
on collective redress, which was carried out by the Consumer Policy Evaluation 
Consortium (CPEC), points out that most of the respondents are business representatives 
and a large majority of the responses come from Germany, the United Kingdom and 
France. Making a difference between stakeholders is important in order to understand the 
results of the paper. The core findings of the study report that business representatives 
usually prefer the first option of the Green Paper –this means, no action at the European 
level– and strongly reject the introduction of collective redress within the Union. In fact, 
business representatives argue that no evidence supports the need for collective redress 
and challenge the competence of the EU to introduce such a mechanism. Moreover, they 
state that the current procedural mechanisms and European measures are sufficient. On 
the contrary, consumer organisations favour option 4 and generally rejected all other 
options. According to these stakeholders, such option is the only one that would establish 
consumers’ confidence in the internal market and improve access to justice. As for legal 
practitioners and Member States’ public authorities, they are highly divided between 
option 1 and 4. Finally, academics generally prefer a combination of option 2, 3 and 4.  
It has to be underlined that options 3 and 4 did not trigger much controversy: it is 
commonly accepted that cooperation between Member States is desirable and that the use 
of ADR should be further encouraged. Nevertheless, some issues still need to be solved: 
first, it is feared that the opening-up of national collective redress mechanisms to foreign 
consumers would suppose a great burden for courts hearing the collective action, and 
would trigger issues of applicable law. Additionally, this situation would certainly foster 
forum shopping. Second, because ADR proceedings are voluntary, stakeholders suspect 
that they would not be used unless a binding judicial system of collective redress would 
be implemented. 
158. Eurobarometer on Consumer Redress in the European Union: Consumer 
Experiences, Perceptions and Choices.337 We make some comments on this 
Eurobarometer because of its specific part dedicated to collective redress. During April 
and May 2009, ten qualitative in-depth interviews were held in 27 Member States 
                                                
336 Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium, Assessment of the economic and social impact of the policy 
options to empower consumers to obtain adequate redress, Final Analytical Report on the Green Paper on 
Consumer Collective Redress (2009), available on the Commission’s website supra n 325. 
337 TNSqual+, Consumer Redress in the European Union: Consumer Experiences, Perceptions and Choices, 
Qualitative Eurobarometer (2009) available on the Commission’s website supra n 325.  
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amongst specific target consumers. The study explores consumers’ awareness and 
experiences regarding different redress mechanisms. The study starts with an interesting 
fact: less confident consumers whose investment in a product or a service is low are not 
likely to complain at all. In principle, consumers of Western Europe would not complain 
to the supplier below 50 Euros and would not seek further redress in case of negative 
response if their claim amounts to less than 100 Euros. Therefore, this study confirms that 
very small-value claimants can be characterised by their apathy. Then, it is useful to report 
that very few respondents experienced any kind of cross-border redress. They explain that 
redress would be highly difficult to obtain as they do not know what their rights are in a 
foreign country, not to mention language barriers. Moreover, they would not know which 
body to approach in order to get some support and how to start any type of action.  
Overall, consumers’ awareness of collective redress mechanisms is low. The ones 
who knew about the existence of such procedural tool were informed by consumer 
associations. Incidentally, the Eurobarometer underlines the fundamental role that these 
associations and public authorities in giving information to consumers about their rights 
and the different ways of obtaining redress. In fact, many consumers admit that any 
process of recovery would first start by approaching a consumer association or a public 
authority. Then, consumers regard positively the sharing of costs, responsibility and time 
that collective proceedings offer. On the negative side of the balance, they mention that 
it would certainly be difficult to contact other claimants and that the collective action 
could cause a reduction of the compensation –due to the pay-outs that this kind of action 
implies.  
The study further illustrates consumers’ preferences regarding instruments of 
redress in relationship to a small-value claim –i. e. between 5 and 10 Euros– and a high-
value personal damage claim. In the first case, consumers would first approach a 
consumer association or a public authority and then start collective ADR proceedings if 
further redress is sought, as it is deemed to be quicker than court collective action. 
Regarding high-value claims, respondents show a preference for judicial collective 
proceedings because of their perceived authority and weight. Finally, collective actions 
were considered as an attractive tool to solve cross-border disputes. 
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159. Consultation Paper: Discussion on the Follow-up to the Green Paper.338 DG 
SANCO launched the Consultation Paper with the purpose to create a support document 
in preparation for the hearings of the 29 May 2009. This paper takes into account the 
responses, suggestions and critiques made to the Green Paper on consumer collective 
redress and thus, redefine the boundaries of the discussion by proposing new tailored 
policy options.  
To start with, the Consultation Paper recalls the central role of consumers’ 
confidence for the construction of a competitive and innovative European market. In this 
vein, the elaboration of effective redress mechanisms enhances consumers’ trust and 
discipline traders. The emergence of mass damages –increased by the use of internet and 
globalisation– requires an adequate response. As a result, the EU proposes to elaborate 
accessible, affordable and effective redress to tackle this particular situation. 
Simultaneously, the rise of unmeritorious claims should be avoided. The Consultation 
Paper also underlines the existence of a justice gap for very low and low-value claimants 
who struggle to obtain compensation when their rights are violated. Moreover, claimants’ 
opportunities to get their harm repaired greatly depend on their location as national 
legislations still have disparate protection regimes. The Consultation Paper insists on the 
importance of offering equal access to justice to consumers. This would also mean that 
traders are all subject to the same enforcement regime that would foster healthy 
competition. In this context, the paper acknowledges the insufficiency of the current 
instruments adopted both at the European and national levels so far. In light of the above, 
collective redress is an interesting tool as it provides a reduction of costs for claimants 
and economies of scales. Nevertheless, the efficiency of such mechanism could still be 
improved: currently, collective redress suffers from lack of funding, publicity, and 
incentives. Cross-border collective actions entail additional difficulties and consumer 
associations usually cannot represent foreign consumers.  
For all these reasons, the Consultation Paper presents five options that aim at 
reinforcing the current redress system. All the suggestions are based on a mix of 
instruments involving ADR, self-regulation and judicial collective redress, as the 
responses to the Green Paper prescribed. Following the example of the Green Paper, the 
first option consists in maintaining the status quo. According to the second option, the 
Commission would, in cooperation with stakeholders, elaborate a collective ADR 
                                                
338 European Commission, Consultation paper for discussion on the follow-up to the Green Paper on 
consumer collective redress (2009), available on the Commission’s website supra n 325. 
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mechanism, as well as an internal complaint handling system to be implemented within 
businesses’ corporate structure through a code of conduct. As for the third suggestion, it 
is a non-binding measure that would consist in encouraging Member States to adopt a 
collective ADR instrument together with a judicial collective redress tool, both opened to 
foreign consumers. Besides, the power to order skimming-off and compensation in case 
of very low value claims would be given to public authorities. The fourth option is similar 
to the previous one but would be a binding measure for all Member States. Finally, the 
last option aims at establishing an EU-wide test case procedure. The Consultation Paper 
ends up with an impact assessment of all the options proposed, detailing the positive 
aspects as well as the drawbacks. The summary of the main trends of the public hearing 
on consumer collective redress on 29 May 2009339 reports that in general terms, business 
representatives support minimal EU involvement –this corresponds to the first and the 
second option– while consumer representatives favour options 4 and 5.  
160.  Consultation Paper: Towards a coherent approach to collective redress.340 
Although all Member States have adopted some kind of collective redress instrument, 
these vary widely from one legal order to another. Therefore, the enforcement of rights is 
uneven across the EU. In light of this, the public consultation launched by the 
Commission aims at identifying the common principles underpinning collective redress 
and examining how these principles would apply to the different national mechanisms 
adopted within the EU. Finally, it investigates in which fields collective redress could 
have an added value. Broadly speaking, the numerous questions presented to stakeholders 
concern the need, added value, efficiency, structure and scope of collective redress, 
including the safeguards that should be built up to prevent abusive litigation. Besides, the 
role of ADR within the redress system is discussed. In the next paragraphs, we provide a 
summary of stakeholders’ responses during the hearings that took place on the 5 April 
2011. We follow the tripartite structure adopted by the hearings.  
First of all, the question of collective redress potential added value was addressed. 
In this case, consumer representatives insisted on the necessity for Member States to 
adopt efficient means of collective redress in order to fulfil the current enforcement gap. 
They also explained that ADR mechanisms would not be used in practice if no judicial 
                                                
339 The Summary of the main trends of the public hearing on consumer collective redress on 29 May 2009 
is available on the Commission’s website supra n 325. 
340 European Commission, Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective Redress 
SEC(2011)173 final. 
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collective redress instrument existed with the purpose to act as a “stick”. On the contrary, 
business representatives questioned the need for collective redress: in their opinion, 
public authorities should remain the only actors in charge of the enforcement strategy. 
For the rest, ADR represents one of the cheapest and quickest means for consumers to 
obtain compensation. One business representative qualified the adoption of judicial 
collective redress as a “bulldozer approach” since other efficient means of conflict 
resolution would be able to achieve the same objective at a cheaper cost.  
Second of all, the hearings tackled the question of efficiency. In particular, 
participants and panellists were asked what kind of features an efficient collective redress 
mechanism should have. The views on this specific question greatly diverged: on the one 
hand, some respondents –essentially business representatives– expressed their fear of the 
American class action and the abuses that the use of this device may generate. On the 
other hand, opponents to this view stated that collective redress is a necessity and a matter 
of access to justice. From a structural perspective, participants’ discussed the following 
elements: standing to sue –should it be wide or strict?–, the option between opt-in and 
opt-out –while the opt-in system is deemed difficult to implement because consumers 
cannot always be identified, opt-out is assimilated to the dangerous US class action 
system–, and funding –business representatives are usually against any kind of financial 
incentives. Furthermore, many participants mentioned that active case-management by 
judges is desirable and even specialised courts for collective redress would be an 
interesting solution.  
Finally, the third hearings session was a sort of “catch-all” discussion which dealt 
with other convenient common principles, the suitable approach to collective redress –
horizontal or by sectors–, ADR and cross-border issues. During this session, stakeholders 
reiterated the importance of ADR for the redress system. However, one of the speakers 
called participants’ attention on the fact that out-of-court collective settlements would 
pose some practical problems: among other things, we mention the identification of other 
claimants, the way by which claimants take the decision to agree or reject a settlement, 
and the issues regarding funding and costs. Then, it seems that stakeholders agreed on the 
fact that any collective redress system should be modelled according to the specific sector 
in which it is to be implemented. Last but not least, participants urged the Commission to 
facilitate the start of cross-border collective suits that currently face too many obstacles 
to be viable. 
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161. EU Parliament Resolution: Towards a Coherent Approach to Collective 
Redress.341 In 2012, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the topic of 
collective redress on its own initiative. The document goes back over the Commission’s 
work and in particular its public consultation “Towards a coherent European approach to 
collective redress”. In this context, the final version of the Parliament’s Resolution 
suggests the introduction of a “Union scheme of collective redress,” which would apply 
horizontally and include a set of common principles. In this vein, the European Parliament 
is concerned about providing uniform access to justice to citizens of the Union.342  
Nevertheless, the text is not crystal-clear and some doubts about its interpretation 
still remain. A closer look at the proposals of amendments put the spotlight on some 
important points of dissension between the members of the Parliament: first of all, while 
some parliamentarians agreed with the setting up of a horizontal framework as the Draft 
Report advocates,343 others showed their preference for a sector-by-sector approach.344 
Accordingly, a horizontal approach would mean that the same collective redress 
framework would apply indifferently to the subject matter concerned. Contrarily, an 
application by sectors means that principles would be implemented differently in 
consumer protection, competition law, environmental matters, and so on. At the end of 
the day, a moderated approach was elected:345 the Parliament recommends a horizontal 
framework for collective compensatory redress, which will be allowed only regarding 
certain legislations expressly listed in an Annex. Put it differently, a uniform collective 
redress instrument should be adopted within the EU but its material scope should be 
limited. However, the text does not impede the adoption of sector-specific rules within 
the horizontal framework if that is deemed convenient.  
Second of all, it seems that parliamentarians were divided on the question whether 
a Commission’s initiative should apply to cross-border and/or national cases.346 Although 
the final version of the document makes some references to the difficulties in obtaining 
                                                
341 European Parliament, Resolution of 2 February 2012 on “Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress” (2011/2089(INI)). The Draft Report (PE467.330, 15.07.2011) was elaborated by the 
Committee of Legal Affairs (rapporteur: Klaus-Heiner Lehne), and further amended by the members of the 
Parliament (PE472.305, 22.09.2011). All the documents are available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?lang=en&reference=2011/2089(INI)#docu
mentGateway.  
342 European Parliament, Resolution supra n 341, para 15. 
343 European Parliament, Draft Report supra n 341, para 8. 
344 See European Parliament, Amendments supra n 341, No 11, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, 43, 46, 47, 64, and 
67 that envision the possibility of a sectorial approach. 
345 European Parliament, Resolution supra n 341, para 15 and 24. 
346 See European Parliament, Amendments supra n 341, No 14, 42, 44, and 45. 
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redress in a cross-border context, it would be incautious to conclude that the Parliament 
recommends the exclusion of national disputes from the resolution’s scope. Finally, it is 
also unclear whether the Parliament wished to introduce a EU-wide collective redress 
mechanism in addition to existing national instruments or, to harmonise national 
collective redress tools already adopted by Member states.  
As far as jurisdiction is concerned, the rapporteur explicitly recommends the 
adoption of a special provision for collective redress actions.347 In his opinion, the courts 
of the Member State where the defendant is domiciled should be competent in order to 
avoid forum shopping. However, amendment 68 reversed this solution by simply 
affirming that the Brussels I regulation should be a “starting point” in order to determine 
which court has jurisdiction.  
162. European Consumer Agenda.348 The European Consumer Agenda –that 
replaced the Consumer Policy Strategy– aims at boosting consumer trust into the 
European market and tackles the new social and economic challenges of this era. Not 
surprisingly, collective redress is encompassed in the EU enforcement strategy. However, 
the commentaries and conclusions contained in the European Consumer Agenda are quite 
meagre: taking into account the Consultation Paper of 2011 and the Parliament Resolution 
of 2012, the Commission will consider to take on further action in order to implement a 
European framework for collective redress. 
163. Recommendation of the Commission and Communication Accompanying 
It.349 The Recommendation, together with the Communication, reflects the position of the 
Commission on collective redress. Whereas the Recommendation establishes common 
principles applicable to collective redress, the Communication contextualises them. It has 
to be highlighted that both documents designate access to justice as the principal goal of 
collective redress.350 
Now turning to the non-binding common principles established by the 
Commission, these apply to judicial and out-of-court collective redress mechanisms. It is 
                                                
347 European Parliament, Draft Report supra n 341, para 16. 
348 European Commission, A European Consumer Agenda - Boosting confidence and growth COM(2012) 
225 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/consumer_agenda_2012_en.pdf.  
349 European Commission, Recommendation supra n 248; European Commission, Communication supra 
n 253. 
350 European Commission, Recommendation supra n 248, recital 10; European Commission, 
Communication supra n 253, 3, 7. 
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useful to point out that these principles are integrated into a horizontal framework, and 
thus, we infer that competition law, consumer protection, financial services, 
environmental protection, data protection and non-discrimination cases are included in 
the Recommendation’s material scope. The Recommendation’s objective is to provide 
uniform access to justice to consumers and victims within the European market. First and 
foremost, the document of the Commission sets forth a definition of collective redress. In 
this context, the Commission acknowledges the existence of four different forms of 
redress: (1) the group action for injunctive relief; (2) the group action for damages; (3) 
the representative action for injunctive relief; (4) the representative action for damages. 
While in a group action, two or more claimants litigate on behalf of a larger group of 
victims, the representative action allows a representative entity, an ad hoc entity or a 
public authority to act in representation of a group of claimants. The common principles 
can be divided into three categories: the first one encompasses all principles applicable 
to both collective injunctive and compensatory relief. The second one specifically 
concerns principles applicable to injunctive relief and the last one deals with collective 
action for damages. We summarise the common principles in the following table: 
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Table 2: Common principles on collective redress 
Actions for injunctive relief Actions for damages 
- Early on in the case, the judge should assess whether all the conditions regarding 
admissibility are fulfilled –be they codified or left to the discretion of the judge,– so 
that unmeritorious claims are refrained; 
- The dissemination of the information about the existence of a collective action or the 
intention to bring one should take various interests into account, such as the freedom 
of expression, the right to information, and the protection of the defendant’s 
reputation; 
- Standing to sue should be limited and attributed under clear conditions of eligibility. 
This can be explained by the fact that consumers or victims are not parties to the 
proceedings, and thus, it is fundamental to guarantee that their interest is well 
represented; 
- National rules on admissibility and standing should not impede cross-border 
collective redress. Moreover, representative entities entitled to bring collective 
proceedings in one Member state should be able to do it in others; 
- The “loser pays” rule should apply; 
- The origin of the funds that finance the collective action has to be disclosed to the 
court, so that conflict of interests or the insufficiency of resources could be detected; 
- The action seeking injunctive relief 
should be tackled in an expeditious 
manner in order to prevent the violation 
of EU law; 
- Adequate sanctions must be put in place 
for defendants who do not comply with 
the injunctive relief order. 
- Collective redress should in principle be 
based on an opt-in basis; 
- The use of ADR should be encouraged 
but remain voluntary; 
- Contingency fees and punitive damages 
have to be prohibited; 
- Third-parties who finance the collective 
action should not obtain a reward based 
on the amount of the settlement or the 
compensation awarded; 
- Any follow-on action can only start after 
the decision of the public authority in 
order to avoid procedural and 
substantive inconsistencies. 
 
Finally, the Commission advocates the creation of national registers of collective 
actions. An assessment of the implementation of the Recommendation will be carried out 
by the 26 July 2017 at the latest. 
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B. The European Union’s Journey Towards the Implementation of Collective 
Redress  
164. As the documents released by the EU show, the implementation of collective 
redress has the potential to foster access to justice. Nevertheless, this policy objective 
might be difficult to guarantee in a cross-border context, as many obstacles still refrain 
people from litigating in another Member State. Such obstacles are detailed below (infra; 
1.). The persistence of the enforcement gap has encouraged the European Union to enact 
or reinforce existing procedural tools. Therefore, the second part of this sub-section 
critically analyses the steps taken by the European Union in order to implement collective 
redress in light of the documents presented above (infra; 2.). We dedicate special attention 
to the Recommendations of 2013, which is the outcome of the Union’s work on collective 
redress. 
1. Empirical Evidence on Consumer Behaviour 
165. The following discussion sheds some light on consumer behaviour in the 
internal market, and especially in cross-border transactions or collective redress actions. 
This empirical evidence should ideally lead us to understand what obstacles consumers 
face in obtaining redress. Spotting those obstacles would allow the European Union to 
offer an appropriate response to those problems. Presently, however, said empirical 
evidence is fragmentary. In particular, data is lacking regarding the actual number of 
consumer cross-border cases over a given period, as well as the number of collective 
redress claims brought so far. Additionally, there is no clear picture on the “size” of the 
enforcement gap and the impact of harmonisation measures on consumer confidence.351 
For the sake of this work, we therefore rely on the studies commissioned by the 
European Union on collective redress. We complete this information with the 
Eurobarometer surveys. These sources put the spotlight on the factors that affect 
consumers’ confidence in the market and thus, refrain them from shopping across the 
                                                
351 As Loos points out, “empirical evidence  that  full  harmonization  is  the  most  effective  means  of 
solving the perceived problems of the fragmentation of rules for the use of the internal market or of  
improving  consumer  confidence  in  the  internal  market  is  missing  entirely”. Although this argument 
concerns harmonisation of substantive consumer law, we consider that it is equally applicable to 
harmonisation of procedural laws (MBM Loos, Full Harmonisation as a Regulatory Concept and its 
Consequences for the National Legal Orders: The example of the Consumer Rights Directive, Centre for 
the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No 2010/03, 9, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/). 
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border and eventually obtain compensation for their harm. From all these documents, we 
extracted three important elements that will guide our analysis. 
166. First, empirical evidence confirms that small-value claimants are usually 
rationally apathetic. In particular, studies show that consumers would usually not seek 
redress if the amount of their damage were below 500 Euros.352 This result is 
approximately the same for cross-border transactions.353 Eurobarometers also indicate 
that some people questioned would not go to court whatever the amount of their claim.354 
However, only few people who tried to solve their dispute amicably could not come to a 
solution.355 This tendency is also reflected in cross-border transactions.356 
167. Second of all, many barriers impede consumers to seek recovery on an 
individual basis: the cost of taking action; the unawareness regarding the way to enforce 
rights; the time needed to prepare and organise the case; the risk of losing time and money 
if the case does not succeed; and the lack of bargaining power of consumers with respect 
to defendants.357 Moreover, it has to be highlighted that consumers face additional 
obstacles when their conflict entails an international component. Specifically, consumers 
who have to cross the border in order to defend their rights state that they struggle to get 
in contact with the company, face language issues, as well as additional costs and are 
confronted with differences between national legislations.358 So much that many of the 
people surveyed think that “it is ‘almost impossible’ to seek redress in relation to cross-
border purchases”.359 In all cases, only 2% of people surveyed were involved in judicial 
proceedings abroad.360 As regards collective redress, the possibility to get together 
appears to incentivise many consumers to go to court. For example, a Eurobarometer 
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shows that 41% of people surveyed would be willing to litigate their rights if they could 
join other claimants.361 This number reached 67% in a subsequent Eurobarometer.362 
168. Finally, studies underline the importance of certain entities such as consumer 
associations or public entities in order to defend consumer rights. The role of lawyers 
should also be emphasised. According to some surveys, consumers highly trust these 
actors in order to defend their rights.363 Additionally, one survey reveals that 
approximately “one in ten Europeans (…) had asked for advice or assistance from a 
consumer association”.364 Usually, they contact consumer associations in order to get 
practical information or obtain legal advice.365 To our knowledge, no empirical data has 
been gathered regarding the obstacles faced by consumer associations or public bodies 
when they have to start judicial proceedings abroad. However, the reports on the 
Injunctions Directive show that these obstacles are likely to be significant. To be more 
specific, the second report on the Injunctions Directive shows that either consumer 
associations or public authorities rarely seek injunctive relief in the courts of another 
Member State.366 Instead, representative entities usually start litigation in the market in 
which they are active, when this is possible. The report identifies various obstacles to 
cross-border actions for injunctive relief, namely the costs and length of proceedings, the 
complexity of the procedure, the limited effects of injunctions and the difficulty to enforce 
the judgment when the trader does not comply with it.367 
169. In order to reinforce those findings, we drafted our own questionnaire on 
obstacles to cross-border litigation and collective redress. After having distributed this 
questionnaire to many consumer associations and ECC Centers, we received an answer 
from three representative consumer associations –namely, Altroconsumo, ADICAE and 
DECO– that we have published in Annex III. Although this result might be quite meagre 
and does not allow us to build up strong conclusions, we could still extract interesting 
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results from those answers. We have included our conclusions in the relevant sections of 
this research project.  
As regards cross-border litigation, we asked consumer associations about 
obstacles to the start of proceedings abroad.368 Although the answers were rather sketchy, 
we had the overall impression that all the elements we listed were potential obstacles to 
cross-border litigation. Out of our list, the most relevant barriers that impede consumer 
associations to bring actions abroad appear to be the costs of proceedings, language, and 
differences in substantive laws. We asked the same question as far as cross-border 
collective redress is concerned.369 Again, responses vary significantly and all elements 
seem to be problematic. Overall, main obstacles to the start of collective redress actions 
abroad include costs of proceedings, lack of financial resources, difficulties to gather 
victims together and to distribute compensation. 
2. The Initiative of the European Union 
a. Fighting Against the Enforcement Gap with Collective Redress 
170. Through the harmonisation of substantive consumer laws at the national 
level, the European Union attempted to foster consumer confidence in the market. 
However, European institutions soon realised that the existence of substantive rights 
without procedural enforcement was useless. In light of the above, the European Union 
has explored various ways to fulfil the current enforcement gap.370 For instance, it first 
enacted the Injunctions Directive, as well as the Small Claims procedure, and then 
encouraged the use ADR mechanisms. Additionally, it strengthened the cooperation of 
public authorities regarding consumer protection. With the same goal in mind, the 
Commission started to investigate collective redress in 2007. Because this instrument is 
able to overcome rational apathy, achieve economies of scale and reduce information 
asymmetries,371 it is perceived as a serious candidate to improve access to justice.  
                                                
368 Question 3 of our questionnaire. 
369 Question 4.4 of our questionnaire. 
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Consumer Law” (2008) 1 (2) Erasmus Law Review 16-22; G Wagner, “Private Law Enforcement Through 
ADR: Wonder Drug or Snake Oil?” (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 189-190. 
  109 
171. In this context, the European institutions examined various options to 
implement this procedural tool: to start with, the Green Paper on consumer collective 
redress presented four policy options to be considered by stakeholders: these suggestions 
range from simple passivity of the European legislator to the enactment of a collective 
redress mechanism. However, the answers to the Green Paper show a strong opposition 
from business representatives who challenge the necessity of such an instrument, as well 
as the competence of the EU to take any legislative measure. Instead, business 
representatives advocate that ADR could perfectly fulfil the current enforcement gap. 
These considerations were taken into account by the Commission in its Consultation 
Paper of 2009: henceforth, judicial collective redress is only considered as a viable 
alternative if complemented with ADR mechanisms.372 In a sense, the Commission 
mitigated its options in order to make them more attractive to business representatives, 
who are the ones that should be convinced for a political consensus to be reached. 
Eventually, the Commission issued its Recommendation in 2013, which principally aims 
at facilitating access to justice for European citizens. 
172. Unfortunately, the different documents released by the Commission 
sometimes lack clarity. To begin with, the Commission does not state whether it aims at 
covering cross-border or purely national cases. Certainly, this represents an important 
decision, as it conditions the Union’s competence to legislate. Then, one does not know 
what instrument should carry out a potential legislative measure and if it should be 
binding or not. Besides, the proper terms of the documents, are quite vague: for instance, 
option 4 of the Green paper suggests that the EU could adopt “a non-binding or binding 
EU measure to ensure that a collective redress judicial mechanism exists in all Member 
States”.373 However, this choice of terms makes it difficult to guess whether the Union 
would adopt a uniform procedure available in cross-border cases on the model of the 
Small Claims procedure, whether it aims at harmonising existing national collective 
redress mechanisms, or whether it simply requires that all Member States have a 
collective redress instrument, whatever its shape. Another element that should be 
highlighted is that no collective redress model seems to be favoured by European 
institutions, although in the Consultation Paper of 2009 the Union seems to incline 
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towards the test case procedure.374 Nevertheless, the document does not advance the 
reasons for such a choice. Finally, the same happens when the Consultation Paper 
suggests the combination of ADR with collective proceedings. No studies or impact 
assessment examine the feasibility or the desirability of such a solution. It looks like the 
dispute system design is “à la carte”. 
b. The Recommendation of 2013 
173. We dedicate the next paragraphs to the last document published by the EU 
regarding collective redress, namely the Commission’s Recommendation of 2013.375 As 
explained above, the document gathers suggestions regarding the structural features that 
national collective redress instruments should follow. Such a Recommendation is both 
the outcome of a discussion regarding collective redress and the starting point of future 
steps in this field. After an in-depth analysis of the Recommendation, we conclude that 
the Recommendations establish strong safeguards but do not promote the implementation 
of efficient collective redress mechanisms. Furthermore, we believe that a future 
legislative act could possibly take the form of a harmonisation measure.376  
174. To start with, the Recommendations are restrictive in their terms. For 
instance, according to paragraph 3(a), the term collective redress should be understood as 
“(i) a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility to claim cessation of illegal behaviour 
collectively by two or more natural or legal persons or by an entity entitled to bring a 
representative action (injunctive collective redress); (ii) a legal mechanism that ensures 
a possibility to claim compensation collectively by two or more natural or legal persons 
claiming to have been harmed in a mass harm situation or by an entity entitled to bring a 
representative action (compensatory collective redress)” (emphasis added). Accordingly, 
the document offers a definition of collective redress, which does not include all existing 
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national schemes: while the Commission seems to accept the representative model, the 
Dutch WCAM is excluded from the Recommendation, inasmuch as this mechanism does 
not involve any claim for compensation or injunctive relief. In fact, parties only request 
the court to make a settlement binding. Similarly, the test case model remains out of the 
Recommendations’ scope, whereas this mechanism does not involve any representative 
claimant. As far as the class action model is concerned –for example as enacted in 
Portugal–, it is equally banned from the collective redress definition when a single person 
litigates on behalf of a group of victims. The adoption of such an excluding definition 
should be carefully pondered, as it promotes some collective redress models and rejects 
others. Here, it is surprising that the test case model, so much valued by the Consultation 
Paper of 2011, remains eventually out of the Recommendation’s scope. Similarly, it is 
not clear whether the Dutch model is concerned by the Recommendation or not, although 
the promotion of ADR is an essential policy objective of the Union.  
Similarly, the Recommendation defines a mass harm situation as a “situation 
where two or more natural or legal persons claim to have suffered harm causing damage 
resulting from the same illegal activity (…)” (emphasis added). When the illegal activity 
consists in a single act, like a shipwreck or a plane crash, no major interpretative problem 
arises. However, one may wonder whether repeatedly similar illegal behaviours might 
enter the scope of this definition. For example, firms whose Terms & Conditions are 
abusive conclude different individual contracts with consumers. As a result, in case 
numerous consumers would question the validity of an alleged abusive term in a 
collective redress action, should the tribunal consider that their situation stems from “the 
same” illegal activity?  
175. Finally, it should be underlined that the Recommendation sometimes uses 
vague terms. For example, according to paragraph 21, an opt-in based system should be 
established, unless “reasons of sound administration of justice” justify the adoption of an 
opt-out collective redress mechanism. In light of this, does sound administration of justice 
refer to manageability purposes? Or does this provision authorise the court or the 
legislator to certify or adopt an opt-out collective action when the nature of the claims –
that are so small that an opt-out scheme is the only way to make them viable– commands 
it? Additionally, it is difficult to explain the Commission’s preference for an opt-in based 
collective redress mechanism. As we stated earlier in this Chapter (supra, I.D.1.) the opt-
in system might not sufficiently foster access to justice, especially where small-value 
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claims are involved. The well functioning of the opt-out based US class action further 
reinforces this argument. Lastly, in one of her interesting contributions, Sibony confirms 
that, from a behavioural perspective, the opt-out mechanism can overcome rational 
apathy and hence, promote access to justice.377 
176. Following this, paragraphs 25 to 28 encourage Member States to use 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Nevertheless, as earlier mentioned, it is quite 
unfortunate that the Commission does not assess the desirability and suitability of such 
mechanisms for consumer disputes that are in principle fit for collective actions. 
Specifically, the Recommendation tacitly acknowledges that these disputes could make 
use of Directive 2008/52/EC on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial 
matters.378 However, it is arguable that mediation is an adequate dispute resolution tool 
for collective consumer disputes, given that many logistical problems may occur: first, 
how could a mediator maintain the level playing field between parties? How can a final 
agreement be applicable to absent parties? Who should choose the mediator and how 
should intervention of absent parties be managed? Can mediation adequately protect 
consumers’ rights as judicial proceedings would? Furthermore, the Recommendation 
does not mention whether collective redress mechanisms should encompass an ADR 
process within its structure or whether ADR should be available as an independent 
alternative to collective redress. In this regard, the European Parliament clarifies that 
ADR should be an alternative and not a pre-condition to collective redress proceedings.379  
177. Then, the Recommendations establish many safeguards that intend to control 
the use of collective redress: in particular, standing is allocated to representative entities 
and is submitted to stringent eligibility conditions; the loser-pays rule has to be 
maintained; third-party funding is limited; and, contingency fees, as well as punitive 
damages are not permitted. On the contrary, the US class action allocates standing to 
individuals; applies the American rule on costs; allows third-party funding; is based on a 
kind of contingency fees model; and permits punitive damages in certain cases. Although 
the American device is the target of many critiques, it is undoubtedly an efficient 
procedural machine. Therefore, the choice of the Commission to recommend the adoption 
of opposite structural features for collective redress is questionable. Accordingly, the 
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workability of a collective redress tool that would include all these characteristics is 
doubtful. In an interesting and instructive paper, Hodges explains that the use of a 
procedural vehicle can be incentivised or refrained thanks to certain levers.380 For 
instance, a private enforcement system that would imply no costs for the claimant; 
establish the loser-pays rule as a principle; provide high damages; allow contingency fees 
and punitive damages; accept wide discovery practices as well as jury trial and facilitate 
aggregation of claims, would encourage litigation.381 On the contrary, the absence of such 
levers would reduce the amount of litigation in a given system. As a result, we observe 
that the safeguards established by the Commission in its Recommendation act as 
disincentives to litigate. However, the document does not offer substitution incentives 
that would counterbalance these limitations and foster access to justice. As Nagy states, 
“the Recommendation, in essence, interdicts the risk premium devices of US law, which 
are rather unpopular in Europe, anyway, while it fails to offer any surrogate”.382 
Specifically, the obligation for Member States to introduce a collective redress 
mechanism into their legal order is not an incentive in itself because it does not guarantee 
the efficiency of the procedural tool. We consider that the Recommendation should 
achieve a certain balance between the protection of the defendant from unmeritorious 
claims and access to justice. In fact, the Commission’s focus on safeguards is not fully 
justified, since Member States have enacted procedural tools that respect the rights of 
both parties. The proof of this fact is that no litigation “boom” has occurred in European 
legal orders, even in Portugal, where a system that looks like the US class action device 
was adopted. 
178. In our opinion, the focus of the Recommendations on the protection of the 
rights of the defence demonstrates two things: first, it is arguable that the 
Recommendation improves access too justice because, as we mentioned earlier, no 
incentives to litigate was introduced in the document of the Commission. In fact, uniform 
safeguards have the effect of guaranteeing that some minimum procedural standards are 
maintained in any collective redress proceedings, regardless of where the litigation takes 
place. Consequently, this measure probably aims at fostering mutual trust, which in turn 
facilitates the recognition and enforcement of judicial decisions within the EU. However, 
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we do not see how minimum standards of protection in favour of the defendant can 
actually motivate consumers to start litigation. Second of all, the fact that the Commission 
mainly focuses on the rights of the defence and imposes restrictive structural features to 
collective redress is probably the visible result of the lack of political consensus between 
consumer representatives on the one hand, and business representatives on the other. 
Therefore, the only possible trade-off is to encourage Member States to adopt collective 
redress mechanisms but under stringent conditions. This time, it seems to us that the 
Commission has failed to establish an even playing field between the rights of claimants 
and defendants.  
179. Finally, the Recommendation does not truly tackle the cross-border problems 
that collective redress may trigger. Paragraph 17 only clarifies that national procedural 
rules should not hinder parties of another Member State from initiating collective redress 
actions. This result is certainly unfortunate as private international law issues are 
numerous. This “oversight” reveals that the European institutions probably do not intend 
to clarify private international law rules and adapt them to collective redress. Instead, the 
procedural nature of the Recommendation somehow indicates that the Commission is 
certainly thinking about approximating the national procedural rules on collective redress, 
pursuant to Article 114 TFUE. However, the opportunity to use Article 81 TFEU in order 
to enact a cross-border collective redress procedure should not be discarded. The 
competence of the Union to enact such rules is examined below (infra; C.2.). 
180. To sum up, our analysis shows that the initiatives of the Union in the field of 
collective redress are hesitant. The lack of political consensus and data surely contributed 
to such a result. Eventually, the Commission published a non-binding Recommendation 
in 2013. This document essentially sets up safeguards against abusive litigation but does 
not actually foster access to justice. Since it rejects the features adopted by the US class 
action model, it is unlikely that the Recommendation actually boosts the efficiency of 
collective redress mechanisms. 
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C. Opponents’ Objections to Collective Redress 
1. ADR as the Only Means to Solve Consumer Disputes 
181. As the documents released by the European institutions show, opponents to 
the adoption of collective redress argue that the necessity of such a procedural tool in the 
European judicial system is far from obvious. Rather, they consider that ADR383 are a 
satisfying means to address consumer disputes, and thus, that collective redress is not 
needed. This argument is partially valid: on the one hand, the different investigations 
leaded by the European Union demonstrate that an important enforcement gap exists 
regarding consumer disputes. On the other hand, however, opponents rightly point out 
that the European Union has failed in its attempt to establish the usefulness of collective 
redress in comparison with other extrajudicial mechanisms. For this reason, this section 
investigates and reveals the added value of collective redress in comparison with its direct 
competitor: consumer ADR. This analysis is not an exhaustive assessment, which aims 
at determining, in absolute terms, whether one tool is better than the other. Rather, we 
evaluate whether collective redress is a priori useless where ADR mechanisms exist, 
because in such a case, the debate regarding the implementation of collective redress 
would become worthless. Therefore, our work offers a primer on this particular topic. 
182. Before starting our analysis, we make two disclaimers: in the first place, it 
must be recalled that collective redress takes very different forms. Therefore, the 
comments we make below could not be equally applicable to every collective redress 
mechanism. Consequently, and in order to facilitate our comparative assessment, the 
concept of collective redress will equate to the most commonly used mechanism within 
the EU, namely the representative model. In the second place, we set aside the debate 
over the suitability of ADR to consumer disputes: undeniably, consumer ADR schemes 
are popping up all over Europe and are here to stay.384 Consequently, it is pointless to 
question their existence. Against this backdrop, our analysis starts by comparing the 
characteristics of collective redress with ADR from a structural perspective. The objective 
is to shed light on the comparative advantages that each instrument possesses and 
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underline their differences (infra; a.). Then, we pinpoint the specific issues that these two 
systems face when they are used in a cross-border context (infra; b.). We conclude that 
the usefulness of collective redress cannot be dismissed. In our opinion, ADR and 
collective redress are complementary mechanisms: we observe that they might serve as 
procedural vehicles for different types of disputes and solve distinct cross-border issues, 
although their coverage sometimes overlap. In this sense, we deem that the opponents’ 
argument is not valid. 
a. Consumer ADR and Collective Redress Compared… 
183. Consumer ADR mechanisms –also called CADR or CDR– encompass any 
out-of-court process, which aims at resolving disputes involving consumers –the 
denominated B2C disputes.385 Arbitration, conciliation and mediation are typical 
consumer ADR. A leading study on the use of ADR prepared by Civic Consulting 
observes that in 2007, over 750 CADR systems were registered across Europe.386 A look 
at the structure of these mechanisms shows that important variations exist both, 
geographically and materially: while some ADR schemes are linked to public authorities, 
others are private bodies; they may be financed through public or private means; their 
coverage could be sector-based or general; some ADR bodies apply the law, while others 
use equity; the outcome of the process might be binding or not for parties; and the 
adherence of businesses to an ADR scheme in a certain sector could be mandatory or 
not.387 In light of the above, the ADR Directive of 2013388 aims at improving the current 
system by requiring Member States to extend the coverage of their ADR schemes and 
building up uniform quality standards.  
184. Even though consumer ADR mechanisms are heterogeneous, they often 
constitute an interesting alternative to court proceedings in terms of costs, flexibility and 
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time:389 as regards the financial aspect, some consumer ADR entities offer their services 
to consumers for free, such as the Spanish Sistema Arbitral de Consumo,390 whereas 
others require the payment of a modest fee. This is the case of the Dutch 
Geschillencommissie,391 a group of sector-based complaints commissions offering 
different dispute resolution procedures. Depending on the sector, consumers have to pay 
a registration fee of approximately 25 to 125 Euros. These fees are refunded if the 
consumer wins the case. Another advantage of consumer ADR is that the procedure is 
often more flexible and efficient: written procedures rather than oral hearings are often 
preferred, legal representation is not always required, online tools are sometimes 
available, and the decision-making process might be based on fairness rather than law.392 
Finally, thanks to streamlined procedures, ADR are deemed to be quicker than court 
proceedings. In particular, the Civic Consulting study that we mentioned above estimates 
that ADR entities usually issue a decision within a timeframe of 90 days.393  
185. That being said, consumer ADR mechanisms equally suffer from important 
drawbacks: first of all, the high number of mechanisms whose coverage is limited makes 
it difficult for consumers and businesses to know and have access to all the existing 
dispute resolution tools.394 This means that some consumer disputes might not be covered 
by a specific ADR scheme. Second of all, the use of ADR is voluntary. As a result, 
businesses that are reluctant to use out-of-court mechanisms or to comply with a non-
binding decision could call into question the viability of consumer ADR.395 Lastly, it is 
doubtful that all ADR instruments successfully tackle the absence of level playing field 
between parties in consumer disputes: for example, traders are usually well advised and 
represented by lawyers. Contrastingly, consumers may often renounce to hire a lawyer in 
order to avoid paying fees. Therefore, the preparation of the case and the development of 
arguments might be uneven. In the same way, mediators could experience difficulties in 
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maintaining a certain balance between a consumer and a trader, given that mediators only 
empower parties to reach their own agreement and are not supposed to actively intervene 
in the conflict. 
186. We now turn to examine the virtues and vices of collective redress, in 
comparison with consumer ADR. To begin with, since the cost of collective redress 
proceedings is either borne by a representative claimant or spread among all the victims, 
this procedure is likely to be cheap enough to fit low-value cases. This is particularly true 
if the collective redress mechanism is opt-out based. In this sense, collective redress could 
occasionally serve as a more adequate procedural vehicle than ADR mechanisms do.396 
Furthermore, collective actions could also be useful in case ADR bodies do not cover 
claims arising from a particular sector. Then, consumers could resort to collective redress 
when businesses refuses to participate in any out-of-court dispute resolution process. 
Finally, it must be highlighted that collective redress mostly suits small-value claims, 
which are numerous and widespread. Hence, contrarily to ADR, this instrument is not an 
option when damages only concern an individual consumer. In this vein, we notice that 
these devices may deal with different types of disputes.  
187. Nevertheless, some ADR entities also provide collective redress procedures, 
and thus, directly compete with the judicial system. In particular, the Civic Consulting 
Study on the use of ADR indicates that three kinds of collective redress procedures exist: 
the first one consists in a representative process,397 whereby a representative body 
“litigates” on behalf of a number of victims. The Spanish Sistema Arbitral de Consumo, 
The Lisbon Arbitration Center, the Service de médiation auprès du groupe SNCB in 
France and, the Service de médiation pour le secteur postal in Belgium provide such a 
tool. Then, some ADR service providers perform collective investigations.398 Under this 
model, various cases are explored together and the decision-maker renders a subsequent 
single decision applicable to all claims. Finally, the collective procedure of the 
Scandinavian type allows an Ombudsman to initiate proceedings before an ADR body on 
behalf of multiple consumers.399 There is no need for consumers to be identified or to 
actively manifest their desire to be bound by the decision. Although ADR entities have 
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set up collective redress procedures, their experience remains limited.400 In fact, 
according to the Study, some ADR bodies consider that courts are better equipped to deal 
with complex cases.401 Indeed, it seems that consumer ADR suits simple disputes. Finally, 
the non-binding nature of a decision issued in an ADR process could undermine the 
effectiveness of collective redress.402  
188. Similarly, the combination of arbitration with collective procedures –that 
gave rise to the concept of class arbitration403– have generated intense debates regarding 
the desirability and workability of such a cocktail in the United States: on the one hand, 
one may argue that nothing impedes the transplant of the class action device to 
arbitration.404 In particular, the federal legislation on arbitration neither invites nor 
prohibits class arbitration.405 On the other hand, and as we mentioned earlier, when class 
actions merge with arbitration, adaptability issues may appear.406 Besides, class 
arbitration engenders due process concerns:407 specifically, since arbitration is a matter 
of consent, parties keep control on the design of the procedure. Therefore, the rights of 
absent parties in a class arbitration could be in danger.408 In an attempt to solve this issue, 
some consumer arbitration service providers solicit the intervention of courts in the class 
arbitration process.409 However, this intervention may greatly complicate and slow down 
                                                
400 For example, the Spanish consumer arbitration system allows for class arbitration (Article 56 of Royal 
Decree 231/2008 of February 15, which establishes the Consumer Arbitration System). However, according 
to a relatively recent paper written by A Montesinos García (“Últimas tendencias en la Unión Europea 
sobre las acciones colectivas de consumo. La posible introducción de fórmulas de ADR” [2014] 12 Revista 
electrónica del Departamento de Derecho de la Universidad de La Rioja 104) no such action has ever taken 
place. More generally, Radicati di Brozolo observes that Europe should see no “waves of class action 
arbitrations” any time soon (LG Radicati di Brozolo, “Class Arbitration in Europe?” in Nuyts and 
Hatzimihail, supra n 244, 219). 
401 Civic Consulting, supra n 386, 109. 
402 Ibid. 
403 S Strong, “Does Class Arbitration ‘Change the Nature’ of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a 
Return to First Principles”, (2012) 17 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 205-210. 
404 Ibid, 201-271. The author compares class arbitration with other multiparty arbitration proceedings and 
concludes that, although these devices sometimes differ, class arbitration does not “change the nature” of 
arbitration. Therefore, class proceedings should not be excluded from arbitration on this ground; Keating 
v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App.3d 784 (California Court of Appeal, 1982), 492. In this famous case, which 
is one of the earliest judgment dealing with class arbitration, the California Court of Appeals ruled that 
“there is no insurmountable obstacle to conducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis. In an appropriate 
case, such a procedure undoubtedly would be the fairest and most efficient way of resolving the parties 
dispute”. 
405 This has been highlighted by the Supreme Court of California in Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 
584 (1982), 608-614. 
406 See supra para 39. 
407 J Sternlight, “As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action 
Surivive?” (2000) 42 William and Mary Law Review 52-53. 
408 AT&T Mobility LLC, supra n 66, 348-349. 
409 MA Weston, “Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions” (2006) 
47 (5) William and Mary Law Review 1732-1740. 
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the pace of arbitration.410 Some arbitration organisations such as the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) also promulgated specific procedural rules applying to 
this particular model or arbitration.411  
Recently, however, two phenomena appear to have closed this debate: first, the 
US Supreme Court issued two important decisions, which greatly limit the use of class 
actions in arbitration. To begin with, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,412 the 
Supreme Court ruled that the availability of class arbitration cannot be inferred from an 
arbitration clause that does not tackle this particular question. Put it differently, absent an 
explicit reference to class arbitration, this instrument is not available to parties. Then, 
traders who are willing to avoid any kind of class proceedings can insert arbitration 
clauses into their contracts with consumers coupled with a class action waiver.413 
Consequently, some argue that access to justice is substantially undermined since 
victims’ only option is to proceed in arbitration on an individual basis.414  
As a result, the American experience shows that class arbitration may not be the 
best venue to deal with consumer disputes, given that such a mix might generate 
important practical and due process concerns. 
b. … in a Cross-Border Context 
189. As regard cross-border disputes, the following paragraphs demonstrate that 
consumer ADR may not offer a better forum for consumers’ complaints than collective 
redress. Here too, the ADR Directive should be taken into account as the text equally 
covers cross-border consumer disputes. 
                                                
410 J Sternlight, supra n 407, 49-52. 
411 AAA, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration, available at 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%
20Arbitrations.pdf. 
412 AT&T Mobility LLC, supra n 66. 
413 A class action waiver can be defined as an arbitration provision “that only authorizes claims brought in 
an individual capacity or that expressly bans representative class actions in arbitration or court” (MA 
Weston, “The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?” [2012] 60 Kansas Law Review 767).  
414 In that respect, the Supreme Court of California stated that “[i]f the right to a classwide proceeding could 
be automatically eliminated in relationships governed by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of a 
provision for arbitration, the potential for undercutting these class action principles, and for chilling the 
effective protection of interests common to a group, would be substantial. Arbitration proceedings may 
well provide certain offsetting advantages through savings of time and expense; but, depending upon the 
nature of the issues and the evidence to be presented, it is at least doubtful that such advantages could 
compensate for the unfairness inherent in forcing hundreds or perhaps thousands, of individuals asserting 
claims involving common issues of fact and law to litigate them in separate proceedings against a party 
with vastly superior resources” (Keating v. Superior Court, supra n 405, 609). 
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190. Consumers or their representatives often have to initiate collective 
proceedings at the domicile of the defendant. As Chapter III further details, the general 
forum of Article 4 BRIbis –and Article 7(2) BRIbis to a certain extent– will usually be 
the only forum where collective proceedings may take place. In the same fashion, the 
complaint of a consumer against a trader domiciled in another Member State will likely 
be presented to an ADR entity based in the State in which the trader has its seat. This can 
be explained by the fact that, under the ADR Directive, Member States “shall ensure that 
disputes covered by the Directive and which involve a trader established on their 
respective territories can be submitted to an ADR entity which complies with the 
requirements set out in this Directive” (emphasis added).415 And to add: “Member States 
shall ensure that ADR entities: (…) accept both domestic and cross-border disputes”.416 
In other words, the ADR Directive requires ADR service providers to accept claims 
lodged by consumers domiciled in a different Member State than the one in which they 
operate. However, the Directive does not oblige them to accept claims brought against 
foreign traders.417 Exceptionally, ADR bodies sometimes cover these claims if businesses 
accept to be submitted to their “jurisdiction” (“voluntary jurisdiction”).418 
191. In this context, the role of ECC-Net –as well as FIN-Net for financial 
matters– should be emphasised. Indeed, in each Member State, the European Consumer 
Centres (hereafter, ECC) inform consumers about their rights, assist them with their 
cross-border complaints and if necessary, help them to find the appropriate ADR entity 
where they could resolve their dispute.419 In particular, when consumers are not able to 
find any amicable solution to their conflict with a trader located abroad, they can direct 
their complaint to the ECC of their domicile –also called the consumer ECC.420 This 
Centre supports the consumer and offers translation services if needed. Then, the 
consumer ECC transfer the complaint to the ECC of the trader’s seat –also called the 
trader ECC–, which in turn send the case to the appropriate ADR scheme. The latter 
contacts and informs the trader about the complaint and tries to solve the conflict. 
                                                
415 Article 5(1) of the ADR Directive.  
416 Article 5(2)(e) of the ADR Directive. 
417 F Gascón Inchausti, “Specific Problems of Cross-Border Consumer ADR: What Solutions?” in Stürner 
et al., supra n 385, 37 and 44-48. 
418 For example, the firm PayPal accepts to be submitted to the competence of the English Financial 
Ombudsman Service, albeit it is seated in Luxembourg (C Hodges et al., supra n 387, 276). 
419 ECC Denmark, Cross-Border Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Europe – Practical Reflections on the 
Need and Availability (2009), 10, available at http://dokumenter.forbrug.dk/forbrugereuropa/crossborder-
dispute-resolution/. 
420 For more information on the case-handling procedure, see ECC Denmark, supra n 419, 10-12. 
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However, in practice, not many cases are actually transferred to an ADR entity: rather, 
ECCs usually contact the trader directly and attempt to find an amicable solution.421 
According to an ECC-Net report on cross-border dispute resolution of 2009,422 from all 
complaints received in 2007, only 3.7% were forwarded to an ADR body. This figure 
increased to 4.9% for the year 2008. Furthermore, the report indicates that during these 
two years, ECCs resolved half of the complaints that were sent to them. It seems that the 
lack of available ADR schemes in many sectors is the primary cause of this result. Thanks 
to the adoption of the ADR Directive, which requires Member States to offer general 
coverage for all contractual obligations stemming from sales contracts or service 
contracts, this problem might partially dissapear in the future. 
192. Importantly, some empirical studies show that the use of ADR by traders 
remains very low, which contradicts the argument of collective redress’ opponents. In 
particular, the Flash Eurobarometer 186423 on business attitudes towards cross-border 
sales and consumer protection of December 2006 indicates that only 3% of the traders 
interviewed use ADR on a regular basis. The rest do not use out-of-court mechanisms 
either, because they do not know their existence (41%), or because they do not need them 
(39%). Subsequently, the Flash Eurobarometer 224424 of January 2008 that is a follow-
up on the previously-mentioned investigation comes to the same result. As for the Flash 
Eurobarometer 278425 of November 2009, it states that 8% of traders did use ADR to 
solve their disputes with consumers in the past two years –this figure raises to 9% in 
2010426, 10% in 2011427 and drops to 7% in 2012428–, while 48% of traders said they did 
not need to use ADR. To sum up, although the use of ADR increases over time, the 
number of businesses that actually resort to out-of-court mechanisms remains low. 
                                                
421 Ibid, 10-12. 
421 Ibid, 12. 
422 Ibid, 17 and 57. 
423 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 186, Business attitudes towards cross-border sales and 
consumer protection (2006), 49. 
424 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 224, Business attitudes towards cross-border sales and 
consumer protection (2008), 45. 
425 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 278, Business attitudes towards enforcement and redress 
in the Internal Market (2009), 69. 
426 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 300, Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and 
consumer protection (2011), 76. 
427 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 331, Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and 
consumer protection (2012), 124. 
428 European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 359, Retailers’ attitudes towards cross-border trade and 
consumer protection (2013) 130-131. 
  123 
193. On the consumer side, notwithstanding the important role of the ECC-Net in 
facilitating the resolution of international B2C disputes, many barriers still refrain them 
from complaining abroad. Both the Study on the use of ADR in the European Union429 
and the IMCO Study on cross-border ADR430 identify these obstacles, which sometimes 
overlap with the ones present in purely domestic cases. These include the absence of ADR 
schemes in certain industries or areas and the reluctance of traders to participate in an 
ADR procedure, respectively the risk of non-compliance of a non-binding decision.431 
Other issues specific to cross-border conflicts embrace language barriers, potential travel 
costs for the consumer, and lack of awareness regarding the ADR system.432 For example, 
the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), which deals with consumer disputes against 
traders located in the United Kingdom is the most important ADR service provider in the 
European Union. Indeed, the Ombudsman usually deals with more than 2 million 
inquiries and complaints a year, while other ADR schemes typically assess between 2.000 
and 10.000 cases a year. It is interesting to note that between 2009 and 2014, the number 
of cross-border complaints presented to the FOS represented between 1 and 2% of the 
total inquiries and complaints that the service provider dealt with.433 
194. In a cross-border context, the role of Online Dispute Resolution (hereafter, 
ODR) should not be underestimated. Specifically, ODR is another path to consumer 
dispute resolution, which combines ADR with the use of technologies.434 For instance,435 
the automated resolution system mechanism is an instrument whereby parties go through 
an online negotiation scheme by proposing settlement amounts. Other ODR mechanisms 
that are worth mentioning are online mediation and arbitration. Both instruments respect 
the traditional principles of ADR but include e-forms of communication into the dispute 
resolution process. The main advantage of ODR is certainly its ability to reduce costs: 
given that face-to-face meetings are solved by the use of technologies, parties may avoid 
travel and accommodation expenses. Nevertheless, ODR does not solve potential 
                                                
429 Civic Consulting, supra n 386. 
430 European Parliament, Cross-Border Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union, 
P/A/IMCO/ST/2010-15, PE464.424 (2011), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/imco/dv/adr_study_/adr_study_en.pdf. 
431 Civic Consulting, supra n 386, 112-115; European Parliament, supra n 430, 48-51. 
432 European Parliament, supra n 430, 48-51. 
433 Compare the figures presented by the FOS in its annual reports, available at http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/publications/annual-reviews.htm. 
434 Creutzfeldt, supra n 385, 6. 
435 The following examples are extracted from S Yuthayotin, Access to justice in Transnational B2C E-
Commerce - A Multidimensional Analysis of Consumer Protection Mechanisms (Springer, 2015) 237-240.  
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language differences and most importantly, it requires parties’ consent to submit their 
dispute to an out-of-court system. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, usual rules relevant 
for ADR schemes apply. However, technologies may circumvent jurisdictional issues if 
the dispute resolution process can entirely be held without the parties’ physical presence 
in the foreign forum.  
The ODR Regulation of 2013436 aims at resolving these cross-border concerns by 
setting up a free-of-charge dispute resolution platform.437 Specifically, this system deals 
with conflicts that arise in connection with online sales or service contracts. In order to 
achieve this objective, the platform allows claimants to fill out an online complaint form 
in one of the official languages of the EU. If necessary, the complaint is then translated 
and sent to the trader. As soon as the trader accepts to go through an ADR procedure, the 
ODR platform assists parties in searching for the appropriate ADR. This platform also 
serves as a forum to conduct the online resolution of the dispute. It is worth mentioning 
that the Union commits itself to proceed to the translation of all documents transferred 
via the platform. In light of these considerations, the ODR platform removes potential 
language barriers between the parties, as well as travelling costs.438 These are certainly 
important improvements. However, the ODR Regulation is submitted to party autonomy 
and thus, its effectiveness would be impaired if traders were reluctant to use ODR as a 
method to solve their conflict with consumers. Additionally, it must be underlined that 
the ODR platform has a limited coverage.  
195. Cross-border collective redress may achieve great economies of scale in 
terms of costs as well. Furthermore, both the preparation and the defence of the case may 
be easier thanks to the representative’s better expertise. Often, the representative will be 
assisted by a lawyer. Language issues may also be overcome for the same reason. Last 
but not least, it must be highlighted that judicial collective proceedings are not submitted 
to parties’ consent: indeed, once the action is brought, the defendant will be led into the 
judicial machinery disregarding his consent. As far as jurisdiction is concerned, Chapter 
III demonstrates that the only viable forum to litigate a collective action will usually be 
located at the defendant’s domicile. However, this could be problematic in the absence of 
funding, considering that initiating judicial collective proceedings abroad is expensive. 
                                                
436 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013, supra n 319. 
437 This platform is operational since 9 January 2016 and is accessible through the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/odr. 
438 Gascón Inchausti, supra n 417, 54-56. 
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On the negative side of the balance, however, collective redress instruments are not 
available in all fields of law and sometimes lack efficiency. 
196. As a result, we observe that collective redress is an interesting tool that could 
possibly complement ADR439 in fields that remain outside their scope. Similarly, 
collective redress appears to be particularly appropriate where numerous victims, who are 
geographically dispersed, suffer a damage that is individually low but globally huge. 
From an international perspective, cross-border collective redress entails as many 
advantages as ADR. Therefore, the choice of either instrument must be made on a case-
by-case basis. The results of our questionnaire seem to confirm this fact: indeed, 
consumer associations believe that both, ADR and collective redress are useful –with the 
exception of ADICAE who believes that ADR represent a superior means to solve 
disputes.440 
Besides, collective redress may be constructed as an incentive for parties to first 
go through an ADR procedure, and consider collective proceedings as the ultima ratio. 
However, the development of ADR without collective redress would not give the right 
incentives. This has been underlined in the Netherlands, where discussions advocate the 
implementation of judicial collective redress in connection with the Dutch WCAM based 
on a voluntary settlement mechanism. It has been argued that the existence of a binding 
collective redress procedure would encourage parties to settle, as the alternative would 
not be “no litigation at all” any more but go through collective redress proceedings.441 To 
sum up, the added value of collective redress is evidenced and thus, the argument of 
opponents to this device is not viable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
439 On this argument, see also the analysis of M Stürner, “ADR and Adjudication by State Courts: 
Competitors or Complements?” in Stürner et al., supra n 385, 11-29. 
440 Question 4.5 of our questionnaire. 
441 See the Dutch Consultation on a draft bill on Redress of Mass Damages in a Collective Action (July 
2014), available at https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/motiedijksma/document/1177. 
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2. Competence of the European Union 
197. In 2008, the Feedback Statement on the Green Paper revealed that some 
industry representatives, legal experts and to a lesser extent public authorities challenge 
the competence of the EU to implement measures regarding collective redress. In their 
opinion, Articles 81, 114 and 169 TFEU, as well as the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality would limit the legislative competence of European institutions, in 
particular as regards the adoption of a collective redress procedure applicable in every 
Member State –which corresponds to option 4 of the Green Paper.442 They contend that 
further investigation is needed on this particular question before any measure is adopted. 
Moreover, in the Consultation Paper of 2009, some industry representatives argued that 
the Union would only have the power to enact provisions regarding cross-border 
collective redress.443  
This argument is a priori valid: it is commonly acknowledged that the European 
Union does not enjoy a general competence to legislate.444 Rather, the institutions have 
to respect the principle of conferral. Besides, Member States’ procedural autonomy 
should be preserved. Recently, however, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in 
combination with a relatively extensive interpretation of its wording by the ECJ, has 
amplified the possibility for the Union to regulate procedural questions.  
198. As far as collective redress is concerned, two main provisions might 
constitute a relevant legal basis on which the EU could establish its power to legislate: 
Articles 81 and 114 TFEU –coupled with 169(2)(a) TFEU. This section voluntarily 
excludes other possible grounds. Specifically, Article 169(2)(b) TFEU is not examined, 
given that it severely limits the Union’s competence.445 Then, Article 352(1) TFEU 
equally remains outside the scope of this research project, as the unanimity of the Council 
                                                
442 Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium (CPEC), Assessment of the economic and social impact of the 
policy options to empower consumers to obtain adequate redress - Final analytical report on the Green 
Paper on consumer collective redress submitted by the Consumer Policy Evaluation Consortium (2009), 9-
10, available on the Commission’s website, supra n 325.  
443 European Commission, Feedback Statement of the Consultation Paper of 2009, 3, available on the 
Commission’s website, supra n 325. 
444 B Hess, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht: ein Lehrbuch (CF Müller, 2010), 28. 
445 Article 169(2)(b) TFEU does not allow the EU to legislatively impose its own policy objectives. The 
purpose of this provision is to coordinate or reinforce existing national policies regarding consumer law 
(DH Wendt, “Kollektiver Rechtsschutz in Europa – Kompetenzen, Alternativen und Safeguards” [2011] 
22 [16] Europaische Zeitschrift für Wirtschatsrecht 618; B Lurger, “Art. 169 AEUV” in R Streinz (ed), 
Vertrag über die Europäische Union une Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union [CH Beck, 
2nd edn, 2012], 1732). 
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would be required in order to implement provisions regarding collective redress. 
However, as earlier mentioned, the Council mainly represents Member States who do not 
show much enthusiasm about this new procedural tool. Finally, despite the non-negligible 
role of the ECJ in fostering private enforcement through the respect of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness, it does not have the power to provide national procedural 
rules on collective redress. 
a. Article 81 TFEU 
199. According to Article 81(1) TFEU “[t]he Union shall develop judicial 
cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, based on the principle of 
mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases”. As Article 81(2) 
TFEU clarifies: “[f]or the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the 
Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt 
measures, particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market, 
aimed at ensuring: (…) (c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States 
concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction; (…) (f) the elimination of obstacles to the 
proper functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of 
the rules on civil procedure applicable in Member States”.  
200. Article 81 TFEU (ex-Article 65 TEC) is a potential legal basis on which the 
Union could lay down in case it aims at regulating collective redress procedures in cross-
border traffic. For example, the measure could consist in enacting an “autonomous” 
collective procedure at the European level on the model of the Small Claims Procedure. 
Similarly, Article 81 TFEU permits the promulgation of private international law rules, 
which would take into account the specificities of collective redress.  
There are two fundamental requirements that any European initiative based on 
this provision must comply with: first of all, the legislative measure has to be limited to 
cross-border cases. Although the interpretation of this requirement is controversial,446 one 
must admit that this condition is fulfilled at least when parties are domiciled or seated in 
different Member States.447 Second, the measure undertaken must concern civil matters. 
                                                
446 B Hess, supra n 444, 34-36; S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), 
609-611. 
447 B Hess, supra n 444, 35; S Leible, “Art. 81 AEUV”, in Streinz, supra n 445, 957. This author highlights 
that the European Commission advocates for a broad definition of the cross-border requirement. 
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For the definition of this term, we can refer to the case law of the ECJ, which delineates 
this concept by reference to some European instruments, like the BRIbis.448 Finally, it 
must be underlined that since the Lisbon Treaty, it is not required that the measure strictly 
aims at improving the functioning of the internal market.449 Indeed, the previous version 
of Article 81 TFEU stated that “measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil 
matters having cross-border implications, [can] be taken (…) in so far as necessary for 
the proper functioning of the internal market” (emphasis added). Therefore, the wording 
of Article 65 TEC seemed to require a stronger link between this concept and the measure 
to be enforced. Nevertheless, strong debates arose regarding the interpretation of this 
provision since its elaboration: while some consider the internal market necessity as 
merely programmatic, others advocate for the imposition of strict competency 
limitations.450 Eventually, Article 81 TFEU crystalizes the earlier expansive 
interpretation of Article 65 TEC: henceforth, by using the wording “in particular”, Article 
81 TFEU does not require initiatives to be related to the internal market.  
201. Then, Article 81(2) TFEU establishes that the measure at stake must ensure 
one of the goals listed in the provision. The catalogue is exhaustive.451 Among other 
things, lit. (c) enables the EU to enact private international law provisions, and lit. (f) 
makes it possible for the Union to adopt measures enhancing the compatibility of Member 
States’ civil procedural rules. The objective of lit. (f) consists in offering access to justice 
and effective legal protection.452 Finally, lit. (g) encourages the development of ADR 
mechanisms.  
202. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Article 81 TFEU overrides the application 
of Article 114 TFEU,453 which enables the Union to undertake harmonisation measures. 
This can be explained by the proper wording of Article 114 TFEU, which states that the 
provision is applicable “[s]ave where otherwise provided in the Treaties”. Where the 
                                                
Accordingly, it considers that said requirement is fulfilled every time the case entails any international 
component. 
448 Leible, supra n 447, 957; Peers, supra n 446, 608. 
449 Leible, supra n 447, 958; Peers, supra n 446, 605. 
450 B Hess, supra n 444, 33-34; E Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law – A Policy Area Uncovered 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), 43. 
451 M Kotzur, “Article 81 TFEU”, in R Geiger et al., European Union Treaties – A Commentary (CH 
Beck/Hart, 2015), 439. 
452 Ibid, 441. 
453 Ibid, 439. Contra: Committee on Legal Affairs, Europeanisation of Civil Procedure: Towards Common 
Minimum Standards?, PE 559.499 (2015), 14-15, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_IDA(2015)559499. 
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European Union shares its competence with Member States, the contemplated measure 
must respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (Articles 5(3) and 4 TEU). 
203. In light of these considerations, we theoretically see no obstacle to the 
enactment of a European collective redress procedure that would deal with cross-border 
cases in conformity with Article 81(2)(f) TFEU. In case the Union would rather enact 
specific private international law rules regarding collective redress and thus, foster the 
interoperability of national laws in this field, then Article 81(2)(c) TFEU would be the 
appropriate legal basis. In any case, Article 81 TFEU is not restricted to a certain area of 
substantive law.454 Therefore, a horizontal approach to collective redress would be 
possible under this provision. 
b. Article 114 TFEU 
204. If the European institutions intend to harmonise455 national procedural rules 
on collective redress, Article 114(1) TFEU (ex-Article 100a and 95 EC) is the relevant 
legal basis to examine. According to this provision, the Council, acting by qualified 
majority, together with the Parliament, may “adopt the measures for the approximation 
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States 
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market”. The 
content of Article 114(1) TFEU has been interpreted by the prominent First Tobacco 
Advertising case.456 In this judgment, the ECJ ruled that the European Union does not 
have a general and inherent competence to regulate.457 Rather, any measure of 
approximation must be tightly linked to the establishment and the functioning of the 
internal market. Moreover, the competence that Article 114 TFEU confers to the Union 
has to be exercised in conformity with the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
                                                
454 However, the adoption of measures in the field of family law is submitted to the special legislative 
procedure, pursuant to Article 81(3) TFEU. 
455 In European procedural law, this concept should be broadly interpreted. See B Hess, “Procedural 
Harmonisation in a European Context” in XE Kramer and CH van Rhee (eds), Civil Litigation in a 
Globalising World (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012), 160, who states that “the term shall designate all kinds of 
the external influences to procedural systems. This approach encompasses the adaptation and reform of 
existing legal systems which are triggered by the competition between the national systems. (…) In 
European procedural law, a heterogeneous termonology is found ranging from approximation, 
coordination, cooperation, and harmonisation to unification”. 
456 Case C-376/98 Germany v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419. 
457 Ibid, paras 83-84. 
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Exceptionally, Member States can derogate a harmonisation measure pursuant to Articles 
114(4)-(9) TFEU. 
205. Article 114(1) TFEU imposes three requirements:458 first, there must be 
diverging national legislations in the particular sector that is to be the object of a 
harmonisation measure. Similarly, this provision is applicable when the enactment of 
future laws at the local level threatens the good functioning of the internal market. In this 
context, the ECJ clarified that the existence of differences between national laws does not 
automatically confer the right to harmonise. Furthermore, it is not necessary that all 
Member States previously legislated in the field that is the object of the harmonisation 
measure. Then, these diverging national rules must constitute an obstacle to trade or 
threaten to act as such.459 Therefore, this statement implies that a certain interstate activity 
exists between various Member States.460 In other words, in an integrated area, 
harmonisation is justified only if interaction between distinct territories is present.461 
Conversely, where all disputes remain local, no supranational act to harmonise is 
necessary.  
Once these legislative differences are recorded, one has to verify that these lead 
either, to a restriction of the freedom of goods or services or to a distortion of competition. 
This is the second requirement necessary for the application of Article 114 TFEU.  
Finally, the approximation measure must aim at establishing an internal market 
(Article 26 TFEU). According to the case law that followed the First Tobacco Advertising 
case, it is not necessary that the measure only aims at improving the functioning of the 
internal market. Rather, the ECJ accepts that once it is established that the measure fulfils 
the requirements imposed by Article 114 TFEU, then it does not matter if this measure 
additionally pursues another goal –such as the protection of public health of consumers. 
                                                
458 Following the scheme suggested by F Geber, “Rechtsangleichung nach Art. 114 AEUV im Spiegel der 
EuGH-Rechtsprechung” (2014) 1 Juristische Schulung 22-23. 
459 I Maletić, The Law and Policy of Harmonisation in Europe’s Internal Market (Edward Elgar, 2013), 
43-45. 
460 For example in the Case C-380/03 Germany v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-11573, claimants 
were seeking the annulment of two provisions of Directive 2003/33/EC that restricted the advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products in the EU in certain types of media such as newspapers, periodicals and 
magazines. In this context, one of their arguments was that a large majority (99%) of the products concerned 
were marketed on a national basis. Therefore, according to them, the prohibition responded “only very 
marginally to the supposed need to eliminate barriers to trade”. The ECJ rejected this argument by stating 
that the movement of newspapers, periodicals and magazines usually cross the national borders and that 
this is even truer with the rise of internet. Accordingly, the ECJ ruled that the harmonisation measure was 
conform to Article 114 TFEU. 
461 KD Kerameus, “Procedural Harmonization in Europe” (1995) 43 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 403. 
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In this case, the measure is still permitted by Article 114 TFEU.462 In fact, it seems that a 
quite generous interpretation of the market-building requirement prevails, so that the link 
between the measure and its impact on the internal market is now loose.463 If a measure 
aims at different goals at the same time, the main objective must serve as ground to set 
up the Union’s competence.464 As a result, harmonisation of procedure has to be based 
on Article 114 TFEU when it aims at improving the functioning of the internal market. If 
another objective is at the core of the measure, then Article 81 TFEU should be 
considered, but any act would be limited to international cases.465 When the potential 
measure deals with harmonisation of civil procedure in a cross-border context and aims 
at smoothing the functioning of the internal market, Articles 81 and 114 TFEU overlap. 
They could both serve as a legal basis if no primary objective can be determined. 
However, this situation has never occurred yet.466  
206. Our analysis regarding the Commission’s Recommendation let us think that 
a harmonisation measure could well be the substance of a future legislative act on 
collective redress. Is this allowed by Article 114 TFEU? In our opinion, it is far from 
obvious that Article 114 TFEU grants the EU a legislative competence to harmonise 
national procedural rules on collective redress for the following reasons: to start with, this 
Chapter clearly showed that national legislations on collective redress are relatively 
heterogeneous (supra; §§ 107-141) and thus, this could theoretically justify the 
intervention of the EU. Nevertheless, although national differences exist, this is not 
sufficient for the Union to acquire a competence to harmonise pursuant to Article 114 
TFEU. Additionally, these diverging national laws must create barriers to the freedom of 
goods or services or produce distortions of competition. However, it has not been 
demonstrated that the existence of diverse collective redress mechanisms among the EU 
actually represent such a barrier.467 In particular, as far as consumers are concerned, it is 
arguable that the diversity of collective redress procedures looms large in their mind when 
they shop across the border.468 So much so that the presence of a uniform collective 
                                                
462 Maletić, supra n 459, 46-48.  
463 Maletić, supra n 459, 31-32, 46-48; W Frenz and C Ehlenz, “Rechtsangleichung über Art. 114 AEUV 
und Grenzen gem. Art. 5 EUV nach Lissabon” (2011) 22 (16) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 
624-5, who observes that once the other conditions of Article 114 TFEU are fulfilled, one can presume that 
there is a link between the measure and the functioning of the internal market.  
464 Case C-155/91 Commission v Council [1993] ECR I-00939, paras 19-21. 
465 Committee on Legal Affairs, supra n 453, 13. 
466 Ibid, 14. 
467 Wendt, supra n 445, 617-8. 
468 The same comment has been expressed by Wagner (supra n 371, 184) regarding ADR. 
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procedure would surely not correspondingly lead to an increase of international activities 
because many other barriers would remain like the lack of trust to buy on the internet, 
language differences, the additional cost that foreign litigation may generate, and so on. 
207. It is true however, that the lack of uniform dispute resolution schemes in all 
Member States might hinder businesses when offering their products or services in other 
territories, as they expose themselves to different procedural systems and such a cost has 
to be internalised. Theoretically, the lack of uniform dispute resolution mechanism in 
Member States could refrain European citizens to conclude transactions in other markets 
as they might feel unprotected. Nevertheless, these considerations remain relatively 
theoretical: as far as businesses are concerned, studies show that obstacles to their 
international expansion are the fear of fraud, the obligation to comply with different tax 
laws, as well as the obligation to comply with different laws regarding consumer 
matters.469 It is not clear whether this last category encompasses national procedural laws. 
As far as substantive law is concerned, harmonisation of consumer law must have 
significantly reduced the existence of this potential barrier for traders.  
208. For now, it seems to us that the causal link between procedural harmonisation 
and the improvement of the functioning of the internal market is rather weak in the 
reasoning of the Commission. However, thanks to the favourable case law built up by the 
ECJ, regulation of collective redress pursuant to Article 114 TFEU cannot be excluded. 
The argument would go as follows: when consumers know that similar dispute resolution 
mechanisms exist in every Member State, they might trust that in case of conflict, a 
familiar instrument will be available to vindicate their rights. Accordingly, one can argue 
that harmonisation fosters consumer confidence. As a result, this would increase cross-
border trade and thus, facilitate international commerce of goods or the provision of 
services. However, this reasoning could lead to the automatic ability to legislate under 
Article 114 TFUE, given that any harmonisation measure may abstractly simplify 
                                                
469 See European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 186, Business attitudes towards cross-border sales and 
consumer protection (2006), 26-32; Flash Eurobarometer 224, supra n 424, 20-27; and Flash 
Eurobarometer 331, supra n 427, 31-48 according to which the risk of fraud or non-payment linked to 
cross-border transactions, as well as compliance with different tax laws and the obligation to respect 
different consumer protection rules represent the main barriers to the internationalisation of traders’ 
activities. Then, Flash Eurobarometer 300, supra n 426, 24-31 reveals that one third of retailers surveyed 
would be interested in making cross-border commerce if regulations were the same among the EU. 
Additionally, one-third of retailers also think that harmonisation would boost their cross-border activities. 
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procedure in Europe and thus, encourage citizens to shop abroad. It remains to be seen, 
which one of these two interpretative premises would prevail before the ECJ. 
Although a literal interpretation of Article 114(1) TFEU let us think that the Union 
would lack competence to harmonise national procedural rules regarding collective 
redress, a look at practice could make us change our mind. Indeed, the ADR Directive 
has been adopted pursuant to Articles 169 and 114 TFEU and also aims at fostering access 
to justice.470 Like collective redress, the harmonisation of ADR schemes among the EU 
do not a priori present any direct link with the functioning of the internal market. 
However, it could perfectly be argued that the harmonisation of rules regarding ADR 
mechanisms enhance legal certainty and encourage market players to undertake cross-
border activities, as they are certain about having access to alternative means of dispute 
resolution abroad.  
c. How much EU Intervention Do We Need? 
209. As we mentioned earlier, depending on the existence of political consensus, 
it is likely that the EU attempts to produce a more incisive legal instrument on collective 
redress. Should this happen, the EU could lay down its competence on different grounds. 
On the one hand, Articles 81 TFEU would enable the Union to regulate cross-border 
aspects of collective redress. For example, this provision would also permit the creation 
of an independent cross-border collective redress procedure. On the other hand, thanks to 
Article 114 TFEU, the EU could approximate national legislations on collective redress. 
Because of the procedural nature of the Recommendation, we believe that European 
institutions aim at harmonising national procedures. 
The discussion that follows shows the benefits and shortcomings to regulate 
collective redress pursuant to either Article 81 or 114 TFEU. We conclude that the 
benefits of an incisive EU intervention would anyway remain limited as far as consumer 
matters are concerned. Alternatively, we argue that a combination of softer measures 
would be preferable, such as the establishment of appropriate private international law 
                                                
470 For an interesting critique regarding the use of these provisions see H Eidenmüller and M Engel, “Die 
Schlichtungsfalle: Verbraucherrechtsdurchsetzung nach der ADR-Richtlinie und der ODR-Verordnung der 
EU”, (2013) 34 (36) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1704-1710; G Rühl, “Aussergerichtliche 
Streitbeilegung ausser Rand und Band? Zur Kompetenz des europäischen Gesetzgebers zum Erlass der 
Richtlinie über alternative Streitbeilegung und der Verordnung über Online-Streitbeilegung” in T 
Ackermann and J Köndgen (eds), Privat- und Wirtschaftsrecht in Europa, Festschrift für Wulf-Henning 
Roth zum 70. Geburtstag (CH Beck, 2015), 459-487. 
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provisions regulating cross-border collective redress actions on the basis of Article 81 
TFEU, coupled with the improvement of collective redress mechanisms’ efficiency and 
the development of ADR. In all cases, we believe that ADR cannot exist without the 
“threat” of collective redress.  
210. The measures in Articles 81 and 114 may have significant advantages, some 
of which were already mentioned (supra; b.). First, because both measures may bring 
some procedural “uniformity” –through the harmonisation of civil procedure or the 
enactment of a cross-border procedure for collective redress–, they are able to reduce the 
costs of litigation: if parties presume that procedural rules are similar in every Member 
State, they would spend less time and effort to become acquainted with foreign laws. In 
this sense, both harmonisation and regulation of cross-border aspects of collective redress 
certainly bring transactional costs down.471 Second, similar rules on procedure might 
incentivise citizens to bring their claims abroad, inasmuch as they are certain that the law 
will be the same everywhere. Along the same line of reasoning, the establishment of a 
facilitated recognition and enforcement regime for collective judgments or settlements 
would in turn foster legal certainty. Finally, the above-mentioned measures could be 
beneficial for traders too, as they would not have to internalise the costs of being 
submitted to different procedural legislations.472 Nevertheless, the next lines reveals that 
any measure which attempts to modify procedural rules might entail limited or simply 
hypothetical advantages.  
211. To start with, European legislative acts usually do not provide for exhaustive 
procedural rules and recourse to national provisions are often necessary.473 Therefore, 
national specificities still remain, as long as full-fledged unification is not reached. Even 
in this case, differences in the interpretation and the application of the legislation could 
materialise. A telling example is the one of the European Small Claims Procedure: 
                                                
471 L Visscher, “A Law and Economics View on Harmonisation of Procedural Law”, in Kramer and van 
Rhee, supra n 455, 82; G Wagner, “The Economics of Harmonisation: The Case for Contract Law” (2002) 
39 Common Market Law Review 1014. 
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equally applies to civil procedure. See the Green paper on policy options for progress towards a European 
Contract Law for consumers and businesses COM(2010) 348 final; likewise, Flash Eurobarometer 300, 
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cross-border sales if laws regulating transactions with consumers were the same across the EU”; Wagner, 
supra n 471, 1013-1014. 
473 M Tulibacka, “Europeanization of Civil Procedures: In Search of a Coherent Approach” (2009) 46 
Common Market Law Review 1545. 
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according to Regulation 861/2007, Member States have to provide for a procedural tool, 
which specifically deals with small-value claims. This procedure is optional and available 
for cross-border cases. However, it essentially relies on national laws, as Article 17 states. 
Specifically, the Regulation only establishes the procedural principles that Member States 
must respect and leave the remaining questions, such as the availability of appeal, up to 
national legal orders. To sum up, as long as European procedures rely on national laws, 
it is necessary for parties to acquire some knowledge about other legal orders if they want 
to appropriately bring or defend their claim. Consequently, both harmonisation and cross-
border regulation tackle transaction costs in a limited manner. Along the same line of 
reasoning, some might argue that where a high degree of harmonisation exists, no private 
international rules are needed.474 However, this implies that full-harmonisation is possible 
and that it adequately tackles all cross-border issues. As we mentioned earlier, this is 
improbable, at least for the time being. 
212. Specifically, we observe that harmonisation of civil procedure might not be 
able to fight all obstacles that cross-border litigation triggers, especially as regards 
consumer disputes, because these do not necessarily relate to the structure of collective 
redress: for example, how could harmonisation tackle language barriers? Similarly, the 
costs of initiating proceedings abroad, even if minimised, would still remain too high in 
many cases to make litigation affordable.  
The Injunctions Directive illustrates this point: this legislative act imposes the 
mutual recognition of certified entities’ capacity to sue –like consumer associations– and 
allow them to bring actions for the cessation of violations of consumer rights. 
Accordingly, when a particular entity obtains capacity to sue from its Member State of 
origin, courts from another Member State have to recognise this capacity too. Thanks to 
this measure, the EU is willing to give an impulse to cross-border litigation. Nevertheless, 
as we mentioned above, the two reports released regarding this Directive demonstrate that 
important barriers other than divergent procedural rules hinder entities to litigate 
abroad.475 
                                                
474 XE Kramer, “Harmonisation of Civil Procedure and the Interaction with Private International Law” in 
Kramer and van Rhee, supra n 455, 124. 
475 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interest COM(2008) 756 
final, paras 17-27; Report concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, supra n 366, part 4. 
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Furthermore, our questionnaire reveals that 2 out of the 3 consumer associations 
interviewed would bring more collective redress actions abroad in case procedure were 
harmonised.476 However, this should not constitute a “free pass” towards a harmonisation 
measure. Naturally, cross-border litigation is more appealing where procedural rules are 
similar. But our questionnaire also highlights the presence of important obstacles to cross-
border litigation that harmonisation would partially solve. In light of this, even if a certain 
degree of harmonisation is desirable, it cannot remove all obstacles to the start of 
proceedings abroad. 
213.  Then, one might wonder whether a harmonisation measure would actually 
motivate citizens to shop abroad. In other words, it is not self-evident that procedural 
differences disturb the functioning of the internal market.477 To our knowledge, no 
empirical evidence shows that inter-European trade would increase if procedural 
differences were erased. In the same fashion, the ability of similar procedural rules to 
improve access to justice –as the Recommendation of 2013 on collective redress would 
like to– is questionable. Accordingly, even if collective redress procedures would share 
identical features, it is arguable that better accessibility to courts would be achieved. This 
is because access to justice hinges on the actual efficiency of the procedural tool at stake 
and not its similarity with sister-instruments. For instance, the test case model of 
collective redress would maybe perfectly work in Austria but not in Sweden, albeit these 
mechanisms would be one and the same. The reason for this is that procedural vehicles 
do not evolve in a vacuum. In fact, they are tightly linked to the judicial organisation of 
a given legal order, as well as to its culture and social environment. This has been 
demonstrated in Chapter I regarding the US class action (supra; Chapter I, I.A.). This is 
why as far as procedural law is concerned, one form does not fit all. In reality, when two 
collective redress mechanisms, which are structurally dissimilar, can nonetheless work 
efficiently, then we consider that access to justice is guaranteed.  
214. As regards measures adopted pursuant to Article 81 TFEU, the creation of a 
procedural system dealing with cross-border collective redress in parallel with national 
provisions is not desirable. It creates complexity and adds up work for national judges 
                                                
476 Question 4.7 of our questionnaire. 
477 Tulibacka, supra n 473, 1534. 
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who are already overburdened.478 Another problem is that this twofold system could 
create an important difference of treatment between parties whose disputes are purely 
domestic and participants to international proceedings.479 Similarly, this discrimination 
problem could arise where coverage is only sector-based.  
215. Finally, we have underlined earlier in this Chapter that Member States are 
currently undertaking important reforms regarding collective redress (supra; § 107). 
Some latecomers are still in the process of enacting some kind of collective redress 
mechanism. In this context, we have highlighted that European legal orders often engage 
in a comparative law exercise in order to improve their own collective redress mechanism. 
As a consequence, harmonisation pursuant to Article 114 TFEU would not be an 
appropriate measure if systems are not “mature” enough. Besides, the comparative law 
exercise undertaken by Member States may equally lead to the approximation of national 
legislations, with the difference that it follows a bottom-up approach and is not imposed 
by a supranational authority.480 In an extreme case, a harmonisation measure might even 
disrupt the legislative process that takes place at the local level.481 Besides, harmonisation 
might impose certain structural features to collective redress mechanisms that do not fit 
into a particular legal order. For example, if a European measure imposes a mediation 
process as a pre-condition to the initiation of collective proceedings, this could fit in the 
Netherlands but not in a State where no ADR culture exists. Therefore, imposing such a 
process could increase parties’ costs and make them lose time. In light of these 
considerations, we think that national legislators are better positioned to evaluate what 
the relevant features of a collective redress mechanism should be according to their legal 
order.482 
216. As a conclusion, although we acknowledge the advantages of a 
harmonisation measure or the creation of a cross-border procedure for collective redress, 
we believe that these are not the best venues for the European Union to act. In fact, we 
consider that the European Union did not sufficiently prove the benefits of these measures 
in comparison with other alternatives. This is certainly due to the lack of clear information 
                                                
478 Z Vernadaki, “Civil Procedure Harmonization in the EU: Unravelling the Policy Considerations” (2013) 
9 (2) Journal of Contemporary European Research 310. In a similar fashion, see also the comments of 
Storskrubb on the Small Claims procedure (supra n 450, 231-232). 
479 Tulibacka, supra n 473, 1539. 
480 Visscher, supra n 471, 78. 
481 Tulibacka, supra n 473, 1551; Vernadaki, supra n 478, 304. 
482 Vernadaki, supra n 478, 304-305. 
  138 
regarding their actual effect on the internal market. For example, it might be very hard to 
establish whether harmonisation has a direct impact on the rise of cross-border cases. For 
this reason, additional evidence should previously be gathered before far-fetched 
measures such as harmonisation or the creation of a cross-border procedure are adopted. 
Among other aspects, it could be useful to have a clear picture about the number of 
international suits –including collective redress actions– brought during a certain 
timeframe. Furthermore, we would appreciate more information on market players’ 
behaviour. In particular, it could be interesting to launch a Eurobarometer in order to 
measure whether the presence or the absence of collective redress modify traders and 
consumers’ behaviours. Finally, additional studies might futher explain what incentivise 
people to litigate abroad and what barriers impede consumer associations and similar 
actors to start collective proceedings in another Member State.  
217. As a result, this work suggests another approach that does not condemn the 
above-mentioned measures but rather proposes the use of various instruments in order to 
foster access to justice. In particular, we propose to focus on the implementation of private 
international law rules on jurisdiction for collective redress actions in conjunction with 
other EU measures that aim at boosting the efficiency of national collective redress 
mechanisms, as well as the development of ADR. In other words, we do not support the 
modification of national procedures, unless it is absolutely necessary. 
218. Our approach is based on the following observations: first, the rights of the 
defendants do not seem to be in danger. In fact, Member States have been relatively 
cautious in their implementation of collective redress and thus, we do not see the need for 
the European Union to enact more safeguards for the time being. Besides, Member States’ 
general rules of civil procedure represent a limitative framework within which any 
procedural vehicle should fit. In light of the above, it is doubtful that Member States 
would build up collective redress tools that do not respect the rights of both parties and 
in particular, the rights of the defence. At least, no empirical evidence proves the contrary. 
Second, as we explained above, States are already engaged in reforms of their collective 
redress mechanisms in order to improve their efficiency. Therefore, it might be preferable 
to let national legislators act at the local level, given their knowledge of the legal, political 
and social environment. In other words, the intervention of EU law into national civil 
procedure is not justified as far as collective redress is concerned. 
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219. From a structural perspective, our approach involves two steps: the first one 
consists in clarifying the private international rules regarding collective redress and in 
particular the ones regarding jurisdiction. Experience has shown that claimants –either 
consumers or representative bodies– struggle to bundle claims in a unique and affordable 
forum. We believe that private international law has the power to solve important cross-
border barriers to access to justice. Second, measures increasing the interoperability of 
collective redress mechanisms –including perhaps a partial harmonisation measure– 
could be considered in order to solve remaining procedural issues.  
220. Certainly, our solution may not be the only possibility to approach this 
question. However, it entails substantial advantages that are detailed here: first of all, our 
solution respects the principle of subsidiarity, given that it focuses on cross-border aspects 
of collective redress but let national legislators work on the efficiency of procedural tools. 
In this sense, deference to subsidiarity reinforces the legitimacy of the EU’s intervention. 
Moreover, if best practices are spotted through comparative law analysis, this can lead to 
the convergence of national legislations.  
Second, our approach brings clarity to the current landscape. As we further 
explain in the next Chapter, the application of private international rules on jurisdiction 
within the EU has been rather chaotic: because collective redress does not totally match 
the vision of European private international law, the risk for forum shopping and legal 
uncertainty is significant. Nevertheless, private international law might not be able to 
tackle all cross-border obstacles.483 Therefore, we believe that supplementary measures 
at the procedural law level should back up the private international law solution. A lack 
of coordination between these two areas could lead to undesirable consequences resulting 
in a waste of resources and inconsistencies. For these reasons, it is advisable to settle 
private international law issues first, and subsequently consider additional and more 
incisive measures regarding civil procedure. Naturally, our solution does not impede the 
development of ADR mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
483 Ibid, 133. 
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III. Conclusion 
221. Contrarily to the US class action, collective redress is a much more colourful 
concept whose limits are sometimes difficult to grasp. Besides, this device aims at 
different goals and may assume various functions depending on the legal order. This 
certainly results from the great heterogeneity that characterises the numerous collective 
redress mechanisms adopted by Member States. As the first section of this Chapter 
demonstrates, the structural elements of collective redress vary in terms of participation, 
rules on standing, certification criteria, costs and financing, availability of ADR, as well 
as interests and remedies. Interestingly, collective redress schemes usually possess 
features, which are opposite to the American class action. The unwillingness to reproduce 
the abuses that occurred on the other side of the Atlantic may explain this fact.  
In light of such diversity, however, collective redress tools share some similarities. 
As a result, we were able to come up with a classification of all existing collective redress 
mechanisms into four categories: the representative model, the class action model, the 
test case model and the Dutch model. In order to build up these categories, we took into 
account the structural elements that are relevant from a private international law 
perspective. Our objective is to facilitate our analysis in Chapter III and IV: instead of 
observing how all collective redress mechanisms work in an international context, we 
limit this exercise to the four above-mentioned categories. 
222. The second part of this chapter underlines the role that the European Union 
has played in the field of collective redress. Accordingly, an analysis of the documents 
released by the European institutions is provided. Our research puts the spotlight on 
important issues that may slow down the further development of an EU response to 
collective redress. Among other things, we can mention the lack of political consensus 
and the insufficiency of empirical evidence. In this context, opponents to collective 
redress challenge the EU’s intervention on two grounds: first of all, they argue that ADR 
mechanisms represent a better tool to solve consumer disputes and thus, collective redress 
is not necessary. However, our work shows that collective redress has the power to reduce 
costs and seems to be helpful for (very) small-value claimants. Besides, opt-out based 
systems are well positioned to deal with consumers’ rational apathy. Finally, this device 
could act as an incentive for parties to settle. Besides, ADR instruments do usually not 
offer a better forum than collective redress in cross-border cases. Usually, victims have 
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to either complain or litigate in the forum of the defendant’s domicile. Second of all, 
opponents allege that the EU does not have any competence to regulate collective redress. 
In their opinion, either Article 81 or 114 TFEU would not constitute adequate grounds 
for the Union to intervene. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that both venues are 
potentially available. 
Even though the EU could theoretically legislate on collective redress, it is 
fundamental to determine whether and to which extent an intervention is needed. Our 
work concludes that either measure, the creation of a European cross-border collective 
redress procedure or the harmonisation of national civil procedures is too incisive. 
Besides, it is not certain that they would adequately tackle all obstacles to cross-border 
litigation and thus, their impact on access to justice in consumer matters might very well 
be limited. As a result, this work suggests an alternative, which better respects the 
principle of conferral and subsidiarity. Our approach consists in clarifying private 
international law rules on jurisdiction and solve remaining cross-border issues with very 
limited (harmonisation) measures that would reinforce the interoperability of collective 
redress mechanisms. Thanks to this technique, we aim at coordinating procedural law 
with private international law and create synergies. 
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CHAPTER III  
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES  
223. The previous Chapter describes the characteristics that European collective 
redress mechanisms usually possess. Although said mechansims are quite heterogenous, 
they share important similarities, which have enabled us to organise them into four main 
categories –the representative model, the Dutch model, the class action model and the test 
case model (supra; Chapter II, I.E.). 
Additionally, Chapter II puts the spotlight on the Union’s desire to fulfil the 
current private enforcement gap. As far as collective redress is concerned, the EU could 
adopt a harmonisation measure or create a cross-border procedure on the model of the 
Small Claims Procedure. However, we conclude that both initiatives have limited effects, 
in the sense that their capacity to improve access to justice is doubtful. In particular, we 
distrust their ability to solve all cross-border litigation issues faced by consumers.  
Therefore, we suggest that appropriate private international law rules on 
jurisdiction should be at the heart of a legislative measure regarding collective redress, 
since this discipline is in a good position to foster access to justice. Although we are aware 
that collective redress actions and settlements challenge private international law in many 
ways, we believe that questions regarding applicable law, as well as recognition and 
enforcement play a secondary role for access to justice purposes.  
224. In light of this, the current Chapter starts with a kind reminder of the 
jurisdictional rules provided by the Brussels Regulation (recast) (infra; I.), which are the 
ones that will usually apply to cross-border collective redress actions. Although the 
functioning of those rules is well known, our reminder is instrumental to the rest of the 
Chapter, since it enables us to make references to theoretical developments in an 
organised manner and without repeating ourselves. Thereafter, the second part of Chapter 
III (infra; II.) investigates how European private international law rules apply to the four 
collective redress models we created earlier. Our objective is to analyse whether current 
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private international rules on jurisdiction offer sufficient access to justice to collective 
redress actions. Otherwise, an amendment of such rules should be considered in order to 
fulfil our policy goal. As usual, we end up the Chapter with a conclusion (infra; III). 
I. Jurisdiction under the Brussels Regulation (Recast) 
225. Section I provides an overview of the content of the Brussels Regulation 
(recast). For the sake of our research, we limit our analysis to rules on jurisdiction that 
might be used in a cross-border collective action. The objective of this Section is to build 
up a strong theoretical background that will support our investigation in Section II. To be 
more precise, our research first examines the functioning of European private 
international rules on jurisdiction in order to subsequently apply them to the four models 
of collective redress that we described in Chapter II (supra; I.E.).  
In light of this, Section A starts with an outline of the fundamental features of the 
Brussels Regulation (recast), including its historical roots (infra; A.1.), its scope (infra; 
A.2.), and some general information on the type of jurisdictional rules it contains (infra; 
A.3.). Then, our research explains how potentially applicable rules on jurisdiction in 
collective redress cases work. In particular, we comment Articles 4 and its two “sister” 
provisions, Articles 7(5) and 8(1) (infra; B.). We then analyse Articles 7(1) relating to 
contractual matters (infra; C.), Article 7(2) that covers matters related to tort, delict and 
quasi-delict (infra; D.) and Section 4 which governs consumer contracts (infra; E.). 
Finally, a brief overview of the rules governing lis pendens, related actions (infra; F.) and 
party autonomy (infra; G.) is provided. 
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A. A Primer on the Brussels Regulation (Recast) 
1. Historical Overview 
226. The Brussels Regulation (recast)484 is the European legislation which 
codifies rules on jurisdiction, as well as recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters. The origin of this text can be traced back to the Brussels 
Convention485 (hereafter, BC), a multilateral agreement adopted in 1968 –and reformed 
in 1978, 1982, 1990–486 by the six former States of the European Economic Community, 
namely Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy, pursuant to 
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome.487 The objective of the BC is to facilitate the free 
movement of judgments between Contracting States. Accordingly, the flexibility of the 
recognition and enforcement process shall only be achieved if common international rules 
on jurisdiction are established and followed by the participants. As a result, both elements 
were integrated in the BC.  
In parallel, Members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on the one 
hand, and Member States on the other, concluded the Lugano Convention in 1988 –that 
has been reformed in 2007.488 This Convention basically mimics the Brussels regime as 
regards those States.489  
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Community 
acquired the power to rule on civil cooperation matters. In this context, the BC morphed 
into Regulation 44/2001, namely the Brussels I Regulation490 (hereafter, BRI). The text 
                                                
484 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012, supra n 3. 
485 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(consolidated version) [1990] OJ C189/32. 
486 Convention of Accession of 9 October 1978 of the Kingdom of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice 
[1978] OJ L304/1; Convention on the accession of the Hellenic Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by 
the Court of Justice with the adjustments made to them by the Convention on the accession of the Kingdom 
of Denmark, of Ireland and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [1982] OJ L388/1; 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [1990] OJ 
C189/2. 
487 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:11957E/TXT. 
488 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Lugano 
Convention) [1988] OJ L319/9 and [2007] OJ L339/3. 
489 See P Jenard and G Möller, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 16 September 1988 [1990] OJ C189/57. 
490 Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L012/1. 
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of the Regulation is, however, largely inspired by the Convention. The rules on 
jurisdiction, as well as on recognition and enforcement contained in this Regulation 
directly apply to the Member States and prevail over national laws.491 Besides, in order 
to secure the correct and uniform application of this norm, the ECJ is entrusted with its 
interpretation through preliminary rulings (Article 267 TFEU). The 10 January 2015, the 
Regulation 1215/2012 entered into force and replaced the Regulation 44/2001. 
227. Since its enactment in 1968, the text of the Convention has been modified on 
many occasions. As a result, it is important to emphasise that the case law rendered under 
one version of the text is applicable to its successor where this text concurs. This principle 
of continuity is crystalized in Recital 34 of the BRIbis, which states that “[c]ontinuity 
between the 1968 Brussels Convention, Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and this Regulation 
should be ensured, and transitional provisions should be laid down to that end. The same 
need for continuity applies as regards the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union of the 1968 Brussels Convention and of the Regulations replacing it”. In 
light of these considerations, this Chapter only refers to the provisions of the BRIbis, 
although the case law that is analysed below has been rendered under older versions of 
the text. Should textual differences between these texts exist, they will be pointed out as 
they arise. 
228. It has to be highlighted that the proposal for the Brussels Regulation (recast) 
considered the opportunity to introduce a specific rule on the recognition and enforcement 
of collective redress actions at Article 37(3)(b).492 Eventually, this idea was abandoned. 
According to the proposal, common rules on jurisdiction would have applied to collective 
redress actions. 
 
 
 
                                                
491 Case C-25/79 Sanicentral GmbH v René Collin [1979] ECR 03423, para 5. 
492 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) COM(2010) 748 final, as well as the 
comments of E Lein, “Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Cross-Border Mass Litigation” in Pocar et al., 
supra n 93, esp. 159-161. 
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2. Scope of the Regulation 
229. Material Scope. According to Article 1(1) BRIbis, the Regulation applies to 
civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. The concept of 
“civil and commercial matters” has an autonomous meaning493 and refers to actions of 
private law. Put differently, actions involving the exercise of public authority powers are 
not civil and commercial matters.494 In this line, Article 1(1) BRIbis specifies that 
revenue, customs or administrative matters or the liability of the State for acts and 
omissions in the exercise of State authority fall outside the scope of the Regulation. 
Furthermore, Article 1(2) BRIbis explicitly excludes certain matters from its scope, 
namely questions regarding the status or legal capacity of natural persons (including 
matrimonial matters), insolvency, social security, arbitration, maintenance obligations, 
wills and succession.  
230. Additionally, the Regulation applies to situations that involve various legal 
orders. In other words, the case at issue must have an international character for the 
Regulation to apply. Unfortunately, the exact meaning of this requirement has not been 
established either by the Court of Justice or the European legislator. Therefore, 
interpretations differ regarding this concept.495 Literature predominantly considers that 
the Regulation applies to claims whose components are connected to more than one 
Member State, whatever the nature of this element.496 Along these lines, one might 
wonder whether a case which involves a Spanish citizen domiciled in Madrid, who 
concludes a contract with a Portuguese national domiciled in the same city would fall 
under the scope of the Regulation, although the only international element is the 
nationality of a contractual party. This could seem far-fetched considering the fact that 
nationality is not a relevant connecting factor pursuant to the Regulation. However, this 
broad interpretation ensures a uniform application of private international law rules to 
cross-border cases. 
                                                
493 Case C-29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co. KG v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 01541, para 
3 
494 Case C-814/79 Netherlands State v Reinhold Rüffer [1980] ECR 03807, para 8. 
495 AL Calvo Caravaca and J Carrascosa González, Derecho Internacional Privado, vol I (Comares, 16th 
edn, 2016), 26-32; J Kropholler and J von Hein, Europäisches Zivilprozessrecht – Kommentar zu EuGVO, 
Lugano-Übereinkommen 2007, EuVTVO, EuMVVO und EuGFVO (Frankfurt am Main, Verlag Recht und 
Wirtschaft GmbH, 9th edn, 2011), 121-123. 
496 Ibid, 27. 
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231. Temporal Scope. According to Article 66 BRIbis, the Regulation governs 
legal proceedings instituted after 10 January 2015. Legal scholars suggest that the 
moment when proceedings are instituted should be determined by reference to Article 32 
BRIbis regarding lis pendens and related actions.497 In light of this, the time when 
documents that institute proceedings are lodged with the court is the relevant one. This 
time might be slightly different in each Member State.498 Article 66 BRIbis equally 
applies to authentic instruments registered, as well as court settlements approved or 
concluded after the above-mentioned date. 
232. Territorial Scope. In light of Articles 68 BRIbis and 355 TFEU, Regulation 
1215/2012 applies to all Member States except the United Kingdom, Ireland and 
Denmark.499 However, since the United Kingdom and Ireland used their power to opt-in, 
the Regulation 1215/2012 applies to those territories.500 This legislation is equally 
applicable to Denmark, thanks to the Agreement of 19 October 2005 between the 
European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.501  
3. Types of Jurisdictional Grounds 
233. The Brussels regime offers different types of rules on jurisdiction. To start 
with, the text establishes, as a general rule, that proceedings should be instituted in the 
defendant’s domicile. This principle is outlined in Article 4 BRIbis. In certain 
circumstances, however, policy considerations dictate that courts other than the ones 
designated by the general regime should be given jurisdiction. For instance, as we explain 
in the next paragraphs, consumer protection commands that weak parties, like consumers, 
should be able to sue their contractual partners at the place of their domicile if they wish 
                                                
497 A Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford, 2014), 187; H Gaudemet-Tallon, 
Compétence et exécution des jugements en Europe – Règlement 44/2001, Convention de Bruxelles (1968) 
et de Lugano (1988 et 2007) (Lextenso éditions, 4th edn, 2010), 62-63. 
498 Briggs, supra n 497, 187. 
499 For more detailed comments on the territorial application of the Regulation, see Calvo Caravaca and 
Carrascosa González, supra n 495, 203-205. 
500 See the Protocol 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, 
security and justice annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in particular its 
Article 3 [2012] OJ C326/295. 
501 Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2005] OJ L299/62; Agreement 
between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2013] OJ L79/4. 
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to. In light of the above, Sections 2 to 6 institute special jurisdictional rules, which 
exceptionally derogate Article 4 BRIbis. As a consequence, the ECJ repeatedly declared 
that these special rules on jurisdiction should be interpreted restrictively and cannot go 
beyond the cases expressly envisaged by the Regulation.502  
Specifically, Section 2 BRIbis provides alternative fora, whereby claimants may 
always choose to litigate either, in the defendant’s domicile, or in one of the fora 
contained in Section 2. As for Sections 3 to 5 BRIbis, they create a protective and 
autonomous regime in matters relating to insurance, consumer contracts and individual 
contracts of employment. This means that parties whose claims fall under one of these 
Sections cannot make use of Article 4 BRIbis or other jurisdictional grounds –save where 
otherwise provided. In other words, jurisdiction is exclusively governed by the norms of 
those Sections. Then, Section 6 gives exclusive jurisdiction to courts regarding certain 
matters. These courts are the only ones having jurisdiction. It has to be highlighted that 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from the misapplication of 
jurisdictional rules contained in Sections 3 to 6 will be limited (Article 45.1(e) BRIbis). 
Finally, Section 7 offers parties the ability to conclude their choice of court agreements 
to the extent that party autonomy is permitted. This ability is restricted for disputes 
encompassed in Sections 3 to 6 BRIbis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
502 For example, see Case C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH and Others 
[ECLI:EU:C:2013:138], para 74. 
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B. The Forum of the Defendant’s Domicile (Article 4) and its Two Sisters (Article 
7(5) and 8(1)) 
1. Article 4  
234. Article 4 of the BRIbis (ex-Article 2 BC and BRI) adopts the Roman rule 
actor sequitur forum rei,503 which is always available unless other tribunals have an 
exclusive competence to rule on the dispute, or parties use their autonomy in order to 
submit their conflict to other courts. Specifically, this provision states that “[s]ubject to 
this Regulation, persons domiciled504 in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, 
be sued in the courts of that Member State”. In other words, the Regulation establishes 
that, as a general principle, people have to be sued in the court of their domicile, 
notwithstanding the application of other jurisdictional rules embraced by this text. In this 
regard, nationality is irrelevant. As a consequence, if a Canadian brings a lawsuit against 
a North American domiciled in Belgium, the courts of the latter country would have 
jurisdiction under Article 4 of the BRIbis. Similarly, it must be highlighted that the 
domicile of the claimant is irrelevant. The courts designated by Article 4 BRIbis have a 
general competence to rule on a case, in the sense that their jurisdiction does not depend 
on the object of the dispute, the type of claim or the place where the factual or legal 
elements are located.505 Finally, it is worth mentioning that Article 4 BRIbis allocates 
global jurisdiction to the courts of a Member State, but does not designate which one is 
locally competent. In order to precisely pin down the tribunal that has jurisdiction (ratione 
materiae and ratione loci), one has to look into the domestic law of the Member State in 
which the designated courts are sited.506  
                                                
503 The first formulation of that principle is to be found in the Code of Justinian, see H Gaudemet-Tallon, 
Recherches sur les origines de l’article 14 du code civil – Contribution à l’histoire de la compétence 
judiciaire internationale (Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 10. 
504 The BRIbis determines when an individual or a legal person is domiciled in a particular territory in 
Articles 62 and 63 BRIbis. As regards individuals, the European legislator did not adopt a uniform 
definition of “domicile”. Instead, it sends this task back to Member States. As for Article 63 BRIbis, it opts 
for a different solution by providing a material definition of a legal person’s domicile. In particular, this 
provision asserts that legal persons are domiciled at the place where they have their statutory seat, central 
administration, or the principal place of business. The statutory seat corresponds to the place where the 
legal person is formally constituted, the central administration refers to the location where the company is 
administered, and the principal place of business is the one where the commercial activity is undertaken. 
505 FJ Garcimartín Alférez, Derecho Internacional Privado (Civitas, 3rd edn, 2016), 91. 
506 Gaudemet-Talon, supra n 497, 80; P Jenard, Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [1979] OJ C59/18. 
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235. The solution provided by the Regulation fosters foreseeability and strikes a 
certain balance between the rights and obligations of the respective parties. Different 
justifications support the actor sequitur forum rei principle:507 first of all, initiating 
proceedings at the defendant’s domicile would facilitate the notification process, the 
gathering of evidence, as well as the recognition and enforcement of judgments or 
settlements, because the defendant’s assets are often located there.508 Second of all, the 
obligation for the claimant to litigate in another Member State generates additional costs. 
Therefore, this financial aspect acts as a shield against unmeritorious claims: accordingly, 
the claimant would only sue if the claim is valuable enough.509 Finally, it is considered 
that the State of the domicile is the most appropriate to rule on the legal situation of the 
people located there.510 
2. Article 7(5) 
236. According to Article 7(5) BRIbis (ex-Article 5(5) BC and BRI), a defendant 
domiciled in a Member State can equally be sued in another Member State if he possesses 
a branch, an agency or another kind of establishment there.511 We tackle this jurisdictional 
rule here because it shares important similarities with Article 4 BRIbis. In particular, it 
confers general jurisdiction to the courts designated by this norm.512 However, these 
provisions differ in two significant ways: to start with, Article 7(5) BRIbis cannot be 
“coupled with” Article 8(1) BRIbis, which enables the claimant to attract co-defendants 
                                                
507 For an interesting critique of the actor sequitur forum rei principle, see Calvo Caravaca and Carrascosa 
González, supra n 495, 280-283. 
508 M Virgós Soriano and FJ Garcimartín Alférez, Derecho Procesal Civil Internacional (Civitas, 2007), 
123; D Bureau and H Muir Watt, Droit international Privé, vol I (Thémis Droit, 2nd edn, 2007), 150. 
509 Ibid. 
510 Virgós Soriano and Garcimartín Alférez, supra n 508, 122-123; Bureau and Muir Watt, supra n 508, 
150. 
511 It has to be highlighted that the concepts of “branch, agency or other establishment” are equivalent 
notions and thus, they correspond to the same reality. As a result, and for the sake of simplicity, the rest of 
this work only refers to the branch as a representative of the whole category. The ECJ established that, in 
order to qualify as a branch, an entity has to be under the control and the direction of the defendant (Case 
C-14/76 A. De Bloos, SPRL v Société en commandite par actions Bouyer [1976] ECR 01497, para 23; Case 
C-139/80 Blanckaert & Willems PVBA v Luise Trost [1981] ECR 00819, para 12). In the same fashion, it 
should be noted that an independent corporate entity would certainly not fulfil the dependency requirement, 
unless it acts as a branch on the market and third parties see it as such (Garcimartín Alférez, supra n 505, 
101; Case C-218/86 SAR Schotte GmbH v Parfums Rothschild SARL [1987] ECR 04905, para 15). On top 
of this, the branch must also have the appearance of permanency, have management and be materially 
equipped in order to do business with third parties (Case C-33/78 Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG [1978] 
ECR 02183, para 12). In this sense, the mere presence of a letter box or a website page in a given Member 
State are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 
512 Garcimartín Alférez, supra n 505, 99. 
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in the domicile of one of them.513 Then, contrarily to Article 4 BRIbis, Article 7(5) BRIbis 
directly designates the tribunal that has jurisdiction at the local level, and thus there is no 
need to rely on national laws. Finally, only claims related to the activities of the branch 
may be brought pursuant to Article 7(5) BRIbis. In particular, these disputes might be 
related to the running of the entity or its relationships with third parties.514 Both 
contractual and tort claims fall into the scope of this provision. Besides, it does not matter 
whether the execution of a certain operation occurs within the territory where the branch 
is seated or in another Member State.515 Should Article 7(5) BRIbis be limited to this 
territorial scope, it would often overlap with either the forum for contractual matters 
(Article 7(1) BRIbis), or the one related to tort (Article 7(2) BRIbis). Hence, this 
provision would lose its value. Finally, yet importantly, Article 7(5) BRIbis remains 
available to consumers protected by Section 4 BRIbis that we analyse below (infra; E.). 
3. Article 8(1) 
237. Article 8(1) BRIbis (ex-Article 6(1) BC and BRI) allows the claimant to sue 
all potential co-defendants in the domicile of one of them. Specifically, this provision 
states that “[a] person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: (1) where he is one 
of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, 
provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine 
them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings”. Thanks to Article 8(1) BRIbis, procedural economy can be achieved, as it 
enables courts to rule on various but connected claims at the same time in an identical 
forum. However, the use of this provision is not unlimited. In particular, several 
restrictions, which are further detailed in the next paragraphs, circumscribe the 
application of Article 8(1) BRIbis. Therefore, even though judicial efficiency commands 
the accumulation of claims in the domicile of one of the defendants, this argument cannot 
alone justify the use of this provision. 
238. To begin with, according to its wording, Article 8(1) RBIbis can only attract 
defendants who are domiciled within the EU. The previous version of the Regulation did 
                                                
513 Ibid, 102. 
514 Somafer SA, supra n 511, para 13. 
515 Case C-439/93 Lloyd's Register of Shipping v Société Campenon Bernard [1995] ECR I-00961, para 22. 
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not explicitly mention this condition, but this was clarified by ECJ516 and later codified 
in the recast of the Regulation. Besides, the application of this provision is only possible 
in the domicile of one of the defendants.517  
239. Furthermore, Article 8(1) BRIbis clarifies that a certain connection must 
exist between the different claims at stake. In the words of the ECJ, the connection must 
be of such a kind that it is expedient to hear and determine the claims together in order to 
avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.518 A 
glance to other language versions of the text underlines an important change of wording 
between the BRI and the recast: it is not necessary that irreconcilable judgments could 
result from the non-application of Article 8(1) BRIbis. Today, it is sufficient that a risk 
of contradictory judgments exists.519 In fact, the risk of contradictory judgments has to 
be interpreted in light of Article 29(3) BRIbis and the Tatry judgment.520 In all cases, it 
is for national courts to assess the consequences that separate proceedings would have on 
the case at issue.521 In this context, the ECJ clarified that it is not sufficient that there be 
a divergence in the outcome of the dispute. That divergence must also arise in the context 
of the same situation of law and fact. Such an abstract wording has triggered several 
requests for preliminary ruling to the ECJ in order to shed light on the content of this 
concept. In particular, the Court has been frequently asked about the required degree of 
similarity that Article 8(1) RBIbis imposes between the claims at issue. For instance, the 
Court of Luxembourg first established that an action in delicts cannot be accumulated 
with an action in contractual matters in the forum of the anchor defendant.522 Later on, 
the ECJ introduced more flexibility in this reasoning by declaring that claims grounded 
on different legal basis do not automatically hinder the application of Article 8(1) 
                                                
516 Case C-645/11 Land Berlin v Ellen Mirjam Sapir and Others [ECLI:EU:C:2013:228] para 55. 
517 Case C-51/97 Réunion européenne SA and Others v Spliethoff's Bevrachtingskantoor BV and the Master 
of the vessel Alblasgracht V002 [1998] ECR I-06511, para 44. 
518 Case C-189/87 Athanasios Kalfelis v Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co. and Others 
[1988] ECR 05565, para 12. 
519 I Heredia Cervantes, “Artículo 8” in JP Pérez-Llorca et al. (eds), Comentario al Reglamento (UE) nº 
1215/2012 relativo a la competencia judicial, el reconocimiento y la ejecución de resoluciones judiciales 
en materia civil y mercantil (Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2016), 289-290. 
520 Case C-406/92 The owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship “Tatry” v the owners of the ship 
“Maciej Rataj” [1994] ECR I-05439, para 52. In this case, the ECJ held that Article 22 BC (the predecessor 
of Article 30 BRIbis) “cover[s] all cases where there is a risk of conflicting decisions, even if the judgments 
can be separately enforced and their legal consequences are not mutually exclusive.” 
521 Briggs, supra n 497, 288. 
522 Réunion Européenne, supra n 517, para 50. 
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BRIbis.523 More than the nature of the claims, it is important to assess whether 
contradictory outcomes might be generated by separate proceedings.  
The most recent case law rendered by the ECJ regarding patents equally illustrates 
that the degree of similarity between claims should not be interpreted too strictly. Initially, 
in Roche Nederland, regarding the infringement of a European patent, the Court of Justice 
ruled that claims against several defendants cannot be joined under Article 8(1) BRIbis 
when these committed different infringements concerning patents, which are each 
governed by distinct national legislations according to the Munich Convention.524 Later 
on, however, the ECJ held a more flexible reasoning in a relatively similar situation: in 
particular, in the Solvay case, the Court of Luxembourg stated that Article 8(1) BRIbis is 
applicable where defendants separately committed similar infringements regarding the 
same products and in the same Member States, so that they infringe the same national 
parts of a European patent. 525 This trend was confirmed by the case law issued in other 
areas of law. Said case law seems to tolerate the application of Article 8(1) BRIbis when 
distinct national laws govern the infringement at stake,526 hence confirming the flexible 
approach adopted in Solvay. 
240. Predictability is another limit to the application of Article 8(1) RBIbis. 
Accordingly, legal scholars consider that defendants must be previously linked by a 
certain relationship in order to be sued in the domicile of one of their pair.527 As a result, 
Article 8(1) BRIbis should not be admitted in case of traffic accidents involving various 
responsible parties. Conversely, this provision would apply to joint guarantors, co-
partners in an unlawful cartel agreement or in the context of an action paulienne.528 In all 
cases, Article 8(1) BRIbis cannot be used when the purpose of the claimant is to oust the 
co-defendant from its natural forum. 
                                                
523 Case C-98/06 Freeport plc v Olle Arnoldsson [2007] ECR I-08319, para 46. 
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292; Heredia Cervantes, supra n 519, 294. 
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C. Jurisdiction in Matters Related to Contracts (Article 7(1)) 
1. General Aspects 
241. Article 7(1) BRIbis sets up a special forum for contractual matters. This 
forum represents an alternative to Article 4 BRIbis and assigns jurisdiction to courts that 
are closely connected to the contractual dispute at issue. In other words, this exception to 
Article 4 BRIbis is justified by the principle of proximity.529 It has to be underlined that 
this provision allocates international jurisdiction but also designates which tribunal is 
locally competent. Thus, no reference to national civil procedure is needed.  
242. In order for Article 7(1) BRIbis to apply, it is necessary that the case at issue 
enters the scope of “matters related to contracts”. This concept has been the object of an 
autonomous definition.530 In Jakob Handte, which concerned a dispute between a sub-
buyer of goods and a manufacturer, the ECJ established that contractual matters do not 
cover situations in which there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards 
another.531 This means that, in cases where a single party assumes an obligation towards 
the other, Article 7(1) BRIbis may equally apply.532 Besides, it should be emphasized that 
the existence of a contract between parties is not necessary for the application of this 
provision. 
The ECJ’s case law provides some illustrative examples regarding the application 
of this provision: in a case involving an association that claimed the payment of a sum of 
money to one of its member, the Court of Luxembourg admitted that this situation should 
be considered as a matter related to contracts. Specifically, the Court held that 
membership creates links between its members that are of the same kind as those which 
are created between parties to a contract.533 In another judgment, the ECJ affirmed that the 
relationship between the payee of a promissory note and the giver of a guarantee falls 
within the meaning of Article 7(1) BRIbis, as the latter freely assumes to act as a guarantor 
                                                
529 Case C-386/05 Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH [2007] ECR I-03699, para 22; 
Case C-204/08 Peter Rehder v Air Baltic Corporation [2009] ECR I-06073, para 32; Case C-381/08, Car 
Trim GmbH v KeySafety Systems Srl [2010] ECR I-01255, para 48; Case C-19/09, Wood Floor Solutions 
Andreas Domberger GmbH v Silva Trade SA [2010] ECR I-02121, para 22. 
530 Case C-34/82, Martin Peters Bauunternehmung GmbH v Zuid Nederlandse Aannemers Vereniging 
[1983] ECR 00987, para 10; 11; Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v Traitements Mécano-
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531 Jakob Handte, supra n 530, para 15. 
532 See for example, Case C-27/02, Petra Engler v Janus Versand GmbH [2005] ECR I-00481.  
533 Martin Peters, supra n 530,  para 13. 
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by signing the note.534 Finally, even though the existence of a contract is questioned, the 
ECJ ruled that Article 7(1) BRIbis is applicable. Otherwise, it would be sufficient for 
parties to automatically challenge the validity of the contract in order to displace the 
application of Article 7(1) BRIbis, and thus, deprive it from its legal effect.535 Finally, 
when the obligation assumed by one party arises ex lege, the matter should not be 
considered as contractual.536 
243. When the case at issue is a contractual matter, the second step consists in 
identifying which of the three prongs of Article 7(1) BRIbis applies: first, Article 7(1)(a) 
BRIbis is a fallback rule that establishes jurisdiction for all types of contracts (infra; 2.). 
Specifically, this provision states that the place where the obligation which forms the 
basis of the legal proceedings is relevant to determine jurisdiction (infra; 3.). As for the 
second prong, namely Article 7.1(b) BRIbis, it sets forth an autonomous criterion for sales 
and services contracts. Accordingly, for these types of contracts, the court where the 
characteristic obligation is performed has jurisdiction. Finally, Article 7(1)(c) BRIbis 
explains the relationship between the first two prongs. In particular, it states that where 
Article 7(1)(b) does not apply, then one has to go back to the general rule of Article 
7(1)(a). The transition from paragraph (b) to paragraph (a) may occur in various 
situations: first, when parties contractually establish that Article 7(1)(a) is applicable 
whatever the nature of the contract at issue is. Second, when the delivery of goods or the 
provision of services takes place in a third State. Third, for some authors Article 7(1)(a) 
should be applied when parties to a sales or services contract agree on the place of 
performance of the obligation to pay.537 Fourth, certain authors consider that when the 
place of performance is too difficult to determine, then one should go back to Article 
7(1)(a).538  
 
 
                                                
534 Case C-419/11, Česká spořitelna, a.s. v Gerald Feichter [ECLI:EU:C:2013:165], paras 48-51. 
535 Case C-38/81, Effer SpA v Hans-Joachim Kantner [1982] ECR 00825, para 7. 
536 Case C-519/12, OTP Bank Nyilvánosan Működő Részvénytársaság v Hochtief Solution AG 
[ECLI:EU:C:2013:674], para 24. 
537 Garcimartín Alférez, supra n 505, 111. Contra: AL Calvo Caravaca and J Carrascosa González, Derecho 
Internacional Privado, vol II (Comares, 16th edn, 2016),  860 ; Gaudemet-Tallon, supra n 503, 207. 
538 Gaudemet-Tallon, supra n 503, 204. 
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2. Article 7(1)(a): The Place of Performance of the Obligation in Question 
244. Article 7(1)(a) BRIbis states that “[a] person domiciled in a Member State 
may be sued in another Member State: (1) (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the 
courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question”. Therefore, two steps 
are necessary in order to determine where claimants should litigate their contractual 
disputes: first, one has to find the obligation upon which the party bases the claim (“the 
obligation in question”). Then, the place of performance of this specific obligation has to 
be identified. We now examine these two elements in detail. 
245. The term “obligation in question” has been defined by the ECJ in De Bloos. 
As a preliminary point, it must be highlighted that this judgment was rendered under the 
auspices of the Brussels Convention, which sets up a forum for all types of contracts 
without distinction.539 Consequently, many cases that were rendered at that time would 
fall under Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis today. Nevertheless, this case law is still useful to 
understand the functioning of Article 7(1)(a) BRIbis. Going back to the ECJ’s case law, 
in De Bloos, a Belgian firm (De Bloos) concluded an exclusive distributorship agreement 
with Bouyer, a business located in France. According to the contract, Bouyer transferred 
the exclusive right to distribute its products on various markets to De Bloos.540 
Subsequently, the latter started proceedings in Belgium against its contractual partner, 
alleging a unilateral and unlawful breach of contract, without proper notice being given. 
Indeed, Bouyer considered that the contract had ended and hence, entered into 
negotiations with another distributor.541 On this occasion, the referring court asked the 
ECJ what contractual obligation(s) should be taken into account in order to anchor its 
jurisdictional power. The Court of Luxembourg clarified that the word “obligation” refers 
to the obligation that forms the basis of the legal proceedings.542 More precisely, this 
obligation corresponds to the contractual right upon which the claimant bases the 
action.543 Therefore, the obligation in question does not always correspond to the 
characteristic performance.  
                                                
539 Ex-Article 5(1) BC stated that “[a] person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting 
State, be sued: (…) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the 
obligation in question”. 
540 De Bloos, supra n 511, Opinion of Mr. Advocate-General Reischl, 1512. 
541 Ibid. 
542 De Bloos, supra n 511, para 11. 
543 Ibid, para 13. 
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The meaning of the Court’s answer may first be illustrated by a simple example:544 
if a Spanish firm sues its contractual partner located in Germany for the payment of the 
price corresponding to a delivery of goods, the relevant obligation that determines which 
courts have jurisdiction is the obligation to pay. However, if the German purchaser sues 
the Spanish firm because the goods are defective, the obligation in question is the delivery 
of these goods. For distributorship agreements, such as the agreement in De Bloos, and 
similar complex contractual relationships, the answer to this question is not always 
straightforward. For example, should the obligation to give proper notice be the obligation 
in question? Instead, should the obligation not to sell products to other market players be 
taken into account? Or should the obligation to deliver goods, which is the principal 
obligation of Bouyer, be the relevant one? Unfortunately, this question was not clarified 
by the ECJ.  
246. The second step of the reasoning consists in identifying the place of 
performance of the obligation in question.545 In Tessili, the ECJ held that this place has 
to be understood by reference to the substantive law applicable under the private 
international law rules of the court before which the matter is brought.546 To put it more 
simply, the court seised has to find the law applicable to the obligation in question in 
order to locate the place of performance. In the example mentioned in the above 
paragraph, which involves a Spanish and a German undertakings, if the Spanish firm 
seeks the payment of the price in the Spanish courts, these would have to determine what 
the law applicable to the obligation to pay is. Today, the law applicable to contractual 
obligation is regulated by the Rome I Regulation in civil and commercial matters.547 
According to this Regulation, the law applicable to the obligation to pay is the one 
                                                
544 It is important to emphasise that today, this example would be governed by Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis, 
unless the place of delivery were located in a third State. 
545 Note that in Shenavai, the ECJ considered the possibility that a claim be based on various obligations. 
In an obiter, it held that when more than one obligation forms the basis of legal proceedings, the courts 
where the principal one is performed have jurisdiction (Case C-266/85 Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer 
[1987] ECR 00239, para 19). This is the accessorium sequitur principale rule. Later on, the ECJ clarified 
another point: when the claim at issue is based on obligations of equal rank, then the Shenavai case law 
does not apply (Case C-420/97 Leathertex Divisione Sintetici SpA v Bodetex BVBA [1999] ECR I-06747, 
paras 39-40, 42). This means that national courts must locate the place of performance for each of the 
obligations concerned. 
546 Case C-12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v Dunlop AG [1976] ECR 01473, para 13; Case C-288/92 
Custom Made Commercial Ltd v Stawa Metallbau GmbH [1994] ECR I-02913, para 26; Case C-440/97 
GIE Groupe Concorde and Othes v The Master of the vessel "Suhadiwarno Panjan" and Others [1999] 
ECR I-06307, para 13. 
547 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
I) [2008] OJ L177/6. 
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designated by parties. In the absence of choice of law agreement, then the law of the 
country where the seller has his habitual residence applies. In our example, and in case 
parties did not select the law applicable to their contractual relationship, Spanish law 
would govern the action, as it corresponds to the habitual residence of the seller.  
The ultimate step is to look at Spanish substantive law in order to determine the 
place of performance of the obligation to pay. In this context, Article 1171 of the Spanish 
Civil Code establishes that, in principle, the obligation to pay is performed at the debtor’s 
domicile, unless parties agreed on another location. Therefore, the place of performance 
is Germany, given that the debtor is domiciled there. This means that Spanish courts 
should not accept jurisdiction under Article 7(1) BRIbis. Although the facts of this 
example seem quite simple, one quickly acknowledges the complexity of applying the De 
Bloos/Tessili case law. Consequently, the solution has been simplified since the 
enactment of the Brussels I Regulation for the most frequent contracts of the economy. 
Nevertheless, parties can also avoid the application of this complex technique by locating 
the place of performance in the contract or concluding a choice of court agreement.548 
3. Article 7(1)(b): Sales and Services Contracts  
247. Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis specifically deals with sale of goods and provision of 
services. It reads as follows: “[a] person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in 
another Member State: (…) (b) for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise 
agreed, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be: — in the case of 
the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the goods were 
delivered or should have been delivered, — in the case of the provision of services, the 
place in a Member State where, under the contract, the services were provided or should 
have been provided”. According to this provision, all contractual claims that derive from 
a sale of goods or a provision of services can be dealt with in the forum designated by 
Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis.  
248. Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis directly designates the place of performance for sale 
of goods, as well as provision of services. Although the ECJ did not provide a clear-cut 
definition of these two types of contracts, they should nevertheless be interpreted 
                                                
548 While a choice of court agreement is submitted to the requirements of Article 25 BRIbis, an agreement 
on the place of performance is not (see, C-56/79, Siegfried Zelger v Sebastiano Salinitri [1980] ECR 00089, 
paras 4-5). 
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autonomously. One should not try to technically define the terms “sale” or “service” but 
rather identify whether the characteristic obligation could be one of a sale of goods or 
provision of services.549 As a result, a contract whose characteristic obligation is the 
supply of goods has to be qualified as a “sale of goods” under Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis. 
Similarly, a contract which has as its characteristic obligation the provision of services 
falls in the scope of services contracts.550  
In this context, the ECJ had the opportunity to clarify that a contract whose object 
is to manufacture items thanks to the materials provided by the buyer and under his 
responsibility has to be considered as a contract for the provision of services. However, 
where the manufacturer provides the materials, and is responsible for the good execution 
of the work, then this would rather constitute a contract for the sale of goods.551 On this 
occasion, the Court explained that the previous activity of manufacturing items before 
selling them does not affect the qualification of the contract as a sale of goods.552 In 
another judgment,553 the ECJ stated that, in complex contractual relationships covered by 
a distributorship agreement, although they imply the selling of goods, they are more likely 
to be considered as a contract for the provision of services rather than a sale of goods. 
According to the Court, the distributor provides a service to the grantor, by selling his 
products and thus, increasing his distribution. In return, the distributor earns the 
competitive advantage to be the sole reseller of the grantor’s products in a given territorial 
area. Therefore, the purpose of the contract leads the Court to conclude that a 
distributorship contract cannot be considered as a simple bunch of successive selling 
agreements that would qualify as a sale contract.  
As regards the concept of provision of services, its exact boundaries are still 
unclear. On the one hand, for instance, Berlioz considers that the provision of services 
encompasses any contract whereby a party is under the obligation to do or not to do 
something, for free or against remuneration, in someone’s benefit.554 The objective of 
such a broad meaning is to avoid falling too easily under the scope of Article 7(1)(a) 
BRIbis, and have to cope with its complexity. On the other hand, however, it has to be 
                                                
549 Briggs, supra n 497, 268-269; Kropholler and von Hein, supra n 495, 173. 
550 Car Trim, supra n 529, para 32. 
551 Ibid, paras 40-43. 
552 Ibid, para 38. 
553 Case C-9/12 Corman-Collins SA v La Maison du Whisky SA [ECLI:EU:C:2013:860], paras 24-43. 
554 “toute opération ayant pour finalité l’accomplissement par une personne, au profit d’une autre, d’un 
acte, positif ou non, à titre onéreux ou non” (P Berlioz, “La notion de fourniture de services au sens de 
l’article 5-1 b) du Règlement de « Bruxelles I »” [2008] 135 [3] Journal du Droit International 717). 
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highlighted that some important judgments call into question the applicability of such a 
broad definition. For instance, in Falco, the ECJ seems to limit the scope of services 
contracts in two ways: first of all, the Court states that the objectives laid down by the 
Regulation require Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis to be interpreted narrowly, as it is an exception 
to Article 4 BRIbis.555 Second of all, the ECJ considers that in a contract of license, 
whereby the owner of an intellectual property right simply commits not to challenge the 
use of this right by his contractual partner, no provision of service is provided. In other 
words, this reasoning seems to indicate that the mere abstention from one party or an 
obligation not to do prevents the application of Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis.556  
Overall, literature emphasises that two requirements must be fulfilled for a 
contract to qualify as a provision of service: an activity in exchange of a remuneration – 
that does not have to be monetary. For example, contracts for legal, tax or architectural 
services fall under the scope of this definition. Similarly, services offered by 
intermediaries for financial investments or by real-estate agents are encompassed within 
the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis.557 
249. Furthermore, Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis establishes that the place of performance 
for sales contracts is the place where the goods are –or should have been– delivered. 
Similarly, as regards provision of services, the place of performance is located where the 
services are –or should have been– provided. In other words, this means that reference to 
national laws in order to determine the place of performance, as the De Bloos/Tessili case 
law provides, is excluded. Instead, the place of performance for these types of contracts 
has to be interpreted in an autonomous manner, according to the origins, objectives and 
scheme of the Regulation.558 Against this background, the ECJ ruled that, in a case 
involving a sale contract, national courts first have to ascertain whether the place of 
delivery is apparent from the parties’ agreement.559 In case contractual terms are silent on 
this particular issue, then the ECJ indicates that the final destination, where the goods 
were physically transferred to the purchaser, and where he obtained the actual power of 
                                                
555 Case C-533/07 Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lindhorst [2009] ECR I-
03327, para 37. 
556 Ibid, para 31.  
557 Kropholler and von Hein, supra n 495, 169-171. 
558 Car Trim, supra n 529, para 47; Color Drack, supra n 529, paras 18, 24; Rehder, supra n 529, paras 31, 
33; Falco, supra n 555, paras 20, 26. 
559 This is expressly allowed by Article 7(1)(b), which states that the place of performance corresponds to 
the place where services have to be provided (or should have been provided) “under the contract” (Car 
Trim, supra n 529, paras 54-5). This includes Incoterms (Case C-87/10 Electrosteel Europe SA v Edil 
Centro SpA [2009] ECR I-04987, para 22). 
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disposal, is the actual place of performance.560 The same rule is applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the provision of services. Nevertheless, issues could arise when the final 
destination of goods or services does not match the transfer of property, this is, when 
intermediaries are involved.561 However, in Car Trim, the ECJ seems to endorse the 
ultimate place where goods are handled as the place of performance.562  
250. When the contract has to be performed in various locations within a single 
Member State or in different Member States, the ECJ indicates that the relevant place is 
the one which presents the closest linking factor with the contract at issue. Most of the 
time, this place corresponds to the place where the main delivery of goods or provision 
of services is carried out, according to economic criteria.563 This particular location has 
to first be inferred from the contract.564 Alternatively, national courts have to take into 
account where, in fact, the most part of activities were held.565 Eventually, if the principal 
place of performance cannot be determined, then the claimant has the choice to sue at the 
location of the delivery of his choice.566 In this context, in a contract involving air 
transport services, the ECJ held that a passenger may alternatively sue the airline 
company, which is liable for the cancellation of his flight, at the place of departure or 
arrival. In the opinion of the Court, these two locations present a close linking factor with 
the contract.567 On another occasion involving an agency contract, the ECJ clarified that 
where the place of performance cannot be inferred from the contract and that no main 
activity can be identified, then the agent’s domicile is deemed to be the place that presents 
the closest linking factor with the contract.568 This result is in contrast with the previous 
case law of the ECJ.569 Indeed, it seems that the Court intends to reduce the fora available 
to claimants when the place of performance is difficult to locate, as it establishes an 
alternative forum in the agent’s domicile. It looks like the Court wanted to avoid the 
conclusion that no principal performance can be identified and thus, allocate jurisdiction 
to a multiplicity of courts. 
                                                
560 Car Trim, supra n 529, para 62. 
561 Briggs, supra n 497, 270. 
562 Car Trim, supra n 529, para 60. 
563 Color Drack, supra n 529, para 40; Rehder, supra n 529, para 35; Wood Floor, supra n 529, para 31. 
564 Wood Floor, supra n 529, paras 38-9. 
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566 Color Drack, supra n 529, para 42; Rehder, supra n 529, para 44. 
567 Rehder, supra n 529, paras 43-4. 
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569 U Grušić, “Jurisdiction in Complex Contracts under the Brussels I Regulation” (2011) 7 (2) Journal of 
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D. The Place where the Damage Occurred (Article 7(2)) 
1. General Aspects 
251. In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi delict, a claimant may initiate 
proceedings “in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur”. 
For the sake of simplicity, we hereafter refer to this category as matters relating to tort. 
Indeed, the three distinct concepts involved in Article 7(2) BRIbis reflect the existence of 
different national legal traditions and only means that this provision covers strict, as well 
as fault-based liability.570 Proximity and good administration of justice both command 
the existence of such a forum. On many occasions, the Court of Justice has stated that this 
special jurisdictional ground relies on “a particularly close connecting factor between a 
dispute and the court which may be called upon to hear it, with a view to the efficacious 
conduct of the proceedings”.571 Finally, it must be underlined that Article 7(2) BRIbis 
designates international, as well as local jurisdiction. 
252. The type of actions encompassed within matters related to tort are not limited 
to actions for damages. In this sense, the text makes clear that preventive actions fall 
under the scope of Article 7(2) BRIbis, as it states that proceedings can be started at the 
place where the harmful event “may” occur. Although there is no space for doubts today, 
it must be highlighted that the old text of the Brussels Convention did not expressly 
foresee this possibility. Fortunately, the ECJ came to the rescue in Henkel: in its 
judgment, the Court of Justice clarified that a preventive action brought by a consumer 
association in order to prohibit a German trader to use unlawful terms and conditions in 
his relationship with Austrian consumers fell under the scope of Article 7(2) BRIbis. This 
solution subsequently crystalized in the BRI. Additionally, negative actions seeking to 
establish the absence of liability enter the scope of the forum for matters related to tort.572 
                                                
570 U Magnus and P Mankowski, Brussels I Regulation, European Commentaries on Private International 
Law (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2nd edn, 2011), 234. 
571 Case C-21/76 Handelskwekerij G. J. Bier BV v Mines de potasse d'Alsace SA [1976] ECR 01735, para 
11. See also Case C-220/88 Dumez France SA and Tracoba SARL v Hessische Landesbank and Others 
[1990] ECR I-00049, para 17; Case C-68/93 Fiona Shevill, Ixora Trading Inc., Chequepoint SARL and 
Chequepoint International Ltd v Presse Alliance SA [1995] ECR I-00415, para 19; Case C-364/93 Antonio 
Marinari v Lloyds Bank plc and Zubaidi Trading Company [1995] ECR I-02719, para 10; Réunion 
Européenne, supra n 517, para 27. 
572 Case C-133/11 Folien Fischer AG and Fofitec AG v Ritrama SpA [ECLI:EU:C:2012:664]. 
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2. Matters Related to Tort 
253. In Kalfelis, the ECJ established that two requirements must be met in order 
for a claim to be related to tort: first of all, the claim is not covered by Article 7(1) BRIbis 
on contractual matters, and second of all, the claim must aim at determining the 
defendant’s liability.573 In other words, the ECJ has opted for a negative and autonomous 
definition. Hence, in order to ascertain whether an action is a matter related to tort, it is 
necessary to first determine whether, in light of the European case law, it is contractual 
in nature. Specifically, in Rudolf Gabriel, the Court of Justice established that national 
courts have to first examine whether Article 17 BRIbis applies, as it constitutes a lex 
specialis in relation to Article 7(1) BRIbis. Subsequently, if the case at issue is not a 
matter related to contracts, then national courts may envisage the application of Article 
7(2) BRIbis. Indeed, in order for the latter to apply, the former must necessarily be 
discarded.574  
254. If Article 7(1) and 7(2) BRIbis are mutually exclusive, does it mean that 
every action which is not contractual in nature falls under the scope of matters related to 
tort? It seems that the answer to this question is negative. This may be illustrated by the 
reasoning of the ECJ in Reichert, a case in which a bank brought an action paulienne 
against the Reicherts for having transferred the ownership of an immovable property to 
their son. In its judgment, the Court of justice states that the action at issue is not a matter 
related to tort, given that it does not aim at establishing the defendant’s liability. Besides, 
it is unlikely that this action would fall under Article 7(1) BRIbis, as there is not obligation 
freely assumed either by the bank or the Reicherts. As a result, it appears that only Article 
4 BRIbis is available in this case. Apart from those borderline cases, it has to be 
emphasised that the range of disputes covered by Article 7(2) BRIbis remains broad.575  
255. Finally, the ECJ had the opportunity to clarify two important points: first, 
different actions, which are nevertheless based on a similar set of facts, cannot be 
                                                
573 Kalfelis, supra n 518, para 17.  
574 Case C-96/00 Rudolf Gabriel [2002] ECR I-06367, paras 33-36. Confirmed by Engler, supra n 532, 
paras 29-32. 
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accumulated in a unique forum, even though this is justified by sound administration of 
justice.576 This unfortunately leads to the fragmentation of litigation.577 Second, the ECJ 
held that actions related to pre-contractual negotiations fall under the scope of “matters 
relating to tort”. Specifically, the Court of Justice considers that the breaking off of 
negotiations do not constitute the breach of an obligation freely assumed by one party 
towards the other. Rather, it may be a violation of a rule of law, namely the obligation to 
act in good faith.578 
256. The abstract wording of Article 7(2) BRIbis has to be considered in very 
different kinds of situations, which might sometimes generate complexities. In light of 
the above, the case law of the ECJ is an important guideline to understand this provision. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss some of the difficulties that have arisen in 
connection with the application of Article 7(2) BRIbis. These difficulties essentially 
concern the location of the place where the harmful event occurred.  
3. The Place Where the Harmful Event Occurred or May Occur 
a. The Dissociation Between the Place Giving Rise to the Damage and its 
Materialisation 
257. In Mines de Potasse d’Alsace,579 an undertaking located in France (Mines de 
Potasse d’Alsace) discharged chlorides in the waters of the Rhine, which increased their 
level of salinity. Bier, an undertaking located in the Netherlands and engaged in 
horticulture, waters and irrigates its seed-beds with these waters. In this context, Bier had 
to take costly measures in order to limit the damage that poor quality waters made to its 
plantations. Consequently, Bier and Stichting Reinwater, an association that promotes the 
improvement of the quality of the waters of the Rhine, initiated proceedings in the Court 
of first instance of Rotterdam, alleging that the conduct of Mines de Potasse d’Alsace was 
illegal and caused a damage to Bier’s horticultural business. The Court at Rotterdam 
declared that it had no jurisdiction under Article 7(2) BRIbis. Indeed, it considered that 
the place where the damage occurred was located in France. As a result, the claimants 
                                                
576 Kalfelis, supra n 518, para 21. 
577 Gaudemet-Tallon, supra n 503, 174-175. 
578 Case C-334/00 Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik 
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lodged an appeal in the court of appeal in The Hague, which in turn referred to the ECJ 
for preliminary ruling. In particular, the referring court asks the Court of Justice whether 
“the place where the damage occurred” under Article 7(2) BRIbis should be interpreted 
as the place where the damage became apparent or the place where the event having the 
damage as its sequel occurred. 
In its judgment,580 the ECJ held that the two above-mentioned connecting factors 
were of equal importance. Depending on the circumstances, they may both allocate 
jurisdiction to courts which are well placed for gathering of evidence or conducting 
proceedings. On the one hand, in case the place giving rise to the harmful event is 
favoured, it is likely that Article 7(2) BRIbis would consequently lose its effect, as this 
place would often coincide with the domicile of the defendant (Article 4 BRIbis). On the 
other hand, accepting the place where the damage manifested itself as the only connecting 
factor would impede courts that are close to the cause of the damage to have jurisdiction. 
As a conclusion, the ECJ considered that the claimant might initiate proceedings either in 
the courts of the place where the damage occurred (Erfolgsort), or in the courts of the 
place where the event giving rise to the harmful event took place (Handlungsort). 
b. Materialisation of the Damage in Various Member States 
258. In Shevill, the Court of Justice was confronted for the first time with a 
damage, which materialised in more than one Member State. In this context, the ECJ had 
to assist the referring court to determine where the place of the damage was. The facts of 
the case can be summarised as follows:581 Press Alliance, a publisher located in France, 
published various press articles regarding Fiona Shevill, a national domiciled in the 
United Kingdom, and Chequepoint, a bureau de change and her former employer whose 
seat was in France. These press articles were published in France-Soir, which is 
essentially distributed in France. Considering that these articles were defamatory, as they 
implied that they had participated in drug trafficking and money laundering, Miss Shevill 
and Chequepoint –followed by its sister company operating in the United Kingdom, Ixora 
Trading Inc, and its mother company located in Belgium– brought proceedings for 
damages suffered in the United Kingdom against Press Alliance in the British courts. 
                                                
580 Ibid, paras 15-25. 
581 Shevill, supra n 571, paras 2-16. 
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In the circumstances such as the ones in the case at issue, the Court of Justice held 
that the place of the event giving rise to the harmful event corresponds to the location 
where the publisher is established. Indeed, this is where the press article was issued and 
put into circulation.582 As for the place where the damage actually materialises, it has to 
be located where the defamatory article was distributed and where the victim alleged to 
have suffered injury to his/her reputation.583 Importantly, the ECJ pointed out that the 
court of the place of the event giving rise to the damage has jurisdiction to rule on the 
whole damage. However, the court of the place where the damage occurred has a limited 
territorial jurisdiction: it can only rule on the harm that took place within the State where 
the court seised is established.584 In this sense, the Court of Justice departs from German 
law, which allows courts to order compensation for the whole damage, whatever the basis 
of their jurisdiction.585 As the Advocate General Darmon states, this solution would 
certainly encourage forum shopping. Besides, it is doubtful that the court of the place 
where the damage materialised has sufficient proximity with the dispute to rule on it in 
its entirety.586 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the solution of the Court of 
Luxembourg might trigger conflicting judgments.587 
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E. Special Jurisdiction for Consumer Matters (Section 4)  
1. General Aspects 
259. Section 4 BRIbis establishes a special rule on jurisdiction for certain 
categories of consumers, which are deemed to be weaker than their contractual partners. 
In order to protect them from the consequences of this uneven playing field, the European 
legislator allows certain consumers to “thwart” the general jurisdictional regime 
established by the Regulation.588 The result is that these consumers can only be sued in 
the courts of their domicile according to Article 18(2) BRIbis. This objective is 
highlighted in Recital 18 of the Regulation and has been made explicit by the ECJ. For 
instance in Shearson, the Court affirmed that Section 4 “is inspired by the concern to 
protect the consumer as the party deemed to be economically weaker and less experienced 
in legal matters than the other party to the contract, and the consumer must not therefore 
be discouraged from suing by being compelled to bring his action before the courts in the 
[Member] State in which the other party to the contract is domiciled”.589 Finally, it should 
be reminded that the provisions of Section 4 have to be interpreted in a restrictive manner, 
given that they constitute an exception to Article 4 BRIbis.  
260. The wording of Section 4 has evolved over time. Hence, case law must be 
analysed carefully according to the different versions of the text that have been adopted. 
However, were the texts concur, the case law rendered under the older versions of Section 
4 has to be followed. Historically, the Brussels Convention only covered a limited number 
of contracts. Later, Section 4 was extended in order to match the growing protection that 
was offered to consumers under national law.590 Finally, the text was further extended in 
order to encompass sales on internet.591 Today, three provisions compose Section 4 
BRIbis: first of all, Article 17 sets the boundaries of the material scope of the Section. 
Then, Article 18 clarifies the jurisdictional ground for consumer matters. Finally, Article 
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19 deals with party autonomy and frames the possibility for parties to conclude choice of 
court agreements. 
261. As already mentioned, Section 4 applies autonomously, this is, irrespective 
of other jurisdictional grounds. In other words, the application of Section 4 is mandatory 
and hence, displaces the general regime established by the Regulation. There are however 
two exceptions to this rule: the first one is Article 6 BRIbis, which deals with defendants 
whose domicile is not located in a Member State. In principle, national rules of private 
international law apply in order to determine which court has jurisdiction on non-EU 
defendants. Nevertheless, the recast of the Brussels Regulation introduced an “exception 
to the exception” in Article 18(1). Accordingly, it is henceforth possible for a consumer 
to initiate proceedings in the court of his domicile against a defendant located in a third 
State. It should be pointed out that this solution does not work the other way around. The 
second exception is materialised in Article 7(5) BRIbis, which enables consumers to bring 
their action in the courts where the branch of a company is seated. Finally, it should be 
underlined that Section 3 relating to insurance, as well as Section 6 on exclusive 
jurisdiction, prevail over Section 4. 
2. The Notion of Consumer and the Types of Contracts Covered 
262. As mentioned earlier, Article 17 BRIbis designates the types of contracts that 
may fall under the application of Section 4. En passant, this provision defines what a 
consumer is for the sake of the Regulation. Article 17 BRIbis reads as follows: “1. In 
matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose which 
can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, jurisdiction shall be determined 
by this Section, without prejudice to Article 6 and point 5 of Article 7, if: (a) it is a contract 
for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; (b) it is a contract for a loan repayable 
by instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or (c) 
in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial 
or professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any 
means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including that 
Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities. 2. Where a 
consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in a Member State but 
has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Member States, that party shall, 
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in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed 
to be domiciled in that Member State. 3. This Section shall not apply to a contract of 
transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination 
of travel and accommodation”. 
263. To start with, the concept of consumer was first defined by the ECJ592 and 
then crystalized in the text of the Convention, as amended in 1978. Accordingly, a 
consumer is a person who concludes a contract for a purpose that is not related to his trade 
or profession. In assessing whether a party is a consumer, national courts must take into 
account the position of this party in a particular contractual relationship. Hence, the 
subjective situation of a person is irrelevant.593 Furthermore, the Court of Justice had the 
occasion to clarify that the protective forum is available to a final consumer acting himself 
and who did not assign his rights to another party.594 Finally, although Article 17 does 
not explicitly mention it, it implies that the contractual partner of a consumer protected 
by Section 4 has to be a professional. In other words, Section 4 is not applicable to private 
parties, contracts between consumers and contracts between a private party and a 
consumer.595 
264. Contrarily to Article 7(1) BRIbis, the application of Section 4 requires the 
actual conclusion of a contract between a consumer and a professional. This has been 
clarified by the ECJ in a series of judgments regarding prize notification.596 Specifically 
in Illsinger, Schlank & Schick, a German company, sent a letter personally addressed to 
Ms. Illsinger, domiciled in Austria, according to which she was the winner of a prize. 
Following the instructions of the company, Ms. Illsinger tore off a coupon that she joined 
to a “prize claim certificate” and sent it back to Schlank & Schick with the objective to 
cash the prize in. Ms. Illsinger argues that she simultaneously placed a trial order, but this 
fact is contested by the company. In any case, it should be highlighted that the obtaining 
of the prize did not depend on an order of goods. Subsequently, Ms. Illsinger initiated 
proceedings in the Austrian courts against Schlank & Schick, seeking the payment of the 
prize. In this context, the referring court asked the ECJ whether this action was contractual 
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in nature within the meaning of Article 17 BRIbis. In its answer, the Court of Justice 
declared that in order for Section 4 to apply, a contract must be concluded between the 
parties. This would be the case where the professional manifests an unconditional will to 
pay the prize to consumers who accept the offer. The ECJ added that the object of this 
offer must be sufficiently clear and precise, as to generate a link of a contractual nature. 
If such a contractual link cannot be established, Article 17 BRIbis could apply if the 
consumer makes an order of goods to the professional, following the prize notification. 
In this case, a claim for the payment of the prize would be non dissociable from the order 
and thus, enter the scope of this provision.597 
265. There are three types of contracts contained in Article 17(1) BRIbis: 
contracts for sale of goods on instalment credit terms (Article 17(1)(a)); contracts of loan 
or credit that aim at financing a purchase of goods (Article 17(1)(b)); and all other 
contracts that entertain a special connection with the consumer’s domicile (Article 
17(1)(c)).  
The sale of goods on instalment credit terms is a uniform concept that has been 
defined by the ECJ in Société Bertrand. Accordingly, this concept should be defined as 
“a transaction in which the price is discharged by way of several payments or which is 
linked to a financing contract”.598 Besides, in Hans-Herman Mietz, the Court clarified 
that Article 17(1)(a) BRIbis only applies when the seller transfers the possession of the 
goods to the buyer before the purchase price is fully paid.599 The object of Article 17(1)(b) 
BRIbis also encompasses sales of goods on instalment credit terms. However, it 
especially concerns funding operations, whose purpose is to finance sales of goods. 
Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis covers all other contracts –except contracts of transport– 
concluded by a consumer with a professional, when the latter either pursues his activities 
in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or directs such activities to this territory. 
While the first option requires the trader’s presence in the Member State where the 
consumer is domiciled, the second one suggests that the trader advertises and promotes 
his products or services without being physically present on this particular market. In this 
case, the Regulation requires the contract to be in relationship with the activities directed 
to the Member State of the consumer domicile. 
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266. In Rudolf Gabriel, the Court of Justice indicated that advertising techniques 
may take place via press, radio, television, cinema or any other means. Additionally, more 
personal advertising measures are also covered by Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis like the 
sending of catalogues to the consumer or commercial offers made to him in person, in 
particular by an agent or door-to-door salesman.600 Since this judgment, the rise of 
internet generated additional interpretative issues concerning this provision. In particular, 
should one consider that the offer of products or services through a website, which is 
accessible from the consumer’s domicile, constitutes an activity that is directed to this 
territory? The ECJ answered this question negatively in the joined cases Pammer and 
Hotel Alpenhof. Indeed, it concluded that the mere accessibility of a website is not 
sufficient to fulfil the requirements of Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis.601 On this occasion, the 
Court also offered a useful non-exhaustive list of elements that may constitute evidence 
that the trader directed its activities to the Member State where the consumer is domiciled. 
These elements include: “the international nature of the activity, mention of itineraries 
from other Member States for going to the place where the trader is established, use of a 
language or a currency other than the language or currency generally used in the Member 
State in which the trader is established with the possibility of making and confirming the 
reservation in that other language, mention of telephone numbers with an international 
code, outlay of expenditure on an internet referencing service in order to facilitate access 
to the trader’s site or that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other Member 
States, use of a top-level domain name other than that of the Member State in which the 
trader is established, and mention of an international clientele composed of customers 
domiciled in various Member States”.602 
Later on, the Court of Justice added some precisions to this case law: in 
Mühlleitner, it ruled that Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis does not require the contract to have 
been concluded at a distance. In the case at issue, Ms. Mühlleitner, an Austrian national, 
went to Germany in order to buy a car that she previously found on a website. When she 
returned in Austria, she discovered that the car was defective and sued the German seller 
in the courts of her domicile for damages and repayment of the purchase price. In this 
context, the ECJ pointed out that Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis was applicable to the action at 
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stake, even though Ms. Mühlleitner personally went to another Member State in order to 
conclude the contract after having consulted the offer on a website.603 Besides, it is not 
necessary to establish causality between the means used to target consumers in a given 
Member State and the subsequent conclusion of a contract. Indeed, in Emrek, a French 
business run by Mr. Sabranovic directed its activities to Germany through its website. 
However, Mr. Emrek, domicilied in Germany, concluded a contract with this company 
after having learned about its existence from acquaintances. In this case, the ECJ 
concluded that the application of Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis does not require the 
establishment of a causal link between the prior consultation of a website and a contract, 
as it would run against its wording and undermine consumer protection.604 
3. Protective Forum 
267. When an action falls under the material scope of Article 17 BRIbis, the 
consequence is that protective rules on jurisdiction apply. In particular, Article 18 BRIbis 
establishes the following: “1. A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party 
to a contract either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or, 
regardless of the domicile of the other party, in the courts for the place where the 
consumer is domiciled. 2. Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other 
party to the contract only in the courts of the Member State in which the consumer is 
domiciled. 3. This Article shall not affect the right to bring a counterclaim in the court in 
which, in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending”. 
According to this provision, two situations must be distinguished, depending on 
who the claimant is. In particular, consumer claimants may bring a suit against a 
professional domiciled in the EU, either in the courts of their own domicile or in the 
courts of the defendant’s domicile. Since the entry into force of the BRIbis, consumer 
claimants may also start proceedings against a defendant seated in a third-State in the 
courts of their own domicile. This amounts to a forum actoris. 
When the claimant is the professional, then only one option is available: he must 
litigate in the Member State where the consumer is domiciled (Article 18(2) BRIbis).  
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F. Rules on Lis Pendens and Related Actions 
268. Articles 29 and 30 BRIbis establish rules of coordination when two –or 
more– proceedings, which share a certain degree of similarity, start in the courts of 
different Member States. The objective of these norms is to avoid the issuance of 
irreconcilable judgments. According to Article 29 BRIbis on lis pendens, a second seised 
court located in the EU must stay proceedings if another claim “involving the same cause 
of action and (…) the same parties” was firstly brought in the courts of another Member 
State. In this vein, the ECJ ruled that parties are identical even when their procedural 
position in the different proceedings diverge.605 Additionally, the ECJ interpreted that 
Article 29 BRIbis is applicable where proceedings share a similar cause and object. On 
the one hand, the cause of action refers to the facts of the case and the applicable law,606 
and on the other hand, the object refers to the objective of the claim.607 Put it differently, 
the two proceedings must essentially relate to an identical dispute. In case the conditions 
of Article 29 BRIbis are fulfilled, the second court seised must stay proceedings. It will 
then decline jurisdiction in case the court first seised confirms its jurisdictional power 
over the dispute (Article 29(3) BRIbis). The only exception to the prior tempore rule, is 
contained in Article 31(2) and (3) BRIbis. This provision states that the court designated 
in a choice of court agreement shall have priority. As a result, other courts of the Member 
States, even if they are seised first, should stay proceedings until the designated court 
establishes or decline jurisdiction.608 Finally, Article 33 BRIbis governs coordination 
between EU and extra-EU proceedings. Basically, conditions are the same as in Article 
29 BRIbis. If these are fulfilled, the EU court will have the possibility to stay proceedings 
if recognition and enforcement of the extra-EU judgment is likely and sound 
administration of justice commands it (Article 33(1)(a) and (b) BRIbis). 
269. When two actions pending in different Member States are not identical but 
related, Article 30 BRIbis states that the second seised court may stay proceedings. In 
other words, there is no obligation for said court to do so, as in Article 29 BRIbis. At the 
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request of one of the parties, the court may also decline jurisdiction and thus, allow the 
case to be consolidated in the court first seised –assuming it has jurisdiction and that 
consolidation is permitted by its national procedural law. Finally, Article 30(3) BRIbis 
clarifies that actions are related when they “are so closely connected that it is expedient 
to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments”. 
Therefore, the connection requirement may be fulfilled even if separate judgments with 
non-mutually exclusive consequences could theoretically be issued.609 
G. Party Autonomy 
270. According to Article 25 BRIbis, parties may enter into a choice of court 
agreement with the purpose to thwart the general rules on jurisdiction established by the 
Brussels regime. In order to guarantee the reality of the agreement, Article 25 BRIbis 
imposes certain formal conditions. Since the BRI, consent may also be given through 
electronic means. For the sake of this research project, it is important to highlight that 
party autonomy is limited as far as consumer contracts are concerned. In particular, 
Article 19 BRbis states that choice of court agreements are only valid if: (1) there are 
concluded after the rise of the dispute; (2) they offer additional fora where consumers 
may start litigation without depriving them of the ones established in Section 4 BRIbis; 
(3) they designate the courts of the Member State where both parties are domiciled or 
habitually reside at the time the contract is concluded. 
271. As for Article 26 BRIbis, it allocates jurisdiction to courts where the 
defendant enters an appearance and does not contest said court’s jurisdictional power. 
The only limit to this rule is the existence of an exclusive ground of jurisdiction pursuant 
to Article 24 BRIbis. In case the defendant is the weak party, such as a consumer, the 
court nonetheless has to inform him of his right to challenge jurisdiction (Article 26(2) 
BRIbis). 
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II. Jurisdiction and Collective Redress 
A. The Representative Model 
1. Outline of the Representative Model 
272. Thanks to the enactment of Directive 2009/22/CE, all Member States have 
enacted a representative model of collective redress, whereby associations are entitled to 
protect consumer interests. However, this Directive only refers to actions for injunctive 
relief. In certain States, like Spain, France, Austria, Finland, Greece and Belgium, a 
broader range of remedies are available under the representative model. As for Portugal, 
Italy, Norway, Sweden, Bulgaria and Poland, the representative mechanism has been 
coupled with the class action model that is analysed below (infra; C.). In other words, in 
those States, both representative entities and individuals may start collective redress 
proceedings. Although it has been shaped in different fashion, the representative model 
is the most widespread collective redress mechanism within the EU. This might explain 
the abundance of bibliographical sources regarding this model, and the corresponding 
literature gap with respect to others.  
273. Basically, two scenarios are relevant for the sake of this research project: 
under the first one, a representative body litigates on its own behalf in order to defend the 
interests of consumers at large. In this case, there is no transfer of an individual’s claim 
to an intermediary. As a result, no one in particular is represented in court. Instead, a 
somehow abstract interest is protected. In chapter II, we call it “general interest” (supra; 
§ 115). Usually, these actions seek injunctive –or declaratory– relief. Under the second 
scenario, the representative body acts on behalf of a group of victims. Therefore, it 
protects various aggregated individual interests. In this situation, the intermediary is the 
representative of a determined or determinable group of victims. Often, those actions seek 
monetary compensation. 
274. In order to illustrate this point, we briefly present the French system on 
collective redress, since its procedural toolkit contains both kinds of actions.610 On the 
one hand, the Action exercée dans l’intérêt collectif des consommateurs (Article L.621-6 
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FCC) allows any accredited consumer association to ban illegal practices, which violate 
European Directives. For example, this provision enables associations to litigate against 
unfair terms. Because consumer associations initiate proceedings in order to protect a 
general interest, there is no group of victims directly represented. As one may expect, this 
model is usually based on automatic membership.  
On the other hand, representative entities, such as consumer associations, 
sometimes act on behalf of identified victims. Depending on the goals of the national 
legislators, this specific mechanism might be opt-in or opt-out based. Typically, the 
French Action en représentation conjointe (Article L.622-1 to 4 FCC) follows such a 
scheme. According to this procedural instrument, two or more consumers mandate an 
aggregated consumer association in order to defend their claims in court. Their damage 
must stem from the same unlawful behaviour and be committed by the same professional. 
In this scenario, the consumer association does not have any proper claim but assists 
consumers to obtain compensation. For example, the Conseil National des Associations 
Familiales laïques (Cnafal) brought an Action en représentation conjointe against a travel 
agency for having sold trips to Turkey that did not actually correspond to the description 
in their catalogue.611 
275. Taking into account these considerations, we structured this section as 
follows: to start with, we address questions surrounding the representative entity, such as 
its private or public nature, as well as standing to sue issues (infra; 2.). Although the latter 
topic is procedural, it may have a significant impact on private international law 
questions. We then observe how private international law rules on jurisdiction apply to 
the two categories of actions we described above (infra; 3.). The distinction between 
actions in the general or collective interest is important because, on the one hand, one 
may consider that a representative entity protecting a general interest should not benefit 
from the fora available to (potential) victims. On the other hand, however, this option 
might be open in the second scenario described above, given that the representative entity 
acts on behalf of a determined group of victims. Should differences exist between those 
actions, we will underline them as they arise. Finally, we close the sub-section with an 
interim conclusion (infra; 4.) Along the way, we use some emblematic cases in order to 
illustrate our reasoning. However, because collective redress suits involving international 
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components pursuant to the representative model are scarce, it will unfortunately not 
always be possible to take a court judgment as a basis of analysis. 
2. The Representative Entity 
276. This sub-section tackles two particular questions: the first one concerns the 
identification of the representative entities that fall under the scope of the Brussels regime 
(infra; a.). This subject is examined in light of the judgment of the ECJ in the Henkel 
case, which was issued in 2002. We already announce that this leading case will also be 
referred to in the sub-section dedicated to questions on jurisdiction. Notably, our research 
shows that it is not clear whether public representatives or private representatives 
exercising a public power could rely on the BRIbis for jurisdictional purposes. The second 
question examines standing to sue from a more general perspective by addressing the 
usual issues faced by representatives who wish to litigate abroad (infra; b.). As we will 
see, standing to sue does not generate any fundamental issue when actions are covered by 
Directive 2009/22/EC. However, uncertainties arise outside the scope of said Directive, 
for example when actions for damages are at stake. 
a. The Nature of the Representative Entity 
i. Statement of Facts of the Henkel Case 
277. The Verein für Konsumenteninformation (hereafter, VKI) is a major Austrian 
consumer association domiciled in Vienna. Among other activities, the entity actively 
protects consumer interests in court. In this context, in 1999, the VKI brought proceedings 
against Mr. Henkel, a trader located in Germany, in order to protect Austrian 
consumers.612 According to the representative association, Mr. Henkel had used or 
offered unfair terms in his contractual relationships with said consumers. As a result, the 
VKI sought injunctive relief in the Handelsgericht Wien (Commercial Court of Vienna) 
pursuant to Paragraph 28 of the Konsumenschutzgesetz (KSchG), which codifies 
Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms.613 The consumer association argued that the 
Commercial Court of Vienna had jurisdiction to hear the dispute under Article 5(3) BC, 
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the predecessor of Article 7(2) BRIbis. Nevertheless, the Court rejected the VKI’s 
argument, given that no damage arose out of tort, delict or quasi-delict. In light of this, 
the Court found it had no jurisdiction. The Court seised on appeal, namely the 
Oberlandesgericht Wien (Regional Court of Vienna), overturned this decision and held 
that the preventive action brought by the VKI entered the scope of the BC. Subsequently, 
Mr. Henkel brought an appeal to the Oberster Gerichtshof (the Austrian Supreme Court), 
which asked the ECJ to clarify whether a preventive action such as the one at issue was a 
matter related to tort under the Brussels regime. 
In the case under analysis, the ECJ shed light on three important questions: to start 
with, the Court of Justice examined the potential application of Section 4 BRIbis, as well 
as Articles 7(1) and (2) BRIbis (ex-Articles 5(1) and (3) BRI) to the case at issue. Then, 
it ruled that preventive actions fell under the scope of Article 7(2) BRIbis. This solution 
has been accepted and codified since the entry into force of the BRI. In the next lines, we 
assess the private or public nature of the VKI, which conditions its ability to benefit from 
the fora of the Brussels regime. 
ii. The Public or Private Nature of the Representative 
278. In Henkel, the United Kingdom government submitted that the claim brought 
by the VKI did not enter the scope of the Brussels regime. In particular, it explains that 
the Austrian consumer association is a public entity and that the action at issue stems 
from the exercise of a public power. Nevertheless, the ECJ rejected this argument and 
concluded that the VKI was a private body. Moreover, its claim affected commercial 
relationships between individuals. As a consequence, the Court ruled that the action fell 
under the material scope of the BC. The reasoning of the ECJ has to be examined in light 
of Article 1 BRIbis, which restrains the material scope of the Regulation to “civil and 
commercial matters”. 
279. According to the ECJ’s case law, the concept of “civil and commercial 
matters” is the object of an autonomous definition that takes into account the objectives 
and the scheme of the Brussels regime. This solution has been established by the ECJ in 
Eurocontrol.614 In this case, the claimant, namely the European organisation for the safety 
of air navigation (Eurocontrol), sought the payment of charges owed by a person 
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governed by private law, for the mandatory and exclusive use of the organisation’s 
equipment and services. In this context, the ECJ had to determine whether the action at 
issue was civil and commercial in nature. The Court of Luxembourg ruled that certain 
disputes should be excluded from the Regulation’s scope, either by reason of the legal 
relationship between the parties to the action or the subject-matter of said action.615 In 
light of the above, the Court concluded that Eurocontrol was a public body that exercised 
a public power, given the relationship of subordination existing between such an 
organisation and its users.616  
In Ruffer, the Court of Justice cemented its previous case law regarding Article 1 
BRIbis.617 This case involved a claim brought by the Netherlands against the owner of a 
ship for the recovery of the costs involved in the removal of a wreck in public waterways. 
The ECJ considered that the Netherlands acted as a body invested with public authority, 
as the function of policing waterways stems from an international Treaty. The Court 
added that the filing of such a claim in the civil courts –and not the administrative ones– 
did not affect this reasoning.618  
Conversely, for example, in Sonntag, the ECJ held that an action for damages 
brought against the teacher of a public school who caused harm to a pupil for incorrectly 
exercising his duty of supervision entered the scope of Article 1 BRIbis.619 According to 
the Court, even though the parties were joined to criminal proceedings as civil parties, 
the action at stake has to be considered a civil claim. Furthermore, even if the teacher 
acted on behalf of the State, he was not invested with a public power when he supervised 
pupils during a school trip. In fact, he assumed the same functions as the ones a teacher 
from a private school would have.620 The consecutive judgments that have been rendered 
on this matter shadow the established case law.621 
From the previously analysed case law, we infer that the application of the 
Regulation has to be rejected when two conditions are fulfilled, namely the existence of 
a dispute between a public authority and an individual governed by private law, and the 
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use of public law prerogatives by said authority. As the case law shows, however, the line 
separating civil and commercial relationships form public law ones is thin and sometimes 
difficult to establish. 
280. Taking these considerations into account, it seems to us that the private or 
public nature of the VKI in Henkel is not self-evident.622 It has to be underlined that public 
entities, such as the Austrian Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Labour Union Federation, 
and the Republic of Austria, are all members of the VKI.623 Therefore, these elements 
might cast some doubts regarding the private nature of this organisation. Besides, in an 
online document, the VKI expressly states that it litigates cases on behalf of the Austrian 
government.624 This might indicate that some power is transferred from the State to the 
consumer association.  
Along the same line of reasoning, it is difficult to conclude that the claim brought 
by the VKI, which consists in prohibiting a trader to use unfair terms, is of a private rather 
than public law nature. On the one hand, one may argue that such an action enters the 
scope of the Regulation, as it is founded upon Directive 93/13/EEC, which is grounded 
on private law. Furthermore, the power to challenge unfair terms under national laws is 
usually not restricted to certain claimants: individual consumers can equally contest the 
validity of a clause that governs their relationship with a trader. As a result, the object of 
the VKI’s action is not different than a claim that would arise from a relationship 
governed by private law. On the other hand, however, it seems that through its action, the 
VKI protects interests of consumers at large and more generally, the well-functioning and 
the transparency of the market. In this case, the protection of Austrian consumers from 
the use of unfair terms in courts is a specific prerogative that no individual consumer 
alone is able to exercise. In fact, many Member States allocate standing to sue to a quite 
limited range of actors in order to guarantee that these supra-individual interests are well 
represented and protected.  
281. As we explained above, the representative model has been implemented in 
distinct ways among Member States. As a result, some national mechanisms may involve 
much more “public components” than others. For these mechanisms, the application of 
                                                
622 C Michailidou, “Internationale Zuständigkeit bei vorbeugenden Verbandsklagen” (2003) 3 Praxis des 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 223. 
623 We extracted this information from the VKI’s website and documents of presentation 
(https://www.konsument.at/kontakt). 
624 Ibid. 
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the Brussels regime is more difficult to justify.625 Typically, the Finnish representative 
action illustrates our point.626 The Group Action Act of 2007 enables the Finnish 
Consumer Ombudsman, a public authority, to take a legal action in mass consumer 
disputes. Specifically, the Ombudsman represents consumers who opted into the 
proceedings and may seek usual remedies available under Finnish law. It should be 
highlighted that it is the only entity to have standing to sue. According to the Consumer 
Protection Act 34/1978, the Ombudsman may defend a general interest without 
consumers’ consent. However, only injunctive relief is available under this model. 
Consumers only have a secondary right to sue, in case the public authority does not act. 
In both scenarios, it is not clear whether the Regulation should apply, for the following 
reasons: first, there is no doubt that the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman is a public 
authority. Second, its almost exclusive right to defend supra-individual interests indicates 
that this power may well have been acquired from the State. 
b. Standing to Sue and Litigation Abroad 
282. The following lines briefly present some procedural problems faced by 
consumer associations in cross-border collective redress cases. The examples below that 
illustrate said problems took place before the enactment of the Injunctions Directive, 
which sets up a system whereby standing to sue has to be mutually recognised for certain 
actions. This is justified since the procedural issues faced during the pre-Injunctions 
Directive era might reappear out of the scope of Directive 2009/22/EC. The next 
paragraphs mainly focus on procedural issues that are often faced by consumer 
associations, as this case is the most common .  
283. The start of collective redress proceedings in foreign courts may generate 
significant and sometimes insurmountable procedural issues for consumer associations. 
In particular, national courts rule on questions regarding capacity and standing to sue627 
                                                
625 Along these lines, Michailidou (supra n 622, 224) argues that in order for the Brussels Convention (now, 
the BRIbis) to apply, one should determine whether the consumer association is entrusted with a public 
power or aims at controling the fairness of given private contractual relationships. According to this 
reasoning, the Convention would only apply to the latter case. 
626 For more information on the Finnish system regarding collective redress, see Annex II.J. 
627 It has to be underlined that any investigation regarding standing to sue faces terminological difficulties 
(for an in-depth comparative law analysis on this question, see A Blomeyer, “Types of Relief Available 
[Judicial Remedies]” in M Cappelletti [ed], International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol XVI, 
Chapter 4 [JCB Mohr/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982]). Because Member States usually approach 
procedural questions in a different fashion, some concepts are not easy to translate and transpose. Besides, 
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in different ways. In the first place, capacity to start proceedings relies on legal 
personality. Therefore, Member States usually recognise an association’s legal 
personality either according to the place of its principal establishment or the place of its 
incorporation.628 In certain cases –like for public authorities–, the capacity to sue can also 
be established by law.629 In the second place, standing to sue is allocated under different 
conditions depending on the legal order concerned and it may be examined under distinct 
laws. 
284. Today, the Injunctions Directive clarifies the procedural landscape by 
imposing the mutual recognition of standing to sue for most actions for injunctive 
relief.630 To be more specific, the former version of Directive 2009/22/EC, which was 
enacted in 1998, harmonises certain aspects of injunction procedures that aim at 
protecting consumer rights. According to Article 3 of the Directive, qualified entities may 
seek injunctive relief against a trader who violated the text of a Directive mentioned in 
Annex I. Among others, the Directive on unfair terms and package travels is included in 
the list. Entities qualified to protect consumer interests are designated by each Member 
State. Their identity is published in the Official Journal of the European Union, in 
accordance with Article 4(3) of the Directive.631 Nevertheless, said Directive does not 
deal with capacity to sue or what French literature calls intérêt pour agir. Besides, 
collective redress actions for damages are not encompassed in the Directive’s scope. 
Therefore, procedural questions surrounding those actions is for Member States to solve.  
                                                
they do not always have their equivalent in all European States, which makes comparisons difficult. For 
the sake of this research project, and in order to simplify our analysis, we distinguish between capacity to 
sue (capacité pour agir) and standing to sue (qualité pour agir). 
628 M Fallon, “An Essay on the Mutual Recognition of Group Actions (Governmental, Organizational, of 
Class Actions) in Cross-Border Consumer Conflicts within the European Community” in T 
Bourgoignie (ed), Group actions and the defense of the consumer interest in the European community 
(Brussels, Story, 1992) 253. 
629 JY Carlier, “Les actions collectives transfrontières. Rapport belge” in B Stauder (ed), Les actions 
collectives transfrontières des organisations de consommateurs – Droit international et droit du marché 
intérieur, Actes du colloque organisé avec le Centre d’études juridiques européennes (Zürich, Schultess, 
1997) 47-48; Fallon, supra n 628, 253. 
630 We build up this brief introduction thanks to the following sources: D Hoffmann, “Directive ʻActions 
en cessation en matière de protection des intérêts des consommateurs (Dir. 98/27/CE du 19/5/98)ʼ” (2000) 
1 European Review of Private Law 147-154; P Rott, “The Protection of Consumers’ Interests After the 
Implementation of the EC Injunctions Directive Into German and English Law” (2001) 24 Journal of 
Consumer Policy 401-411; S Wrbka, European Consumer Access to Justice Revisited (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 40-53. 
631 Notification from the Commission concerning Article 4(3) of Directive 2009/22/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests, which codifies 
Directive 98/27/EC, concerning the entities qualified to bring an action under Article 2 of this Directive 
(Text with EEA relevance) [2016] OJ C361/1. 
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285. Procedural differences, among other factors, certainly create uncertainties 
that may refrain consumers’ representatives from suing in other Member States. In order 
to illustrate this point, we cherry picked two emblematic examples that we present below.  
286. First of all, the law applicable to standing to sue in France is governed by 
both the lex fori, as well as the law of constitution of the consumer association.632 In 
France, the law limits the number of players which are able to initiate collective redress 
actions. In particular, consumer associations which want to start such actions have to be 
certified, pursuant to Article L.811-1 FCC. Among other things, these associations must 
have at least one year of existence and be sufficiently representative. In light of this, it is 
likely that French courts demand foreign associations to possess such a certificate or a 
similar document.633 However, certain Member States like Germany do not impose any 
certification process on their consumer associations. Practically, this means that German 
associations might not be able to litigate in France, where the Injunctions Directive does 
not apply.634  
As we mentioned before, French courts also take into account the law of the 
representative’s constitution. Accordingly, a German association that has standing to sue 
in the State of its domicile may not exercise this right in France if French associations do 
not possess a similar right. It would be discriminatory to allocate more rights to foreign 
entities than to national ones (discrimination à rebours).635 Similarly, if a consumer 
association is not able to represent certain supra-individual interests under its law of 
constitution, then this prohibition also applies in France.636  
287. Our second example concerns a case of false advertising. In 1995, the Second 
Instance Court of Köln (Germany) rendered a judgment637 in a case involving a claim 
                                                
632 P Mayer and V Heuzé, Droit international privé (Lextenso éditions, 2010), 375-6; A Morin, “Les actions 
collectives transfrontières. Rapport français” in Stauder, supra n 629, 76-77. 
633 For example Belgium adopted a different solution: the requirement of a certificate  is examined 
according to the law where the consumer association comes from. As a result, Rigaux and Fallon explain 
that “l’action introduite en Belgique par une association française de consommateurs suppose que celle-ci 
puisse produire l’agrément octroyé conformément au droit français et qui conditionne, selon ce droit, la 
représentativité de l’association. Cela signifie que cette association ne doit pas, pour agir en Belgique, avoir 
obtenu l’agrément prévu par la droit Belge” (F Rigaux and M Fallon, Droit international privé [Larcier, 
3rd edn, 2005], 473). 
634 JY Carlier, Guide des litiges transfrontières (Paris, Institut National de la Consommation, 1993), 52-55. 
635 ML Niboyet and G de Geouffre de La Pradelle, Droit international privé (Lextenso éditions, 2011), 502-
503. 
636 Mayer and Heuzé, supra n 632, 376. 
637 Judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Köln (higher regional court), case 6 U 25/94 rendered on 12 May 
1995. Note that we could not have access to the judgments of the first instance court and the German 
Supreme Court. For this reason, we completed our explanations on the facts with the following sources: 
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brought by a German consumer association (Verbraucherschutzverein, hereafter, VSV) 
–at the request of UFC-Que Choisir– against Direct Shopping, whose mailbox was 
located in Germany. The latter allegedly promised to sell products to French consumers 
against the payment of a sum of money in advance. The advertisements for this offer were 
sent from Czech Republic. Consumers who accepted the trader’s deal either received 
products whose quality did not meet the contractual standards or received no answer from 
their business partner at all.  
In its decision,638 the Second Instance Court established that, according to §13 of 
the German competition law (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb, UWG), a 
consumer association must demonstrate that its statutes aim at protecting the interest 
which has been harmed. However, VSV did not encompass the protection of French 
consumers within its status. As a result, the consumer association did not possess any 
intéret à agir. Additionally, the Court mentions that §13 UWG may only be used if 
German law has been violated, which was doubtful in the case at issue. The decision has 
been confirmed by the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).639 
288. To sum up, these examples show that different procedural approaches to 
capacity and standing to sue, as well as intérêt à agir in certain Member States might 
significantly complicate the start of proceedings abroad. Although the Injunctions 
Directive partially solved those procedural issues, we explain below that important 
barriers to cross-border litigation remain (infra; § 420). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
Carballo, supra n 4, 74; J Franck and P Foucher, “Expériences concrètes de résolution de litiges 
transfrontières dans le domaine de la publicité” in Stauder, supra n 629, 83-108; HW Micklitz, “Cross-
Border Consumer Conflicts – A French-German Experience” (1993) 16 Journal of Consumer Policy 418-
434. 
638 Judgment of the higher regional court Köln, supra n 637, 11-22. 
639 HW Micklitz, “Efficacité internationale de l’action en suppression des clauses abusives: point de vue 
allemand” (2000) 52 (4) Revue internationale de droit comparé 874, footnote 9. 
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3. Questions Regarding Jurisdiction  
a. Section 4 BRIbis 
289. As we mentioned earlier, the reasoning of the ECJ in the Henkel case will 
guide our analysis of jurisdictional questions. In this case, the ECJ held that a consumer 
association cannot benefit from the protective forum established by Section 4 BRIbis. 
Another solution would run against the wording of Article 18(1) BRIbis, which states that 
“[a] consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the 
courts of the Member State in which that party is domiciled or, regardless of the domicile 
of the other party, in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled” (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, only consumers who personally bring their claims may benefit from 
Section 4 BRIbis.  
Along the same line of reasoning, the following arguments support this approach: 
firstly, the concept of consumer under Section 4 BRIbis does not include corporations 
such as consumer associations. Secondly, it is doubtful that preventive actions seeking 
the protection of a general interest are encompassed in said Section, given that its 
application hinges on the existence of a contract. The Court’s decision in Henkel is also 
endorsed by Shearson where the ECJ ruled that the assignment of a consumer claim to a 
company (assignee) cannot be encompassed in Section 4 BRIbis.640 Specifically, the 
Court held that the Brussels regime “protects the consumer only in so far as he personally 
is the plaintiff or defendant in proceedings”.641 The strict reading of the Court 
significantly limits access to Section 4 BRIbis by representative entities. 
290. However, part of the literature underlines that a different interpretation of the 
Regulation is possible, at least as regards actions protecting the collective interest of 
multiple individual consumers.642 Essentially, such an interpretation advocates that the 
spotlight should not be put on parties in proceedings but rather on the material situation 
at stake.643 Accordingly, one should not automatically reject access to Section 4 BRIbis, 
                                                
640 Shearson, supra n 589. 
641 Ibid, para 23. 
642 M Danov, “The Brussels I Regulation: Cross-Border Collective Redress Proceedings and Judgments” 
(2010) 6 (2) Journal of Private International Law 372-377; C González Beilfuss and B Añoveros Terradas, 
“Compensatory Consumer Collective Redress and the Brussels I Regulation (Recast)” in Nuyts and 
Hatzimihail, supra n 244, 248-252; P Jiménez Blanco, “El tratamiento de las acciones colectivas en materia 
de consumidores en el Convenio de Brusselas” (2003) 5709 Diario La Ley 1574-1576. 
643 Carballo, supra n 4, 107-8; Jiménez Blanco, supra n 642, 1574. 
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when actors other than consumers go to court: when representative entities litigate on 
behalf of consumers who hold the substantive right for which compensation is sought, 
they act as mere representatives. As a result, Section 4 BRIbis should be opened for said 
representatives, although they do not qualify as consumers. The representation 
mechanism should not change either the nature of the claim, or the reasoning regarding 
jurisdiction.  
Besides, Article 18 BRIbis does not explicitly require a consumer to personally 
litigate his claim in court. This argument has been thoroughly developed by Professor 
Danov who underlines that, pursuant to the text of the Regulation, “consumers may bring 
proceedings” (emphasis added) in the courts listed in Section 4 BRIbis.644 In the author’s 
opinion, this means that other actors are equally able to litigate in those fora.  
A last argument that militates in favour of a broad interpretation of Sections 4 
BRIbis is the potential application of different regimes regarding party autonomy in 
collective and individual actions. Supposing that representative entities would not benefit 
from a protective forum, Article 25 BRIbis would allow defendants to introduce choice 
of court agreements or class action waivers into their contractual relationships with 
consumers. Although Article 19 BRIbis limits the use of this kind of provision, it would 
not apply to a consumer who bundles his claim with others.645 In other words, if 
representative entities were not included in Section 4 BRIbis, no protective rule would 
regulate the use of pre-trial choice of court agreements. 
291. Opponents to this vision may criticise this approach as it contradicts the 
principle, whereby provisions regarding protective fora should be interpreted 
restrictively. This view has to be nuanced. To start with, rather than a restrictive 
interpretation, the ECJ favours an interpretation that does not go beyond the cases 
expressly envisaged by the Regulation. For example, the ECJ regularly clarifies the scope 
and meaning of Article 7(2) BRIbis in a sense that, in our opinion, sometimes goes 
beyond what a restrictive interpretation would command. In this context, the ECJ 
occasionally “creates” specific fora in order to deal with the emergence of complex 
international disputes. In this vein, the expansion of the concept of “consumer” pursuant 
to Article 18 BRIbis in order to adapt to collective redress should not automatically run 
                                                
644 Danov, supra n 642, 376. 
645 Carballo, supra n 4, 112; González Beilfuss and Añoveros Terradas, supra n 642, 250. Tzakas, supra n 
280, 1166. 
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against the principle of restrictive interpretation. However, such an expansion should be 
supported by policy considerations. In this sense, it is arguable that the ECJ stands in a 
good position to assess whether Section 4 BRIbis might be used by representative entities. 
Perhaps this decision should be the object of a legislative act.  
292. Nevertheless, even if a broad interpretation were adopted, additional 
problems would remain: to start with, the categories of consumers protected by the 
Brussels regime are limited. As a consequence, certain categories of victims, such as 
investors and SMEs, are not always included into Section 4 BRIbis. However, these actors 
may well be in need of more protective jurisdictional rules. In fact, the notion of 
“consumer”, along with the active-passive dichotomy adopted by the Regulation does not 
adapt to collective redress. Additionally, it has to be highlighted that general interests, in 
absence of any contract, remain out of said provision’s scope. Finally, although we 
proceed to an extensive interpretation of Article 18 BRIbis, concentration of proceedings 
would be difficult in case consumers are domiciled in different Member States or in 
different locations within the same national territory: in which forum should all claims be 
centralised and according to which criteria?646 On the one hand, centralising claims in the 
domicile of one consumer is difficult to achieve, as courts of this domicile could hardly 
have jurisdiction over consumers located in a different place.647 On the other hand, 
bundling claims in the domicile of the representative entity is difficult to justify, as this 
forum is not expressly mentioned in Section 4 BRIbis.  
b. Article 7(1) BRIbis 
293. In case Section 4 BRIbis does not apply, Articles 7(1) or 7(2) BRIbis could 
constitute an appropriate jurisdictional ground. As regards Article 7(1) BRIbis, one 
should distinguish between collective redress actions for injunctive relief that protect a 
general interest and actions for damages, which bundle individual consumer claims. In 
Henkel, the Austrian consumer association brought an action of the first type against a 
German trader: it sought to protect the general interest of Austrian consumers, no matter 
                                                
646 González Beilfuss and Añoveros Terradas, supra n 642, 252. 
647 E Lein, “Cross-Border Collective Redress and Jurisdiction under Brussels I: A Mismatch” in Fairgrieve 
and Lein, supra n 94, 135; Nuyts, supra n 244, 73; M Posnow-Wurm, “Rethinking Collective Redress, 
Consumer Protection and Brussels I Regulation” in Nuyts and Hatzimihail, supra n 244, 270. This author 
adds that this solution is contrary to the principle of the Regulation which consists in limiting the number 
of available fora. 
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the existence of potential individual contracts. In this case, the Court of Justice considered 
that no contract governed the relationship between the Austrian consumer association and 
the trader. Hence, it quickly came to the conclusion that Article 7(1) BRIbis could not 
apply to the action at issue. In its reasoning, the ECJ emphasised the nature of the claim 
between parties to the proceedings. However, the subject-matter of the relationship 
between the defendant and potential victims was set aside.648 Unfortunately, Article 7(1) 
BRIbis does not explicitly state which of these elements should be the base of the Court’s 
assessment. 
In our opinion, there are some arguments for qualifying the VKI’s claim as a 
contractual one, in the sense of Article 7(1) BRIbis.649 This is justified since the use of 
unfair terms is always related to potential or existing contracts. Besides, the terms of this 
provision refer to matters related to contracts: this does not mean that an actual contract 
must exist between litigating parties.650 In other words, the factual situation that underpins 
the claim could be taken into account. The fact that consumers are protected by a 
consumer association’s judicial action should not change the nature of the claim.651 
Conversely, the interpretation of the Court means that Article 7(1) BRIbis would only be 
available for group actions, namely for actions brought by a group of victims who are 
contractually bound with the defendant.652 
294. Now, it is not clear whether the results of the Henkel case law are 
transposable to collective actions for damages. When the representative body merely 
represents individual aggregated interests, it might be precipitated to conclude that, 
because no contractual relationship is available between the alleged wrongdoer and the 
consumer association, Article 7(1) BRIbis should not apply. In order to illustrate this 
scenario, we shall refer to actions, whereby consumers seek monetary compensation 
thanks to the assistance of a representative entity, which has capacity and standing to 
litigate on their behalf. In this situation, because of the mere representative role of the 
consumer association, it might be more appropriate to focus on the subject-matter of the 
                                                
648 ZS Tang, “Consumer Collective Redress in European Private International Law” (2011) 7 (1) Journal 
of Private International Law 111. González Beilfuss and Añoveros Terradas, supra n 642, 253. 
649 Although they recommend the non-applicability of Article 7(1) BRIbis to the Henkel case, A Stadler 
and P Rémy-Corlay acknowledge the contractual nature of the VKI’s claim (P Rémy-Corlay, “Note sur 
l’arrêt Henkel” [2003] 4 Revue critique de droit international privé 694; A Stadler, “Note” [2007] 7 
Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß International 288). 
650 Tang, supra n 648, 109. 
651 Jiménez Blanco, supra n 642, 1576-1577. 
652 Nuyts, supra n 244, 74. 
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relationship between the former parties involved in the dispute, namely the victim and 
the defendant. Article 7(1) BRIbis should cover these cases, as parties usually freely 
assume obligations towards each other.  
295. Even if Article 7(1) BRIbis applied to both types of actions, some significant 
problems would still persist concerning the selection of the court where those actions 
should actually be brought. If we accept the application of Article 7(1)(a) BRIbis, the 
obligation in question has to be pinned down. Similarly, the application of Article 7(1)(b) 
BRIbis requires the localisation of the place where goods are delivered or where services 
are provided.  
296. In Henkel, the prohibition to use unfair terms, in relation to commercial 
transactions with Austrian consumers, represents the obligation in question. Yet, the place 
of performance of said obligation has to be located. When the action preventively seeks 
the prohibition of the use of unfair terms in subsequent contractual relationships, there 
may be various places of performance:653 for example, the place where the contractual 
terms are released, which should correspond to the defendant’s domicile, the place where 
the contract is concluded, which could be difficult to spot in case the agreement takes 
place online, and the place where contractual terms are actually used and enforced, which 
would correspond to the market where the consumer association is active. All these places 
might be relevant locations for courts to establish jurisdiction. Nevertheless, when 
spotting the place of performance of the obligation in question is too hard, one may 
assume that the application of Article 7(1) BRIbis should be rejected, pursuant to the 
Besix case law.654  
Interestingly, Stadler considers that preventive actions such as the one brought by 
the VKI shall not benefit from the forum in contractual matters.655 She explains that the 
absence of contracts impedes the proper location of the place of performance. Besides, it 
is doubtful that this forum could anyway entertain a close connection with the dispute. 
As for Rémy-Corlay, she considers that the compliance of the obligation in question 
cannot be located at all, given that the prohibition to use unfair terms has to be observed 
                                                
653 Rémy-Corlay, supra n 649, 694. 
654 Case C-256/00 Besix SA v Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred Kretzschmar GmbH & Co. KG (WABAG) and 
Planungs- und Forschungsgesellschaft Dipl. Ing. W. Kretzschmar GmbH & KG (Plafog) [2002] ECR I-
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disregarding any location.656 This argument is in accordance with Besix, whereby the ECJ 
rejected the application of Article 7(1) BRIbis to an “obligation not to do something” 
without territorial limit. On the contrary, Leclerc expresses doubts over this 
interpretation. Instead, he suggests that the performance of the obligation can be narrowed 
down to the Austrian market.657 
297. As regards collective redress actions for damages, some authors have 
examined the possibility to extend the Color Drack and Wood Floor case law to those 
actions.658 In these judgments, the ECJ ruled that in the presence of various places of 
performance, the court where the principal one is undertaken should have jurisdiction. 
Could contractual claims be bundled in a single court following this case law? The answer 
is probably negative. The judgments only concerned one contract, two parties and various 
places of performance. Typically, in collective redress cases, various contracts and parties 
are involved, as well as multiple places of performance. Therefore, concentration of 
proceedings appears to be difficult, given that the place of performance of the obligation 
in question is likely to be located in different places in the national territory or in distinct 
Member States.659  
c. Article 7(2) BRIbis 
298. Again, the applicability of Article 7(2) BRIbis has to be assessed differently 
for actions protecting a general interest and actions seeking compensation for a 
multiplicity of individual consumers. On the one hand, the ECJ held that Article 7(2) 
BRIbis should apply to the first category of actions. In Henkel, the Court of Luxembourg 
ruled that the claim of the VKI, given that it could not be considered as a contractual 
matter and given that it sought to establish the defendant’s liability, met the criteria of 
Article 7(2) BRIbis.660 On the other hand, however, it is not clear whether actions 
defending aggregated interests would also fall under the scope of Article 7(2) BRIbis. In 
all cases, should Article 7(2) BRIbis apply, representative entities could litigate either at 
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the place where the event giving rise to the damage arose or where it materialised. In both 
situations, the localisation of the damage might be problematic.  
299. In Henkel, the ECJ did not address questions regarding territorial jurisdiction. 
This is rather unfortunate since the preventive character of the VKI makes the localisation 
of the damage particularly difficult. In absence of any guidance from the Court of Justice 
and as we highlighted before, this place could be located in many different places (supra; 
§ 296). For example, under Spanish law,661 it is possible to bring an action seeking the 
prohibition of the use of unfair terms either in the courts where the defendant has a branch 
or his/her domicile. Alternatively, if the defendant does not have any domicile in Spain, 
any qualified person may bring collective redress proceedings either in the courts where 
the consumer adhered to the contract (Article 52.1.14º of the Spanish Law of Civil 
Procedure (SLCP)), or at the domicile of the actor (Article 52.1.16º SLCP). This last 
sentence means that a consumer association may bring proceedings at its own domicile. 
It represents a good option, as it permits the localisation of the damage in a unique forum. 
However, this is a national legislative choice that has not been endorsed by the ECJ and 
thus, other Member States may adopt a different reading of Article 7(2) BRIbis based on 
their national experience, which might disrupt a uniform interpretation.  
Furthermore, the literature has expressed its doubts on the application of Article 
7(2) BRIbis. For example, according to Rémy-Corlay,662 given that the consumer 
association in Henkel protects all consumers in general, the damage cannot be properly 
located in light of the principle of proximity. As a result, the application of Article 4 
BRIbis should be preferred. Similarly, Kessedjian considers that Article 7(2) BRIbis 
should not be applicable to collective actions that aggregate numerous individual claims. 
Another solution would lead to the rise of multiple fora to the detriment of the 
defendant.663 
300. Despite the above-mentioned interpretative difficulties, Article 7(2) BRIbis 
often offers a forum that enables representative entities to start collective actions seeking 
the protection of general interests in the State where they are located. At least, this is the 
case for actions that aim at prohibiting the use of unfair terms. For example, in 2013, a 
                                                
661 This example has been extracted from Carballo, supra n 4, 112-113. 
662 Rémy-Corlay, supra n 649, 696. 
663 C Kessedjian, “L’action en justice des associations de consommateurs et d’autres organisations 
représentatives d’intérêts collectifs en Europe” (1997) 2 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e 
processuale 290. 
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first instance court of Madrid declared the nullity of eight provisions implemented in the 
Terms and Conditions of an Irish airline company.664 The Organización de Consumidores 
y Usuarios (OCU) –a Spanish consumer association incorporated in Madrid– started 
proceedings in Spain against the Irish defendant. Although the Spanish court did not state 
its reasoning regarding its jurisdictional power, it seems reasonable to assume that Article 
7(2) BRIbis was the relevant basis to accept jurisdiction.665 In 2014, an Austrian second 
instance court admitted an action for injunctive relief brought by the VKI against TVP-
Treuhandgesellschaft, located in Hamburg. Said court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article 7(2) BRIbis. The latter company allegedly used unfair Terms and Conditions in 
its contractual relationship with Austrian investors. The details of this case are further 
examined below (infra; D.a.).  
The questionnaire we drafted for the sake of this research project confirms this 
trend. According to the results, when consumer associations start cross-border litigation, 
they usually do so in the Member State in which they are active on the basis of Article 
7(2) BRIbis.666 
301. In case multiple aggregated interests are at stake, the representative entity 
may decide to initiate collective proceedings at the place where the damage arose. This 
alternative is interesting as it allows the representative to centralise individual claims in 
a single forum.667 Besides, the court that enjoys jurisdiction has the power to rule over 
the whole damage. However, in certain cases, the place which gives rise to the damage 
may be difficult to spot. Furthermore, this place often corresponds to the defendant’s 
domicile and significantly minimises the usefulness of Article 7(2) BRIbis.668 
Alternatively, a representative body might be tempted to sue the defendant at a closer 
location, namely the place where the damage occurred. Nevertheless, the court’s 
jurisdiction at this particular place is territorially limited. Importantly, it can only rule on 
the damage that took place within its territory. This means that participation to collective 
redress actions initiated there would be limited and hence, remain local.669 
                                                
664 Juzgado Mercantil no 5 de Madrid (commercial court),  case 113/2013 rendered on 30 September 2013. 
665 For other examples –most of which contain an international component– see the presentation prepared 
by BEUC, available at http://www.beuc.eu/publications/2013-00451-01-e.pdf. 
666 Questions 1.1, 1.3 and 2.1 of our questionnaire. 
667 Lein, supra n 647, 134; A Stadler, “Die grenzüberschreitende Durchsetzbarkeit von Sammelklagen” in 
M Casper et al. (eds), Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Sammelklage? (Sellier European Law Publishers, 
2009), 158. 
668 Lein, supra n 647, 134; Nuyts, supra n 244, 76-77; Stadler, supra n 667, 158. 
669 Carballo, supra n 4, 121; Michailidou, supra n 622, 226-227; Nuyts, supra n 244, 77; Tzakas, supra n 
280, 1162-1163. 
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d. Other Possible Grounds for Jurisdiction 
302. Another provision might be relevant as regards the allocation of jurisdiction 
for the representative model: Article 25 BRIbis on choice of court agreements.670 When 
actions for the protection of general consumer interests are at stake, party autonomy is 
likely to play a minor role, since parties are usually not bound by any contractual 
relationship. However, a choice of court agreement can still be concluded after the dispute 
arises. When consumers are represented by a consumer association, the presence of 
choice of court agreements that bind them with the defendant should be taken into 
account. In those cases, such an association is usually a mere representative and does not 
possess any claim. Thus, choice of court agreements concluded by consumers with an 
alledged wrongdoer should not lose their effectiveness because of the representation 
scheme. The validity of ex post choice of court agreements concluded by representative 
entities and imposed on people represented is analysed under the Dutch model (infra; 
B.4.). 
4. Interim Conclusion  
303. As the Henkel case shows, the ECJ seems to advocate a strict interpretation 
of the European private international law rules on jurisdiction, at least as regards actions 
protecting general interests. This is because the Court of Justice focuses only on the 
relationship between the litigating parties and sets aside the subject-matter of the action. 
It remains to be seen whether this case law will equally encompass other kinds of actions, 
such as damage claims brought by consumer associations on behalf of victims. In the 
event that the interpretation of the Court in Henkel is maintained for all types of collective 
redress actions under the representative model, Article 4 BRIbis might well be the only 
viable forum where collective redress claimants seeking damages could concentrate their 
claims. On the positive side of the balance, the Chapter shows that 7(2) BRIbis has been 
successfully used by consumer associations especially in order to fight unfair terms. In 
all cases, private international law rules on jurisdiction which allocate territorial 
                                                
670 Theoretically, Article 7(5) BRIbis represents an additional forum were collective redress claims could 
be brought under the representative model. According to this provision, a claimant may sue the defendant 
at the place where his branch is located. Sometimes, Article 7(5) BRIbis might offer a closer forum than 
the domicile of the defendant. Centralisation of all claims could be achieved at this place, just as under 
Article 4 BRIbis. Nevertheless, this forum will not always be available, as not all defendants possess 
branches in all EU Member States. For this reason, we do not further examine this provision here. 
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jurisdiction might be problematic for the bundling of multiple individual claims. Even if 
a more generous and flexible interpretation would be adopted, it is not clear whether 
Section 4, Article 7(1) or Article 25 BRIbis would offer an appropriate forum where 
victims could alternatively concentrate their claims. This result shows the inadaptability 
of the Brussels regime to collective redress. 
B. The Dutch Model 
304. The Dutch model on collective redress is an innovative and relatively 
effective one. As a result, this model deserves to be included within this research project. 
Although it fosters effective administration of justice, the Dutch collective redress system 
challenges European private international rules on jurisdiction. In light of this, this section 
first provides an outline of the Dutch model (infra, 1.). It specifically focuses on the Dutch 
out-of-court collective settlement procedure. Then, we investigate two cross-border cases 
that have been tackled by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. This allows us to put the 
spotlight on the main issues regarding international jurisdiction (infra, 2., 3. and 4.). We 
end up this section with a conclusion (infra, 5.). 
1. Outline of the Dutch Model 
305. The Netherlands possess two collective redress instruments. On the on hand, 
Article 3:305a of the Dutch Civil Code (hereafter, DCC) enables qualified associations 
or foundations to bring claims for injunctive or declaratory relief with the objective of 
protecting general interests.671 On the other hand, the Dutch legislator adopted a specific 
procedure for mass damage claims in 2005, namely the Wet collectieve afwikkeling van 
massaschades (hereafter, WCAM). It has to be highlighted that the Netherlands has not 
implemented a judicial mechanism allowing collective redress actions for damages yet. 
Discussions are currently held at the Ministry of justice in order to complete the 
procedural toolkit with such an action.672 While the first instrument is encompassed in 
                                                
671 In order to build up the outline of the Dutch model, we used the bibliographical sources listed in Annex 
II.A. 
672 A bill was presented to the Dutch Parliament on 16 November 2016. An English comment was drafted 
by I Tzankova on http://www.collectiveredress.org/newsitem/6041 regarding this new instrument. 
Unfortunately, the bill has not been translated to English yet. 
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our analysis regarding the section dedicated to the representative model, the following 
lines focus on the WCAM. 
306.  Prior to the start of the WCAM procedure, a representative association or 
foundation concludes an agreement with the alleged wrongdoer(s), on behalf of a group 
of victims (also called interested parties). This negotiation phase takes place out-of-court. 
The WCAM is substantially broad and usually applies to agreements whereby victims 
seek compensation. Since its reform in 2013, the mechanism’s material scope has been 
enlarged and also applies to bankruptcy cases. This means that the WCAM procedure 
applies even when victims look for something other than compensation.  
307. Once the settlement agreement is concluded, parties jointly petition the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has exclusive jurisdiction under the WCAM to make 
said agreement binding pursuant to Article 1013(3) of the Dutch Civil Code of Procedure 
(hereafter, DCCP). In case petitioners would have difficulties to reach an agreement, a 
pre-trial hearing in the Court of Appeal is available. As regards the substantive aspects of 
the settlement agreement, Article 7:907(2) DCC and Article 1013(1) DCCP enumerate a 
series of basic requirements that have to be fulfilled. Specifically, the agreement must 
contain a description of the event to which the agreement relates; a description of the 
group(s) of victims; the (approximate) number of persons pertaining to the mentioned 
group(s); the compensation that will be awarded, as well as the conditions that should be 
met in order to obtain redress; the procedure by which compensation will be awarded; 
and the name of the persons who should receive written notification. The settlement 
agreement has to be annexed to the request. 
308. Subsequently, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal must assess whether the 
settlement agreement is fair and complies with the requirements imposed by the DCC. In 
order to achieve this objective, the Court holds a hearing session in order to gather 
petitioners’ arguments. At the same time, the Court invites any person concerned with the 
agreement to appear in court and file a statement of opposition. The Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal shall reject the agreement in the event one of the grounds of refusal listed in 
Article 7:907(3) DCC arises. In particular, the most important elements examined by the 
Court are the amount of compensation awarded to the victims on the one hand, and the 
representative nature of the association or foundation on the other. If the Court is not 
entirely satisfied, it may offer petitioners the possibility to amend the settlement 
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agreement. In case the Court considers that the contractual terms agreed upon are fair, it 
declares it binding for interested parties. Following the announcement of the Court’s 
decision, the group of victims under whose behalf the agreement is concluded should 
have an opportunity to opt-out of the settlement. Accordingly, the judge sets up an 
appropriate time frame of at least three months in order for people to express their desire 
not to be bound by the decision (Article 7:908(3) DCC). Importantly, only petitioners 
may jointly appeal the Amsterdam Court’s decision. 
309. Once the opt-out period is over and the decision has become binding, the 
compensation has to be allocated to interested parties. In light of this, people bound by 
the decision should present all the relevant documents that prove the existence of their 
claim in order to receive compensation. Usually, the procedure, the necessary documents, 
and the distribution plan are detailed within the settlement agreement or annexed to it. In 
this regard, the settlement agreement may provide that the right to compensation expires 
after a certain period of time. This time frame cannot be reduced to less than one year 
(Article 7:907(6) DCC). 
310. The literature underlines the following positive aspects of the WCAM:673 
from the alleged wrongdoer’s perspective, the WCAM is an interesting alternative to the 
opening of a multitude of individual proceedings. In this sense, the Dutch collective 
redress procedure represents a saving of costs and time. Additionally, the WCAM offers 
closure to the alleged wrongdoer, given that people encompassed in the settlement 
agreement lose their right to bring individual proceedings regarding the same dispute. 
Finally, thanks to the WCAM, loss of reputation can be avoided. As for interested parties, 
the WCAM allows them to centralise their claims in a single forum thanks to the help of 
a representative body. Here too, savings on costs and time can be achieved. On the 
negative side of the balance, the availability of a judicial collective redress action is 
missing.674 Indeed, this kind of procedural tool would probably encourage parties to 
settle. Typically, this could have a significant impact on cases where negative-value 
claims are involved. 
                                                
673Government of The Netherlands, The Dutch ʻClass Action Financial Settlement Actʼ (ʻWCAMʼ), 
available at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-
dutch-class-action-financial-settlement-act-wcam/wcamenglish.pdf; B Krans, “The Dutch Act on 
Collective Settlement on Mass Damages” (2014) 27 Global Business & Development Law Journal 287. 
674 On this particular point, see the interesting conclusion of JJ Kuipers, “La loi sur le règlement collectif 
de dommages de masse aux Pays-Bas et ses ambitions dans l’espace judiciaire européen” (2012) 64 (1) 
Revue internationale de droit comparé 226-227. 
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2. The Shell Settlement 
a. Summary of Facts 
311. Shell is one of the most important oil and gas company in the world. It is 
owned by Shell Transport and Trading Company (hereafter, STT) that is seated in the 
United Kingdom, and Shell Petroleum N.V. (hereafter, Royal Dutch), registered in the 
Netherlands. On 9 January 2004, the Shell group announced that it would proceed to the 
re-categorisation of its “proven” reserves, which correspond to the oil and gas reserves 
that the company plans to market quickly.675 Specifically, it appears that the proven 
reserves of Shell had been overestimated for years because of allegedly unlawful 
bookkeeping practices.676 As a result, the price of the group’s shares dropped, affecting 
shareholders’ investment all over the world.  
312. Subsequently, some investors brought class actions in the US, claiming that 
Shell’s disclosures regarding its actual reserves from 8 April 1999 until 2004 were 
misleading and thus, violated American federal securities legislation and regulations.677 
Eventually, parties to the US class action settled. Similarly, in January 2006, some 
European investors brought proceedings in the United States in order to obtain redress 
from Shell. Nevertheless, the US courts rejected jurisdiction over non-American 
investors.678 In light of these considerations, the Dutch shareholders association 
(hereafter, VEB), alongside the Shell Reserves Compensation Foundation (hereafter, the 
Foundation) and two pension funds on the one hand, and STT and Royal Dutch on the 
other, came to an agreement regarding the compensation of shareholders domiciled 
outside the US. On 11 April 2007, they presented a joint petition to the Amsterdam Court 
of Appeal under the WCAM procedure in order to make the agreement binding.679 The 
declaration of the binding nature of the agreement was rendered on 29 May 2009. In 
particular, the settlement aimed at compensating shareholders –meaning natural or legal 
persons– who acquired shares in STT or Royal Dutch outside the US from 8 April 1999 
                                                
675 B Laperche et al. (eds), Innovation, Evolution and Economic Change – New Ideas in the Tradition of 
Galbraith (Edward Elgar, 2006), 179.  
676 Ibid; “Humiliation: A once Proud Firm, Brought Down by its own Flaws, Needs a Thorough Shake-up” 
(22.04.2014) The Economist, available at http://www.economist.com/node/2611051. 
677 Amsterdam Court of Appeal, case 106.010.887 rendered on 29 May 2009 (hereafter, Shell Decision), 
10. All the documents concerning the Shell dispute are available at: http://www.shellsettlement.com/docs/. 
678 Shell Decision, 11. 
679 Ibid, 2. 
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until 18 March 2004, and who were domiciled or seated outside the US. Petitioners 
estimate that 500.000 investors would be covered by the agreement.680 From these 
investors, 68% of Royal Dutch’s shareholders were domiciled or seated in Europe –in 
particular, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Germany and Belgium–, and 96% of 
STT’s shareholders had their domicile or seat in the United Kingdom. 
According to the Settlement Agreement, the Shell companies were liable to 
compensate shareholders. who resided outside the US, up to $352.6 million for the 
damage they suffered following the drop of the share price.681 Yet, this obligation did not 
amount to the acknowledgment of any responsibility by the Shell group. As regards 
shareholders, in case the Settlement Agreement became binding and they chose not to 
opt-out, they would lose their right to initiate individual proceedings against the Shell 
companies.682 
313. In its decision, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal focused on three questions: 
the first one concerns the notification process of the binding decision and the right to opt-
out, the second covers international jurisdiction, and the last one consists in an assessment 
of the substantive aspects of the Settlement Agreement, notably its reasonableness. In the 
next lines, we examine how the Court of Appeal established jurisdiction and we set aside 
the remaining questions, as they are secondary for the sake of this research project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
680 Ibid, 22. 
681 Ibid, 14. The Distribution plan is described at Section II of the Shell Settlement Agreement, available at 
http://www.shellsettlement.com/docs/. 
682 Article IX of the Shell Settlement Agreement. 
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Figure 1: Geographic location of parties involved in the Shell settlement 
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* A: Agreement 
b. Questions Regarding Jurisdiction 
314. In order to establish its jurisdictional power, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
distinguishes between investors domiciled or seated in a Member State, and investors 
whose domicile or seat is located outside the European Union.683 It is useful to recall that 
in any case, shareholders who reside in the US are not encompassed in the Settlement 
Agreement concluded under the WCAM procedure. As far as other non-EU investors are 
concerned, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on their case according to Dutch private 
international rules on jurisdiction. In particular, Article 3 DCCP states that “[w]here legal 
proceedings are to be initiated by a petition of the petitioner or his solicitor (…), Dutch 
courts have jurisdiction: (a) if either the petitioner or, where there are more petitioners, 
one of them, or one of the interested parties mentioned in the petition has his domicile or 
habitual residence in the Netherlands”. As for shareholders residing within the EU, the 
Dutch Court relied on Articles 4 and 8(1) BRIbis (ex-Articles 2 and 6(1) BRI), as well as 
the corresponding provisions of the Brussels and Lugano Convention for investors 
                                                
683 Shell Settlement Agreement, 30-34. 
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domiciled in a State covered by these legislations.684 The rest of this section explains how 
said Court established jurisdiction under the BRIbis and offer a critical assessment. We 
leave other international texts on jurisdiction out of the scope of this research project. 
i. Article 4 BRIbis 
In its decision, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal explains that it has jurisdiction 
over investors who reside in the Netherlands according to Article 4 BRIbis. Curiously, 
the Court considers that interested parties to the Settlement Agreement are the persons to 
be sued under the BRIbis.685 In other words, investors have to be considered as defendants 
within the meaning of the Regulation. As we further examine in the next sub-section, the 
Dutch Court relies on Article 8(1) BRIbis in order to extend its jurisdictional power to 
investors located outside the Netherlands, but within the European Union.686 The same 
technique is applied in order to bind victims located in States submitted to the Brussels 
and the Lugano Conventions. 
315. The reasoning of the Court of Appeal is questionable on various grounds. To 
start with, the Court explains that the case at issue enters the material scope of the 
Regulation (Article 1 BRIbis).687 Nevertheless, it does not investigate whether an 
international component exists,688 although many investors, their representatives and 
Royal Dutch are all domiciled in the Netherlands. In case those investors acquired their 
shares on the Dutch market, one may wonder whether this situation actually possesses an 
international nature that would justify the application of the BRIbis.  
Nevertheless, we recall that one of the parties to the negotiations, namely STT, is 
domiciled in another Member State. This factor may well give an international component 
to the Shell case. Additionally, a great number of investors claiming compensation reside 
abroad. Let us not forget that, in the Owusu case,689 the ECJ accepted the application of 
the Brussels regime in an action brought by a British claimant against various defendants, 
one of whom was domiciled in the United Kingdom, for an accident that occurred in a 
                                                
684 Although, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal applied the provisions of the BRI, we make reference to the 
BRIbis, which is the text currently in force.  
685 Shell Decision, 31. 
686 Ibid. 
687 Ibid, 30-31. 
688 H van Lith, The Dutch Collective Settlements Act and Private International Law (2010), 31, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/saw_annex_en.pdf. 
689 Case C-281/02 Andrew Owusu v N. B. Jackson, trading as "Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas" and Others 
[2005] ECR I-01383, para 35. 
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third State. However, on might wonder whether the solution should be the same as regards 
Shell investors domiciled in the Netherlands who acquired shares in Royal Dutch on the 
local securities market. In all cases, we acknowledge that this question is interesting from 
a theoretical point of view, since it would clarify the “international degree” that a dispute 
needs to possess in order to fall under the scope of the BRIbis. However, it appears to be 
secondary in this case, as Dutch rules on jurisdiction alternatively open a forum in the 
Netherlands for a WCAM settlement to take place.  
316. Furthermore, we recall that parties to the contract must bring a joint petition 
to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in order to make their Settlement Agreement binding. 
In this context, it is doubtful that the presentation of a joint petition under the WCAM 
procedure can be considered as contentious proceedings,690 since the court is seised in the 
absence of a present dispute.691 Yet, one may wonder whether the filing of objections in 
the Court of Appeal might call into question this reasoning. Similarly, we do not think 
that through this procedure, petitioners seek declaratory relief. Instead, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the petition presented to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal triggers a non-
contentious procedure.  
317. More generally, one may wonder whether non-contentious proceedings fall 
within the scope of the BRIbis.692 At first sight, the wording of the Regulation does not 
exclude them from its scope of application. In this sense, the Jenard Report explicitly 
states that the text applies “irrespective of whether the proceedings are contentious or 
non-contentious”.693 Along the same line of reasoning, the last version of the Regulation 
makes clear that the Brussels regime encompasses both out-of-court settlements validated 
by a court, as well as the ones concluded in the course of proceedings (Article 2(b) 
BRIbis). Finally, de Miguel Asensio confirms this interpretation in light of the Schneider 
judgment of 2013.694 In this case, a Hungarian citizen under guardianship appealed the 
decision of the Sofia District Court, which denied him the authorisation to dispose of a 
property located in Bulgaria. The Court of Justice rejected the application of the BRIbis 
to this non-contentious action. However, it did so because questions regarding capacity 
                                                
690 L Perreau Saussine, “Quelle place pour les class actions dans le règlement de Bruxelles I ?” (16 May 
2011) 20 La Semaine Juridique – Édition Générale 995. 
691 Virgós Soriano and Garcimartín Alférez, supra n 508, 118. 
692 Perreau Saussine, supra n 690 p.; I Tzankova and H van Lith, “Class Actions and Class Settlements 
Going Global: the Netherlands” in Fairgrieve and Lein, supra n 94, 86 and footnote 55. 
693 This argument is developed by van Lith, supra n 688, 9 citing the Jenard Report. 
694 Case C-386/12 Proceedings brought by Siegfried János Schneider [ECLI:EU:C:2013:633]. 
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remain out of the Brussels regime’s scope, and not because the action was non-
contentious in nature.695 As a result, de Miguel Asensio concludes that there is no 
impediment for the BRIbis to encompass non-contentious actions.696 
318. Even assuming that this statement is correct, one cannot help but notice the 
unsuitability of the BRIbis with non-contentious actions: to start with, the dichotomy 
between defendant and claimant that is applicable to usual contentious actions is tough to 
transpose to this kind of proceedings.697 In particular, the wording used by the European 
legislator regarding rules on jurisdiction, as well as recognition and enforcement do not 
fit non-contentious schemes. For example, by using the words “defendant” and “be sued” 
–and not “petitioners”– in the provisions related to jurisdiction, the European legislator 
seems to have contentious proceedings in mind. Then, although court settlements are 
explicitly included within the scope of the Regulation, the text only refers to them for 
enforcement purposes. In light of this, it is not clear whether rules on jurisdiction equally 
apply to court settlements. The exclusive application of rules regarding enforcement to 
settlements because of their non-contentious nature would not be especially shocking. It 
is well known that Chapter II of the BRIbis on jurisdiction and Chapter III on recognition 
and enforcement are relatively independent.698 To such an extent that when national 
courts acquire jurisdiction according to their national legislations, the settlements 
validated by them still benefit from the European enforcement regime.699  
319. Therefore, even if we were to admit that the joint petition would fall under 
the Brussels regime, the reason(s) that motivated the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to 
qualify interested parties as defendants is/are unclear. The fact that interested parties must 
be summoned to appear before the Court seems to have constituted a relevant factor.700 
Moreover, the opportunity for interested parties to file an objection in the Court of Appeal 
is an additional element that supports this interpretation.701 According to van Lith, this 
                                                
695 Ibid, para 31. 
696 P de Miguel Asensio, “Ley de la Jurisdicción Voluntaria y Derecho Internacional Privado” (2016) XVI 
Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado 153 and footnote 8. 
697 Ibid, 155-156; A Halfmeier, “Recognition of a WCAM Settlement in Germany” (2012) Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht 178; Kuipers, supra n 674, 230-231; Perreau Saussine, supra n 690, 995. 
698 Perreau Saussine, supra n 690, 996. 
699 Ibid. 
700 Shell Decision, 31; R Hermans and J de B Leuveling Tjeenk, “International Class Action Settlements in 
the Netherlands since Converium” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Class & Group 
Actions 2016, 6. As for Kramer, she expresses doubts on the reasoning of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
(XE Kramer, supra n 375, 259). 
701 van Lith, supra n 688, 38; Hermans and Leuveling Tjeenk, supra n 700, 6. 
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conception fits Dutch civil procedure but might not be shared by all national legal orders 
or the ECJ.702 In fact, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal brings a new question to the 
table, namely what does “defendant” mean within the scope of the Regulation and who 
should interpret it.703 In the case at issue, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal means that 
it has jurisdiction if only one interested party is domiciled or seated in the Netherlands.704 
Therefore, this particular court has the power to rule on a global collective redress 
settlement, even if it does not have any serious connection with the case at stake.  
320. In our opinion, it is difficult to qualify both petitioners as defendants, since 
they jointly present the Settlement Agreement to the Court of Appeal. In light of this, 
neither of them is the party “to be sued”. As regards interested parties, their position is 
ambiguous like in many other collective redress schemes. On the one hand, some 
elements indicate that they act similarly as defendants: for instance, they are able to file 
objections and must be summoned. On the other hand, however, they are not technically 
parties to the proceedings and hence, they should not acquire acquire the status of 
defendant.705 Furthermore, Halfmeier puts the spotlight on the fact that the possibility to 
opt-out is not offered to defendant in contentious proceedings.706 Therefore, it is not 
convincing to qualify interested parties as such. Because interested parties have no right 
to appeal the decision of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, Kuipers comes to the same 
conclusion.707 
321. Taking these considerations into account, we might have to use a “fiction” 
in order to find out who the defendant in a WCAM procedure is. Specifically, we could 
allocate the status of claimant to people that allegedly have a claim because they suffered 
harm, and the status of defendant to the people who are presumably responsible of said 
harm.708 Accordingly, for the sake of the application of the BRIbis, interested parties 
                                                
702 van Lith, supra n 688, 38. 
703 While van Lith considers that the interpretation of this procedural term should be left to Member States, 
Kuipers advocates a uniform interpretation (compare van Lith, supra n 688, 37 and Kuipers, supra n 674, 
230). 
704 Kuipers, supra n 674, 233; Tzankova and van Lith, supra n 692, 84; van Lith, supra n 688, 39. 
705 JJ Kuipers, “Schemes of Arrangement and Voluntary Collective Redress: A Gap in the Brussels I 
Regulation” (2012) 8 (2) Journal of Private International Law 235-237; Tzankova and van Lith, supra n 
692, 72. 
706 Halfmeier, supra n 697, 178. 
707 Kuipers, supra n 674, 230. 
708 According to Kuipers, the alleged wrongdoer should indeed be considered as the defendant in a WCAM 
procedure because he is the one accused of having committed harm and against whom compensation is 
sought (Kuipers, supra n 674, 231).  
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would be qualified as claimants, and the alleged wrongdoer who contractually obliges 
himself to pay would be the defendant. Even though this reasoning might be fair, it is 
quite acrobatic. In particular, it generates two issues: the first one is that the effectiveness 
of the WCAM would be negatively limited. In case this procedure is the only way for 
interested parties to have access to justice, this interpretation might be counterproductive. 
The second issue is that this reasoning is not appropriate anymore if we consider the 
possibility for the alleged wrongdoer to start a declaratory negative action that aims at 
releasing him from any liability. In such an action, the alleged wrongdoer would be the 
claimant and interested parties would be on the side of the defence.  
322. To sum up, although non-contentious actions such as joint petitions under 
the WCAM could be encompassed within the Brussels regime, important mismatches 
would remain. Notably, the unsuitability of the defendant/claimant dichotomy to the 
Dutch collective redress model puts the principle of predictability into jeopardy. 
ii. Article 8(1) BRIbis 
323. In the next lines, we assume that, according to Article 4 BRIbis, interested 
parties domiciled or seated in the Netherlands in the Shell case are defendants in the 
proceedings. In this vein, we now have to determine whether Article 8(1) BRIbis may 
constitute an appropriate ground for the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to expand its 
jurisdictional power and reach interested parties domiciled in other Member States. As 
explained in the previous section (supra, I.B.3.), Article 8(1) BRIbis permits the 
accumulation of claims in the forum of one of the defendants’ domicile, when these 
claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear them together in order to avoid 
potentially irreconcilable –meaning contradictory– judgments. Specifically, the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments must stem from the similar situation of fact or law. Additionally, 
a previous factual link must exist between the co-defendants for Article 8(1) BRIbis to 
apply, in light of the principle of predictability. 
324. As regards the case at issue, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal explains that 
Article 8(1) BRIbis is applicable, as claims that the Shell companies owe against 
interested parties are closely connected.709 This is so, given that the alternative scenario, 
namely the existence of numerous individual proceedings in different Member States, 
                                                
709 Shell Decision, 31-32. 
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would probably lead to irreconcilable judgments.710 Moreover, the Court states that the 
application of potentially different substantive laws does not call into question this 
conclusion. It particularly refers to the relationship between STT and English investors, 
which may be governed by English and not Dutch law.711 In light of this, the Court makes 
quite clear that the point of attention is the degree of similarity that Shell’s claims possess 
under the Settlement Agreement.  
325. In the event that the Court of Appeal is right to focus on the Settlement 
Agreement, we think it is highly likely that the claims of the Shell group arise from the 
same situation of facts. Because the position of the Shell companies towards investors is 
analogous and stems from the same event,712 we conclude that the situation of facts is 
similar. The same is true as regards the legal situation of law: although different national 
laws may apply to the substance of the case, this does not prevent the application of 
Article 8(1) BRIbis.713 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this reasoning is relatively 
uneasy, since it is hard to determine what claims are held by the Shell group and against 
who. According to the Court of Appeal, it seems that Shell’s claim against investors 
consists in the respect of the terms of the Settlement Agreement.714  
326. Finally, as regard the principle of predictability, it is doubtful that it is 
guaranteed, as there is no previous link between the co-defendants.715 As a result, a 
Spanish investor who acquired actions in Royal Dutch and who was subsequently harmed 
by the company’s conduct could be surprised to be encompassed in a Dutch collective 
redress scheme just because another investor –that he does not know– is domiciled there. 
This result is even more far-fetched in the Converium case (infra; 3.), given that the 
majority of victims were located in Switzerland and only a minority resided in the 
Netherlands. For this particular reason, and even following the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning, the accumulation of claims in a single forum pursuant to Article 8(1) BRIbis 
should be rejected.  
327. In all cases, we find that the Amsterdam Court’s decision to ground its 
assessment of Article 8(1) BRIbis on the existence of the Settlement Agreement rather 
                                                
710 Ibid. 
711 Ibid, 32. 
712 van Lith, supra n 688, 40. 
713 Freeport, supra n 523, para 41; Painer, supra n 502, para 79-82. 
714 Shell Decision, 32. 
715 Kuipers, supra n 705, 237-240. 
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than the underlying relationship between parties is rather confusing. At the time the Court 
assessed the application of said provision, the Settlement Agreement was not binding. 
Technically, therefore, Shell did not possess any claim against investors.  
If we admit that the Amsterdam Court of Appeal should rather focus on the 
underlying relationship binding interesting parties with the Shell Group,716 Article 8(1) 
BRIbis could also be difficult to apply: since each relationship would have to be 
considered individually, differences between the investors’ situation could arise. 
Typically, this would be the case if interested parties were divided in different groups of 
victims, according to the specific circumstances of their case. In this context, one might 
wonder whether the claims of the alleged wrongdoer would remain similar. 
3. Converium Settlement 
a. Summary of Facts 
328. On the 9 July 2010, Converium, Zurich Financial Services (hereafter, ZFS), 
the Stichting Converium Foundation (hereafter, the foundation) and the VEB presented a 
joint petition under the WCAM procedure in the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in order to 
make their agreement binding. According to said agreement, Converium and ZFS were 
bound to pay $58.400.000 to investors who acquired shares in Converium outside the 
US.717 The facts that gave rise to the damage are as follows: Converium and ZFS –the 
sole shareholder of Converium before December 2001–,718 whose domicile is in 
Switzerland, made repeated disclosures between January 2002 and September 2004 
concerning their reserves for risks. According to the companies, these reserves were 
deemed insufficient and had to be adjusted.719 This statement resulted in a drop of the 
share price and thus, harmed approximately 12.000 investors. Among these investors, 
approximately 8.500 were located in Switzerland, about 1.500 in the United Kingdom, 
and around 200 in the Netherlands.720 It should also be highlighted that Converium’s 
shares were traded on different markets including the US and Switzerland. Following 
                                                
716 Kuipers seems to endorse this approach (Kuipers, supra n 674, 232). 
717 See Converium and ZFS Settlement Agreements. All the documents concerning the Converium case are 
available at http://www.converiumsettlement.com/.  
718 http://www.converiumsettlements.com/EN/case.php. 
719 Amsterdam Court of Appeal, case 200.070.039/01 rendered on 12 November 2010 (hereafter, 
Converium Decision), 3-4. 
720 Ibid, 5-6. 
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these events, a group of investors domiciled in the US and who bought their shares on the 
American Stock Exchange brought proceedings in the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York. Eventually, parties came to an agreement in December 2008.721 
However, the US District Court stated that its jurisdictional power could not reach 
investors domiciled outside the US and who had bought their participation on a foreign 
Stock Exchange.722 As a result, VEB and the Foundation concluded two agreements with 
each of the alleged wrongdoers, on behalf of investors who purchased shares in 
Converium on a non-US stock exchange and who were domiciled outside the United 
States’ territory.723 
329. Conversely to the Shell case, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal dealt with the 
question of jurisdiction previously to the notification to interested parties about their right 
to opt-out and before assessing the fairness of the agreement. In particular, the Court 
affirmed that it had jurisdiction under Articles 4 and 8(1) BRIbis as regards investors 
domiciled in a Member State. The same reasoning applies mutatis mutandis to persons 
located in Switzerland and hence, submitted to the Lugano Convention. Alternatively, the 
Court ruled that it could equally have jurisdiction under Article 7(1) BRIbis. The 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal regarding the application of this provision is assessed 
below. Beforehand, it has to be underlined the allocation of jurisdiction in Converium is 
quite arguable because the Netherlands does not entertain close connections with the case. 
To be more precise, both defendants, as well as the majority of investors were located in 
Switzerland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
721 Ibid, 4-5. 
722 Ibid. 
723 Ibid, 5-6. 
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Figure 2: Geographic location of parties involved in the Converium settlement 
 CH NL Rest of EU (esp. UK) 
Petitioners 
   
Interested 
parties 
   
Jurisdiction 
Article 6(1) Lugano 
Convention or 5(1) of the 
same text 
Article 4 BRIbis 
or 7(1) BRIbis 
Article 8(1) BRIbis or 7(1) 
BRIbis 
* A: Agreement 
b. Application of Article 7(1) BRIbis 
330. First of all, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal explains that the validity of the 
Settlement Agreements rests upon its decision. Specifically, the Court clarifies that 
Converium and ZFS must compensate investors who suffered harm only once the 
Agreements become binding.724 Even though this contractual obligation has not come 
into effect yet, the Court of Appeal considers that the forum of Article 7(1) BRIbis –and 
the corresponding provision of the Lugano Convention– should be open. In order to 
justify its reasoning, the Court explains that the Henkel case regarding preventive actions 
may be transposed to the dispute at issue.725 For the record, in said case, the ECJ held that 
preventive actions fell within the scope of Article 7(2) BRIbis, although the damage did 
not occur yet. Second of all, the Settlement Agreements state that the Swiss undertakings 
must pay the amount of compensation on a bank account located in the Netherlands.726 
                                                
724 Converium Decision, 13. 
725 Ibid. 
726 According to Schedule A of the Escrow Agreement concluded between Converium and the 
representatives, an escrow agent is designated in order to manage the money of the Settlement Agreement, 
which has to be paid on a bank account (ABN AMRO Bank N.V. with registered office in Amsterdam). A 
civil law notary domiciled in The Hague will endorse the role of escrow agent. The same is applicable to 
ZFS. 
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Subsequently, the Foundation will be in charge of distributing the money to the victims. 
As a result, the Court in Amsterdam concludes that the place where the performance of 
the contractual obligation shall be undertaken is the Netherlands.727 The next lines first 
examine whether the joint petition is a contractual matter. In case the answer is positive, 
we proceed to assess what the obligation in question is and where it has to be performed. 
Indeed, at this stage of the explanation, we can already conclude that Article 7(1)(a) 
BRIbis is the relevant jurisdictional ground, since no sale of goods or provision of took 
place pursuant to Article 7(1)(b) BRIbis. 
331. In Converium, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal focuses its attention on the 
relationship of the parties to the proceedings (here, the petitioners). Here too, however, it 
is not clear whether the relationship between the petitioners or between the alleged 
wrongdoers and the victims should be the appropriate basis to establish jurisdiction.728 
Because the claim consists in a joint petition that refers to an agreement, we are tempted 
to acknowledge the contractual nature of the request: indeed, petitioners conclude a 
contract that will benefit interested parties. In particular, the alleged wrongdoers commit 
themselves to pay compensation to investors, so there is at least one obligation freely 
assumed by one contractual party.  
However, some think that the conditional nature of a Settlement Agreement makes 
the application of Article 7(1) BRIbis doubtful.729 One may counter argue that the ECJ 
has repeatedly held that the existence of a contract is not necessary for said provision to 
apply. In this sense, the conditional nature of the Agreement shall not per se exclude a 
petition under the WCAM from the scope of “matters related to contracts”. In this sense, 
the case law delivered by the ECJ regarding prize notification to consumers might help 
to prove this point: in Engler,730 for example, the Court of Justice held that a professional 
who sent a letter containing a prize notification to a consumer might be a contractual 
matter pursuant to Article 7(1) BRIbis. Indeed, when a professional sends a letter on its 
own initiative to the consumer’s domicile, which designate him/her as the winner of a 
prize, this may well constitute an obligation freely assumed by said professional. Only 
Section 4 BRIbis would require the actual conclusion of a contract in order to apply. 
Along the same line of reasoning, a Settlement Agreement whereby an alleged wrongdoer 
                                                
727 Converium Decision, 14. 
728 Tzankova and van Lith, supra n 692, 84; van Lith, supra n 688, 42-45. 
729 Kramer, supra n 375, 260; Kuipers, supra n 674, 236; van Lith, supra n 688, 43-44. 
730 Engler, supra n 532. 
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commits himself to compensate victims may well enter the scope of Article 7(1) BRIbis, 
even though the binding effect is submitted to the posterior approval of a Court. 
Another argument that would lead to the conclusion that the matter is not 
contractual is that the obligation(s) freely assumed must take place inter partes.731 In other 
words, because Converium and ZFS assume obligations towards third parties, the forum 
of Article 7(1) BRIbis would consequently not be open. However, according to Lehmann, 
this requirement does not mean that the claimant and the defendant must be the initial 
parties to the contract.732 Rather, it “suffices that they have succeeded ex post to the 
position of one of the contractual parties”. He then mentions the assignment of claims, 
subrogation and succession as examples. In this vein, can one assume that interested 
parties succeed to the representative entities who initially concluded the settlement 
agreement with the alleged wrongdoer? This interpretation is rather difficult to accept 
since the succession of parties –supposing that it can actually be qualified as such– does 
not take place at the time the court is seised but only once the settlement agreement is 
declared binding. However, it seems reasonable to admit that interested parties must have 
acquired the position of contractual parties at the time the court is seised in order to benefit 
from the forum of Article 7(1) BRIbis. 
332. Yet, supposing that the action is a contractual matter, the obligation in 
question has to be pinpointed and its place of performance located, according to Article 
7(1)(a) BRIbis, as the Settlement Agreement does not consist in the delivery of goods or 
the provision of services. Although each contractual partner, as well as beneficiaries 
assume different rights and obligations, the compensation of victims appears to be the 
primary obligation that justifies the petition to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal. The 
interested parties’ waiver not to start subsequent individual proceedings is contingent on 
the compensation.733 
333. Then, given that Converium and ZFS commit themselves to pay the due 
amount on a Dutch bank account, the Court of Appeal considers that the Netherlands is 
the place where the obligation has to be performed. On the one hand, one might consider 
                                                
731 B Allemeerschen, “Transnational class settlements Lessons from Converium” in S Wrbka et al. (eds), 
Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests (Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 372. 
732 M Lehmann, “Special Jurisdiction (Article 7(1))” in A Dickinson and E Lein (eds), The Brussels I 
Regulation Recast (Oxford University Press, 2015), 145. 
733 However, Allemeerschen, supra n 731, 370 thinks that those two obligations are the main ones in the 
Settlement Agreement. 
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that this contractual clause equates to an agreement on the place of performance, which 
displaces the Tessili/De Bloos case law. On the other hand, however, because the money 
has to be eventually carried to the victims, one might consider that the Netherlands is an 
intermediary location. In this case, the place of performance of the obligation in question 
would have to be determined. By default, the law of the habitual residence of the party 
required to carry out the characteristic obligation –here, the obligation to pay– applies 
(Article 4(2) of the Rome I Regulation), that is: Swiss law. Under that law, the obligation 
to pay must be held at the place of the creditor’s domicile (Article 74(2)(1) of the Swiss 
Code of Obligations). Accordingly, the place where the obligation in question should be 
performed corresponds to the domicile of investors. In such a situation, Article 7(1)(a) 
BRIbis does allow the centralisation of the WCAM procedure in a single forum, since 
investors are domiciled in different Member States. 
4. Other Possible Grounds of Jurisdiction 
334. First of all, the application of Section 4 BRIbis could come into play in the 
event that consumers protected by said Section were represented.734 Pursuant to this 
provision, the domicile of the defendant seems to be the only location where the 
settlement agreement could be validated for all consumers. As we explain in the next 
paragraphs, a choice of court agreement could offer an alternative forum, but it is doubtful 
that it can be imposed on third-parties. 
335. The application of Section 4 BRIbis may have important consequences in the 
event that a consumer is entitled to obtain compensation under a WCAM decision, but 
misses the date in order to manifest himself and obtain the monetary compensation. This 
consumer could be willing to challenge the decision of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal 
in subsequent individual proceedings by invoking its lack of jurisdiction. In this case, and 
supposing that the defendant opposes the existence of a WCAM settlement agreement, 
could consumers raise an exception to the recognition of said settlement?  
336. First of all, it has to be emphasised that the Brussels regime does not regulate 
the recognition process of settlements. Therefore, Article 45(1)(e)(i) BRIbis doubtfully 
constitutes any ground for refusal. Rather, it is reasonable to believe that national laws 
                                                
734 Halfmeier, supra n 697, 177. 
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govern the recognition of WCAM settlements agreements.735 Therefore, the possibility to 
counterstrike the recognition of a settlement agreement depends on national laws. 
337. Second of all, petitioners could introduce a choice of court clause pursuant 
to Article 25 BRIbis into the settlement agreement in order to dispel any doubts regarding 
the Dutch courts’ jurisdiction. In this context, could victims actually be bound by such a 
clause without having expressly signed or consented to it? Some scholars answer 
positively to this question.736 In order to support their approach, they argue that the 
Gerling case737 should apply, mutatis mutandis, to cases such as Shell or Converium.  
In Gerling, the ECJ was asked whether a choice of forum clause could apply to 
beneficiaries who did not agree to said clause. The Court of Justice held that a choice of 
court agreement, which is concluded in the benefit of people who are not parties to the 
contract, may be invoked by such parties. Therefore, it is not necessary that these sign the 
choice of forum clause.738 According to this case law, beneficiaries of the Shell and 
Converium settlements should be able to invoke a choice of court agreement, which 
designates Dutch courts. Yet, the question remains as to whether such a clause may be 
imposed on them. It seems that the answer should be negative in light of the Société 
financière case,739 where the ECJ held that a choice of court agreement cannot be relied 
on against a beneficiary if he has not expressely subscribed to such an agreement. 
338. Lastly, if we determine that the conclusion of a settlement agreement under 
the WCAM is not a contractual matter pursuant to Article 7(1) BRIbis, the application of 
Article 7(2) BRIbis should be examined. For this provision to apply, the action must 
involve the liability of the alleged wrongdoer. In this sense, the financial loss that 
followed the alleged wrongdoer’s disclosures may justify the application of Article 7(2) 
BRIbis. However, the presentation of a settlement agreement to the Amsterdam Court of 
Appeal does not involve any admission of liability.740 In this case, it is not sure that Article 
7(2) BRIbis could apply.  
                                                
735 Gaudemet-Tallon, supra n 503, 496.  
736 Tzankova and van Lith, supra n 692, 85-86; van Lith, supra n 688, 46-47. Contra: Kramer, supra n 375, 
252. 
737 Case C-201/82 Gerling Konzern Speziale Kreditversicherungs-AG and others v Amministrazione del 
Tesoro dello Stato [1983] ECR 02503. 
738 Ibid, 10-20. 
739 FJ Garcimartín, “Prorogation of Jurisdiction” in Dickinson and Lein, supra n 732, 301 who cites the 
case of the ECJ C-112/03 Société financière et industrielle du Peloux v Axa Belgium and Others [2005] 
ECR I-03707, para 43. 
740 In particular, see the Shell Settlement Agreement, 3-4. 
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5. Interim Conclusion 
339. The Dutch model has been highly criticised because of its inadaptability to 
European private international rules. However, this model is relatively efficient. Even 
though a small number of cases have been tried before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal, 
these cases were certainly significant. The success of the Dutch model may be explained 
by its flexibility and international coverage. Flexibility is achieved thanks to the Dutch 
system’s focus on efficient administration of justice.741 For example, Article 7:907 DCC 
states that associations or organisations should be sufficiently representative in order to 
negotiate a settlement. However, the provision does not require that all individual victims 
are represented and said associations or organisations can be created on an ad hoc basis. 
These flexible rules certainly facilitate the use of the Dutch collective redress mechanism. 
As regards the broad coverage of WCAM actions, it can be achieved thanks to the 
expansive interpretation of private international law rules on jurisdiction. Specifically, 
the application of Article 4 and 8(1) or 7(1) BRIbis allocates jurisdiction to the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal when only one interested party is domiciled in the 
Netherlands.742 Although such an interpretation fosters access to justice, it might disturb 
the equilibrium created by the BRIbis and not always respect the principle of proximity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
741 Kuipers, supra n 674, 220. 
742 Tzankova and van Lith, supra n 692, 84. 
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C. The Class Action Model 
340. This sub-section starts with a description of the class action model (infra; 1.). 
Then, we have selected the emblematic Schrems case as a basis for our private 
international law reasoning (infra; 2.). In light of this, we first describe the facts of the 
case and subsequently discuss private international law questions on jurisdiction. Finally, 
we conclude (infra; 3.). 
1. Outline of the Class Action Model 
341. According to the class action model, a representative claimant litigates on 
behalf of a group of victims. Usually, this representative claimant is an individual who 
also has a claim against the defendant –otherwise, it falls under the representative model 
for the sake of this research project. In this sense, the structure of this model resembles 
the American class action device. However, a pure class action model has not been 
implemented yet in Europe, except perhaps in England where, pursuant to Rule 19.6 of 
the Civil Procedure Rules, only a victim with a claim can litigate on behalf of a group of 
individuals.743 Specifically, this provision requires that the representative possesses an 
identical interest to the members of the group. Following this reasoning, a consumer or 
trade association cannot act as representatives when they do not have a proper claim 
against the defendant.744 A majority of Member States have implemented mixed 
mechanisms where individuals, along with representative entities, may litigate on behalf 
of a group. For instance, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Bulgaria adopted such a 
system. As far as Spain is concerned, the lawmaker adopted a group action mechanism: 
according to the law on civil procedure,745 a group of claimants may gather together and 
litigate. In this vein, it should be underlined that the class action model is not always 
based on a representative system. For example, in Austria, the Österreichisches Modell 
der Sammelklage (collective action of the Austrian type) allows individuals, as well as 
other entities such as consumer associations, to acquire claims of victims and concentrate 
                                                
743 For more information on the system of the United Kingdom regarding collective redress, see Annex 
II.H. 
744 PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 589-590. 
745 In particular, see Article 11 of the SLCP. For more information on the Spanish system regarding 
collective redress, see Annex II.B. 
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them into one proceedings.746 In such a scenario, people transfer their right to 
compensation to an individual, who does not technically act as a representative claimant 
but for himself. Article 227 of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter, ACCP) 
regulates this procedure. From a private international law perspective, we make no 
difference between a transfer of claims to an individual and a collective redress action, 
whereby an individual represents the class, as long as the litigating party is a consumer 
with a proper claim. 
2. Schrems Case 
342. The “Schrems saga,” is a legal dispute between an Austrian lawyer, 
Maximilian Schrems (hereafter, Max Schrems) and Facebook which started in 2013. The 
Schrems v Facebook controversy involves various court decisions both at the national and 
European levels. In particular, two different kinds of proceedings were generated by this 
international dispute: firstly, an administrative complaint was brought against Facebook 
for breach of data protection laws in 2013. Subsequently, a collective action started in 
Vienna. Both proceedings gave rise to requests for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. The 
most recent request, which concerns the collective action, is still pending as we write 
these lines. In the next paragraphs, we briefly deal with the administrative complaint, 
inasmuch it helps to understand the substance of the dispute. Then, we dedicate the rest 
of the section to the Austrian cross-border collective redress action, which triggers 
interesting private international law questions.  
343. As a preliminary note, it is appropriate to issue some caveats: the next lines 
attempt to faithfully rebuild the Schrems v Facebook case. Access to the decisions of the 
different instance courts, as well as the applications prepared by the claimant have made 
this possible. However, important documents are missing, such as the answers filed by 
Facebook against the claimant’s assertions. Because of this, it was not always possible to 
perfectly reconstruct the arguments of the defence in detail. Furthermore, some factual 
aspects of the case have been fervently debated by the litigating parties and it was not 
always possible for the courts to establish the truth. These disputed facts are mentioned 
as they arise.  
                                                
746 For more information on the Austrian system regarding collective redress, see Annex II.G. 
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a. The Administrative Complaint 
344. On 25 June 2013, Max Schrems, a lawyer domiciled in Austria, brought a 
complaint747 to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner against Facebook Ireland Ltd –a 
daughter company of Facebook Inc.748 Indeed, Ireland corresponds to the place where the 
company has its European headquarters. In substance, Max Schrems alleges that the 
transfer of his data from Facebook Ireland Ltd to the US, where the mother company is 
located, has to be prohibited, as the latter country does not possess the same protection 
standards regarding personal data. To support his argument, Max Schrems makes 
reference to Edward Snowden’s disclosures regarding the mass surveillance tactics used 
by the National Security Agency (NSA).749 Thanks to a program named PRISM, the NSA 
has access to information gathered by social networks like Facebook. In light of this, the 
NSA enjoys a broad power to survey European Facebook users.  
345. Notwithstanding the above, the Commission’s decision 2000/520/EC, 
adopted in accordance with the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC,750 states that transfer 
of personal data from the Union to the US is allowed, as long as the latter State guarantees 
an adequate level of protection. This level of protection has been brought into alignment 
thanks to the adoption of Safe Harbour principles agreed upon by the US Department of 
Commerce on the one hand, and the European Commission on the other.751 US 
organisations that comply with said principles are deemed to respect an adequate level of 
privacy protection. Nevertheless, the Safe Harbour principles do not apply to public 
bodies like the NSA.  
                                                
747 Actually, Max Schrems first brought 22 individual complaints against Facebook to the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner. Later on, he brought an additional complaint whose content is detailed in the 
following paragraphs. Eventually, Max Schrems withdrew the 22 original complaints in 2014. All the 
complaints are available at http://europe-v-facebook.org/EN/Complaints/complaints.html. 
748 All documents regarding the administrative complaint can be found on the following website: 
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/DE/Anzeigen/anzeigen.html. 
749 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data; 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-
decoded#section/1. 
750 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] 
OJ L281/31. This Directive approximates Member States’ legislations in order to foster the free movement 
of personal data, but simultaneously guarantees an appropriate level of protection of individuals’ 
fundamental rights. 
751 For more information on the content of the Safe Harbor principles, see 
https://build.export.gov/main/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.  
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346. In light of the positive decision of the Commission, the Irish Commissioner 
rejected Max Schrems’ complaint. The case went to the High Court, which referred a 
question for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. Indeed, the referring Court wonders whether 
the existence of a Commission’s decision impedes the surveillance authority (here, the 
Irish Commissioner) to assess an individual’s claim for breach of data protection laws. 
The ECJ first ruled that the existence of a Commission’s decision does not suppress the 
power of a national supervisory authority to assess an individual complaint for breach of 
data protection rules, as stated in Article 28(4) of the Data Protection Directive.752  
Then, the ECJ added that the Decision of 2000 is invalid. The Court of 
Luxembourg relies on various arguments to support this statement, which essentially all 
underline the unfortunate limited nature of the Safe Harbour principles, and in particular 
their inapplicability to US public bodies. Besides, said principles may be discarded where 
a national security, a public interest, or a law enforcement requirement dictates it. The 
Court adds that there is apparently no limit to the State’s intervention when such a 
requirement is fulfilled. In this context, general access to personal data by public 
authorities goes against Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union.753 Thus, the ECJ considers that such a decision is not valid. 
347. Since the invalidation of the Safe Harbour principles, Facebook Ireland Ltd 
alternatively uses model contracts in order to transfer personal data from the EU to the 
US. The adoption of standard contractual clauses between Facebook Ireland Ltd and its 
mother company is allowed by a bunch of decisions issued by the Commission.754 In this 
vein, Max Schrems reformulated his complaint –taking into account the invalidity of the 
Safe Harbour principles–,755 which the Irish Commissioner accepted to assess. As a result, 
the national supervisory authority plans to obtain another judgment of the ECJ in order to 
determine whether transfer of data under model contracts ensures an appropriate level of 
                                                
752 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner [ECLI:EU:C:2015:650], paras 
53-58. 
753 Ibid, paras 82, 86, 88, 94. 
754 All available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/transfer/index_en.htm. 
755 After the Safe Harbour principles were struck down by the ECJ, the US Department of Commerce and 
the European Commission concluded a new agreement on the exchange of personal data: the EU-US 
Privacy Shield. This agreement imposes more stringent conditions on the level of privacy protection and 
prevents general access to personal data by US government bodies. For more information on this agreement, 
see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/eu-us-privacy-shield/index_en.htm, 
and in particular the Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection 
provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield (notified under document C(2016) 4176) [2016] OJ L207/1. 
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protection, as required by the Data Protection Directive.756 Therefore, the Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner brought a suit to the Irish High Court.757 
348. Finally, Facebook has argued that the administrative complaint should 
trigger the application of Article 29 BRIbis on lis pendens. In other words, the Austrian 
court must stay the collective action –whose content we detail in the next paragraphs– 
because of the existence of a previous administrative complaint. The court of second 
instance has examined this argument and has concluded that the object of the 
administrative process is more restricted than the judicial claim. Because the object of the 
complaint and the claim does not coincide, lis pendens rules cannot apply.  
In our opinion, it is in any case doubtful that the administrative complaint actually 
represents “proceedings” brought in the “court” of a Member State. In a similar context, 
the ECJ has recently rejected the application of the BRIbis to a writ of execution issued 
by a notary, ruling that he could not be considered as a “court” within the meaning of the 
Regulation.758 In order to support its argument, the ECJ emphasised that in the case at 
issue, the issuance of the writ was not conducted inter partes. Similarly, the complaint 
brought by Schrems petitions the Irish Data Protection Commissioner to make use of its 
investigating power pursuant to Section 10 of the Irish Data Protection Act.759 Therefore, 
this procedure involves no claim, defendant or court. Instead, the complaint generates 
administrative measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
756 For more information on this second claim to the ECJ, see http://www.europe-v-
facebook.org/PA_MCs.pdf. 
757 An update of this administrative procedure is available at http://europe-v-facebook.org/MU_HC.pdf. 
758 Case C-551/15 Pula Parking d.o.o. v Sven Klaus Tederahn [ECLI:EU:C:2017:193], paras 54-59. 
759 Available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1988/act/25/section/10/enacted/en/html#sec10. 
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b. The Collective Judicial Action 
i. Statement of Facts 
349. In parallel to the administrative complaint in Ireland, Max Schrems started 
collective redress proceedings in Austria along with seven Facebook users. While the 
majority of the assignors have their domicile in Austria and India, one user is domiciled 
in Germany.760 Thanks to an ad hoc website, 25.000 users subsequently assigned their 
claim to Max Schrems.761 50.000 additional users were registered on a waiting list. 
Practically, the action brought by the 8 claimants has been possible thanks to Article 235 
ACCP –that permits an extension of the action’s scope.762 However, to date, no tribunal 
has allowed the case to proceed on a class action basis –pursuant to the Österreichisches 
Modell der Sammelklage. As already explained above, thanks to this model, individuals 
could assign their claims to Mr. Schrems, who would bundle them in a single forum. 
Finally, it has to be mentioned that litigation is financed by a third-party, namely 
ROLAND ProzessFinanz AG, located in Germany. The firm covers trial costs, as well as 
the attorney’s fees. In case of success, it is entitled to receive a 20% share of the 
compensation awarded.763 
350. As regards the substance of the claim, Mr. Schrems argues, among other 
allegations, that Facebook unlawfully exploits users’ personal data. For this reason, he 
claims up to 500 euros per victim in compensation for the damage sustained. The 
Landesgericht (Regional Court), which is the first instance court seised, rejected the 
litigant’s claim on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction. Specifically, the Viennese 
court considers that Max Schrems cannot qualify as a consumer. Besides, a class action 
of this size –that involves people from other Member States and even third States– is not 
allowed by the Austrian Civil Code of Procedure.  
In light of this ruling, Max Schrems appealed to the Oberlandsgericht (Court of 
Appeal). This court partially overturned the first instance court’s decision: on the question 
regarding jurisdiction, the court admitted that Max Schrems is a consumer. However, it 
                                                
760 Lawsuit initially filed in the Viennese commercial court in 2014, 42-45. The document is available at 
http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sk/sk_en.pdf. 
761 For a country breakdown, see http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/fbclaim_pat.pdf. 
762 http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sk/fs_en.pdf. 
763 http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/sk/rl_fs_en.pdf. 
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agreed with the Regional Court by establishing that EU law does not allow the bundling 
of 25.000 claims in the Austrian courts.  
Eventually, the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court), to which both litigants 
appealed, had to adjudicate on the admissibility of a collective redress action of the 
Austrian type and assess the jurisdiction of the courts. In order to fulfil this task, the 
Supreme Court sent two questions for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. We reproduce them 
here:764 
351. “1. Is Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (‘Regulation 
No 44/2001’) to be interpreted as meaning that a ‘consumer’ within the meaning of that 
provision loses that status, if, after the comparatively long use of a private Facebook 
account, he publishes books in connection with the enforcement of his claims, on occasion 
also delivers lectures for remuneration, operates websites, collects donations for the 
enforcement of his claims and has assigned to him the claims of numerous consumers on 
the assurance that he will remit to them any proceeds awarded, after the deduction of 
legal costs? 
2. Is Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to be interpreted as meaning that 
a consumer in a Member State can also invoke at the same time as his own claims arising 
from a consumer supply at the claimant’s place of jurisdiction the claims of others 
consumers on the same subject who are domiciled 
a.  in the same Member State, 
b.  in another Member State: or 
c.  in a non-Member State, 
if the claims assigned to him arise from consumer supplies involving the same 
defendant in the same legal context and if the assignment is not part of a professional or 
trade activity of the applicant, but rather serves to ensure the joint enforcement of 
claims?” 
352. In light of the above, the next lines deal with three issues generated by the 
dispute between Mr. Schrems and Facebook. We first deal with private international law 
questions. Specifically, we examine whether Max Schrems should be considered as a 
consumer pursuant to Section 4 BRIbis and whether he could litigate other consumers’ 
                                                
764 Case C-498/16, Schrems (no judgment issued yet). 
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claims (infra; ii.). Following this, we observe whether Austrian courts could have 
jurisdiction on other grounds (infra; iii.). Finally, we examine the procedural question 
regarding the admissibility of the collective action under Austrian law (infra; iv.).   
ii. Questions on Jurisdiction and Procedure: Section 4 BRIbis and 227 ACCP 
(1) Is Mr. Schrems a Consumer? 
353. On the one hand, Facebook considers that Mr. Schrems cannot reasonably be 
defined as a consumer, pursuant to Section 4 BRIbis.765 The firm argues that the claimant 
has used his private Facebook account in order to achieve commercial objectives. It 
should be underlined that parties do not discuss the fact that the defendant directs its 
activities to Austria, pursuant to Article 15(1)(c) BRIbis. 
According to Facebook’s statement, Mr. Schrems created two relevant website 
pages, namely “europe-v-facebook” and “fbclaim” in order to advertise the publication 
of a book (“Kämpf um deine Daten”), and participated to different events and conferences 
–against a small remuneration.766  
To be more specific, the claimant created an association called “europe-v-
facebook” in 2012. A Facebook page and a website –both created in 2011– provide an 
update on the association’s activities.767 The goal of this association is to enforce 
fundamental rights of people following violations of data protection laws. Furthermore, 
this legal frame was used in order to finance part of the administrative proceedings in 
Ireland.768 As regards “fbclaim”, this website was created in 2014 with the objective to 
gather victims together in a judicial collective action.769 Importantly, the defendant seems 
to consider that Mr. Schrems used his Facebook private account in order to undertake all 
those activities.770 Taking these considerations into account, Facebook believes that the 
claimant has been using his account in an unusual manner since 2011, which is not proper 
of a consumer.  
                                                
765 The arguments of Facebook against Mr. Schrems’ capacity as a consumer, which are developed in the 
next lines, can be found in the judgment of the Landesgericht Wien (first instance court), case 3Cg 52/14k-
29 rendered on 30 June 2015, 12-14. 
766 For a chronological overview of the claimant’s activities, see judgment of the first instance court, supra 
n 765, 19-23. 
767 The Facebook page is available at https://www.facebook.com/eversusf/ and the website is http://europe-
v-facebook.org/EN/en.html. 
768 Judgment of the first instance court, supra n 765, 19, 24. 
769 Ibid, 21, 25. 
770 Ibid, 13-14. 
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The court of first instance (Landesgericht) agrees with Facebook and clarifies that 
parties’ contractual relationship has been governed by two different regimes:771 indeed, 
on 15 November 2013, Facebook modified its Terms and Conditions that were 
subsequently accepted by Mr. Schrems. Accordingly, the previous contractual 
relationship between the parties was superseded by the newly concluded contract 
(novatio).772 Therefore, in the court’s opinion, the contractual relationship of 2013 should 
be the taken into account, in order to assess whether Mr. Schrems is a consumer or not. 
In light of this, the professional nature of the claimant’s activities seems to have been 
dominant at least since 2013.773 Nevertheless, the first instance court does not offer more 
arguments in order to justify this position. 
354. On the other hand, in the original lawsuit filed by Mr. Schrems in the 
Landesgericht, the claimant argues that the court has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
15(1)(c) BRIbis.774 This is so because Mr. Schrems is a consumer and as such, he is able 
to sue Facebook at the place of his domicile. As the Brussels regime establishes, Section 
4 BRIbis applies to contracts concluded between a consumer and a trader, the former 
being a person who acts for non-professional purposes.  
In this vein, Mr. Schrems shows that he has been using his Facebook account for 
private purposes since 2008. Similarly, the website pages “europe-v-facebook” and 
“fbclaim” have been created and are managed by the claimant himself and pursue a non-
professional objective. Specifically, in order to convince the different courts seised, the 
claimant demonstrates that most of his actions on the above-mentioned online platforms 
were not related to commercial activities. For example, in his appeal to the second 
instance court, Mr. Schrems states that out of 350 writings posted on “europe-v-
facebook”, only 4 concerned the publication of his book, 9 were related to academic or 
political manifestations –and thus potentially followed a commercial purpose. In any 
case, the claimant maintains that “europe-v-facebook” is an independent website that has 
no link with the consumer contract object of the claim. Nevertheless, the court of second 
instance was not able to clarify the veracity of this statement. In its opinion, it is not clear 
whether Mr. Schrems has used his private Facebook account in order to build up the 
                                                
771 Ibid, 33. 
772 Ibid, 33-34. 
773 Ibid, 33-34. 
774 Lawsuit initially filed in the Viennese commercial court in 2014, supra n 760, 9. 
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website or whether it created another account –and thus, concluded a second contract with 
Facebook.  
The second instance court equally concludes that Mr. Schrems should be 
considered as a consumer.775 Even though one accepts the fact that an entirely new 
contract was signed in 2013, which supersedes the previous contractual relationship of 
the parties, the court considers that since this year, Mr. Schrems has used his Facebook 
account in a private manner. In order to support this argument, the Oberlandesgericht 
acknowledges that the capacity as consumer has to be assessed at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract –here, in 2013.776 However, the claimant only started using the 
mentioned website page in an objectively professional manner the day he announced the 
publication of his book, namely the 29 May 2014. Therefore, the professional purpose of 
the consumer contract, if there was one, was merely incidental at that time.777 
355. In our opinion, and contrarily to what the defendant implies, the setting up 
of a collective redress action should not, in itself, be considered as a professional activity. 
Under certain circumstances, litigation may pursue a commercial purpose. For example, 
this might be true as regards companies like CDC,778 which dedicates its time and money 
to the private enforcement of competition law claims. In the case object of analysis, 
however, we believe that Mr. Schrems is not a businessperson whose goal is to enforce 
data protection rights. Contrarily to CDC, Mr. Schrems does not bring collective redress 
claims on a regular basis and does not make money out of this activity. The fact that he 
is a lawyer should not affect this reasoning, since lawyers may also bring lawsuits outside 
their profession, for personal purposes.  
Yet, it is true that Mr. Schrems undertook three different types of activities that 
may involve a professional goal: first of all, the claimant created different websites in 
order to gather victims together and obtain financing. Second of all, Mr. Schrems 
participated to conferences and other similar events essentially regarding the proceedings 
he started against Facebook. Sometimes, he received a small remuneration for his 
participation to said events. Last but not least, he took advantage of one of his website in 
order to advertise the publication of his book “Kämpf für deine Daten”.  
                                                
775 Judgment of the Oberlandesgericht Wien (second instance court), case 11 R 146/15v rendered on 9 
October 2015, 9-13. 
776 Ibid, 10-11. 
777 Ibid, 12-13. 
778 A description of CDC’s profile and activities is available supra; § 138 and corresponding footnotes. 
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The creation of websites –linked or not to a private Facebook account–, as well as 
the participation in conferences and other similar manifestations should not, in this case, 
be regarded as professional activities. Indeed, the initiation of collective proceedings 
always requires an investment in terms of time, money, and human resources. As anyone 
can imagine, the management of 25.000 assigned claims is not an easy task. In this 
context, it does not seem reasonable to conclude that Mr. Schrems is not a consumer 
because the creation of these websites and his participation to conferences facilitated the 
bundling of multiple claims. Otherwise, we should admit that all individual claimants 
would lose their capacity as consumers once they bring a collective action.779 In fact, all 
the methods used by the claimant either helped him to handle the size of the claim or to 
advertise it. The fact that the claimant earned some money for those activities does not 
affect this reasoning, as the amount involved is almost insignificant. Finally, as regards 
the publication of the claimant’s book, one might consider that this goes beyond the 
organisation and advertising of the pending dispute between Mr. Schrems and Facebook. 
In this context, Mr. Schrems used the reputation of the case in order to sell a book, which 
might be considered a professional activity. Now, it has to be examined whether this 
single activity may change the qualification of Mr. Schrems as a consumer. 
As far as the relevant timeframe is concerned, when a consumer changes the 
purpose of his contract with a trader, one might consider that Section 4 BRIbis should not 
apply anymore. However, this might generate interpretative problems: how should one 
examine a change of purpose? What are the relevant criteria to be applied? Should this 
change of purpose be preponderant and visible for the defendant?  
Such interpretative problems become especially disturbing in the following 
situation: let us assume that two traders conclude a selling agreement, and that one of 
them subsequently decides to use the acquired goods for personal purposes. If the change 
of purpose is taken into account, Section 4 BRIbis should apply in case of conflict. In this 
case, this would mean that the defendant would be subjected to different jurisdictional 
rules without being aware of it. Such a subjectivity seems unreasonable and runs against 
the principle of predictability. It is unlikely that the protection of Section 4 BRIbis goes 
so far. This conclusion seems to be in line with the ECJ’s case law: in Benincasa, the 
Court ruled that an Italian national who concludes a franchising agreement with the 
intention to exercise a professional activity in the future, but never does so, cannot be 
                                                
779 Judgment of the second instance court, supra n 775, 10. 
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considered as a consumer.780 The fact that he never actually pursued any commercial 
activity appears to be irrelevant for the Court. Instead, the objective according to which 
one concludes a contract is essential. In light of this, a change of purpose after the 
conclusion of the contract does not seem to affect the professional nature of the 
transaction. 
In the case at issue, it appears that the only professional activity undertaken by the 
claimant is the publication of his book on one of his websites. It is doubtful that, when 
Mr. Schrems concluded his contract with Facebook in 2013, he had this professional 
activity in mind. Therefore, we conclude that at the time the contract was concluded, no 
professional activity existed and the claimant did not manifested his intention to use his 
Facebook account for professional purposes. 
(2) Can a Consumer who Represent Others Use Section 4 BRIbis? 
356. As we previously explained in the statement of facts, Mr. Schrems brought 
proceedings in the Austrian courts along with seven other claimants located in Austria, 
and Germany, pursuant to Article 235 ACCP. However, the claimant is willing to convert 
his suit in a collective redress action of the Austrian type (Article 227 ACCP) and hence, 
bundle claims of at least 25.000 other users dispersed around the world. In light of this, 
Austrian courts have to decide whether they have jurisdiction to hear claims of the seven 
claimants, and whether they could extend their jurisdictional power to the rest of the 
victims. 
357. On the one hand, and according to the claimant, when the assignee is himself 
a consumer, then European, as well as Austrian case law do not refrain access to courts 
pursuant to Section 4 BRIbis or its national equivalent. In light of this, Mr. Schrems refers 
to the Shearson case –among others– in order to demonstrate that the ECJ only prevents 
the use of Section 4 to claimants that represent a group of consumers but are not 
themselves bound to the defendant by a consumer contract. The claimant comes to the 
same conclusion when he looks at the national case law rendered by the Austrian Supreme 
Court.781 Similarly, the claimant cites extensive literature in order to support his 
                                                
780 Benincasa, supra n 593, paras 16-19. 
781 Appeal filed by Maximilian Schrems to the Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court) GZ 3 Cg 52/14k on 
2 November 2015, 10-15; Appeal filed by Maximilian Schrems to the Oberlandesgericht (second instance 
court) on 14 July 2015, 17-18. 
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argument.782 Then, Mr. Schrems argues that the text of the BRIbis does not impose any 
“Personenidentität”.783 In other words, the Brussels Regulation does not require the 
consumer to be the claimant. Another interpretation would strengthen the conditions of 
Section 4 BRIbis, and this approach is not defendable. 
In fact, the claimant seems to suggest that when courts have the ability to rule on 
the claim of the assignee, it can hear all other consumer claims. On the contrary, the ECJ 
seems to favour an “individualistic” approach: in CDC,784 the ECJ ruled that, in order to 
locate the place where the damage manifested itself in a case regarding artificially inflated 
prices induced by a cartel agreement, national courts had to identify this place “for each 
alleged victim taken individually”. Therefore, it might well be that courts should not only 
focus on the assignee but also on original claimants in order to determine whether they 
have jurisdiction over a whole group of consumers located in different States. In many 
cases, this might generate the fragmentation of litigation and hence, the impossibility to 
bring a collective redress action, because consumers are often domiciled in different 
States or in different locations within the same State. However, an extensive interpretation 
that would allow the court of the assignee’s domicile to hear all claims would broaden 
the jurisdictional power of said court, without legislative support. 
358. On the other hand, the court of first instance establishes that national rules of 
procedure do not allow the bundling of foreign victims’ claims in Austrian courts.785 The 
Austrian court relies on a lack of procedural economy in order to justify its position: in 
its opinion, foreign assignors’ claims generate different legal questions and hence, no 
economies of scale can be achieved for those disputes. Unfortunately, the court does not 
clearly mention whether it has jurisdiction over assignors who are domiciled in Austria 
pursuant to Article 227 ACCP. 
As for the second instance court, it declares that Austrian courts do not have 
jurisdiction over assignors according to the wording of the BRIbis, since the text makes 
clear that only consumers who are parties to the proceedings may benefit from the 
protective forum of Section 4 BRIbis. The court’s position relies on the Kolassa 
judgment, which has been decided by the ECJ. In this case, the Court of Justice declared 
that Article 18 BRIbis applied “only to an action brought by a consumer against the other 
                                                
782 Ibid, 16-17; Ibid, 18. 
783 Appeal filed by Maximilian Schrems to the Supreme Court, supra n 781, 11. 
784 CDC, supra n 526, esp. para 52. 
785 Judgment of the first instance court, supra n 765, 30. 
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party to the contract”.786 The Oberlandesgericht infers from this statement that the forum 
for consumer contracts is only open to consumers who personally bring their claims.787 
359. In our opinion, and in order to determine whether Mr. Schrems may litigate 
on behalf of consumers under Section 4 BRIbis, one must distinguish between two 
categories of assignors: the ones domiciled in Austria, such as Max Schrems, and those 
who reside within the European territory.788  
360. As far as consumers located in Austria are concerned, Austrian courts have 
jurisdiction to hear their claims pursuant to Section 4 BRIbis, given that they have their 
domicile in said Member State. In this context, it has to be recalled that Section 4 BRIbis 
establishes international, as well as local jurisdiction when consumers wish to initiate 
proceedings against the trader in the forum of their domicile. Therefore, the centralisation 
of claims might be impeded if these consumers are domiciled in different parts of the 
country.  
361. As regards consumers domiciled in a Member State other than Austria, 
Section 4 BRIbis only allows them to litigate in the forum of their domicile or in the 
Member State where the defendant is seated –here, Ireland. As a result, these consumers 
can only rely on a choice of court agreement in order to litigate in Austria. As we 
mentioned above (infra; § 365), the consent of the defendant is necessary for such a forum 
to be open. In the case at issue, however, Facebook fervently fought the jurisdiction of 
the Austrian courts. In light of this, the Landesgericht can only acquire jurisdiction if 
Article 7(1) or 7(2) BRIbis is available. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that these provisions 
apply, because Facebook users surely are consumers. Hence, for them, jurisdiction is 
exhaustively regulated by Section 4 BRIbis. As for Article 7(2) BRIbis, it should not 
apply, inasmuch assignors are linked to Facebook by a contract.  
To conclude, Austrian courts only possess jurisdiction over consumers domiciled 
in Austria, pursuant to Section 4 BRIbis. 
                                                
786 Case C-375/13 Harald Kolassa v Barclays Bank plc [ECLI:EU:C:2015:37], para 32. 
787 Judgment of the second instance court, supra n 775, 15-16. 
788 We set aside jurisdictional questions regarding assignors domiciled in a third State, since they do not 
fall under Section 4 BRIbis. According to Article 18 BRIbis, consumers have the possibility to bring their 
claim “in the courts of the Member State in which [they are] domiciled”. Therefore, we infer that only 
consumers located in a Member State may be protected by this Section. Conversely, foreign assignors might 
try to rely on the alternative forum for contractual matters. 
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iii. Other Grounds on Jurisdiction  
(1) Choice of Court Agreement 
362. Under the class action model, parties may conclude a choice of agreement 
before or after the rise of the dispute. In the Schrems case, an ex ante choice of court 
agreement bound Facebook with its users. Therefore, we examine the validity of such a 
clause in the next paragraphs. Furthermore, we analyse whether Mr. Schrems could 
alternatively present the claims he acquired in the Austrian courts thanks to the conclusion 
of an ex post choice of court agreement. 
363. In its lawsuit, the claimant puts the spotlight on the existence of a choice of 
court agreement contained in Facebook’s Terms and Conditions –also called Statement 
of Rights and Responsibilities. According to this agreement, Facebook users accept to 
litigate their disputes in the Californian courts. In its most recent version, Facebook’s 
Terms and Conditions state the following: “You will resolve any claim, cause of action 
or dispute (claim) you have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook 
exclusively in the US District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court 
located in San Mateo County, and you agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of such 
courts for the purpose of litigating all such claims. The laws of the State of California will 
govern this Statement, as well as any claim that might arise between you and us, without 
regard to conflict of law provisions”.789 However, the claimant correctly argues that a 
choice of court clause concluded before the rise of the dispute, and which does not allow 
consumers covered by the Brussels regime to litigate in the fora provided by Article 18(1) 
BRIbis, cannot be valid pursuant to Article 19 BRIbis. Such a clause might nevertheless 
be valid for assignors domiciled in third States, given that there are not covered by Section 
4 BRIbis.  
Along the same line of reasoning, if Austrian courts conclude that Mr. Schrems 
and the assignors are not consumers, then the choice of court agreement would be 
applicable. This means that parties would probably have no choice but to submit their 
disputes to the Californian courts. As the claimant explains,790 this result might be 
unfortunate in case American courts reject jurisdiction on the ground of forum non 
conveniens. In his opinion, this is highly likely to happen given the weak links that the 
                                                
789 See no 15 of Facebook’s Terms and Conditions, available at: https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms. 
790 Appeal filed by Maximilian Schrems to the Supreme Court, supra n 781, 25. 
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dispute possesses with the US legal order. Should this happen, access to justice would 
probably be barred in the US, as well as in the European Union. 
364. Supposing that the choice of court agreement would respect Section 4 
BRIbis, it remains to be seen whether they would bind Mr. Schrems as the assignee of 
consumer claims. The recent CDC case791 sheds light on the power of choice of court 
agreements, when victims assign their claims to a special purpose vehicle. In this case, 
the Court of Justice first clarified that in order for CDC to be bound by choice of court 
agreements, it should have succeeded in the rights and obligations of the original parties. 
This has to be established by the national substantive law designated by the private 
international law rules of the court seised.792 If this is the case, then CDC would be bound 
by the choice of court agreements. We believe that this case law equally applies to the 
Schrems case. 
365. As far as ex post choice of courts agreements are concerned, we see no 
obstacles for Mr. Schrems to agree on the jurisdiction of the Austrian courts after he 
become the sole holder of victims’ claims. Nevertheless, the conclusion of a choice of 
court agreement requires the consent of the defendant. In this case, however, Facebook 
fiercely contests the jurisdictional power of Austrian courts. Therefore, this option seems 
to be excluded. 
(2) Alternative Fora of Article 7 BRIbis 
366. Contrarily to the opinion of the first instance court, Max Schrems argues that 
Article 7(2) BRIbis should alternatively confer jurisdiction to the Austrian courts at least 
over assignors domiciled in Vienna. This place does not only correspond to their 
domicile, but also to the place where the unlawful intervention into their private sphere 
occurred and where they usually use their Facebook account.793 Relying on the E-Data 
and Olivier cases,794 the claimant argues that the infringement to personality rights occurs 
at the place where victims have the centre of their interests. This location usually matches 
the place of their habitual residence. Unfortunately, the second instance court rejects this 
                                                
791 CDC, supra n 526. 
792 Ibid, para 64-65. 
793 Appeal filed by Maximilian Schrems to the second instance court, supra n 781, 19-21. 
794 Joined cases C-509/09 eDate Advertising GmbH v X and C-161/10 Olivier Martinez and Robert 
Martinez v MGN Limited [2011] ECR I-10269. 
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argument: it explains that a contractual relationship exists between Facebook and the 
assignors, pursuant to Article 7(1) BRIbis. Consequently, the forum for tort is not open.795  
367. In our opinion, assuming that assignors are consumers in the sense of the 
Regulation, it is doubtful that Austrian courts can acquire jurisdiction pursuant to Articles 
7(1) or 7(2) BRIbis. In presence of consumers, Section 4 BRIbis alone tackles the 
question of jurisdiction. Again, it is unlikely that the assignment of claims to a third party 
has an impact on someone’s capacity as a consumer. In light of this, an assignee could 
only bundle claims in one of the fora provided by Section 4 BRIbis, namely in the 
consumers’ domicile or in the Member State where the defendant is seated. Assuming 
that consumers are domiciled in different locations within a given Member State or 
dispersedly located on the European territory, the unification of proceedings is practically 
difficult, not to say impossible.  
iv. Admissibility of the Collective Action 
368. If the Austrian courts have jurisdiction pursuant to any of the grounds 
provided by the Brussels regime, then the possibility to bundle the claims of other users 
through the Österreichisches Modell der Sammelklage (Article 227 ACCP) has to be 
examined. This provision states that claimants can bundle their claims in a single action 
against the same defendant, when the court has jurisdiction over all claims and the same 
type of procedure applies to them.796 
369. Summarising the case law regarding Article 227 ACCP, the court of first 
instance explains that this provision applies where similar questions of fact or law exist. 
These have to represent a leading question common to all claims.797 Although the 
Landesgericht acknowledges that claims assigned to Mr. Schrems may trigger common 
fundamental questions, it rejects the possibility for claimants located in Germany and 
India to join collective redress proceedings. It does so on the basis that for those victims, 
the efficient-administration-of-justice requirement does not apply.798 As already 
                                                
795 Judgment of the second instance court, supra n 775, 16. 
796 “(1) Mehrere Ansprüche des Klägers gegen denselben Beklagten können, auch wenn sie nicht 
zusammenzurechnen sind (§ 55 JN), in derselben Klage geltend gemacht werden, wenn für sämtliche 
Ansprüche (1) das Prozeßgericht zuständig und (2) dieselbe Art des Verfahrens zulässig ist”. The full 
Article, along with the corresponding case law of the Supreme Court is available at 
https://www.jusline.at/227_ZPO.html. 
797 Judgment of the first instance court, supra n 765, 30. 
798 Ibid, 30-31. 
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mentioned, it is not clear whether the court accepts the collective action to proceed for 
the remaining Austrian assignors. Additionally, the court of first instance admits that, by 
establishing its jurisdiction in accordance with the domicile of the assignee, many 
potential fora could pop up.799 This is not reasonable since it affects the private 
international law principle of predictability.  
370. In our opinion, it is highly likely that the assigned claims possess common 
questions of fact and law. It is doubtful that the application of different substantive laws 
to the case at issue modifies this reasoning, at least as regards consumers domiciled in the 
European Union. This can be explained by the fact that a European Directive, which 
harmonises national laws, regulates the transfer of personal data. The arguments of the 
court of first instance, which rely on procedural efficiency and predictability of the forum 
are not convincing. These are simply not required by the legal provision. Therefore, it 
seems unreasonable to strengthen the requirements imposed by the law. As a result, we 
think that the claim should proceed as a collective claim pursuant to Article 227 ACCP, 
as long as the Austrian courts previously establish jurisdiction over the assignors. 
3. Interim Conclusion 
371. The dispute between Max Schrems and Facebook puts the spotlight on the 
difficulty for assignees or representatives to bundle consumer claims in a single forum. 
In the case object of analysis, even if Max Schrems would qualify as a consumer, it is 
likely that the Austrian courts would lack jurisdiction over assignors located outside 
Austria. Section 4 BRIbis offers protection to consumers, but this protection is limited: 
consumers cannot unilaterally decide to litigate in different fora than the ones provided 
in Section 4 BRIbis without the defendant’s consent. Furthermore, the individualistic 
approach of the Brussels regime does not allow national courts to rule over victims’ 
claims invoking that they trigger common questions of fact or law. The Regulation 
requires that said courts establish jurisdiction over each individual claim. The current 
private international rules on jurisdiction “forces” collective actions to remain national 
and narrow. 
                                                
799 Ibid, 31. 
  232 
372. Soon, the ECJ will have to clarify whether Mr. Schrems qualifies as a 
consumer and whether he can bring multiple consumer claims in the forum of Article 18 
BRIbis. This certainly represents a critical moment in the evolution of European 
collective redress, as the decision of the Court might either significantly complicate or 
foster access to justice. On the one hand, if the ECJ adopts a strict interpretation of the 
BRIbis, it is likely that Mr. Schrems cannot bring a collective action on behalf of all 
Facebook users around the world. On the other hand, we could expect that the Court of 
Justice will favour a more active approach and decides to favour access to justice over a 
literary interpretation with the objective of offering a proper forum for collective redress 
claims in Europe. 
D. The Test Case Model 
373. The test case model that we present in this sub-section has been adopted, 
both in Germany and in the United Kingdom, although other collective redress 
mechanisms have also been implemented in these States. Through the test case model 
procedure, claims sharing common issues of fact or law are usually listed in a register. 
Then, a “pilot” case is selected, whose questions are resolved by a higher court. This case 
subsequently serves as an example to solve similar registered claims. In Germany, the 
Gesetz über Musterverfahren in kapitalmarktrechtlichen Streitigkeiten (hereafter, 
KapMuG) adopted the test case procedure.800 In the United Kingdom, the Group 
Litigation Order (hereafter, GLO) was implemented in Part 19 III of the Civil Code of 
Procedure.801 However, the latter mechanism does not always provide a test case 
procedure. Sometimes, it is used like a usual joinder.  
374. The test case model has been included in this research project because of its 
increasing relevance, at least at the national level. For example, in Germany, while in 
“2015, the register received 17 entries, in the first half of 2016, the number of new entries 
had already doubled to 34”.802 As for the English GLO, not less than ninety-four cases 
have been tried under this mechanism from its entry into force until July 2015.803 Because 
of globalisation and the increasing integration of markets, it is not excluded that test case 
                                                
800 For a comprehensive description of this procedure, see infra, Annex II.F. 
801 For a comprehensive description of this procedure, see infra, Annex II.H. 
802 B Schneider and H Heppner, “Germany” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and 
Group Actions 2017, avaiblable at https://iclg.com/. 
803 A list of those cases is available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/group-litigation-orders. 
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proceedings involve cross-border elements with more and more frequency. We dedicate 
the rest of this sub-section to the German test case model for two reasons: first, two 
significant cases involving international components are currently going through this 
procedure. Second, the KapMuG essentially aims at enforcing investors’ claims, who 
often are the weak parties in judicial proceedings. Even though not all investors are 
consumers under the Brussels regime, it is interesting to take into account this category 
of victims, since they are potential “clients” of the collective redress procedure. 
375. This sub-section starts with an outline of the German test case model. 
Specifically, we shed light on the structure of this model, the procedural requirements it 
imposes, as well as the advantages and drawbacks that it entails (infra; 1.). Following 
this, we examine two recent international cases, which have recently started under the 
KapMuG procedure, namely the MPC-Fonds case, and the Volkswagen scandal (infra; 
2.). Once the statement of facts of both cases is clarified, our research turns to examine 
questions regarding international jurisdiction. As we explain below, the German courts 
relied on Article 4 BRIbis in order to establish jurisdiction in both disputes (infra; 3.a.). 
However, parallel claims, whose content is detailed in the next lines, have been triggered 
pursuant to other grounds of jurisdiction (infra; 3.b.). We eventually end up this section 
with an interim conclusion (infra; 4.). 
1. Outline of the Test Case Model 
376. In 2005, the German legislator adopted the KapMuG. At that time, this 
legislation was considered as a “pilot-project”, but it was eventually amended in 2012 
and prolonged until 2020.804 The material scope of the KapMuG mainly encompasses 
securities –or shareholder– disputes. In particular, §1 KapMuG states that claims 
regarding prospectus liability can be litigated under this Act. Moreover, disputes 
concerning the offer or use of false, misleading, or omitted capital market information are 
also included within the legislation’s scope. Finally, the lack of communication of said 
information to investors is also mentioned in §1 KapMuG. While prospectus liability 
protects the primary capital market, liability rules on false, misleading, or omitted capital 
market information safeguard transactions on the secondary market.  
                                                
804 In order to build up the outline of the German test case model, we resorted to the bibliography cited in 
Annex II.F. 
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To sum up, the KapMuG only applies to a limited sector. Historical reasons may 
explain this fact. Indeed, said legislation was enacted following the Deutsche Telekom 
case, which invaded the German dockets a few years ago.805 To be more precise, between 
2000 and 2001, approximately, the share price of Deutsche Telekom dropped, causing a 
significant damage to its investors. In particular, victims alleged that the German trader’s 
prospectus, released at the time of the initial public offerings, contained incorrect 
information regarding, inter alia, the value of the company’s real estate. As a result, 
around 17.000 claims massively assaulted Frankfurt’s dockets, which did not possess any 
procedural instrument in order to manage such a number of claims. As a consequence of 
this case, the German legislator drafted a test case model for collective cases related to 
securities disputes. 
377. From a structural perspective, the test case model is a three-tier procedure. 
To begin with, either the claimant or the defendant brings a petition 
(Musterverfahrensantrag) to the first instance court (§2 (1) KapMuG), seeking the start 
of the test case proceedings. At the national level, the court that has jurisdiction is the one 
where the company has its registered office (Article 32b of the German Civil Code of 
Procedure (hereafter, GCCP)). The applicant must convince the court that the case at issue 
generates questions of law or fact that are common to other claims (§2 (3) KapMuG). If 
this is so, the court publishes the petition for a test case procedure into a specific electronic 
register, namely the Klageregister, which is available on the website of the German 
Official Journal (Bundesanzeiger).806 Six months after the publication date, at least nine 
other claimants (Beigeladenen) must present their claim for test proceedings to start (§6 
(1) KapMuG). These claims should not necessarily be presented in the same lower 
                                                
805 For an overview of the Deutsche Telekom case, see A Halfmeier, “Litigation Without an End? The 
Deutsche Telekom Case and the German Approach to Private Enforcement of Securities Law” in D Hensler 
et al. (eds), Class Actions in Context – How Culture, Economics and Politics Shape Collective Litigation 
(Edward Elgar, 2016), 279-298; A Stadler, “A Test Case in Germany: 16 000 Private Investors vs. Deutsche 
Telekom” (2009) 10 (1) ERA Forum 37-50; AW Tilp and TA Roth, “The German Capital Market Model 
Proceedings Act as Illustrated by the Example of the Frankfurt Deutsche Telekom Claims” in WH van 
Boom and G Wagner (eds), Mass Torts in Europe: Cases and Reflections (Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2014), 
131-142.  
806 
https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ebanzwww/wexsservlet?&global_data.designmode=eb&genericsearch_p
aram.fulltext=Klageregister%20&genericsearch_param.part_id=5&%28page.navid%3Dto_quicksearchlis
t%29=Suchen. 
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court.807 Notably, the inscription in the register interrupts the prescription period. We 
infer from these elements that the first phase of the model is based on the opt-in system.  
Supposing that the required quorum is reached after 6 months, the lower court 
refers the case to the Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht). To be more precise, 
the court which published the first petition for the initiation of a test case procedure has 
jurisdiction to make the order for reference (Vorlagebeschluss), pursuant to §6 (1) and 
(2) KapMuG. Once the order for reference is made public, all pending claims depending 
on the resolution of the common issues presented to the Oberlandesgericht will be stayed 
and automatically included in the test case proceedings (§8 KapMuG). This phase of the 
model is based on the system of automatic membership. Indeed, the efficient 
administration of justice commands the curtailment of the parties’ individual rights.  
378. In the second phase of the test case proceedings, the Higher Regional Court 
must rule on the common questions of the dispute. In order to achieve this objective, said 
Court selects one leading claimant (Musterkläger), whose case will serve as a model to 
solve the remaining claims (§9 KapMuG). This information is published in the register. 
The rest of claimants are not parties to the test case proceedings. However, they are 
allowed to intervene, as long as their participation is not inconsistent with the lead 
claimant’s action (§14 KapMuG). Their right to extend the object of the test case 
proceedings is equally noteworthy (§15 KapMuG). Within six months after the 
publication, other similarly-situated claimants may declare themselves to the Higher 
Regional Court. These claimants do not become parties to the test model proceedings 
either. However, after the model case decision is issued, registered claimants will be able 
to start proceedings and benefit from the test case decision. 
379. Finally, the test case procedure may end up either with a decision of the 
Higher Regional Court or with a settlement. In the first case, the Oberlandesgericht sends 
its decision back to lower courts that will continue the proceedings on an individual basis. 
Among other things, these courts will rule on issues regarding causation and the potential 
amount of damages to be allocated to the claimant in case of successful trial. The test case 
decision issued by the Higher Court binds all claimants whose proceedings were stayed 
according to § 8 (1) KapMuG. Any claimant or defendant can file an appeal against this 
                                                
807 As we explain below (infra, 3.a.), thanks to § 32b GCCP, domestic disputes should be centralised at the 
registered office of the issuer. However, in international cases, the application of the BRIbis may lead 
claimants to file their actions in different locations.  
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decision (§20 KapMuG). In the second case, the lead claimant and the defendant can 
submit a written agreement to the Court in order to put an end to the dispute (§17 
KapMuG). The Court can also make proposals in view of a settlement. In any case, the 
authorisation of said Court is required for the agreement to be binding (§18 KapMuG). It 
has to be highlighted that no appeal is available against this authorisation. However, 
claimants are offered the opportunity to manifest their intention not to be bound by the 
settlement within a month since its notification to them (§19 KapMuG). This settlement 
remains valid, unless more than 30% of victims withdraw from it (§17 (1) KapMuG). In 
other words, the settlement phase of the KapMuG is based on an opt-out system. 
380. Although the German test case model offers investors a chance to bundle 
their claims and thus, achieve economies of scale, this system remains criticisable.808 In 
this paragraph, we mention a few critiques that have been raised against the KapMuG: to 
start with, the test case model does not really depart from the two-party paradigm. This 
means that each claimant still enjoys an individual treatment to a certain extent. For 
instance, this explains why claimants conserve the right to intervene or to appeal, as well 
as filing a motion to extend the scope of the test case proceedings. However, the 
individualisation of claims refrains the collectivisation process and thus, may create 
delays and inefficiencies.  
Additionally, the coming and going of the test case file between the first and the 
second instance courts significantly slows down proceedings. For example, the resolution 
of the Deutsche Telekom case lasted more than a decade until the German Supreme Court 
issued its final say.809 Of course, it will take some more time until individual proceedings 
are definitely closed.  
Last but not least, because the costs incurred by the test case procedure become 
part of the first instance proceedings, only claimants are liable for them. In other words, 
                                                
808 Among others, see E Feess and A Halfmeier, “The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG) 
– A European Role Model for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Market? Analysis and Suggestions for 
Reform”, 26-27, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/; C Geiger, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im Zivilprozess - 
Die Gruppenklage zur Durchsetzung von Massenschäden und ihre Auswirkungen (Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 
66-70; B Haar, “Investors Protection Through Model Case Procedures – Implementing Collective Goals 
and Individual Rights Under the 2012 Amendment to the German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(KapMuG)” (2014) 15 European Business Organization Law Review 96-103; B Heil and B Lee, “The Role 
of Private Litigation” Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Paper 7, 9-16, 
available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/fisch_2016/7; HW Micklitz and A Stadler, “The 
Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure” (2006) 17 (5) 
European Business Law Review 1487-1488; HW Micklitz, supra n 289, 16. 
809 Bundesgerichtshof (Supreme Court), case XI ZB 12/12 rendered on 21 October 2014. 
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this means that registered claimants do not bear any cost. This might create a free-riding 
effect, given that victims could simply register their claim –instead of initiating 
proceedings– and use the decision of the Higher Regional Court at no cost. 
2. Recent International Cases Following the KapMuG Procedure 
381. As we announced earlier, two significant and international cases are now 
described. The statement of facts serves as a basis to the subsequent analysis of private 
international law questions regarding jurisdiction. 
a. The MPC-Fonds Scandal 
382. Since 2002, MPC Münchmeyer & Petersen Capital AG (hereafter, MPC) 
offered Austrian citizens, the opportunity to participate in various investment funds (here, 
MPC-Fonds), whose purpose was to pool financial resources and acquire real estate, ships 
and life insurances. Those funds, which are structured as closed-end funds, issue a certain 
number of shares on the market through an initial public offering (IPO).810 On this 
occasion, a prospectus is distributed among interested investors. After the targeted 
amount is reached, the fund closes. Practically, this means that “latecomers” cannot invest 
in the fund anymore.  
In the MPC-Fonds case, MPC published a prospectus that was intended to 
Austrian consumers, offering them the opportunity to invest in closed-end funds –like 
Holland 47.811 Those funds mainly aimed at financing Dutch real estate. It has to be 
highlighted that the offer was promoted by intermediary banks and financial consultants. 
The MPC-Fonds were structured on the basis of limited liability partnerships, as it is usual 
in Germany.812 Consequently, because investors became limited partners of those funds, 
they coped with far more risks than investors who trade usual securities.813 Yet, the 
                                                
810 H Domash, Mutual Fund and Closed-End Fund Investing: What You Need to Know (FT Press, 2011), 
Chapter IV (only available online at http://proquest.safaribooksonline.com/9780132782036). A more 
precise definition is available on the CFE Connect website, available at http://www.cefconnect.com/closed-
end-funds-definition. 
811 For an overview of all the funds involved in the scandal, see 
https://verbraucherrecht.at/cms/index.php?id=2220. 
812 A Holher, “Open-End and Closed-End Funds and Real Estate Investment Trusts” in M Mütze et al. 
(eds), Real Estate Investments in Germany – Transactions and Development (Springer 2007), 280. 
813 http://www.konsument.at/geld-recht/mpc-skandal-2500-teilnehmer-170-mio-schaden?pn=9. A notable 
issue is that banks, which helped financing the acquisition of Dutch real estate, may sell the properties in 
order to reimburse their investment. Additionally, they can ask investors to repay the distribution of money 
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corporate and investment structure of the MPC-Fonds is not clearly described by the 
sources we gathered. Suffice it to say that investors in closed-end funds usually invest 
either directly in the fund or indirectly through a trustee. A mixed structure is also 
possible.814 In the case at issue, it seems that Austrian investors were at least offered the 
choice to invest via TVP-Treuhandgesellschaft, a trustee located in Germany.815 
383. Following improper management activities, Austrian citizens lost a great part 
of their investment. As a result, thirteen investors started proceedings in Germany under 
the KapMuG, with the VKI’s support. In substance, they alleged that the prospectuses 
regarding investments in the closed-end funds were misleading. Therefore, they sought 
compensation for their loss against MPC, its Austrian daughter company (CPM Anlagen 
Vertriebs GmbH) and TVP-Treuhandgesellschaft. In 2016, the Landgericht Hamburg 
issued a decision for the start of test case proceedings to the Second Instance Court, 
regarding the MPC-Fonds scandal. 
b. The Volkswagen Case 
384. Volkswagen is an automobile manufacturer, whose seat is located in 
Wolfsburg (Germany).816 Throughout the year 2007, the German firm started the 
construction of new Diesel engines. Said engines were implemented in about eleven 
million vehicles around the globe. In May 2014, a study held by the International Council 
on Clean Transportation (ICCT) on the one hand, and the Center for Alternative Fuels 
Engines and Emissions of West Virginia University on the other, revealed that the above-
mentioned Diesel engines overreached the permitted gas emissions level –in particular, 
nitrogen oxides– during on-road tests. Indeed, Volkswagen implemented a “defeat 
device”, namely a software, whose purpose was to reduce gas emission during laboratory 
                                                
they received in the past, out of the benefits of the funds. For more information on this question, see 
https://verbraucherrecht.at/cms/index.php?id=2255. 
814 C Just, “Legal Framework for Real Estate Asset Classes” in T Just and W Maennig (eds), Understanding 
German Real Estate Markets (Springer, 2nd edn, 2016), 129. 
815 https://verbraucherrecht.at/cms/index.php?id=2254. 
816 Along with the judgment of the Landgericht Braunschweig (regional court), case 5 OH 62/16 rendered 
on 5 August 2016, the following sources have been used in order to build up the statement of facts: G Gates 
et al., “How Volkswagen Is Grappling With Its Diesel Scandal” (18.11.2016) New York Times, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-
explained.html; JC Yung and SB ʻAlisonʼ Park, “Volkswagen's Diesel Emissions Scandal” (25.10.2016) 
Thunderbird International Business Review, available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tie.21876/full. 
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tests. In particular, said software has the ability to recognise when a vehicle is being tested 
and consequently starts disguising emissions levels.  
In this context, discussions started between Volkswagen and the US 
administration, namely the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California 
Air Resources Board (CARB). In December 2014, the manufacturer proceeded to a 
product recall, but was not able to solve the car emissions problem. As a result, in 
September 2015, Volkswagen acknowledged that it had manipulated the software 
regulating car emissions in order to comply with regulatory standards. An article 
published by the New York times in September 2016 estimates that the German First 
Instance Court of Braunschweig, which is located at Volkswagen’s seat, received 
approximately 1.400 claims from deceived shareholders, representing a total and 
cataclysmic amount of 8.2 billion Euros. Both domestic and foreign, as well as private 
and institutional investors were suing.  
Some administrative bodies in Germany equally brought a lawsuit against the 
manufacturer. Basically, they argue that Volkswagen should have disclosed the 
information regarding nitrogen emissions. By not doing so, Volkswagen is charged with 
inside trading. 
3. Questions Regarding Jurisdiction 
385. Both in the MPC-Fonds and the Volkswagen cases, German courts acquired 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 4 BRIbis (infra; a.). As we already announced in the 
introduction to the section, parallel proceedings popped up in other States regarding the 
same disputes (infra; b.). 
a. Article 4 BRIbis 
386. In the Volkswagen case, investors started proceedings in the Landgericht of 
Braunschweig (First Instance Court), which corresponds to the location where the 
defendant has its headquarters, pursuant to Article 4 BRIbis. This information can be 
deduced from the statement of facts established by the First Instance Court, as well as 
press releases mentioned above. However, this question has not been explicitly tackled 
by said Court. In the MPC-Fonds case, the First Instance Court of Hamburg clearly set 
forth its reasoning regarding jurisdiction. Thanks to the similarities that the international 
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disputes analysed above share, the remarks we formulate here regarding the MPC-Fonds 
case are applicable mutatis mutandis to the Volkswagen scandal.  
387. In MPC-Fonds, the Court of Hamburg considered that it had jurisdiction over 
the German trader and the trustee pursuant to Articles 4 and 63(1)(a) BRIbis.817 
Additionally, the Court established that it equally had jurisdiction over claims directed to 
the Austrian daughter company, thanks to Article 8(1) BRIbis. Local jurisdiction is 
determined by § 32b GCCP. According to such provision, “For complaints in which: 1. 
The compensation of damages caused by false or misleading public capital market 
disclosures, or caused by the failure to make such disclosure, or 2. The compensation of 
damages caused by the use of false or misleading public capital market disclosures, or 
caused by the failure to inform the public that such public capital market disclosures are 
false or misleading, (…) is being asserted, that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction that 
is located at the registered seat of the issuer concerned, (…) where said registered seat is 
situate[d] within Germany”.818  
388. Thanks to § 32b GCCP, disputes litigated under the KapMuG should 
normally be centralised in the court where the issuer has its registered seat.819 At least, 
this is the case for purely domestic disputes. As far as international disputes are 
concerned, § 32b GCCP applies insofar as private international rules on jurisdiction –
such as Article 4 BRIbis– do not designate the court that possesses local jurisdiction. 
Where claimants rely on Article 7(2) and Section 4 BRIbis in order to litigate in Germany, 
national provisions regarding jurisdiction are discarded.820  
389. The forum contained in Article 4 BRIbis is certainly advantageous for a 
number of reasons. First of all, the notification of the judicial action to the defendant is 
facilitated, inasmuch as it does not trigger the application of international texts or 
European Regulations.821 As long as the procedure is based on an opt-in system, 
                                                
817 Landgericht Hamburg (regional court), case 327 O 279/15 rendered on 2 February 2016, 4-5. 
818 An English version of this provision is available on the website of the Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection (https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html). 
819 B Hess, “Der Regierungsentwurf für ein Kapitalanlegermusterverfahrensgesetz – eine kritische 
Bestandsaufnahme” (2004) 48 Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht – Wertpapiermitteilungen Teil IV 
2331; Micklitz and Stadler, supra n 808, 1486. 
820 Geiger, supra n 808, 62; C Heinrich, “§ 32b” in HJ Musielak (ed), Kommentar zur Zivilprozessordnung 
(Verlag Franz Vahlen, 7th edn, 2009), 172. 
821 For an overview of the notification process in cross-border collective redress proceedings see Carballo, 
supra n 4, 141-185. 
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notification of the Oberlandesgericht decision to potential foreign claimants should not 
pose particular problems, as they are clearly identified. The publication of important 
information into the Klageregister further smooths the communication between all parties 
concerned by the test case proceedings. Second of all, although the Injunctions Directive 
should usually not apply to claims in test case proceedings,822 the initiation of proceedings 
by foreign claimants in Germany do not generate issues regarding recognition and 
standing to sue. This can be explained by the fact that the KapMuG is not built up on a 
representative model. Moreover, no consumer association may start test case proceedings 
if it does not have any proper claim. Third of all, no process of recognition and execution 
should be triggered, as the assets of the defendant are usually located at his/her domicile. 
Finally, as specifically concerns the MPC-Fonds case, Austrian investors did not have to 
face any language issue. As a result, the remaining obstacles to the start of proceedings 
in Germany could be the lack of financing or the potential structural inefficiencies of the 
KapMuG like delays and costs. 
b. Other Grounds of Jurisdiction 
390. Theoretically, test case proceedings could certainly start in Germany by 
relying on a provision other than Article 4 BRIbis. As far as we know, however, this is 
not usual. In practice, this means that in most test case proceedings, claimants domiciled 
abroad usually have to move to the defendant’s domicile in order to litigate under the 
German test case model. The MPC-Fonds and the Volkswagen cases illustrate this point. 
However, in both cases, parallel claims popped up, along with KapMuG proceedings. 
This fragmentation of litigation may indicate the presence of a loophole in the collective 
private enforcement system of Member States. In particular, parallel litigation may be the 
result of the limited efficiency of collective redress model in Europe. Besides, this could 
also be a reflection of the complexity and cost of litigating abroad. Finally, the 
fragmentation of proceedings may simply be the result of diverse litigation strategies. As 
many victims are usually involved in large-scale disputes, the emergence of multiple 
proceedings in different locations should not be surprising.  
Taking into account these considerations, we dedicate the next lines to parallel 
proceedings which have popped up both in the MPC-Fonds (infra; i.) and the Volkswagen 
                                                
822 Indeed, the Directive only covers actions for injuctive relief brought by certified bodies –and not 
individuals–, whose name is published in the Official Journal of the EU. 
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(infra; ii.) cases. This leads us to introduce some considerations regarding lis pendens and 
related actions between multiple collective redress cases (infra; iii.). 
i. MPC-Fonds Case 
391. Along with the German test case procedure, additional collective redress 
proceedings took place in Austria.823 
392. In 2014, the VKI brought three collective actions (Sammelklage) in the 
Commercial Court of Vienna against the Austrian branch of MPC (CPM Anlagen 
Vertriebs GmbH) and an Austrian bank (Hypo Steiermark) who acted as an intermediary. 
In these collective suits, the VKI represented thirty-three investors who claimed 
compensation –up to 2.5 million Euros– for the damage caused by wrong investment 
advice.824 These suits are financed by FORIS AG, located in Germany.825 Until now, 
judgments have condemned the defendants but without giving explanations as regards 
their jurisdictional power.826 
393. In parallel, the VKI started proceedings in Vienna against TVP-
Treuhandgesellschaft, whose seat is situated in Hamburg. The consumer association 
argues that the trustee used unfair Terms and Conditions in the contracts which governed 
his relationship with Austrian investors (Treuhandvertrag).827 As a result, the VKI asks 
the Viennese Court to declare the prohibition to use unlawful contractual clauses, 
pursuant to § 28 of the Austrian Consumer Law (Konsumentenschutz Gesetz, KSchG), as 
well as the publication of the judgment. The VKI has standing to bring an action for 
injunctive relief according to § 29 of said law. The Commercial Court of Vienna based 
its jurisdiction on Article 7(2) BRIbis.828 As we already explained, this technique has 
                                                
823 This sub-section does not comment on the various criminal proceedings which started against MPC, its 
Austrian daughter company, as well as TVP.  
824 “ʻGeschlossene MPC-Fondsʼ – VKI bringt 3. Sammelklage ein” (31.05.2016), available at 
http://www.konsument.at/presse/geschlossene-mpc-fonds-vki-bringt-3-sammelklage-ein-31-05-2016. 
825 “Sammelklagen des VKI gegen den AWD Österreich werden fortgesetzt”, available at 
https://www.foris.com/presse/detail/sammelklagen-des-vki-gegen-den-awd-oesterreich-werden-
fortgesetzt.html. 
826 Handelsgericht Wien (commercial court), case 16 Cg 45/14p rendered on 22 December 2016; Oberster 
Gerichtshof (Supreme Court), case 3 Ob 190/16m rendered on 26 January 2017. 
827 Claim filed by the VKI against TVP in the Handelsgericht Wien (commercial court), 3-9, available at 
https://verbraucherrecht.at/downloads/Verbandsklage_VKI_gegen_TVP_Treuhandgesellschaft.pdf. 
828 Handelsgericht Wien (commercial court), case 53 CG 43/13 i -10 rendered on 08 May 2014. 
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been validated by the ECJ in the Henkel case.829 This Court has material jurisdiction over 
the dispute pursuant to § 51(2)(10) of the law on jurisdiction (Juridiktionsnorm).830 
394. To sum up, all the parallel proceedings we mentioned above took place in 
Austria. One may wonder whether Section 4 or Article 7(2) BRIbis would have been 
available in the MPC-Fonds case in order to centralise all claims in Austria. On the one 
hand, although scarce information exists on the type of investors who sustained damages 
in the MPC scandal, it seems that most of them could probably qualify as consumers 
pursuant to the Brussels regime. This might be inferred from the information released by 
the VKI on its website.831 However, it is not clear whether Austrian investors actually 
concluded a contract with MPC. In light of this, the use of Section 4 BRIbis should not 
be excluded for individual consumer claims. In any case, it would be relatively difficult 
to gather all claims in a single jurisdiction, through the intervention of the VKI. In such 
a context, the Chief of the VKI’s legal department, Dr. Peter Kolba, explained that the 
start of proceedings in Germany was necessary, as a cross-border collective redress suit 
through the assignment of claims to the VKI was not possible in Austria. Moreover, he 
stated that because of the assignment of claims to the VKI, the protective forum contained 
in Section 4 BRIbis would probably not apply.832   
On the other hand, Article 7(2) BRIbis could open a forum at the domicile of the 
victims, as the ECJ ruled in Kolassa.833 On this occasion, the Court of Justice clarified 
the application of Article 7(2) BRIbis in a prospectus liability case. Accordingly, the 
victim can litigate at his/her domicile, as long as this location concurs with the place 
where the event giving rise to the damage or the place where the damage occurred.834 
Again, this forum could be useful for individual claimants. However, the centralisation 
                                                
829 See supra, II.A.3. 
830 Claim filed by the VKI against TVP in the commercial court, supra n 827, 2. The law on jurisdiction is 
accessible online at https://www.jusline.at/51_JN.html. 
831 To be more specific, the consumer association mentions the presence of small investors 
(http://www.konsument.at/cs/Satellite?pagename=Konsument/MagazinArtikel/Detail&cid=31888728369
4). 
832 “Diese Vorgangsweise war notwendig, weil eine grenzüberschreitende Sammelklage durch Abtretung 
von Ansprüchen an den VKI nicht möglich ist. Laut Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes und 
des Obersten Gerichtshofes in Österreich, verliert man durch Abtretung von Ansprüchen an einen Verband 
den Verbrauchergerichtsstand in Österreich” (“Geschlossene Fonds – deutsches Gericht lässt Klage zu” 
[08.02.2016], available at http://www.konsument.at/presse/geschlossene-fonds-deutsches-gericht-laesst-
klage-zu-08-02-2016). 
833 Kolassa, supra n 786. 
834 Ibid, paras 49-50. 
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of proceedings would be difficult because the place where the damage occur will rarely 
be the same for all investors.  
ii. The Volkswagen Case 
395. The global consequences generated by the Volkswagen scandal gave rise to 
numerous judicial, as well as non-judicial actions supported by consumer associations 
around the world.835 Essentially, two significant initiatives should be underlined.  
396. In Europe, the Netherlands seems to be prepared for the start of a WCAM 
procedure involving all non-US investors who suffered loss as a result of their investment 
in Volkswagen securities. To be more precise, the Volkswagen Investor Settlement 
Foundation836 seeks compensation on behalf of European investors who acquired shares, 
and public or private debt, from 23 April 2008 until 4 January 2016. These investors are 
encouraged to join the Foundation for free in order to foster the Foundation’s 
representative character under Dutch law. The provisions concerning the formation of the 
Foundation reveals that it intends to conclude a global settlement with Volkswagen under 
the Dutch WCAM procedure.837 Apparently, the setup of the Foundation has been 
financed by an American law firm.838  
397. On the other side of the Atlantic, Volkswagen recently concluded a 14.7 
billion dollars agreement to compensate US car owners for their loss. Here, we insist on 
the fact that not investors but owners of cars modified with the defeat device are 
encompassed in the class. The settlement is the result of a consolidated consumer class 
action.839 To be more precise, all claims pending in the US were transferred to the 
Northern District of California and consolidated for the resolution of pre-trial questions, 
                                                
835 For an overview of the initiatives undertaken by consumer associations in Europe, see the summary 
prepared by BEUC on its website: http://www.beuc.eu/volkswagen-emission-affairs#membersactions. 
836 For more information regarding this Foundation, see http://volkswageninvestorsettlement.com/. It has 
to be underlined that other types of Foundations popped up in the Netherlands. We found at least two others, 
which represent different categories of victims: the Stichting Volkswagen Investors Claim 
(https://www.stichtingvolkswageninvestorsclaim.com/en/about) and the Stichting Volkswagen Car Claim 
(https://www.stichtingvolkswagencarclaim.com/en). 
837 See Article 3(1)(b) of said document, available at http://volkswageninvestorsettlement.com/. 
838 G Moss, “Foundation set up to pursue investor claims against VW in Dutch court” (19.02.2016) 
Investment & Pensions in Europe, available at https://www.ipe.com/news/esg/foundation-set-up-to-
pursue-investor-claims-against-vw-in-dutch-court/10011995.fullarticle. 
839 Consolidated Complaint, available on the website of the Northern District Court of California 
(http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl). 
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following the decision of a panel on multi-district litigation.840 Supporting the jurisdiction 
of the Californian Courts is the fact that “California is the State with the most affected 
vehicles and dealers, where significant testing of affected vehicles occurred, and the home 
of the California Air Resources Board, which played an important initial role in 
investigating and, ultimately, revealing VW’s use of the defeat devices”.841 In any case, 
said Courts have jurisdiction pursuant to the CAFA.842 It remains to be seen whether this 
astronomic settlement will serve as roadmap for European collective redress initiatives or 
not. 
iii. Overlap of Proceedings, Lis Pendens and Related Actions 
398. The emergence of multiple proceedings in different States gives rise to 
potential “overlaps” between the different actions. This represents a fertile ground for 
waste of judicial resources, inconsistent judgments, as well as overcompensation. In this 
context, it has to be examined whether rules on lis pendens or related actions could and 
should coordinate these actions. This question is examined here in a European context, 
since there is no evidence that US proceedings overlapped with European collective 
redress actions in the case examined above.  
399. In principle, European private international law rules on lis pendens rarely 
constitute any obstacle to the rise of parallel collective redress proceedings. Specifically, 
Article 29 BRIbis obliges the second seised court of a Member State to stay proceedings 
in case an action involving the same cause, as well as the same parties is already pending 
in another court located in the EU. It is said that parties must be identical or at least share 
an indissociable interest.843 Besides, two parallel actions must have the same object and 
the same cause.844  
Usually, parallel collective redress proceedings will not involve the same parties, 
at least when they are represented by different entities.845 This can be explained by the 
                                                
840 Transfer Order from Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, available on the website of the Northern 
District Court of California (http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/crb/vwmdl). 
841 Ibid,  2. 
842 Consolidated Complaint, supra n 839, 5-6. For more information on the conditions imposed by the 
CAFA, see infra, Chapter I, II.B.3. 
843 Case C-351/96 Drouot assurances SA v Consolidated metallurgical industries (CMI industrial sites) 
[1998] ECR I-03075, para 23. 
844 Tatry, supra n 520, paras 38, 40. 
845 JN Stefanelli, “Parallel Litigation and Cross-Border Collective Actions” in Fairgrieve and Lein, supra 
n 94, 150; Tang, supra n 648, 125-127.  
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fact that original claimants are often not considered as parties to the proceedings. Rather, 
representative consumer associations or public bodies bring the collective suit and are 
considered the actual parties. In the Volkswagen case, for example, a risk of overlap 
actually exists since both the investors involved in the KapMuG procedure and the Dutch 
WCAM can be the same. However, we believe that Article 29 BRIbis cannot apply for 
two reasons: first of all, while investors bring their individual claims under the KapMuG, 
they must be represented by an association under the Dutch collective settlement 
mechanism. Therefore, the condition regarding the similarity of parties is not fulfilled. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that the procedure under the WCAM qualifies as “proceedings” 
in the sense of Article 29 BRIbis. For the record, such a procedure does not involve any 
judicial action, but the mere declaration by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal of the binding 
effect of an out-of-court settlement. Therefore, one might wonder whether Article 29 
BRIbis encompasses such a constellation. If not, then one should conclude that the 
distinct structure of collective redress instruments could defeat the application of Article 
29 BRIbis.  
400. As regards Article 30 BRIbis, it enables the court of a Member State to stay 
proceedings where a related action is pending in another court of the EU. In other words, 
the second seised court is given the possibility to stay proceedings but is not obliged to 
do so. The concept of “related actions” implies that these “are so closely related that it is 
expedient to hear them together” (Article 30(3) BRIbis). Moreover, Article 30(2) BRIbis 
offers a possibility to consolidate distinct actions. According to Stefanelli, collective 
actions typically represent related actions. However, she mentions that the discretionary 
nature of Article 30 BRIbis would often give rise to the duplication of claims.846 In MPC-
Fonds for example, Article 30 BRIbis might have been used by Austrian Commercial 
Court in Vienna in order to stay collective proceedings against CPM Anlagen Vertriebs 
GmbH, and wait for the German court’s decision on the defendant’s liability. Taking into 
account the notable delays characterising the German test case procedure, it is unlikely 
that the Austrian Court would do so. Moreover, the claim of the VKI may contain 
different arguments and theories regarding the liability of the Austrian daughter company, 
which could perfectly be solved independently from the German sister-proceedings. 
                                                
846 Stefanelli, supra n 845, 150-151. 
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401. To sum up, the lis pendens and related actions regime of the BRIbis is 
unlikely to apply to collective redress. Therefore, distinct collective proceedings could 
overlap. However, because collective suits often involve large-scale and dispersed 
damages, as well as multiple defendants and numerous victims, one may wonder whether 
rules on lis pendens and related actions should actually apply.847 In other words, the high 
degree of heterogeneity regarding the types of claims, the actors involved, and the 
structure of the procedural tools used could make the application of the Brussels lis 
pendens and related actions regime complicated and hence, inefficient. These 
considerations will be taken into account in the construction of our proposal in Chapter 
IV (infra; II.4.). 
4. Interim Conclusion 
402. The KapMuG is a collective redress system through which securities disputes 
may be litigated. It is therefore substantially limited and its structure is still tightly linked 
to the two-party procedural paradigm. Ultimately, two significant international disputes, 
namely the MPC-Fonds and the Volkswagen cases, have been tried in Germany under the 
test case model. Both times, the German courts relied on Article 4 BRIbis in order to 
establish jurisdiction at the defendant’s domicile. This particular forum enjoys notable 
advantages. For some reason, however, parallel collective suits emerged in both cases. 
This may be due to the limited efficiency of collective redress instruments in Europe, or 
be part of a procedural strategy. In any case, the materialisation of multiple proceedings 
within the Union could create undesirable overlaps. The above paragraphs demonstrate 
that the Brussels lis pendens and related actions regime has difficulties to tackle collective 
redress.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
847 On the desirability to apply lis pendens to collective redress claims, see also B Hess, “Cross-Border 
Collective Litigation and the Regulation Brussels I” (2010) 2 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und 
Verfahrensrechts 119-120. 
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III. Conclusion 
403. Ideally, cross-border collective redress proceedings sould take place in a 
single forum of the European Union. Additionally, it should achieve high levels of 
efficiency, include all victims, generate economies of scale for all parties involved, and 
preserve judicial resources. Nevertheless, this collective-redress-wonderland remains a 
daydream for the time being. In fact, many different factors disturb the achievement of 
this ultimate situation: some of them are of a procedural nature and have already been 
highlighted in Chapter II (supra, II.B.1.). Others stem from the relative unsuitability of 
collective redress models to European private international rules on jurisdiction and have 
been developed in the current Chapter.  
404. In particular, our research project shows that the dominant collective redress 
models struggle to permit the bundling of claims in a single forum. For example, the 
representative model appears to work quite well only when a general interest is at stake. 
In this situation, Article 7(2) BRIbis often offers a forum in the Member State where the 
representative body is located. Typically, this is the case when a foreign traders use unfair 
Terms and Conditions with national consumers. However, when claims for damages are 
at stake, representative bodies may be charged with lack of standing in foreign courts. 
The opening of collective proceedings “at home” against a foreign defendant appears to 
be equally difficult, given that the location designated by private international law rules 
on jurisdiction is often not the same for all victims.  
As for the Dutch model, its success is built up on an extensive interpretation of 
private international rules on jurisdiction. But it is not sure that the ECJ would back up 
this solution in the name of access to justice and efficient administration of justice.  
Furthermore, the class action model can probably not benefit from the protective 
forum of Section 4 BRIbis. Insofar as consumers are domiciled in different locations in 
the Union or dispersed within a single Member State, they should not be able to bundle 
their claims in the representative claimant’s domicile.  
Finally, the test case model usually relies on the application of Article 4 BRIbis. 
Other private international law rules on jurisdiction seem to have been irrelevant as far as 
this model is concerned. 
405. Currently, only Article 4 BRIbis, as well as 7(2) BRIbis to a certain extent, 
seem to offer an interesting location to bundle individual claims or defend a general 
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interest. However, because this result stems from the application of an unsuited regime, 
it does not mean that these fora are appropriate. This leads us to our next Chapter, which 
examines whether the private international law landscape should be modified in order to 
better apprehend cross-border collective redress.  
  250 
CHAPTER IV 
PROPOSAL FOR AN APPROPRIATE FORUM REGARDING COLLECTIVE 
REDRESS ACTIONS 
 
406. The need for collective redress actions within the EU represents a challenge 
for European private international law, which is hard to tackle. In particular, Chapter III 
put the spotlight on the numerous mismatches between the Brussels Regulation on the 
one hand, and collective redress mechanisms on the other. So much so that the domicile 
of the defendant seems to be the only available forum where both collective redress 
actions for injunctive relief and damages may be brought. Additionally, Article 7(2) 
BRIbis might be of use when a general interest is at stake. Although these provisions are 
theoretically available, it does not mean that they offer an appropriate forum for collective 
redress actions (infra; I.A. and B.). In such a context, scholars, national legislators, private 
organisations, and the European institutions have presented some solutions in order to 
“fix” the current landscape. We provide a roadmap of their proposals for reform in the 
first part of this Chapter (infra; I.C.).  
407. As we explain below, however, the provisions of the BRIbis do not provide 
accessible fora for collective redress actions. Additionally, the proposals presented only 
offer partial solutions to private international law issues regarding jurisdiction. In this 
context, we consider that a legislative reform is necessary in order to unquestionably 
welcome collective redress actions in Europe. Any change of the law will surely clarify 
the current confusion surrounding collective redress and bring legal certainty. In light of 
this, we dedicate the second sub-section of this Chapter to the elaboration of a new 
jurisdictional ground tailored to collective redress (infra; II.). Eventually, we conclude 
(infra; III.). 
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I. Appropriateness of the Current Provisions and Proposals for Reform 
408. Chapter III underlined the relative unsuitability of collective redress in the 
current European private international law landscape. We also mentioned the failed 
attempt of the Brussels regime to regulate collective redress at the time the recast was 
discussed (supra; § 228) . As a result, only Article 4, as well as Article 7(2) BRIbis, to a 
certain extent, provide fora where litigation of collective redress actions can take place. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that these provisions offer appropriate fora. In order to 
evaluate their appropriateness, fundamental principles of the private international law 
field should be respected. Similarly, an appropriate forum for collective redress should 
be coherent with the policy objectives pursued by the EU (infra; A.1. and 2.). Our analysis 
shows that both Articles 4 and 7(2) BRIbis are not perfectly fit for collective redress 
(infra; B.2. and 3.). In this context, various proposals have been presented in order to 
solve this situation and facilitate cross-border collective redress within the EU. Some 
initiatives have popped up among scholars (infra; C.1.) and a Report has been drafted by 
the International Law Association on this particular topic (infra; C.2.). Furthermore, a 
few Member States have enacted specific rules on jurisdiction for collective redress 
(infra; C.3.). Finally, some solutions have been developed at the European level (infra; 
C.4.). 
A. Looking for an Appropriate Forum 
409. In order to establish whether a given forum is appropriate or not, some 
parameters that guide our reasoning should be established first. Today, however, no 
manual or guidelines explain how to measure the appropriateness of a jurisdictional 
ground. In this research project, the term “appropriateness” measures whether a given 
forum is fair and accessible for parties, as well as respectful of private international law 
principles.  
In light of the above, what characteristic(s) should a suitable forum for collective 
redress possess? In a course given at The Hague Academy of Private International Law 
and published in 2002, Professor Arthur von Mehren successfully theorised the 
fundamental elements that should be considered in order to create a jurisdictional 
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ground.848 Although those principles essentially refer to the drafting of new jurisdictional 
rules, we believe that they are equally useful for evaluating the appropriateness of existing 
fora. Additionally, any jurisdictional ground for collective redress –be it specific or not– 
should be consistent with European policy objectives, such as consumer protection and 
market integration.  
Therefore, we first state the theory established by Professor von Mehren, putting 
the spotlight on the “procedural” elements that an appropriate forum should respect. We 
then detail the EU policy objectives regarding consumer law, which represent the 
substantive aspect that any proposal should take into account. 
1. The Theory of Arthur von Mehren 
410. According to Professor von Mehren, various basic policy principles guide 
the design of a jurisdictional ground: the ease of administration, as well as predictability 
on the one hand, and litigation fairness, whereby the particularities of a dispute are taken 
into account, on the other. Those principles are present within the Brussels regime. In 
particular, Recitals 13 and 15 of the BRIbis command that its fora should be highly 
predictable. Besides, the Regulation sets forth tailored jurisdictional rules regarding 
specific disputes. Most of them are based on the principle of proximity, which has been 
successfully theorised by Professor Paul Lagarde in a famous lecture at The Hague 
Academy of Private International Law in 1986. 849 He defines this principle as a 
connecting factor that links a legal relationship to the State with which said relationship 
entertains “the closest –or at least a close– connection”.850 The author underlines that this 
connecting factor is in principle not positively codified, as far as rules on jurisdiction are 
concerned, but rather guides the enactment of given jurisdictional grounds. It should be 
added that this principle is not absolute. Hence, it is sometimes in tension with other 
                                                
848 A von Mehren, “Theory and practice of adjudicatory authority in private international law: a comparative 
study of the doctrine, policies and practices of common- and civil-law systems: general course on private 
international law (1996)” in Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Tome 295 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002), esp. 68-94. 
849 P Lagarde, “Le principe de proximité dans le droit international privé contemporain ; cours général de 
droit international privé” in Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Tome 196 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986). 
850 Ibid, 25-26. “Ce principe exprime simplement l'idée du rattachement d'un rapport de droit à l'ordre 
juridique du pays avec lequel il présente les liens les plus étroits, du rattachement d'un litige aux tribunaux 
d'un Etat avec lequel il présente, sinon le lien le plus étroit, du moins un lien étroit, enfin d'une subordination 
de l'efficacité d'une décision à l'étroitesse des liens qui la rattachent à l'autorité qui l'a prise”. 
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factors that compete with it, like party autonomy.851 Kessedjian adds that the principle of 
proximity is further challenged by the splitting of connecting points among different 
States and the impossibility to link certain disputes with a territory. Typically, damages 
to the environment or conflicts stemming from contracts concluded on the Internet 
represent telling examples. Additionally, she explains that victims of human rights 
violations sometimes collectively defend their rights in an accessible but remote forum. 
Hence, this choice does not always comply with the principle of proximity. In her opinion, 
greater values require that said principle fades.852 
411. Additionally, Professor von Mehren states that the principles of 
proportionality, as well as the vindication of important policies are additional factors that 
one should take into consideration. The first factor aims at providing enough fora for the 
claimant to litigate, without generating forum shopping. The second one concerns the 
opportunity for a given legal order to open its judiciary system to disputes, which affect 
important national policies. Again, these factors influenced the construction of the 
Brussels regime. To be more precise, Recital 16 sets forth that the Regulation contains a 
multiplicity of jurisdictional grounds. The creation of additional fora, apart from the one 
of the defendant’s domicile, may be justified because a close connection with the dispute 
exists or because considerations of sound administration of justice command it. However, 
exceptions to the forum of the defendant’s domicile are interepreted narrowly and the 
uncontrolled multiplication of fora should be discouraged.853  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
851 Ibid, 61-65. 
852 C Kessedjian, “Le principe de proximité vingt ans après” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde – 
Le droit international privé : esprit et méthode (Dalloz, Paris 2005), 507-521. 
853 Somafer, supra n 511, para 7. 
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2. European Policy Objectives 
412. The appropriateness of a given forum is certainly influenced by the policy 
objectives established by the European Union. As a starting point, Article 81 TFEU 
mainly aims at improving the functioning of the internal market. European institutions 
may enact private international law norms and legislate on ADR in the name of such 
objective. In particular, consumer policy is not totally independent from the market 
integration logic, although one must acknowledge that today this specific policy 
possesses an autonomous existence.854 Early on, the EU underlined the importance of 
consumers as market players. As Chapter II explains, consumer activities represent more 
than half of the European GDP (supra; § 0). Consequently, their role is fundamental to 
the construction of the internal market.855 In order to push consumers to shop abroad, 
confidence in such market is key. In this context, the European Union undertook different 
measures in order to foster said confidence.  
In the 1990s, the European Union assumed the harmonisation of national 
consumer laws.856 It is believed that where legal standards are alike, consumers are sure 
to benefit from the same level of protection in any Member State. Therefore, this should 
motivate them to shop abroad. Despite harmonisation measures, European institutions 
still face a significant issue: the private enforcement deficit (supra; Chapter II, II.B.1.). 
The attribution and harmonisation of rights and obligations among the European territory 
is senseless if no procedural mechanism exists to make them real. Therefore, European 
institutions enacted a multiplicity of legislative acts aiming at fostering access to justice 
                                                
854 Before the enactment of the Treaty of Maastricht, the legislative acts of the European institutions 
regarding consumer protection had to be linked to the functioning of the internal market. This constitutional 
constraint was required by Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome, as well as Article 100a introduced by the 
Single European Act of 1986 –that softens the voting procedure. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Maastricht, the European Union acquired the competence to build up a consumer policy that is independent 
from the functioning of the internal market. For more explanations on the evolution of the EU consumer 
law policy, see Benöhr, supra n 370, Chapters 2 and 3; N Reich, “Economic Law, Consumer Interests and 
EU Integration” in HW Micklitz et al. (eds), Understanding EU Consumer Law (Intersentia, 2009), esp. 9-
16; S Weatherill, EU Consumer Law and Policy (Elgar European Law, 2005), 1-33. 
855 To take relatively recent examples, the link between consumer protection and the internal market has 
been highlighted in the Consumer Policy Strategy, supra n 326, 2 and the European Consumer Agenda, 
supra n 348, 1  –that replaced the Policy Strategy. In the first document, the Commission explains that 
consumers “are the lifeblood of the economy as their consumption represents 58% of EU GDP. Confident, 
informed and empowered consumers are the motor of economic change as their choices drive innovation 
and efficiency”. And to conclude: “The place of EU consumer policy will be at the heart of the next phase 
of the internal market”. In the second document, the Commission states that “[i]mproving consumer 
confidence in cross-border shopping online by taking appropriate policy action could provide a major boost 
to economic growth in Europe. Empowered and confident consumers can drive forward the European 
economy”. 
856 Weatherill, supra n 854, 61-83. 
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in consumer matters. For example, the EU enacted the Injunctions Directive, the Small 
Claims Procedure, and investigated the possibility to add collective redress to the toolbox 
(supra; Chapter II, II.A. and B.). Similarly, the use of Consumer ADR was fostered, and 
methods of ODR were promoted.857  
413. As regards the Brussels regime, its private international law norms followed 
the protective policy implemented by the EU in consumer matters.858 As a result, 
consumer protection increased along the different versions of the Convention and the 
Regulation. At first, the 1968 version of the Brussels Convention only protected 
consumers who concluded contracts for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms, or 
to contract loans expressly made to finance the sale of goods, by offering them a 
protective forum. In 1978, as national laws regarding consumer protection had developed, 
the revision of the Convention extended consumer protection to other types of contracts 
and situations. The objective was to align the Convention with national developments 
regarding consumer law. Then, the enactment of the first Brussels Regulation further 
increased consumer protection by extending the protective forum of Section 4 to passive 
consumers every time traders intended to “fish” them at the place of their domicile. 
Through this revision, the Regulation takes into account the rise of the Internet and the 
challenges that technologies trigger. Finally, the current version of the Brussels 
Regulation allows consumers to attract defendants located in third States in the forum of 
their domicile. Thanks to this, consumers located in the European Union may conclude 
contracts with any trader, disregarding its location, and benefit from the same protective 
private international law rules. Simultaneously, it discourages traders to relocate their 
business outside the EU, with the objective to escape those rules. As we see, the Brussels 
regime adapted its protection regime to the new challenges that consumers of the EU 
faced over time. 
414. Despite all these efforts, Chapter II highlights that an important private 
enforcement gap persists. This is even truer for the compensation of collective damages. 
In fact, harmonisation of substantive law, along with the enactment of procedural tools 
for individual consumers and the promotion of ADR insufficiently secure consumers’ 
                                                
857 In particular, the European Union enacted the Directive 2013/11/EU, supra n 319 and the Regulation 
(EU) No 524/2013 supra n 319.  
858 We built up the evolution of the Brussels regime regarding consumer protection thanks to the following 
sources: Magnus and Mankowski, supra n 570, 367-369; Jenard, supra n 506, 28-29, 33-34; Schlosser, 
supra n 590, 117-120. 
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position on the market. Generally speaking, the Heidleberg report noticed that cross-
border litigation in the EU was not any “everyday business” in 2007.859 As regards 
consumer matters and collective redress, our questionnaire confirms this trend. Notably, 
all three consumer associations questioned stated that they had never brought a cross-
border action in another Member State.860 The same is true for collective redress 
actions.861 On a more positive note, both Altroconsumo and ADICAE have already started 
cross-border proceedings against a foreign defendant in the Member State in which they 
are active.862 They usually do so on the basis of Article 7(2) BRIbis. However, only 
ADICAE has brought a collective redress action against a foreign defendant in Spain.863  
415. Finally, different documents released by the Commission confirm our 
statement. For example, the Evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of collective 
redress mechanisms in the European Union, which is presented in Chapter II (supra; § 
155), shows that only 10% of the judicial decisions gathered entailed a cross-border 
element. Furthermore, the mutual recognition of standing to sue thanks to the Injunctions 
Directive supposedly had to facilitate the start of proceedings abroad for specific entities 
such as consumer associations or public authorities. However, the first report of the 
Commission regarding the application of this Directive presents disappointing results: it 
appears that the cost of foreign proceedings –among other factors– remains an important 
obstacle to cross-border litigation.864  
416. In light of this, Chapter II suggests that private international law could 
constitute an appropriate corrective tool in order to solve the current distortion of the 
internal market and further support European policy objectives (supra; Chapter II, 
II.C.2.c.). In order to find an appropriate forum for collective redress actions, we first 
describe what an ideal model would be like. Then, we explain what can be done in 
practice. This comment leads us to the next sub-section. 
 
                                                
859 B Hess et al., Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States, Study 
JLS/C4/2005/03 (2007), 16-20, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf 
860 Question 2.1 of our questionnaire. 
861 Question 4.1 of our questionnaire. 
862 Questions 1.1 to 1.3 of our questionnaire. 
863 Question 4.2 of our questionnaire. 
864 Report from the Commission concerning the application of Directive 98/27/EC, supra n 475, paras 18-
20. 
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B. Is the Current Situation Satisfactory? 
1. The Ideal Forum for Collective Redress Actions 
417. Taking into account the considerations developed above, what would an 
appropriate forum for collective redress look like? Ideally, this forum should be broad 
enough to host both actions for injunctive relief and damages. There, all individual actions 
should be bundled, by virtue of the principle of sound administration of justice. Moreover, 
this forum should be accessible for claimants or their representatives but respect the rights 
of the defence. In other words, a certain balance between access to justice and those rights 
would have to be achieved in order to avoid abusive litigation: on the one hand, the forum 
for collective redress actions should help covering the current enforcement gap by helping 
consumers to obtain redress. On the other hand, however, abusive litigation should be 
avoided. As Chapters I and II show, this fear stems from the negative experience acquired 
in the US regarding the class action device. As a consequence, most collective redress 
models were built up in a cautious manner (supra; Chapter II, I.D.). Additionally, forum 
shopping has to be discouraged. Lastly, the forum for collective redress should be build 
up respecting the principles sustaining private international law. This means for example 
that collective proceedings should share a close connection with the forum court and be 
predictable. 
In the next paragraphs, we examine whether the current private international law 
rules on jurisdiction comply with the requirements we just described. As we demonstrate 
below, Articles 4 and 7(2) BRIbis, which are the only provisions practically available to 
bundle collective redress actions, do not offer a satisfying forum where aggregated claims 
or consumer general interests could be defended.  
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2. Article 4 BRIbis 
418. Chapter III concludes that, in principle, the defendant’s domicile appears to 
be the only forum where collective redress actions could actually take place (supra; 
Chapter III, III.). This is especially true as far as collective redress claims for damages 
are concerned. This result might appear to be positive at first sight, but we argue that it is 
not completely appropriate.  
419. On the one hand, the domicile of the defendant is a forum consistent with 
private international law principles. Indeed, this connecting factor is the cornerstone of 
the Brussels regime and respects the principle of predictability. Besides, other positive 
elements support the centralisation of collective redress actions in the forum of Article 4 
BRIbis: for example, the scope of this provision is not limited to a specific area –such as 
consumer contracts. Rather, all actions regarding civil and commercial matters can be 
brought there. This includes claims in competition law and for the protection of the 
environment. Additionally, this particular forum is opened to both actions for injunctive 
relief and damages. Finally, relying on the assumption that the defendant’s assets are 
located at his domicile, no recognition and enforcement procedure would take place after 
a collective judgment is issued. 
420. On the other hand, the defendant’s domicile might not be the most 
appropriate forum to bring collective redress claims, inasmuch as it neglects some 
important factors: first of all, it reinforces the defendant’s position who may always 
litigate in a “familiar” legal environment.865 Besides, he could voluntarily set up its seat 
in a Member State that is reluctant to facilitate access to justice for groups of victims, 
even though we admit that this behaviour might be rare in practice.866 Second of all, issues 
regarding the recognition of representative entities might refrain these from starting 
proceedings abroad, as far as the representative collective redress model is concerned. 
This has been underlined by the pre-Injunctions Directive practice (supra, § 282-288). 
Moreover, Article 4 BRIbis seems to ignore the particularly high costs of cross-border 
litigation, especially in consumer disputes. Often, the bundling of claims does not offer 
sufficient leverage to claimants, who might renounce to litigate in a foreign and remote 
                                                
865 Nuyts, supra n 244, 72. 
866 Stadler, supra n 667, 159. 
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forum.867 In this sense, the option to litigate in the forum of the defendant’s domicile does 
not back up European policy objectives, which consist in guaranteeing consumers 
effective access to justice.  
In the above paragraphs, we already highlighted some barriers to cross-border 
litigation (supra; § 167, 169). When Article 4 BRIbis is the only forum where collective 
claims or interests could practically be defended, the private enforcement gap becomes 
even more visible. For example, the second report on the Injunctions Directive shows that 
Article 4 BRIbis is not always accessible for consumer associations or public authorities 
seeking injunctive relief and is rarely used.868 Instead, representative entities usually start 
litigation in the market in which they are active, when this is possible. Our questionnaire 
confirms this trend (supra; § 300, 414). Additionally, both the Volkswagen and the MPC-
Fonds cases, which where litigated under the German KapMuG, gave rise to multiple 
parallel proceedings in different Member States. In this context, centralisation of all 
claims at the domicile of the defendant did not happen, although this was possible. This 
casts serious doubts on the attractiveness of Article 4 BRIbis for collective redress 
actions. 
421. To sum up, Article 4 BRIbis certainly might well be the unique forum where 
collective redress claims for damages might be bundled under the current European 
private international law regime. Notably, this provision guarantees the sound 
administration of justice and is consistent with private international law principles. In 
practice, however, parties seem to prefer alternative fora. Finally, the defendant’s 
domicile may not be the most appropriate forum in terms of access to justice. As we 
explained in the above paragraphs, claimants rarely start litigation at this location, 
because of procedural barriers and the high cost associated with foreign proceedings. 
 
 
                                                
867 Danov, supra n 642, 365; L Gorywoda et al., “Introduction: Market Regulation, Judicial Cooperation 
and Collective Redress” in Nuyts and Hatzimihail, supra n 244, 49; Lein, supra n 647, 133; Nuyts, supra 
n 244, 72; B Añoveros Terradas, “Consumer Collective Redress under the Brussels I Regulation Recast in 
the Light of the Commission’s Common Principles” (2015) 11 (1) Journal of Private International Law, 
156; Tzakas, supra n 280, 1156. 
868 This was confirmed by the Report concerning the application of Directive 2009/22/EC, supra n 366, 
para 2.5. 
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3. Article 7(2) BRIbis 
422. As we conclude in Chapter III, it seems that Article 7(2) BRIbis might 
represent an accessible forum for collective redress actions seeking injunctive relief 
(supra; III.). This means that claims of consumer associations defending a general interest 
often can be brought in a single location, as no individual claim is at stake. In those cases, 
Article 7(2) BRIbis offers a close forum, which releases consumer associations from 
recognition and standing to sue issues. However, this supposes that the place where the 
damage occurred is known and identifiable. Unfortunately, it is not always the case: 
indeed, pinning down the exact location of a general damage might be tricky (for 
example, supra; § 299). 
423. When collective redress actions for damages are at stake, the situation is even 
more troubling. In this case, claims might only be centralised at the place where the event 
giving rise to the damage occurred. Unfortunately, this place might coincide with the 
defendant’s domicile and offer no real alternative forum.869 As a result, if a representative 
body has to initiate a collective suit in a foreign court, similar issues than the ones 
concerning Article 4 BRIbis might appear. As regards the courts of the place where the 
damage materialised, their jurisdictional power is territorially limited.870 Therefore, it is 
doubtful that all cross-border collective redress actions can be litigated there. 
424. To sum up, the initiation of collective proceedings in the alternative forum 
of Article 7(2) BRIbis is a partial solution. While it might represent an accessible forum 
for some actions seeking injunctive relief, it does not especially help the centralisation of 
actions for damages in a single court. In this sense, Article 7(2) BRIbis does not 
automatically support the sound administration of justice and access to justice. 
 
 
 
                                                
869 Lein, supra n 647, 134; Nuyts, supra n 244, 77. 
870 Danov, supra n 642, 368; Nuyts, supra n 244, 77. 
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C. Suggested Proposals for Reform  
1. Scholars 
425. A multiplicity of suggestions have popped up among private international 
law scholars that intend to offer an appropriate forum for collective redress: while some 
consider that an adapted interpretation of the provisions provided by the Brussels regime 
would be sufficient,871 others think that the construction of a specific forum to deal with 
those claims would represent a better option. Among those who consider that an 
amendment of the European private international law regime is necessary, some scholars 
think that the specific forum should be implemented within the Brussels Regulation,872 
while others advocate the creation of an independent instrument.873 
426. Overall, we were able to extract three solutions that aim at facilitating cross-
border collective redress. The first one consists in opening up Section 4 BRIbis to 
representative bodies claiming damages. Through the second solution, scholars advocate 
for the centralisation of proceedings in the market where most victims are affected or 
where the “centre of gravity of the dispute” is located. Finally, the third solution concerns 
the bundling of claims pursuant to Article 8(1) BRIbis. We examine these proposals in 
the following paragraphs. 
427. Some leading scholars consider that Section 4 BRIbis has to be interpreted 
in the sense that it should cover collective redress actions started by representative bodies 
–and consumer associations in particular.874 This is justified since consumers and their 
representative often remain weak, although a possibility to initiate collective proceedings 
exists.875 However, they all acknowledge that the current wording of Section 4 BRIbis 
makes such an interpretation difficult. In this context, a legislative reform may be needed 
in order to validate it.  
                                                
871 Carballo, supra n 4, 130 rejects the idea of a specific forum, inasmuch as it would introduce a 
discrimination between individual and collective claimants; Kessedjian, supra n 663, 286-291 believes that 
the domicile of the defendant is the forum where collective redress claims should be litigated. 
872 Gorywoda et al., supra n 867, 53. 
873 Hess, supra n 247, 67. 
874 Carballo, supra n 4, 111-113; Danov, supra n 642, 376-377 considers that Section 4 BRIbis should for 
example apply when a representative body combines an action for declaratory relief with claims for 
damages in the competition law field; Jiménez Blanco, supra n 642, 1574 believes that the protective forum 
of Section 4 BRIbis should be available in cases where the representative body merely litigates on behalf 
of individual consumers. 
875 Contra: Kessedjian, supra n 663, 289; Tang, supra n 648, 112-114. 
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Although this solution is appealing, we consider that significant drawbacks 
remain: for example, the exact place where the representative body would have to bring 
the collective suit should be first determined: 876 could a collective suit be started at the 
place of the representative’s domicile? Or should it be brought at the domicile of –one 
of– the represented consumers? Then, Section 4 BRIbis only protects a certain type of 
consumers. A consumer association’s power to represent them in court would therefore 
be limited accordingly.877 Furthermore, Section 4 BRIbis requires the existence of a 
contract between a consumer and a professional. This strict criterion might not always be 
easily fulfilled: typically, this would be the case if a consumer association fights against 
the use of unfair terms that have not been implemented in individual contracts. Finally 
yet importantly, in case representative entities could not benefit from the protection of 
Section 4 BRIbis, this means that they would have to respect choice of court agreements 
concluded between consumers and the defendant, although these agreements would have 
been ineffective pursuant to Article 19 BRIbis.878 This would create a paradoxical 
situation since individual consumers would loose the protection of the latter provision 
everytime a representative body litigates on their behalf. 
428. Another innovative proposal has been under scrutiny, whereby the court of 
the market most affected would rule on the cross-border collective suit. This solution is 
inspired by Article 6(3) of the Rome II Regulation, which regulates the law applicable to 
an act restricting free competition.879 Nevertheless, as this connecting factor would be 
new to the Brussels regime, its interpretation is not clear.880 For example, one may wonder 
whether quantitative requirements might suffice in order to pin down the market most 
affected by an unlawful practice. In this case, however, some scholars put the spotlight 
on the fact that small markets would never gain adjudication power over cross-border 
collective redress cases, which might be unreasonable. Therefore, one could imagine the 
implementation of a proportionality rule, according to which the number of victims 
should be compared to the population of a given market. In case the definition of the 
market most affected would rely on competition law, its interpretation would follow 
                                                
876 Carballo, supra n 4, 112-113. 
877 Along the same line of reasoning, Carballo (supra n 4, 108-109) states that “el análisis subjetivo se hará 
siempre en relación con los consumidores, miembros del grupo, con independencia de que sea la asociación 
la que traiga la acción al litigio”.  
878 González Beilfuss and Añoveros Terradas, supra n 642, 250; Carballo, supra n 4, 112. 
879 Hess, supra n 847, 118. 
880 Nuyts, supra n 244, 79; Tzakas, supra n 280, 1167-1168. 
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another scheme. Specifically, the product market, as well as the geographical market 
should be first delimited.881 Whenever qualitative elements have to be taken into account, 
Tzakas highlights that this would equate to a forum non conveniens principle,882 which is 
not completely in line with the Brussels philosophy.  
429. As for the “centre of gravity of the dispute,” it represents a parallel version 
of the market most affected.883 According to this connecting factor, collective redress 
suits should be solved by the courts of the place that lies at the centre of the dispute. It 
has been built up on the reasoning of the AG Cruz Villalón in the joined case e-Date and 
Martinez, whereby he suggested that the courts of the Member State where the “centre of 
gravity of the dispute” is located should have jurisdiction in a case involving infringement 
of personality rights.884 Añoveros Terradas believes that centralising claims in a single 
court would be discriminatory for those consumers whose domicile has not been selected 
as the leading forum. Besides, it is not clear whether this connecting factor should be 
interpreted according to the number of victims harmed or whether other considerations 
should be taken into account.885 
430. The last proposal advocates for the application of Article 8(1) BRIbis to 
multiple claimants. As some scholars explain, however, the current wording of this 
provision, as well as its interpretation by the ECJ does not allow such a reading.886 Article 
8(1) BRIbis should not be broadly interpreted, as it constitutes an exception to the general 
forum of Article 4 BRIbis. Supposing that multiple claimants could benefit from the 
forum offered by Article 8(1) BRIbis, important drawbacks would still make the bundling 
of claims practically difficult: given that co-claimants could be attracted in the domicile 
of any one of them, the members of the collective redress action would likely end up 
litigating in a forum, which has no proximity to the case. If a representative entity litigates 
on behalf of victims in a foreign forum, issues regarding recognition and standing could 
arise, as well as financial hardship.  
 
                                                
881 P Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 5th edn, 2011), 
1012-1016; Hess, supra n 847, 118. 
882 Tzakas, supra n 280, 1167-1168. 
883 Posnow-Wurm, supra n 647, 275-276. 
884 e-Date and Martinez, supra n 794, paras 55-67. 
885 Añoveros Terradas, supra n 867, 153-154. 
886 Lein, supra n 647, 138; Stadler, supra n 665, 158; Añoveros Terradas, supra n 867, 149, 150. 
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2. The Paris-Rio Guidelines 
431. As a preliminary point, it should be highlighted that some private initiatives 
dealing with collective redress or class actions have popped up. In Europe,887 the 
European Law Institute (ELI) prepared a comment on the Commission’s 
Recommendation of 2013, as well as the Directive governing actions for damages in the 
competition law field.888 However, this initiative does not directly tackle issues regarding 
jurisdiction in the private international law area. To our knowledge, the only project that 
deals with this question is the Paris-Rio Guidelines drafted by the International Law 
Association. We present its content in the next lines. 
432. The International Law Association (hereafter, ILA) is a non-governmental 
organisation located in Belgium. According to the provisions governing its constitution, 
the Association’s purpose consists in studying, clarifying, developing and understanding 
private and public international law.889 From 2006 until 2012, the ILA set up a Committee 
on International Civil Litigation & the Interests of the Public. The creation of such a 
Committee stems from the acknowledgement that litigation is not reserved to 
sophisticated parties anymore. More and more players join the litigation field, such as 
small businesses and –we would add– consumers. Therefore, this changing landscape 
forces the law to evolve and adapt to this new reality. In particular, rules on jurisdiction 
should “take into account the varying abilities of parties to litigate in distant fora”.890 
433. On the 73rd Conference of the International Law Association (2008), the 
Committee presented its Report and Resolution on Transnational Group Actions 
(hereafter, the Report), as it considered that this device generated significant issues.891 In 
its Report, the Committee drafted some guidelines or best practices in order to deal with 
                                                
887 On the other side of the Atlantic, the American Law Association drafted the Principles of the Law on 
Aggregate Litigation, available on WestlawNext. From a global perspective, the International Bar 
Association (IBA) drafted Guidelines for Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Judgements for Collective 
Redress in 2008, which aim at fostering the free movement of collective redress decisions, available at 
http://www.mccarthy.ca/pubs/Guidelines_for_Recognizing_and_Enforcing_Foreign_Judgments_for_Coll
ective_Redress.pdf. 
888 Available at http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Projects/S-5-
2014_Statement_on_Collective_Redress_and_Competition_Damages_Claims.pdf. 
889 ILA, Constitution of the Association, Article 3, available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1021. 
890 ILA, Description of the ILA International Civil Litigation & the interests of the public Committee, 
available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1021. 
891 ILA, Conference Report Rio de Janeiro 2008, available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1021. 
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cross-border aspects of collective redress, or “group or collective actions” as the 
document states. In other words, the Report does not impose any specific model for 
collective redress at the national level. Rather, it deals with transnational coordination. 
Two objectives motivate the work of the Committee: on the one hand, it aims at 
identifying the general features of collective redress. On the other hand, it tackles specific 
transnational issues that collective actions face, such as standing, certification, 
jurisdiction, notification, applicable law, gathering of evidence, and case management. 
As regards jurisdiction, the Committee considers that group and collective actions 
should take place at the defendant’s domicile. Another court could only exceptionally 
have jurisdiction on the collective redress claims. In light of this, Section 3 of the Report 
establishes the following rule: 
“3.1. A transnational group action may be brought in the defendant’s forum. If 
the defendant is a corporation, the defendant’s forum is located at any of the following 
three places: 1) where the corporation has its statutory seat or is incorporated, or in the 
state under whose law it was formed; 2) where it has its central administration; 3) where 
its business, or other professional activity is principally carried on. 
(…) 
3.3. A transnational group action may also be brought in the courts of another 
country closely connected to the parties and the transactions, provided that trial of the 
action in that country is reasonably capable of serving the interests of the group and has 
not been selected to frustrate those interests.”892 
434. The solution offered by the Report certainly respects European private 
international rules on jurisdiction. According to its authors, this solution is justified given 
that claimants acquire significant leverage by gathering together.893 Consequently, these 
players do not need any more protection. As we mentioned earlier in this sub-section 
(supra; § 419), the absence of limitation in the material scope has to be positively 
underlined, given that collective redress actions may be brought in a significant variety 
of fields such as consumer protection, competition law, environment protection, and even 
labour law. However, one has to assess the appropriateness of the defendant’s domicile 
differently according to the field of law, since they may involve different interests and 
                                                
892 Ibid, 13. 
893 C Kessedjian, “The ILA Rio Resolution on Transnational Group Actions” in Fairgrieve and Lein, supra 
n 94, 135-136, 238. 
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actors. Besides, it is not sure that in all these fields, the bundling of claims truly reinforces 
the position of the claimants. The Report seems to turn a blind eye to the costs and 
procedural difficulties that entail the start of proceedings abroad. Sometimes, these issues 
might remain significant enough to impede the initiation of collective redress actions. As 
we already underlined in our analysis regarding the appropriateness of Article 4 BRIbis, 
the forum of the defendant’s domicile is not ideal in terms of access to justice. 
435. Another element that should be discussed here is the choice of words made 
by the Committee who talks about group and collective actions rather than collective 
redress. It appears that the purpose of such a terminology is to distinguish European 
mechanisms allowing the bundling of claims from the US class action.894 Due to the 
variety of collective redress mechanisms in Europe, a clearer delineation of the notion 
would be welcome. 
436. Finally, Section 3.3 of the Report admits the possibility for a court other than 
the one of the defendant’s domicile to rule on the collective redress action. Accordingly, 
a court that shares a close connection with the dispute could also acquire jurisdiction to 
rule on the collective redress case. This formulation looks like a forum conveniens,895 
although the Report does not expressly mention it. Additionally, the Committee clarifies 
that the court and not the parties should be able to decide whether another court is best 
placed to hear their claims. This flexible jurisdictional ground shares some similarities 
with the alternative fora of the BRIbis. However, the Brussels regime does not offer courts 
such a margin of discretion in order to determine whether they have jurisdiction or not. 
Therefore, the Report might not be in line with the Brussels regime. By drafting Section 
3.3, however, the ILA acknowledges that the domicile of the defendant might not be the 
only forum closely connected to a collective redress case. 
 
 
                                                
894 Ibid, 135-136, 234 and footnote 3. 
895 It is a forum conveniens in the sense that it allows another court than the one of the defendant’s domicile 
to exceptionnally accept jurisdiction over a collective redress action. On the notion of forum conveniens, 
see M Herranz Ballesteros, El forum non conveniens y su adaptación al ámbito europeo (Tirant lo blanch, 
Valencia, 2011), 35-37. 
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3. National Rules on Jurisdiction 
437. A look at national provisions governing jurisdiction in collective redress 
cases might be instructive. Indeed, national solutions might be a source of inspiration for 
upcoming European legislations.  
438. National rules governing jurisdiction tackle collective redress cases in a 
different fashion. Overall, we could identify three distinct trends: first, national 
legislations on collective redress remain sometimes silent as regards material and 
territorial jurisdiction. In other words, the ordinary system governing questions of 
jurisdiction applies. This is the case in Portugal, for example.  
439. Second, other Member States allocate jurisdiction to the courts of the 
defendant’s domicile, but simultaneously limit the number of courts that may rule on 
collective redress cases. For instance, in Italy, Article 140-bis (4) of the Italian Consumer 
Code states that collective redress claims must be submitted to the courts located in the 
capital of the Region where the company has its registered office. France equally follows 
this scheme: for example, pursuant to Article R.623-2 FCC, the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance of the professional’s domicile has jurisdiction to rule on the French group action.  
440. Third, some Member States have designated a limited number of courts, 
which have exclusive jurisdiction to rule on collective redress actions. This solution is 
advantageous in the sense that it allows courts to gain expertise. Additionally, said courts 
are able to generate harmonised canons of interpretation. In particular, the Amsterdam 
Court of Appeal is the only one able to deal with a WCAM settlement in the Netherlands. 
Then, under the Belgian system, the courts and tribunals of Brussels have exclusive 
jurisdiction to rule on a collective suit according to Article XVII.35 of the Economic 
Code.  
441. To sum up, we notice that national legislators have not developed any 
tailored connecting factor in order to deal with collective redress actions. Usually, the 
domicile of the defendant is the relevant place to bring such actions. Alternatively, 
Member States only allocate jurisdiction to a limited number of specific courts.  
 
  268 
4. Movements at the European Level 
442. At the European level, institutions acknowledge the relative unsuitability of 
collective redress taking into account private international law rules on jurisdiction. 
Specifically, the Commission explained the stakeholders’ position regarding various 
potential solutions in the Communication accompanying the Recommendations of 
2013.896 Among these stakeholders, a number of them believe that a special forum should 
be created in order to tackle cross-border collective redress: for some, the courts of the 
Member States where the majority of claimants are located should have jurisdiction, 
while for others, jurisdiction over consumer contracts should extend to representative 
entities. Another group of stakeholders argue that the defendant’s domicile is the 
appropriate forum where cross-border collective redress actions have to be brought. A 
last category of stakeholders suggests that a specific panel of the ECJ should solve those 
claims.  
443. Even though the Commission possesses a clear overview of the possible 
solutions to the jurisdictional issues generated by cross-border collective redress, none of 
them has been adopted yet.897 The same is true as regards other fields of law. For example, 
in competition law, collective redress has been set apart from the Directive on antitrust 
damages actions of 2014,898 although this topic had already been vividly discussed within 
this field of law.899 Along the same line of reasoning, the General Data Protection 
Regulation (hereafter, GDPR)900 explicitly allows the use of collective redress but does 
not establish any specific forum for it. Rather, the system seems to be the same for all 
actions –individual or collective.  
To be more precise, Article 80 GDPR states that certain not-for-profit bodies, 
organisations or associations may litigate on behalf of data subjects in order to protect 
their rights. The Regulation adds that judicial proceedings should be started “before the 
                                                
896 The different positions adopted by stakeholders are contained in the European Commission’s 
Communication, supra n 253, 13-14. 
897 An overview of all the actions undertaken by the European Union is available in Chapter II (supra, II.) 
898 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L349/1. See in particular Recital 13 of said 
Directive. 
899 For an overview of the actions undertaken by the EU in the competition law field, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/collective_redress_en.html. 
900 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ L119/1. 
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courts of the Member State where the controller or processor has an establishment” 
(Article 79(2) GDPR). This provision recalls the wording of Article 7(5) BRIbis.901 
Alternatively, Article 79(2) GDPR establishes that “proceedings may be brought before 
the courts of the Member State where the data subject has his or her habitual residence, 
unless the controller or processor is a public authority of a Member State acting in the 
exercise of its public powers”. Although those connecting factors might be appropriate 
for individual data protection claims, it seems that they do not sufficiently take into 
account the specificities of collective redress actions. Where the first prong of Article 
79(2) GDPR applies, it might offer a close forum to the victims of data protection 
violations, supposing that both actors are located in the same Member State. However, 
this might not always be the case. As regards the second prong of Article 79(2) GDPR, it 
is likely to trigger similar issues as the fora of the Brussels regime, which designates 
territorial jurisdiction.  
444. Finally, we put the spotlight on a proposal, which was presented when both 
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions were under reform. In 1998, an ad hoc working 
party was set up by the European Council in order to revise the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions. At that time, the Swedish delegation made a proposal to allow actions for 
injunctive relief to be brought in the interest of consumers before the courts of the State 
where an infringement has its effects. The proposal suggested the modification of Article 
5 BC –today, Article 7 BRIbis– in the following way: “A person domiciled in a 
Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued: (…) 3. a) as regards an 
action for an injunction to protect the collective interests of consumers brought by a public 
or private entity, in the courts of the Contracting State in which the infringement has its 
effects”. The Swedish delegation insisted on the fact that the Convention’s scope should 
encompass both private bodies, as well as public authorities –like the Swedish Consumer 
Ombudsman, for example. This suggestion is valuable because it clarifies that public 
authorities should fall within the scope of the Brussels regime. Although our research 
highlights that some representative entities already use this forum, for instance when they 
fight against unfair terms, the proposal of the Swedish delegation crystallises a certain 
                                                
901 However, note that Recital 22 GDPR states that, to the difference of Article 7(5) BRIbis, not only 
branches but also subsidiaries are encompassed within the notion of establishment. 
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practice. Unfortunately, said proposal does not tackle actions for damages. Eventually, 
the text of the Swedish delegation was rejected.902 
II. Proposal 
445. The first section of Chapter IV demonstrates that the current private 
international law rules on jurisdiction do not provide a satisfactory forum where collective 
redress actions could be brought. In light of this, we advocate that a specific forum should 
be set up for those actions. However, due to the great variety of collective redress 
mechanisms in the EU, it would certainly be difficult to encompass all of them in a single 
private international law norm. Therefore, we believe that the representative model 
should be the foundation of any legislative proposal regarding cross-border collective 
redress. The reason is simple: this model is the most widespread throughout the European 
territory, and it takes into account the primary role of representative entities, such as 
consumer associations for the defence of consumer interests and the overcoming of 
rational apathy.  
Likewise, the European institutions seem to endorse the representative model. 
This is visible in the Recommendation of 2013, where the Commission saves standing to 
sue for specific entities.903 More recently, the GDPR applied the same discrimination in 
favour of said model. According to its Article 80, only certain bodies, organisations or 
associations might litigate on behalf of data subjects. 
Additionally, the Dutch model puts the spotlight on the virtues of out-of-court 
agreements: thanks to this technique, courts are not overwhelmed with thousands of 
claims and parties may centralise the dispute in a single forum. We think that private 
international law should consider this model too.  
Conversely, although the class action model might be efficient in the United 
States, it is hardly ever used in Europe, because of the financial hardship it places on the 
representative claimant. In this vein, the Schrems case should be treated as an exceptional 
one. Therefore, we do not recommend the promotion of this model as a priority. Finally, 
the test case model surely is a useful management tool, but it does not appear to be an 
efficient tool against rational apathy, at least at the national level. Nevertheless, we found 
                                                
902 González Beilfuss and Añoveros Terradas, supra n 642, 248, footnote 35; Magnus and Mankowski, 
supra n 570, 233-234. 
903 European Commission, Recommendation supra n 248, paras 4-7. 
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the structure of such a mechanism interesting from a private international law perspective, 
since it allows the centralisation of common issues of fact or law in a single court, with a 
decentralisation system for remaining individual issues. We believe that this model may 
compete with our proposal.  
In light of those considerations, the current section starts with a description of two 
solutions that might facilitate cross-border collective redress actions (infra; A.). While 
the first model advocates for the centralisation of collective claims in a single forum, the 
second one takes the German test case procedure as a basis. As we demonstrate below, 
these options contain interesting features but do not totally support the access to justice 
policy. However, our final solution borrows some of their elements that might enhance 
the value of our final proposal, which we describe in the second part of this subsection 
(infra; B.).  
A. The Competing Solutions 
446. As we suggested earlier, collective redress actions should ideally centralise 
in a single, fair and accessible forum. Furthermore, such actions should exhaustively 
encompass all victims who suffered harm. Therefore, we start this section by examining 
the potential benefits and drawbacks of a fully centralised model for collective redress 
cases, based on the representative model (infra; 1.). Alternatively, the test case model 
could serve as an appropriate basis to create a jurisdictional regime for collective redress. 
Consequently, this suggestion is also analised below (infra; 2).  
Beforehand, it should be noted that the models described above only focuses on 
judicial actions. The possibility of concluding out-of-court settlements is examined in 
detail under our proposal.  
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1. The Centralised Representative Model  
447. The centralisation of all collective redress actions in the dockets of a single 
court represents an interesting option (see the Figure 3). Accordingly, one or various 
entities representing national consumer interests would be able to start litigation in a 
single location for example, in the domicile of the defendant. Alternatively, it has been 
suggested that centralisation could be achieved in the courts of the Member State where 
the majority of victims are located. As we mentioned earlier (supra; § 428), this criterion 
could give rise to important interpretative issues. In all cases, if collective redress claims 
can be accumulated there, significant economies of scale could be achieved. This would 
also help representative entities to reduce costs of proceedings.  
 
Figure 3: Centralised model 
 
448. On the one hand, centralisation at the domicile of the defendant is an 
impeccable solution from a private international law perspective, since it follows 
commonly acknowledged principles of the field. Suffice it to recall that the domicile of 
the defendant is the cornerstone of many private international law texts, including the 
BRIbis.  
449. On the other hand, if an alternative connecting factor is selected, courts 
would certainly have to deal with actions which enterain no close connection with the 
forum. Typically, this will be the case when both the defendant and part of the victims 
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are located in Member States other than the one where litigation starts. As far as private 
international law is concerned, it is difficult to draft objective criteria according to which 
one court could have jurisdiction over foreign collective actions presenting no link with 
its territory. Along the same line of reasoning, removing a court’s jurisdictional power in 
order to allocate it to another one, which possesses no connecting point with such action, 
is difficult to justify.904 Similarly, a look at the American experience (supra; § 48-53) 
shows that state courts usually struggle to extend their jurisdictional power to out-of-state 
defendants and class members in multistate class actions.  
450. Furthermore, we already highlighted that a centralised model does not 
especially support access justice, since it may trigger practical and procedural issues 
(supra; § 420). In particular, supposing that a single court could be selected in order to 
rule on all collective redress claims, this means that the representative entity would often 
have to move to another State in order to litigate the case. However, it is doubtful that 
representative entities, which often have limited financial and human resources, would 
actually start proceedings in a foreign forum. Additionally, there is a risk that the 
prospective court in charge of the European collective action would feel overburdened. 
Indeed, it is not sure that national courts possess the resources to tackle pan-European 
collective redress actions. Even though certain questions are centralised and great 
economies of scales can be achieved, cross-border collective redress cases still put an 
important amount of work over national courts. This could generate important delays for 
parties. In light of this, it is not certain that centralisation of collective redress claims in a 
single court would actually support the principle of sound administration of justice.  
451. Finally, in order for a centralised system to work, minimal harmonisation of 
national collective redress would be needed. In particular, the existence of the 
representative model in each Member State would have to be guaranteed. Besides, all 
mechanisms would have to possess the same material scope and welcome the same types 
of actions –for damages and injunctive relief. Otherwise, access to and availability of a 
centralised system would depend on the Member State. However, as we mentioned in 
Chapter II, harmonisation of collective redress mechanisms should be the ultima ratio. 
                                                
904 Tang, supra n 648, 118. 
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452. Since a centralised forum may not always provide access to justice, market 
players might be tempted to use alternative fora when these are available, like in the 
Volkswagen and MPC-Fonds cases. Therefore, and in order to maintain the effectiveness 
of the centralisation process, a jurisdictional regime for collective redress actions should 
be hermetic just as Section 4 BRIbis for example. In other words, representative entities 
should not be able to use other fora apart from the one where collective redress 
proceedings should be centralised. In the event such a model is adopted, this means that 
a consumer association would not be able to litigate in the forum of Article 7(2) BRIbis 
against a trader who makes use of illegal Terms and Conditions as they often do. Along 
the same line of reasoning, a representative entity would not be able to “shortcircuit” the 
jurisdictional regime for collective redress by making use of Article 7(5) BRIbis. Such a 
result would significantly undermine access to justice. Therefore, a centralised system 
should set up additional incentives in order for representative entities to start litigation 
abroad.  
In light of the above, the next paragraph examines a slightly different centralised 
system (see Figure 4) that attempts to better support access to justice. According to this 
model, a single consumer association –for example, one located in the domicile of the 
defendant– would have the power to bind consumers domiciled in other Member States, 
preferably on an opt-out based system. Although this model looks simple and attractive 
on the paper, we believe that it does not build up appropriate incentives. 
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Figure 4: Centralised model bis 
 
453. We use the following example in order to illustrate our point: DECO is a 
consumer association located in Portugal. Let us assume that this association has the 
power to start collective redress proceedings against a Portuguese defendant who caused 
harm to numerous consumers on the European market. To start with, it is not clear 
whether a European norm could oblige DECO to represent all victims from the EU. 
Indeed, a consumer association has the burden to define the “class” and thus, it can choose 
to represent only victims of the national market. In such a context, it is doubtful that 
European law can force a consumer association to expand its representative power.  
In all cases, we think that DECO would certainly not bring a pan-European 
collective redress action, even if it could. This can be explained by the additional costs 
that the consumer association would have to bear in case it chose to represent consumers 
from other Member States. Notably, DECO would have to notify them their right to opt-
out –probably in a different language than Portuguese– and examine whether the 
applicable law and the harm caused is the same everywhere. DECO would also have to 
deal with potential interventions and offer information to all the participants of the 
“class”. We explained earlier that at least notification costs are usually borne upfront by 
the claimant –here, DECO (supra; § 135). In light of this, what are the incentives for a 
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national consumer association to litigate on behalf of foreign consumers? In our opinion, 
there are few if any. 
Certainly, such costs would decrease if an action in the defence of a general 
interest were brought. Most of the time, those actions are based on the automatic 
membership system. Hence, no notification process is necessary.  
454. As a conclusion, a fully centralised model for cross-border collective redress 
actions is not desirable since it does not support access to justice. Rather, it obliges 
representative entities to figure out a way to litigate abroad, while the defendant does not 
assume the internationalisation of the case. Moreover, such a model requires minimal 
harmonisation of national collective redress mechanisms. 
2. The Partial Centralisation Model 
455. Another interesting model that could inspire us is the KapMuG (see Figure 
5). As we explained earlier (supra; Chapter III, II.D.1), the German test case procedure 
centralises common questions of fact or law in the hands of a higher court. Once those 
issues are resolved, specific questions such as the allocation of damages take place within 
individual proceedings. Therefore, this model enables the “splitting” of proceedings, 
which is the feature that interests us here.  
456. Transposed to cross-border collective redress cases, the partial centralisation 
model advocates that a representative entity could open a principal collective redress 
procedure in the Member State where the defendant is domiciled, taking the test case 
model as a basis. Representative entities located in other Member States could then start 
territorial proceedings in order to solve remaining issues, such as the allocation of 
damages. Therefore, conversely to the KapMuG, standing should be allocated to 
representative bodies in order to better fight rational apathy.  
Under such a model, a single representative entity could litigate the case that will 
serve as a test. Other bodies representing consumers from other Member States may be 
useful intermediaries: they can help with the notification process, determine the size of 
the “class”, provide additional legal support, and so on. However, nothing should impede 
a representative entity to intervene in the principal proceedings if it has the resources to 
do so. As far as costs are concerned, each representative would certainly have to deal with 
costs of notification upfront. The costs generated by the principal proceedings dealing 
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with common issues of fact or law would also have to be shared between all representative 
bodies.  
The connecting factor, whereby a court may open principal proceedings and the 
conditions to start territorial ones remain to be drafted. For example, the domicile of the 
defendant could be an appropriate criterion to open principal proceedings, but other 
options are conceivable. The court dealing with the test case would rule on common 
questions of fact or law. Its judgment would then serve as a basis to solve similar 
individual claims in territorial proceedings. We recall that, under the KapMuG, the 
declaratory judgment of the Higher Court is binding for lower courts dealing with pending 
similar actions. Victims who registered their claims –but did not start proceedings– are 
technically not bound by this judgment. In this context, how should this scheme be 
transposed in cross-border collective redress cases? In light of the above, it seems that the 
judgment issued in the test case should be recognised in Member States where territorial 
proceedings start. People who previously opted-in or did not opt-out would be bound by 
such a judgment. Finally, one would have to establish whether a minimum of participants 
should be required for the test case procedure to start and how the test case should be 
selected. 
This scheme particularly fits actions for damages that involve collective interests. 
However, the opening of territorial proceedings might not be necessary if actions 
protecting general interests are brought, since no individual victims would be involved.  
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Figure 5: The partial centralisation model 
 
457. However, it is not clear how representative entities should manifest their 
intention to be part of the test case procedure. A system of register like under the KapMuG 
could perhaps be set up. Furthermore, how should consumers exercise their right to opt-
in or out? In order to pick up a test case, the court must first have a relatively clear picture 
of who the “class” is and of the issues that are common to the claimants. Therefore, it 
might be better for victims to exercise their right to opt-in or out before a judgment is 
issued. Here, the question is whether the procedural rules of the forum should be 
followed, or whether the modality of participation could be governed by the rules of the 
Member State where territorial proceedings would start. As long as rules on participation 
provide information on the size of the class and the nature of the claims, we believe that 
both options are feasible. The court may also be allocated some margin of discretion in 
order to establish ad hoc participation rules. A last question that should be mentioned 
here is the likely difficulty to deal with potential interventions. The distance that separates 
the victims from the court ruling on common issues might refrain interventions and thus, 
undermine the right to be heard. 
458. Although the benefits of such a model should be acknowledged, it is not 
exempted from critiques. For example, for such a model to include as many victims as 
possible and generate economies of scale, a proper communication channel between 
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representative entities should be established. Otherwise, they might not even be aware of 
the existence of a cross-border test case procedure. Therefore, subsequent test case 
procedures might arise, thus wasting judicial resources. Additionally, this would surely 
undermine the centralisation process and offer only partial closure to the defendant.  
459. Furthermore, just like the centralisation model (supra; § 451), a cross-border 
test case procedure would only be possible if a minimal harmonisation of collective 
redress mechanisms would take place. In particular, access to justice to representative 
entities for both actions for damages and injunctive relief in similar areas of law should 
be provided. Otherwise, a test case procedure might not always be available, depending 
on the Member State.  
460. Another critique that may be targeted at this model is that it offers the 
defendant a relatively comfortable position, in the sense that he/she knows that a cross-
border collective redress will only take place at his/her domicile. Therefore, the burden 
of the internationalisation of the case falls on the consumer associations who have to cope 
with the difficulties of gathering victims together and asking for the collaboration of a 
colleague located in the defendant’s State. In this vein, the partial centralisation model 
possesses a rather weak deterrent effect if any. 
461. As a conclusion, a partial centralisation model inspired by the KapMuG is an 
interesting one since it would provide some consistency to the European judicial area. 
Nevertheless, this model generates important costs, in the sense that it would require a 
minimal harmonisation of national procedures and setting up efficient communication 
channels between representative entities. Furthermore, we are not convinced that such a 
model would actually restore the balance between the claimant and the defendant. As a 
result, we do not reject outright the partial centralisation model. As we will explain above, 
however, we consider that our proposal is better aligned with the Union’s policy that aims 
at fostering access to justice. 
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B. Our Proposal 
1. Overview  
462. Our proposal offers a protective forum for judicial collective redress 
proceedings and promotes the conclusion of out-of-court agreements based on the Dutch 
model. To be more precise, we suggest that the representative entity located in a given 
Member State should be able to bring collective redress actions either at its own domicile 
or in the domicile of the defendant. Conversely, the possibility for the defendant to bring 
negative actions for declaratory relief should be limited. In other words, the specific 
forum for collective redress should follow the structure of Section 4 BRIbis but limit 
standing to sue to representative entities. From a procedural perspective, collective 
proceedings should take place on a national basis. This would guarantee the 
representative power of a given entity but also limit the overlap of cross-border collective 
redress actions, as well as the issuance of concurrent judgments. In practice, this means 
that a consumer association representing consumers of the national market in which it has 
its domicile would be able to start proceedings at this place against a defendant located 
in another –European or third– State. The Member State where a given entity is situated 
should have the power to determine its representative nature.  
463. If the representative entity wishes to start proceedings in the domicile of the 
defendant, this should remain possible for consumers’ representatives who have enough 
resources to litigate there.905 Indeed, if various representative entities collaborate and start 
proceedings at this location, significant economies of scale may be achieved. 
Additionally, no recognition and enforcement process will be needed if the defendant 
possesses his/her assets there. Finally, letting the forum of the defendant’s domicile open 
offers parties a procedural choice. However, we believe that the fading of procedural 
barriers is necessary in order to make Article 4 BRIbis more appealing than it currently 
is. This means that certain incentives have to be created. At least, mutual recognition of 
representative entities’ standing is necessary. Just like under the modified centralised 
model (supra; § 453), these entities could be authorised by law to require the help of their 
colleagues domiciled in the defendant’s domicile in order to start a collective redress 
                                                
905 The possibility to start proceedings in the domicile of a defendant domiciled in a third-State depends on 
the private international law rules on jurisdiction of said State. 
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action there, without facing procedural challenges. Naturally, representative entities 
requiring such help should financially support it.  
464. Additionally, we believe that negotiation procedures on the basis of the 
Dutch model should be promoted. In Chapter III (supra; B.5.), we observed that said 
model is relatively efficient but does not align itself with European private international 
law rules. Our proposal aims at solving this issue. This is why we suggest that the specific 
fora available for judicial collective proceedings should also cover out-of-court 
settlements. In other words, when one or various representative entities from different 
Member States settle with the defendant, they can make their agreement binding either in 
the courts of the domicile (of one of) the representative entity/ies participating in the 
negotiation or in the courts of the defendant’s domicile. This solution is justified since 
the selection of the forum is consensual. Therefore, representative entities cannot force 
the defendant to appear in an unfavourable jurisdiction. From a structural perspective, we 
think that the Dutch model represents an appropriate and efficient mechanism. The 
negotiation procedure is flexible and cheap. Up to now, it has proved to work well. 
Besides, we believe that consumers are sufficiently protected in the event that 
representative entities settle on their behalf and in case the courts control the validity and 
fairness of the agreement.  
2. Advantages 
465. The domicile of the defendant, as the cornerstone of the Brussels regime, is 
justified inasmuch as parties are on a relatively equal footing. The burden of the 
international character of the dispute is spread among parties accordingly.906 However, 
the emergence of collective harms call into question this balance, due to the new type of 
damages they create –usually low and widespread– and the kind of actors they involve –
multiple parties or the public in general. As a result, the previous sub-section highlighted 
that consumers and their representatives struggle to bring collective redress actions 
abroad. This means that they still face important barriers that impede them to obtain 
redress. The forum of the representative entity’s domicile takes into account this new 
reality by restoring the current uneven playing field between corporations and consumers’ 
representatives. In this sense, our proposal supports the initiatives of the European 
                                                
906 Virgós Soriano and Garcimartín Alférez, supra n 508, 123. 
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institutions that aim at providing access to justice. It also exempts representative entities 
from issues regarding standing to sue and costs of litigation abroad. As for the possibility 
of concluding out-of-court settlements, this option is in alignment with EU legislative 
acts that encourage the use of ADR. 
466. Additionally, it could also act as an ex ante incentive for defendants to 
comply with the law, as they are aware that collective redress litigation could start far 
from their domicile. Therefore, the forum we propose may trigger an interesting deterrent 
effect. Besides, we believe that it respects the rights of the defendant, in the sense that it 
is predictable. Conversely, the current application of private international law rules on 
jurisdiction creates confusion as to where collective redress actions should or could be 
brought. Given the absence of coordination, parallel judicial actions often pop up and 
increase the risks of overlapping proceedings. As regards abusive litigation, it is contained 
thanks to the limitation of actors having standing to sue.  
467. Another argument that supports our proposal is that the courts of the 
representative’s domicile are often in a good position to rule on a collective redress action, 
given that multiple victims are located there. Indeed, the damages to individual consumers 
or the general interest usually materialise at this location. Moreover, this result is justified 
from a socio-political perspective: when multiple victims of the national market are 
affected by a given behaviour, courts of that State have an incentive to offer them access 
to justice. Even though the fora provided by the Brussels regime are technically available, 
practical obstacles impede their accessibility. As a result, it is common that access to 
courts is actually barred. Our proposal considers this fact.  
468. Finally, by keeping collective proceedings national, the probability that one 
court has to apply many different laws to the dispute is low. This reduces the workload 
of courts and is time-efficient. Eventually, it has to be underlined that this connecting 
factor is relatively easy to interpret, as the notion of domicile is familiar to the Brussels 
Regulation. In other words, it does not give rise to interpretation doubts like the 
connecting factor of the market most affected.  
469. As regards declaratory actions to make collective agreements binding, our 
proposal certainly clarifies the present landscape. We mentioned earlier that it is not clear 
whether those actions fall under the scope of the Brussels regime (supra; §§ 316-322). 
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Our proposal solves this situation by establishing a specific forum for collective redress 
actions that covers the substantiation of collective redress settlements. This technique 
allows for a quick resolution of disputes without overburdening national courts. In this 
sense, the availability of an ADR procedure further diminishes the courts’ amount of 
work: their role is limited to the control of the validity and fairness of the agreement. 
Moreover, the defendant might achieve closure. At the same time, a collective settlement 
involving multiple representative entities would only be possible where the defendant 
consents to a global settlement. Such a result is therefore respectful of his rights. As 
regards original claimants, they would be represented by entities, according to the 
respective national rules of the market where these are located.  
3. To Be Determined… 
470. Once the connecting factor is established, many other elements must be 
determined. We list the ones that appear fundamental to us, without claiming to be 
exhaustive:  
471. Type of instrument. There are various ways of incorporating a specific 
jurisdictional ground for collective redress in the private international law network: for 
instance, one might consider the opportunity to create an independent instrument, such as 
a Directive or a Regulation. Said instrument could exclusively govern private 
international law questions, on the model of recent regulations regarding family law,907 
or be part of a broader regulatory measure covering different aspects of law, like the 
GDPR. Alternatively, such a jurisdictional ground might be included in the Brussels 
regime.  
472. On the one hand, the design of a customised legislation regarding collective 
redress including private international questions and possibly other aspects of law is 
appealing. It allows for the elaboration of an autonomous system, which might coherently 
regulate a specific device from the procedural and private international law perspectives. 
                                                
907 We think about the Regulation 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regime [2016] OJ L183/1, or the Regulation 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and 
enforcement of decisions in matters of the property consequences of registered partnerships [2016] OJ 
L183/30. 
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The additional aspects that should be the object of a legislative measure include the 
mutual recognition of capacity and standing to sue of representative entities –in case they 
choose to litigate in the forum of Article 4 BRIbis. Similarly, it could be useful to list 
some criteria regarding the fairness of a collective settlement and perhaps the form that 
such an act should possess. However, the negotiation procedure should not be over-
regulated, as it has to remain flexible to be effective. Finally, a specific rule on related 
actions could be drafted in order to coordinate parallel proceedings. The potential 
problems related to the emergence of parallel proceedings is examined later in this 
Chapter (infra; § 490-495). 
473. On the other hand, one might consider the possibility of implementing a 
jurisdictional rule tailored to collective redress within the Brussels regime. This method 
makes it easier for legal professionals to work with private international law norms, as 
they would remain centralised in a single text. However, one has to make sure that the 
specific jurisdictional ground for collective redress claims is consistent with the 
remaining provisions of the Brussels Regulation. For example, this technique permitted 
the introduction of a specific forum for the return of cultural objects in Article 7(4) 
BRIbis.  
474. From a legislative perspective, both possibilities appear to be valid. At the 
European level, the legislator usually enacts private international law norms under the 
shape of regulations or directives.908 In all cases, the principle of proportionality 
commands the adoption of the less incisive measure (Article 5(4) TEU). Over the years, 
one notices a slight change in the legislative technique employed by the European 
institutions: now, not only regulations including exclusively private international law 
norms are created, but also more comprehensive texts are enacted. The GDPR represents 
such an example. In fact, the European Union crafts increasingly more exhaustive 
legislations regarding complex areas of law, where private international law norms are 
often part of a wider legislative measure. Additionally, private international law norms 
are more and more detailed and tailored to specific legal situations. González Campos 
already put the spotlight on this trend in 2000 during his lecture at The Hague Academy 
                                                
908 European Parliament, A European Framework for Private International Law: Current Gaps and Future 
Perspectives (2012), 17, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201212/20121219ATT58300/20121219ATT583
00EN.pdf. 
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of International Law. According to him, the specialisation of private international law 
norms mainly follows social changes and adapts to the increasing complexity of human 
relationships.909 
475. From a legislative standpoint, both Articles 81 and 114 TFEU probably 
enable the European legislator to regulate collective redress to a certain extent. As far as 
our proposal is concerned, Article 81 TFEU seems to be the appropriate legal basis if the 
European legislator wants to adopt a private international rule on jurisdiction regarding 
collective redress, as well as legislative acts on ADR. As we mentioned in the above 
paragraphs, other legal aspects could also be the object of a legislative act such as the 
mutual recognition of capacity and standing to sue. In all cases, the modification of the 
BRIbis in order to include a specific jurisdictional ground regarding collective redress 
seems unlikely for the time being. The Recast entered into force on 10 January 2015 and 
thus, some time will probably pass before the EU considers amending this text again. 
Moreover, despite the numerous documents regarding collective redress that already 
existed at the time of the Recast, the European institutions did not take the opportunity to 
regulate this topic (supra; § 228). Consequently, the adoption of an independent 
instrument might be the faster way out.  
476. To sum up, we recommend the adoption of an independent instrument 
including private international law rules on collective actions for damages and injunctive 
relief. Only some specific elements should be regulated in such an instrument, for 
instance, mutual recognition of capacity and standing to sue, among other aspects.  
477. Nature of the jurisdictional rule. Jurisdictional rules have distinct natures: in 
particular, such rules attribute general, alternative, protective, or exclusive jurisdiction to 
courts within the EU. Moreover, party autonomy plays an important role in the allocation 
of jurisdiction. In light of this, what is the nature of a jurisdictional rule regarding 
collective redress?  
As we pointed out above, the policy objective behind the attribution of jurisdiction 
to the courts of the domicile where the representative entity is located is the correction of 
the current imbalance between original claimants and their representatives on the one 
                                                
909 J González Campos, “Diversification, spécialisation, flexibilisation et matérialisation des règles de droit 
international privé” in Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Tome 287 (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000), Chapter III. 
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hand, and defendants on the other. Procedural considerations and policy objectives 
command such a measure. As a result, this rule is protective in nature. In light of this, we 
used Section 4 BRIbis as a basis to draft such a rule. As we explained, representative 
entities should be able to bring collective redress proceedings either at their own domicile 
or at the domicile of the defendant. The latter should always be available since it entails 
significant advantages for those who can actually reach it (supra; § 463). 
478. Nevertheless, the protective forum of the representative entity’s domicile 
should not be available in all circumstances. For instance, such a forum should not be 
open in cases where two consumers bought a defective product in a local shop located in 
another Member State while they were on holidays. This could be achieved in France 
through the action en représentation conjointe, just to mention one example. One senses 
that it would be unreasonable to attract the defendant to the protective forum of the 
representative entity –supposing that the latter would litigate such a case–, since he/she 
probably did not have the intention to internationalise his/her activities. Moreover, the 
defendant does not seem to entertain any connection with the forum State and he/she did 
not cause any damage on that market.  
In light of the above, various criteria are available in order to streamline the use 
of collective redress procedures in the domicile of the representative entity. To start with, 
we may borrow the wording of Article 17(1)(c) BRIbis, which requires the trader to direct 
its activities to a given Member State in order for consumers to benefit from the protective 
forum of Article 18 BRIbis. However, this would exclude the possibility for 
representative entities to bring a collective redress action in case no commercial activity 
preceded the occurrence of the damage, such as harm to the environment or mass 
accident. Another option is to submit the start of such an action to the emergence of a 
“mass harm situation” in the Member State where the representative body is located. 
Nevertheless, this notion is restrictively defined by the Commission in its 
Recommendation of 2013. Accordingly, the text states that a mass harm situation is one 
where “two or more natural or legal persons claim to have suffered harm causing damage 
resulting from the same illegal activity of one or more natural or legal persons”.910 
Notably, such a definition discards the protection of general interests. 
In such a context, it might be desirable to limit collective redress actions against 
defendants who directed their activities to a given market, and let Article 7(2) BRIbis 
                                                
910 European Commission, Recommendation supra n 248, para 3. 
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apply to environmental damages and mass accident. These situations do not directly relate 
to consumer protection and hence, do not always involve weak parties. 
479. In all cases, a jurisdictional ground for collective redress should not be 
integrated in Section 4 BRIbis because of its limitation regarding certain categories of 
consumers and contracts. In particular, the active-passive dichotomy and the 
corresponding limitation to certain contracts do not seem to fit collective redress actions. 
As we explain below, a delimitation of the material scope through the creation of a list of 
legislations might be more appropriate. As regards declaratory actions to make a 
settlement binding, either the domicile of a representative entity or the one of the 
defendant could alternatively serve as an appropriate forum to validate the agreement.  
480. Conversely, a potential action brought by the defendant against multiple 
consumers or the community is hard to picture. However, the defendant might be tempted 
to bring a declaratory negative action,911 with the objective of demonstrating his lack of 
liability regarding an alleged damage. In this case, should the defendant be able to decide 
where to start proceedings? Following our proposal, this means that the defendant could 
bring a declaratory negative action in the courts of his own domicile or in the domicile of 
a representative entity threatening with the initiation of collective redress proceedings. In 
principle, the equality of treatment of both parties commands the acceptance of the 
defendant’s right to bring actions for negative declaratory relief in the forum of his choice. 
However, allowing this practice is tantamount to allowing some “pre-emptive forum 
shopping”,912 whereby the defendant could secure jurisdiction in a favourable forum to 
the detriment of the representative entity. Therefore, this practice seriously disturbs the 
procedural balance between parties to litigation.913  
In the context of the Brussels regime, the initiation of negative declaratory 
proceedings would not allow the subsequent start of collective redress proceedings in 
another Member State. Indeed, rules on lis pendens and related actions could bar the 
emergence of subsequent proceedings.914 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the 
                                                
911 According to Collins “[a]n action for a negative declaration is for a declaration that the defendant has 
no valid claim or right against the plaintiff”. Note that in declaratory proceedings the role of parties is 
reversed. Therefore, consumers are defendants to the action and the trader becomes the plaintiff (L Collins, 
“Negative declarations and the Brussels Convention” [1992] 108 Law Quarterly Review 545). 
912 Ibid, 546. 
913 A Bell, “The negative declaration in transnational litigation” (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 680-
683. 
914 Gubisch, supra n 605; Tatry, supra n 520; Folien Fischer, supra n 572. 
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defendant could seek negative declaratory relief against an abstract group of victims or 
the community. According to continental law, a negative declaratory action must take 
place within an existing dispute and is not intended to solve abstract legal questions.915 
Therefore, the entities and the potential group of victims they represent should be 
identified. However, it seems particularly tricky to determine the boundaries of the group 
that will be bound by a negative declaratory action in advance.  
In light of those considerations, we advocate for the limitation of the defendant’s 
right to start actions seeking negative declaratory relief. The protective nature of the 
jurisdictional ground we propose justifies this result. Thanks to this limitation, it is 
possible to maintain the balance between parties to the proceedings. In our opinion, the 
threat of collective proceedings abroad should incentivise parties to settle, rather than 
fostering negative declaratory actions that generate complex legal issues. 
481. Terminology and type of action. In Chapter II, we put the spotlight on the 
difficulties to define the concept of “collective redress” (supra; Chapter II, I.B.). In this 
context, it has to be decided whether potential legislation on this topic should define this 
notion or not. In all cases, its content is more important than its “shape”. Consequently, 
we advocate for the inclusion of collective actions for injunctive relief, as well as 
collective actions for damages within the definition. Our research shows that the playing 
field should be levelled for both of them, given that representative entities are in a position 
of relative weakness when they protect either a general or a collective interest. In fact, in 
both actions, representative entities face similar obstacles like the cost of litigating 
abroad. The declaratory action to make a collective settlement binding has to be part of a 
private international law instrument on collective redress too. 
482. Material and territorial scope. As it was pointed out earlier, the material 
scope of Section 4 BRIbis appears to be particularly restrictive. For example, in the 
Volkswagen case, a majority of investors could probably qualify as consumers. 
Nevertheless, their access to the forum of Section 4 BRIbis may be barred, inasmuch as 
no contract binds them to the defendant.916 Along the same line of reasoning, actions 
seeking the prohibition of the use of unfair terms would equally fall outside the scope of 
                                                
915 Blomeyer, supra n 627, 43. 
916 For example, access to Section 4 BRIbis was also rejected in Kolassa, supra n 786. See also L Carballo, 
“Protección de inversores, acciones colectivas y Derecho internacional privado” (2011) 37 Revista de 
derecho de sociedades 219. 
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Section 4 BRIbis. This reasoning applies more generally to the defence of general 
consumer interests. As a result, the material scope of a jurisdictional norm covering 
collective redress claims should probably be wide enough to take into account the typical 
scenarios under which collective actions are needed.  
483. In this context, various options are possible: on the one hand, a list of 
legislations, pursuant to which collective redress would be available, might be elaborated 
on the model of the Injunctions Directive917 or the Insolvency Regulation. However, an 
exhaustive list would have to be regularly updated, and this could be a time-consuming 
process. For example, the Belgian legislator adopted this technique: Article XVII.36 of 
the Belgian Economic Code states that a collective redress claim for damages is 
admissible where the trader infringed a contractual obligation or a legislation listed in 
Article XVII.37. Said provision contains not less than 32 references to European and 
national legislations. Notably, the list encompasses competition law, as well as 
intellectual property rights. On the other hand, a list of abstract fields of law could be 
integrated to the jurisdictional norm, such as consumer protection, shareholder disputes, 
and even competition law if this is deemed convenient. Although such a list offers some 
flexibility, it could give rise to interpretative issues. A last possibility consists in defining 
the actors who may litigate through a representative entity, such as consumers and 
investors. Thanks to this technique, any consumer or investor would be able to participate 
in collective proceedings, no matter the substantive area affected. In our opinion, the 
solution selected by the Belgian legislator is the most comfortable one, as it limits 
interpretative issues and precisely pinpoints the legislations under which collective 
redress actions might be needed. 
484. As regards the territorial scope, the jurisdictional forum regarding collective 
redress could extend to defendants seated in third States, on the model of Section 4 
BRIbis. As a result, European citizens would benefit from an equal treatment no matter 
where the defendant is domiciled.918 This argument is at the origin of the extension of 
Section 4 BRI, during the revision process of the Brussels regime.919 Before that, 
consumers willing to sue defendants domiciled in third countries had to rely on national 
                                                
917 This solution was also supported by the European Parliament, Resolution supra n 341, paras 15, 24. 
918 Tang, supra n 648, 132-133. 
919 FJ Garcimartín and S Sánchez, “El nuevo Reglamento Bruselas I: qué ha cambiado en el ámbito de la 
competencia judicial” (2013) 48 Revista española de derecho europeo 13-18. 
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rules on civil procedure in order to do so. However, Member States’ private international 
law rules were highly diverse. For example, some of them did not offer consumers the 
possibility to start proceedings against foreign defendants in their own domicile. This 
situation generated an important market distortion: consumers located in the EU had 
“more” access to justice in case they sued a defendant seated in the European territory. 
Conversely, consumers litigating against defendants located outside the EU had no 
guarantee to benefit from an affordable forum. This motivated the amendment of Section 
4 BRI.  
485. In disputes involving a defendant located in a third State, special attention 
should be paid to the rise of parallel proceedings and hence, the potential application of 
Articles 33 and 34 BRIbis. Because these provisions do not apply where protective 
jurisdictional norms are at stake, parallel collective redress proceedings could emerge. 
Where collective proceedings pending in different courts are alike, one might wonder 
whether the establishment of transnational rules on civil procedure could synchronize 
courts’ work and bring legal certainty to parties. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether such 
a coordination is needed. For transnational rules to be adopted, it should first be confirmed 
that a risk of under-/overcompensation or under-/over-deterrence exists. To our 
knowledge, no evidence proves this fact. For example, our comments on the Dutch model 
highlighted that American class action settlements on the one hand, and Dutch WCAM 
settlements on the other were mutually exclusive. In the particular cases examined above, 
no sign of overlap appeared. 
486. In case of settlement, it remains to be seen whether representative entities 
from third-States could participate to the negotiations. Allowing foreign representative 
bodies to take part in a collective settlement and make it binding in a court located in the 
EU seems appealing, although it might generate various issues: for example, the 
enforcement of such a settlement over foreign absent parties might not be guaranteed and 
it is doubtful that the EU has any incentive to protect foreign consumers. Additionally, 
negotiations can be particularly complicated if representatives are located in remote 
States.  
487. Standing to sue. The promotion of the representative model for collective 
redress automatically limits the number of players who may start collective proceedings. 
In principle, only certain entities, which represent consumer collective or general 
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interests, should be able to litigate under this model. This includes at least certain 
consumer associations, and public authorities like ombudsmen. Should representative 
individuals be included within the list? This depends on one’s policy objectives: when 
many different players have standing to sue, the chances that collective proceedings start 
are potentially high. Therefore, enlarging the number of actors with the ability to present 
collective claims fosters access to justice. However, one might be concerned to limit 
standing to sue in order to guarantee that original claimants’ interests are well represented 
in court and protected. Additionally, unlimited access to courts creates the risk of 
overburdening them to the detriment of other valuable disputes. In all cases, we believe 
that the allocation of standing to sue should remain the competence of the Member States. 
Then, the standing of representative entities should benefit from a system of mutual 
recognition on the model of the Injunctions Directive. 
As we explained, the representative power of a given entity should be limited to 
the national market. Various reasons explain this limitation: to start with, a limited 
representative power confines the definition of the “class”. Therefore, in case parallel 
proceedings would pop up, they should not overlap. By this limitative measure, we aim 
at protecting the defendant from over-compensation and deterrence. In any case, we 
already highlighted under the centralisation model that representative entities may lack 
incentive to directly represent foreign consumers. As we pointed out under the centralised 
model, this generates potentially important costs that the representative entity would have 
to assume alone. Additionally, limiting the representation power of a given entity enables 
us to prevent the emergence of overlapping proceedings and judgments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  292 
4. Critical Assessment 
488. As the say goes, nobody is perfect. Neither are jurisdictional rules. Therefore, 
in the next paragraphs we put the spotlight on the different critiques to which our proposal 
could be submitted. Once again, our list is not exhaustive. 
489. Fragmentation of the internal market. One may consider that our proposal 
deviates from the EU’s policy, which consists in withdrawing internal barriers to the 
European market. Somehow, the specific forum we drafted acknowledges the differences 
that exist between Member States without trying to overcome them. Additionally, it 
opposes the current legislative trend towards harmonisation.  
In fact, the creation of a specific forum for collective redress actions in the 
domicile of the representative entity contrasts with the usual top-down approach followed 
by the EU. However, we have put the spotlight on the drawbacks that this method entails: 
legislative proposals imposed from the highest level sometimes overlook practical aspects 
that affect their feasibility and effectiveness. Proof of this fact is the moderated success 
of the Injunctions Directive, as well as the European Small Claims Procedure, just to 
mention those examples. Conversely, our proposal suggests that a bottom-up approach is 
preferable. Accordingly, our investigation project has inquired into practice and has 
highlighted the difficulties that may hinder access to justice. As a result, our research has 
showed that the more one tries to centralise collective redress actions in a single forum, 
the more distance is put between a victim and the court having jurisdiction. In such a 
context, access to justice is merely conceptual and hence, cannot be guaranteed in all 
cases. Altough the creation of a specific forum for collective redress in the domicile of 
the representative entity may not be aligned with the current reforms that aim at 
reinforcing the internal market, it has the benefit of being a realistic option built upon 
practical observations. Additionally, the solution we propose is respectful of its 
environment in the sense that it does not impose harmonisation of national procedures. 
Moreover, it complies with European law, as well as private international law principles. 
Later on, and depending on the evolution of the internal market, another, more 
“centralising”, solution may be adopted. Today, however, it seems to us that the actual 
guarantee of access to justice needs to be further improved. Besides, we believe that its 
guarantee should precede the perfection of the internal market, as the latter cannot be 
achieved without the first. 
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490. Fragmentation of litigation. Opponents to our proposal may argue that the 
solution we drafted fosters undesirable parallel litigation. Indeed, allocating jurisdiction 
to the courts of the Member State where the representative entity is located and limiting 
its representation power to national interests creates a fertile ground for parallel 
proceedings. This automatically raises questions regarding coordination of collective 
redress actions, in order to avoid the issuance of judgments that may overlap. 
The rise of distinct but similar proceedings can take place at two different stages: 
on the one hand, two or more collective redress actions with a similar object and/or 
involving the same parties that are pending in the courts of different Member States may 
overlap. On the other hand, issues may equally emerge when two judgments regarding an 
identical dispute are to be recognised and enforced in a given Member State.  
491. There are various weapons against the concurrence of similar actions, 
including forum non conveniens, lis pendens, anti-suit injunctions and clawback 
actions.920 As we know, the Brussels regime tackles parallel proceedings through its rules 
on lis pendens and related actions. As we highlighted earlier (supra; § 399), however, 
when concurrent collective redress actions are pending in different courts, Article 29 
BRIbis is unlikely to apply, since those actions often technically involve different parties. 
In practice, “classes” may nevertheless overlap, as we highlighted in the Volkswagen case 
(supra; § 399). This explains why one representative entity’s power should be limited to 
the litigation of national interests only.  
492. On the contrary, Article 30(1) BRIbis on related actions has the ability to 
prevent the issuance of potentially inconsistent collective redress judgments. Pursuant to 
this provision, the courts where subsequent proceedings start could suspend them in order 
to adapt their decision to the firstly issued judgment. Yet, rules on related actions are not 
mandatory and national courts possess a discretionary power to suspend proceedings or 
not. Therefore, in order to guarantee the coherence of pending collective redress cases, it 
could be useful to oblige courts to suspend proceedings when both collective redress 
actions share the same object. Accordingly, the secondly seised court should be able to 
deviate from the first judgment only if significant differences separate the two cases. 
                                                
920 GA Bermann, “Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence Possible?” (2011) 21 Yearbook of Private 
International Law 21-36. 
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Typically, this would happen where distinct substantive laws apply. This solution would 
maintain the coherence of the outcome for all parties. 
493. This option has also been adopted in the US. A look at the US experience 
shows that the centralisation of class actions in a single forum rarely happens. Rather, 
parallel proceedings are tolerated in the name of federalism and overlapping jurisdictional 
grounds (supra; Chapter I, II.B.2.). In Europe, although the procedural system is not 
based on federalism, jurisdictional rules sometimes multiply the courts with jurisdiction 
over a dispute. Therefore, concurrent actions cannot be totally avoided. In such a context 
and in light of the US experience, we believe that an obligation to suspend proceedings 
and take into account the content of a first collective redress judgment is an appropriate 
and soft coordination measure.  
494. Yet, when various class actions are pending in different US federal courts, 
pre-trial issues can be centralised through MDL. Therefore, consolidation of proceedings 
is possible at the federal level. In Europe, Article 30(2) BRIbis also states that 
consolidation should be allowed at the request of one party if proceedings are both 
pending in first instance and the court first seised has jurisdiction. In light of this, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether consolidation of collective redress proceedings should be 
allowed in the courts of the representative entity’s domicile. In our opinion, if 
representative entities consent to it, they should be able to consolidate proceedings in the 
domicile of one of them. However, this cannot be imposed by the defendant, as 
consolidation implies the continuation of the action in another Member State, which 
generates an additional cost. Naturally, consolidation should also be possible in case 
representative entities are willing to litigate in the forum of the defendant’s domicile. 
495. The overlap of concurrent collective redress actions may also take place at 
the recognition and enforcement stage. Technically, however, the emergence of parallel 
collective redress proceedings should not give rise to “irreconcilable” judgments pursuant 
to Article 45(1) BRIbis. According to this provision, judgments are irreconcilable if they 
involve the same parties. Unless the definition of the “class” overlap, this is not likely to 
happen. In theory, therefore, collective redress judgments, whose outcomes are different, 
may perfectly coexist from a private international law perspective. In practice, however, 
if the definition of the “class” overlaps, over-compensation and deterrence might occur. 
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In order to avoid such a situation, we suggested that the representative power of a 
consumer association should be limited to the national market in which it is active.  
496. Recognition and enforcement. In the next paragraphs, we examine whether 
one can hinder the recognition and enforcement process of collective redress judgments 
and thus, put into jeopardy their free movement. We then tackle the same question as 
regards collective redress settlements.  
In case a collective redress judgment is issued in the domicile of the representative 
entity, a potential recognition and enforcement process will probably take place in the 
defendant’s domicile. Indeed, it is reasonable to suppose that the defendant will usually 
have his assets where he is domiciled. Accordingly, this means that representative entities 
will be forced to start recognition and enforcement proceedings abroad against reluctant 
defendants. This might be expensive and time-consuming. This problem has been 
highlighted for example by the pre-Injunctions Directive cases mentioned above (supra; 
§§ 286-287). Nevertheless, this issue should tend to disappear due to the simplification 
of the recognition and enforcement system.  
In absence of any other specific provision, the BRIbis should apply to collective 
redress judgments issued within the EU. Under the Brussels regime, the recognition and 
enforcement system is facilitated in civil and commercial matters, including collective 
redress judgments. However, it still has to be examined whether grounds for refusal may 
put the free movement of collective redress judgments into jeopardy. We mentioned 
earlier some of those grounds in relationship to the recognition and enforcement of US 
class action judgments in Europe (supra; § 296). Our explanations are also valid as far as 
collective redress judgments are concerned to a certain extent. To be more specific, some 
Member State courts might reject the recognition and enforcement of a collective redress 
judgment based on an opt-out procedure. Similarly, they can call into question the 
notification process that was used in light of the right of parties to be heard. However, 
Article 45(e)(i) BRIbis should not constitute any ground for refusal in case our proposal 
is adopted, as it would clearly allocate a jurisdictional power to courts over collective 
redress cases. In this context, we acknowledge that a potential risk of non-recognition and 
enforcement exists, due to the heterogeneity of collective redress mechanisms. 
Specifically, the ordre public could be used as a basis of denial. 
At the time the BRI was under revision, the Commission rejected the possibility 
of abolishing exequatur for collective redress judgments, since too different procedural 
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models were implemented in Member States. As for the Paris-Rio guidelines,921 they 
suggest a more audacious approach, whereby rules on recognition and enforcement 
should refrain national courts from rejecting collective redress judgments just because 
they are based on an opt-out mechanim. Additionally, the guidelines state that recognition 
and enforcement should be promoted where the due process rights of absent claimants 
have been respected. The same applies where the notification process is deemed to be 
appropriate. 
497. As regards collective redress settlements, they benefit from Article 59 
BRIbis as they qualify as “court settlement” in the sense of Article 2(b) BRIbis. 
Accordingly, settlements that are enforceable in the Member State of origin are submitted 
to the enforcement regime applicable to authentic instruments. As a result, the only 
ground for refusal that has the ability to stop the enforcement process is the ordre public. 
Again, this gives Member States some room to reject the enforcement of collective 
redress settlements based on an opt-out basis, for example. 
498. To sum up, it is not clear to us whether a modification of the current system 
is necessary, since Member States’ experience regarding the recognition and enforcement 
of European collective redress judgments and settlements remains limited for the time 
being.922 However, the adoption of a specific rule on recognition and enforcement for 
collective redress judgments and settlements is conceivable. This measure would 
certainly facilitate and reduce the costs of the recognition and enforcement of such 
judgments and setllements abroad. We would draft this specific rule according to the 
Paris-Rio guidelines that takes an innovative approach by setting the grounds for refusal 
that can or cannot be invoked. Finally, said specific rule could be introduced either in the 
BRIbis or in another piece of legislation regarding collective redress.  
 
 
 
                                                
921 ILA, supra n 891, Section 10. 
922 D Fairgrieve, “The Impact of The Brussels I Enforcement and Recognition Rules on Collective Actions” 
in Fairgrieve and Lein, supra n 94, 178-186. 
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III. Conclusion 
499. Ideally, collective redress actions in the EU should be centralised in a single 
forum. This result would perfectly be in line with the principle of sound administration 
of justice. In practice, however, this principle is sometimes in tension with other 
fundamental values, policies and objectives of private international law such as the 
desirability of access to justice. In light of this, a solution that would comply with all 
these principles is rather unrealistic.  
In such a context, Chapter IV of this research project highlights the difficulties of 
finding an appropriate forum where parties could bring collective redress actions. To start 
with, Article 4 BRIbis does not currently offer an accessible forum for consumers and 
their representatives. Moreover, it seems that it is hardly ever used. As regards Article 
7(2) BRIbis, it may only be useful for the defence of general consumer interests. Then, 
most proposals for reform attempt to accommodate collective redress to the Brussels 
regime. Such attempt of reconciliation is however predestined to fail: how could 
collective redress, which naturally involves multiple claimants or a community fit in a 
legislation based on the two-party-proceedings principle? For this reason, most proposals 
are often partial solutions. 
500. As a result, we advocate for the creation of a new jurisdictional ground, based 
on the representative and the Dutch models: in our opinion, collective litigation should 
take place in the courts of the domicile of the representative entity that litigates on behalf 
of national consumers or their general interest. Alternatively, the forum of the defendant’s 
domicile should remain open. Moreover, we promote the conclusion of out-of-court 
settlements by endorsing the Dutch collective redress model. Courts of the domicile of 
any party –either a representative entity or the defendant– participating to the collective 
settlement should have jurisdiction to make it binding. On the positive side of the balance, 
our proposal respects the core principles of private international law and fosters access to 
justice.  
On the negative side of the balance, however, our solution does not spare judicial 
resources by centralising all collective actions in a single forum. Consequently, it may 
give rise to parallel proceedings and thus, overlapping judgments. Nevertheless, because 
collective redress mechanisms and actions are so different, this risk appears to be limited. 
Besides, we consider that the application of a rule on related actions should also 
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participate in the limitation of such a risk. Finally, although the recognition and 
enforcement of collective redress judgments and settlments will often have to be started 
abroad, the facilitated regime established by the BRIbis should smooth that process. If 
the invocation of the ordre public refrains their free movement within the Union, the 
adoption of a specific rule dealing with the recognition and enforcement of collective 
redress judgments and settlements is conceivable. 
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. As we announced in the introduction, the objective of the present research 
project consists in facilitating cross-border collective redress actions within the EU (§§ 
7-8). In order to achieve this goal, two paths could be followed. On the one hand, 
harmonisation of national procedures, which seems to be the measure that looms in the 
Commission’s head, could be achieved pursuant to Article 114 TFEU (infra; I.). Such a 
measure relies on the current heterogeneity that characterises collective redress 
mechanisms implemented in the EU. On the other hand, our proposal suggests that the 
reform of European private international law rules on jurisdiction would represent a more 
appropriate measure (infra; II.). This idea stems from the belief that private international 
law has the ability to significantly reduce obstacles to cross-border litigation. Those 
measures constitute the two fundamental points around which we have built up our final 
conclusions.  
I. Harmonisation of Collective Redress Mechanisms: Unity over Diversity 
2. Collective redress mechanisms implemented by Member States are 
characterised by their heterogeneity. To such extent that a clear-cut definition of 
collective redress that would encompass all national schemes is impossible to provide (§§ 
109-111). In this context, only a comparative approach could help us to understand this 
phenomenon. We chose the US class action as a point of reference (Chapter I). Because 
of the many abuses generated by class actions, Member States primarily adopted 
instruments with antagonistic structural features (Chapter II, I.D.). This trend was also 
encouraged by the Recommendation of 2013 issued by the Commission, which requires 
Member States to couple their collective redress mechanisms with safeguards, but 
without building up the corresponding incentives to litigate (§§ 173-180). Unfortunately, 
these legislative choices have often affected the efficiency of collective redress 
mechanisms. This has encouraged national legislators to undertake different reforms with 
the purpose of fixing those undesirable effects (§ 107).  
3. In light of the above, since 2007, the European institutions have tried to bring 
some uniformity to the current landscape. Therefore, they have gathered information on 
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collective redress mechanisms adopted by Member States and have met with 
representative stakeholders (§§ 149-163). The Union then presented many policy options 
aimed at implementing collective redress in Europe. Fulfilling the private enforcement 
gap without affecting the rights of the defence are the main objectives pursued by the 
European institutions (§§ 170-180).  
4. In such a context, European institutions may believe that harmonisation of 
national collective redress mechanisms is the appropriate way to regulate collective 
redress, pursuant to Article 114 TFEU (§§ 204-208). Indeed, procedural differences are 
likely to be perceived as obstacles to the internal market, which refrain people from 
shopping abroad. This can be inferred from the documents released by the Commission 
(§ 179). Therefore, a harmonisation measure would supposedly remove barriers in the 
internal market, and thus, encourage people to engage in cross-border activities. 
5. Nevertheless, we argue that harmonisation of collective redress mechanisms 
would only partially tackle obstacles in cross-border litigation (§§ 209-220). Moreover, 
the assumption that procedural harmonisation should encourage people to shop and 
litigate abroad in case of conflict remains a rhetorical argument which to date, that has 
not been sufficiently demonstrated. Along the same line of reasoning, Article 114 TFEU 
can only be used “[s]ave where otherwise provided in the Treaties”. The principle of 
proportionality and subsidiarity command the same approach. As a result, and since the 
beneficial aspects of harmonisation are not satisfactorily supported by empirical 
evidence, we believe that such a measure would be too incisive. Instead, we consider that 
a regulation dealing with private international law aspects of collective redress represents 
a better option. 
6. Although a private international law approach would be followed, our idea 
regarding what an appropriate measure should look like might well clash with the EU’s 
vision. Having the construction of the internal market in mind, the latter might be tempted 
to suggest that collective redress actions should be centralised in a single forum –
presumably the domicile of the defendant or the place where the majority of victims is 
located. As we demonstrate in the last Chapter of this thesis, however, a centralisation 
model is predestined to fail, since it does not create sufficient incentives for consumers 
and their representatives to initiate proceedings in other Member States (§§ 447-454). In 
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other words, centralisation does not take into account the practical obstacles to cross-
border litigation. 
7. In particular, our research project has emphasised that the start of actions in 
another Member State, including collective redress actions, is still rare (§§ 414-415). In 
order to demonstrate this fact, we have made references to various documents. For 
instance, the Evaluation Study on the effectiveness and efficiency of collective redress 
mechanisms in the European Union states that only 10% of the actions brought entailed 
an international component. Similarly, the Reports on the Injunctions Directive mention 
that representative entities hardly ever start actions in another Member State. The 
questionnaire we drafted for consumer associations confirms this fact: usually, Article 
7(2) BRIbis is used by those market players in order to initiate cross-border actions “at 
home” (§ 300). In our opinion, this demonstrates that consumer associations and other 
similar representatives have to deal with significant barriers which refrain them from 
initiating actions abroad. 
II. Our Proposal: Access to Justice over Unity 
8. These considerations have led us to conclude that a specific forum for collective 
redress actions which takes into account those practical problems should be created 
(Chapter IV, II.B.). This is so, because of the patent unsuitability of collective redress to 
the BRIbis. Indeed, European private international law rules on jurisdiction mismatch the 
four predominant collective redress models implemented in the EU –namely the 
representative model (§§ 272-275), the Dutch model (§§ 305-310), the class action model 
(§ 341) and the test case procedure (§§ 376-380). Specifically, our research project shows 
that collective redress actions may only be centralised in the forum of Articles 4 BRIbis, 
as well as Article 7(2) BRIbis –to a certain extent. Nevertheless, those provisions do not 
offer an accessible forum for claimants (§§ 418-424). Furthermore, our analysis regarding 
the German test case procedure shows that even though centralisation can be achieved at 
the defendant’s domicile, this hardly ever happens in practice. Instead, parallel and 
potentially overlapping proceedings often take place (§§ 398-401). Despite the above-
mentioned difficulties, the BRIbis did not take the opportunity to regulate collective 
redress at the time of its last revision process. 
  302 
9. In light of the above, proposals for reform have popped up essentially among 
scholars and private organisations. Unfortunately, those proposals often represent partial 
solutions and do not take into account the practical problems faced by consumers and 
their representatives (§§ 425-436). This led us to create a tailored private international 
law solution, which appropriately deals with cross-border collective redress.  
10. Relying on the above-mentioned observations, we believe that a specific 
forum for collective redress actions should protect consumers and investors, who are 
often small-value claimants in need of a procedural vehicle to “drive” their claims (§§ 
462-469). In particular, we suggest that representative entities –such as consumer 
associations– should have standing to bring collective redress actions against defendants 
located abroad in the courts of their own domicile. However, the possibility to litigate in 
the forum of Article 4 BRIbis has to remain available for those who can reach such a 
forum. Our proposal offers some additional incentives in order to encourage litigation at 
this place, such as the mutual recognition of representatives’ standing to sue. 
Additionally, it should also be possible for parties to make their collective redress 
agreements binding in those fora, on the model of the Dutch WCAM. This scheme 
deserves to be promoted, since it reduces courts’ workload and encourages the use of 
ADR. 
11. Our proposal represents a simple and easy to implement solution, which 
facilitates access to justice by re-establishing the balance between market players (§§ 
465-469). It adopts a bottom-up approach that may not be aligned with the traditional 
approach followed by the European institutions described above (§ 489). However, our 
proposal is realistic and feasible. It gives preference to access to justice over the 
achievement of the internal market, since the latter cannot survive without the first. We 
argue that the construction of the internal market is not mature enough for a centralisation 
model to be implemented. Furthermore, our proposal follows private international law 
principles and respects Member States’ procedural autonomy. It leaves them the 
responsibility to work on the efficiency of collective redress mechanisms. We think that 
national legal orders are in the best position to evaluate the effectiveness of their own 
procedural tools and subsequently reform them if needed.  
12. In case our proposal is adopted, other elements should be determined and 
perfected. Among other aspects, important structural questions should be solved (§§ 470-
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487), such as the type of instrument that would crystallise the proposal –an independent 
legislative act or a jurisdictional rule implemented in the BRIbis–, the nature of the 
jurisdictional rule to be adopted –general, alternative, protective or exclusive–, the types 
of actions encompassed –actions for injunctive relief and/or damages–, the material scope 
of the proposal –horizontal or substantially limited measure– and the allocation of 
standing. Similarly, the creation of a tailored forum in the domicile of the representative 
entity may generate private international law challenges (§§ 490-498). In particular, this 
means that we would have to deal with potentially concurrent actions and make sure that 
Member States do not oppose unreasonable grounds of refusal to the recognition and 
enforcement of collective redress judgments and settlements. In order to avoid such 
issues, our proposal suggests that the representative power of an entity should be limited 
to national interests, so that “classes” do not overlap. Additionally, we do not exclude the 
enactment of a specific provision dealing with recognition and enforcement of collective 
redress judgments and settlements. 
13. To sum up, we hope to have convinced the reader that access to justice should 
precede the achievement of the internal market, as it is a prerequisite for trust, further 
integration and unity. Our proposal advocates the implementation of a system that works 
and effectively guarantees consumers access to courts and compensation for their harm. 
The fact that a centralisation system was discarded does not misalign it with European 
policy objectives. As the saying goes, “all roads lead to Rome”, our proposal too will end 
up building up confidence in the market. It has just taken a different, more realistic, path. 
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CONCLUSIONES FINALES 
1. Como hemos anunciado anteriormente, el propósito de la tesis doctoral es 
facilitar la interposición de recursos colectivos en la UE (§§ 7-8). Para alcanzar nuestra 
meta, hemos considerado las siguientes opciones: por una parte, la armonización de los 
mecanismos de acciones colectivas a través del artículo 114 TFUE, una medida que 
parece favorecer la Comisión (infra; I.). La armonización se justifica por la gran 
heterogeneidad que caracteriza la variedad de instrumentos que han implementado los 
legisladores nacionales. Por otra parte, nuestra propuesta considera que una reforma de 
las normas europeas de competencia judicial internacional sería una opción más 
apropiada (infra; II.). Esta afirmación se basa en la premisa de que el derecho 
internacional privado puede reducir de manera significativa los obstáculos que impiden 
la iniciación de procedimientos transfronterizos. Estas dos opciones constituyen los 
puntos fundamentales en torno a los cuales construimos nuestras conclusiones finales. 
 
I. La armonización de los mecanismos de acciones colectivas: la unidad antes que 
la diversidad 
2. Los mecanismos de acciones colectivas se caracterizan por su heterogeneidad 
y por ello no se puede proporcionar una definición clara que abarque todos los 
instrumentos implementados en el territorio europeo (§§ 109-111). Por consiguiente, sólo 
un ejercicio de derecho comparado nos puede ayudar a entender este fenómeno. 
Naturalmente, hemos elegido la acción colectiva estadounidense como punto de 
referencia (Capítulo I). A la luz de los abusos cometidos en los Estados Unidos, 
observamos que los Estados miembros de la UE han equipado sus mecanismos de 
acciones colectivas con características estructurales opuestas a las acciones 
norteamericanas (Capítulo II, I.D.). De hecho, la Recomendación de 2013 publicada por 
la Comisión aconseja la adopción de instrumentos procesales junto con salvaguardias, 
pero no menciona la creación de los correspondientes incentivos (§§ 173-180). 
Desafortunadamente, estas decisiones de política legislativa han afectado la eficacia de 
las acciones colectivas y los legisladores nacionales intentan solucionarlo a través de 
reformas (§ 107). 
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3. A raíz de estas consideraciones, las instituciones europeas han tratado de 
aportar cierta uniformidad al panorama actual. Es por esto que han recabado información 
sobre los mecanismos de acciones colectivas adoptados por los Estados miembros y han 
consultado a las partes interesadas (§§ 149-163). En definitiva, la Unión ha presentado 
distintas alternativas para implementar las acciones colectivas en su seno, con el objetivo 
de reforzar la aplicación de los derechos de los consumidores sin que ello afecte los 
derechos del demandado (§§ 170-180). 
4. Las instituciones europeas parecen considerar que la armonización de los 
mecanismos de acciones colectivas de acuerdo al artículo 114 TFEU es un método 
apropiado (§§ 204-208). Acorde con esta visión, las diferencias entre las normas 
procesales constituyen obstáculos para la construcción del mercado interior y disuaden 
las actividades transfronterizas. Esto se deduce de los documentos publicados por la 
Comisión (§ 179). Por consiguiente, la armonización suprimiría supuestamente los 
obstáculos en el mercado interior y estimularía las compras transfronterizas. 
5. Sin embargo, dudamos de que la armonización de los mecanismos de acciones 
colectivas suprima los obstáculos antes mencionados (§§ 209-220). En particular, la 
premisa a partir de la cual la armonización de las normativas procesales induciría a las 
personas a adquirir servicios y productos en otros Estados miembros, así como interponer 
sus demandas en dichos estados, es una especulación que no ha sido suficientemente 
probada hasta ahora. Además, el artículo 114 TFUE es de aplicación “salvo que los 
Tratados dispongan otra cosa”. Los principios de proporcionalidad y de subsidiaridad nos 
llevan a la misma conclusión. Consecuentemente, y en ausencia de datos empíricos sobre 
esta cuestión, consideramos que la armonización procesal es una medida demasiado 
incisiva. En cambio, opinamos que la regulación de ciertos aspectos de derecho 
internacional privado sobre las acciones colectivas constituye una mejor opción. 
6. Si nuestro planteamiento fuera adoptado, es probable que no estuviéramos de 
acuerdo con la UE acerca de la forma que debería de tener una actuación a nivel de 
derecho internacional privado. Teniendo en cuenta la construcción del mercado interior, 
la UE podría considerar oportuna la centralización de los procedimientos colectivos en 
un único foro –supuestamente el domicilio del demandado o el lugar en el que la mayoría 
de las víctimas se encuentren. Sin embargo, como lo demuestra el último capítulo de la 
tesis doctoral, un modelo centralizado está condenado al fracaso, pues no crea suficientes 
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incentivos para los consumidores y sus representantes en caso de que deseen interponer 
sus demandas en otros Estados (§§ 447-454). En otras palabras, este modelo no toma en 
cuenta las barreras que en la práctica impiden las acciones transfronterizas. 
7. En particular, nuestro proyecto de investigación pone de relieve que la 
interposición de procedimientos en el extranjero es inhabitual (§§ 414-415). Varios 
documentos evidencian este hecho. Por ejemplo, el estudio publicado por la Comisión 
que evalúa la eficiencia y la eficacia de las acciones colectivas en la Unión europea 
establece que sólo el 10% de las acciones interpuestas conllevan un elemento 
internacional. Igualmente, los informes que evalúan la Directiva sobre acciones de 
cesación mencionan que las asociaciones y entidades similares no suelen interponer 
acciones en otros Estados miembros. El cuestionario que elaboramos dirigido a las 
asociaciones de consumidores confirma este hecho: en principio, estos actores utilizan el 
artículo 7(2) RBIbis para interponer acciones transfronterizas ante los tribunales de su 
propio mercado (§ 300). En nuestra opinión, estos elementos demuestran que numerosos 
obstáculos todavía impiden que las acciones de las asociaciones de consumidores se 
interpongan en otros Estados. 
 
II. Nuestra propuesta: el acceso a la justicia antes que la unidad 
8. A la luz de estas consideraciones y ante el desencaje entre las reglas de 
competencia judicial y las acciones colectivas, concluimos que es necesaria la creación 
de un foro específico para dichas acciones, que tome en cuenta los obstáculos antes 
identificados (Capítulo IV, II.B.).  Efectivamente, hemos tenido ocasión de comprobar la 
incompatibilidad del RBIbis con los cuatro modelos de acciones colectivas de la UE –es 
decir, el modelo representative (§§ 272-275), el modelo holandés (§§ 305-310), el modelo 
de acción colectiva (§ 341) y el procedimiento de caso piloto (§§ 376-380). En particular, 
la presente tesis doctoral observa que las acciones colectivas sólo se consiguen interponer 
en los foros de los artículos 4 y, en cierta medida, 7(2) RBIbis. Sin embargo, estas 
disposiciones no garantizan la accesibilidad del foro para los demandantes (§§ 418-424). 
Además, nuestro análisis sobre el modelo alemán nos muestra que, si bien la acción 
colectiva puede interponerse en el domicilio del demandado, esto no suele ocurrir en la 
práctica. Por lo contrario, se generan procedimientos paralelos y potencialmente 
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concurrentes (§§ 398-401). A pesar de estas dificultades, el RBIbis no aprovechó la 
oportunidad de regular las acciones colectivas en el momento de su revisión.  
9. En este contexto, la doctrina y ciertas organizaciones privadas han elaborado 
propuestas de reforma. Desafortunadamente, estas propuestas ofrecen soluciones 
parciales y tampoco toman en cuenta los problemas prácticos a los que se enfrentan los 
consumidores y sus representantes (§§ 425-436). Estas observaciones nos incitaron a 
crear una solución satisfactoria para las acciones colectivas transfronterizas a través del 
derecho internacional privado. 
10. En particular, consideramos que un foro “a medida” para tales acciones tiene 
que proteger a los consumidores y los inversores, cuyas pretensiones no siempre gozan 
de un instrumento procesal que ofrezca protección (§§ 462-469). Además, consideramos 
que entidades –como asociaciones de consumidores– deben tener legitimación activa para 
interponer acciones colectivas en su propio domicilio en contra de demandados que se 
encuentran en otros Estados. Sin embargo, la posibilidad de litigar en el foro del domicilio 
del demandado quedaría abierta para los que puedan asumirlo. Nuestra propuesta 
proporciona incentivos adicionales, como el reconocimiento mutuo de la legitimación 
activa de los representantes, para estimular la centralización de las controversias en este 
lugar. Finalmente, acuerdos colectivos también se pueden presentar en los foros antes 
mencionados, siguiendo el modelo holandés. Este mecanismo es digno de ser promulgado 
puesto que reduce de manera significativa el trabajo de los tribunales y estimula el uso de 
las ADR. 
11. Nuestra propuesta presenta una solución simple y fácil de implementar que 
facilita el acceso a la justicia, pues reestablece el equilibrio procesal entre las partes (§§ 
465-469). Adopta un planteamiento “bottum-up” que puede no estar alineado con el 
método tradicional normalmente seguido por la UE (§ 489). Sin embargo, nuestra 
propuesta es realista y factible. Favorece el acceso a la justica más que la construcción 
del mercado interior, puesto que el último no puede alcanzarse sin la existencia del 
primero. Argumentamos que el desarrollo del mercado interior no es suficientemente 
maduro para la implementación de un modelo centralizado. Además, nuestra propuesta 
sigue los principios de derecho internacional privado y respecta la autonomía procesal de 
los Estados miembros. Al estar mejor posicionados, los legisladores nacionales 
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mantienen la responsabilidad de incrementar la eficacia de sus mecanismos de acciones 
colectivas y proponer reformas si es necesario. 
12. En caso de que nuestra propuesta se adopte, sería necesario refinar 
determinados elementos. Por ejemplo, haría falta pulir ciertas cuestiones estructurales (§§ 
470-487), como el tipo de instrumento que se debe adoptar –un acto legislativo 
independiente o una nueva regla de competencia judicial en el RBIbis–, la naturaleza del 
foro que se adopta –general, alternativo, de protección o exclusivo–, el tipo de acciones 
que se pretenden regular –de cesación o daños–, el ámbito material exacto de la propuesta 
–horizontal o sustancialmente limitado– y la asignación de la legitimación activa. 
Igualmente, la creación de un foro específico en el domicilio del representante suscita 
cuestiones de derecho internacional privado (§§ 490-498). Por ejemplo, un foro de este 
tipo puede generar procedimientos paralelos y potencialmente concurrentes. Además, los 
Estados miembros podrían rechazar el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las sentencias y 
acuerdos colectivos oponiendo argumentos irrazonables. Para evitar tal resultado, nuestra 
propuesta limita el poder representativo de las asociaciones de consumidores y entidades 
similares a los intereses del mercado nacional. De este modo, las personas o intereses 
representados no se solaparán. Así mismo, no excluimos la creación de una disposición 
específica sobre el reconocimiento y la ejecución de las sentencias y acuerdos colectivos. 
13. A modo de conclusión, esperamos haber convencido al lector de que el acceso 
a la justicia tiene que preceder el perfeccionamiento del mercado interior, puesto que es 
un prerrequisito para la confianza, la integración y la unidad. Nuestra propuesta defiende 
la construcción de un sistema operativo que garantice la aplicación de los derechos y la 
reparación de los daños. El hecho de que un sistema centralizado haya sido descartado no 
significa que nuestra propuesta no encaje con los objetivos europeos de política 
legislativa. Como “todos los caminos conducen a Roma”, nuestra propuesta también 
construye la confianza en el mercado. Aunque sigue un camino distinto y más realista. 
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ANNEXES 
I. United States’ most Relevant Provisions on Class Actions 
Rule 23. Class Actions* 
(a) Prerequisites. 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf 
of all members only if:  
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses 
of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Types of Class Actions. 
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:  
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class members would create a 
risk of:  
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that 
would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, 
would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual 
adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally 
to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The 
matters pertinent to these findings include:  
                                                
* We extracted the text of this provision from SS Gensler, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 
Commentary, available on WestlawNext 
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(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by 
or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; and 
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
(c) Certification Order; Notice to Class Members; Judgment; Issues Classes; 
Subclasses.  
(1) Certification Order. 
(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class 
representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class 
action. 
(B) Defining the Class; Appointing Class Counsel. An order that certifies a class action 
must define the class and the class claims, issues, or defenses, and must appoint class 
counsel under Rule 23(g). 
(C) Altering or Amending the Order. An order that grants or denies class certification 
may be altered or amended before final judgment. 
(2) Notice. 
(A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b) or (b)(2), the 
court may direct appropriate notice to the class. 
(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct 
to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including 
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The 
notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language:  
(i) the nature of the action; 
(ii) the definition of the class certified; 
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; 
(iv) that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the member so 
desires; 
(v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; 
(vi) the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and 
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3). 
(3) Judgment. 
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Whether or not favorable to the class, the judgment in a class action must:  
(A) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), include and describe those whom 
the court finds to be class members; and 
(B) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), include and specify or describe those to 
whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and 
whom the court finds to be class members. 
(4) Particular Issues. 
When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect 
to particular issues. 
(5) Subclasses. 
When appropriate, a class may be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a class 
under this rule. 
(d) Conducting the Action. 
(1) In General. 
In conducting an action under this rule, the court may issue orders that:  
(A) determine the course of proceedings or prescribe measures to prevent undue repetition 
or complication in presenting evidence or argument; 
(B) require—to protect class members and fairly conduct the action—giving appropriate 
notice to some or all class members of:  
(i) any step in the action; 
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment; or 
(iii) the members' opportunity to signify whether they consider the representation fair and 
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or to otherwise come into the 
action; 
(C) impose conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; 
(D) require that the pleadings be amended to eliminate allegations about representation 
of absent persons and that the action proceed accordingly; or 
(E) deal with similar procedural matters. 
(2) Combining and Amending Orders. 
An order under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or amended from time to time and may be 
combined with an order under Rule 16. 
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or Compromise. 
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The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, 
or compromised only with the court's approval. The following procedures apply to a 
proposed settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise:  
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would 
be bound by the proposal. 
(2) If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a 
hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate. 
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a statement identifying any agreement made in 
connection with the proposal. 
(4) If the class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse 
to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to 
individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not 
do so. 
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal if it requires court approval under this 
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn only with the court's approval. 
(f) Appeals. 
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action 
certification under this rule if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit 
clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal does not stay proceedings in the 
district court unless the district judge or the court of appeals so orders. 
(g) Class Counsel. 
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. 
Unless a statute provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must appoint class 
counsel. In appointing class counsel, the court:  
(A) must consider:  
(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the action; 
(ii) counsel's experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and the types 
of claims asserted in the action; 
(iii) counsel's knowledge of the applicable law; and  
(iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class; 
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent to counsel's ability to fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the class; 
(C) may order potential class counsel to provide information on any subject pertinent to 
the appointment and to propose terms for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs; 
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(D) may include in the appointing order provisions about the award of attorney's fees or 
nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and 
(E) may make further orders in connection with the appointment. 
(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel. 
When one applicant seeks appointment as class counsel, the court may appoint that 
applicant only if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1) and (4). If more than one 
adequate applicant seeks appointment, the court must appoint the applicant best able to 
represent the interests of the class. 
(3) Interim Counsel. 
The court may designate interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class before 
determining whether to certify the action as a class action. 
(4) Duty of Class Counsel. 
Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. 
(h) Attorney's Fees and Nontaxable Costs. 
In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees and nontaxable 
costs that are authorized by law or by the parties' agreement. The following procedures 
apply:  
(1) A claim for an award must be made by motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the 
provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the court sets. Notice of the motion must be 
served on all parties and, for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a 
reasonable manner. 
(2) A class member, or a party from whom payment is sought, may object to the motion. 
(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find the facts and state its legal conclusions 
under Rule 52(a). 
(4) The court may refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special master or a 
magistrate judge, as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D). 
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II. Models of Collective Redress in the EU State by State 
The comparative Table below presents the distinct collective redress mechanisms 
adopted by some Member States. In particular, the Table identifies the most important 
structural elements that characterise collective redress mechanisms: for each procedural 
tool, we provide the law or provisions upon which it is based,923 as well as a short 
description of the mechanism in order to facilitate the understanding of the reader. We 
then detail the requirements for certification; identify the participation rule, the actors 
having standing to sue, the remedies available and the specific procedure that has to be 
followed in case there is one.  
Although some comparative studies are already available on the market, we chose 
to make our own comparative analysis for the following reasons: to start with, the works 
that have been publish until now often included various national experts. Because these 
come from different legal cultures, they do not use the same wording and thus, this 
significantly complicates comparisons. Furthermore, not all available studies were 
updated. As a result, and because we anyway had to become familiar with all the 
collective redress mechanisms, we decided to build up our own Table. 
It is to be highlighted that the construction of this comparative table triggered 
several issues: to start with, some national mechanisms have not received any comment 
in one of the languages we understand yet. Therefore, an exhaustive analysis for certain 
devices could not be provided. This is typically the case of Member States located in 
Eastern Europe. Additionally, because some of those instruments are relatively recent, 
the available information was scarce. The unavailability of academic papers or other 
works made this investigation particularly thorny. In any case, each procedural device is 
accompanied with a bibliography, thanks to which the comparative table was made.  
In the following paragraphs, we make some particular comments on the national 
instruments of collective redress 
The Netherlands. Note that no updated translation of the civil code, as well as 
the civil code of procedure was available in English. Therefore, we were not able to 
comment the new pre-trial procedure under Article 1018a DCC. Additionally, the bill 
aiming at introducing a new collective redress action for damage is not included in the 
                                                
923 Access to these legal basis is possible through the Bibliography. 
  316 
Table since no English version is available yet. The same applies to the Explanatory 
memorandum. 
France. We found contradictory evidence as regards the availability of remedies 
under the joint representative action. On the one hand, the French Report prepared by 
Magnier and Alleweldt states that usual remedies are available. On the other hand, the 
Working paper written by Biard and Amaro seems to conclude that only monetary 
compensation is available.  
Poland. The defense of general interests takes place in administrative proceedings 
(Title IV of the Act of 16 February 2007 on competition and consumer protection). 
Therefore, we did not include this mechanism within the Table. The same can be said as 
far as complaints to Consumer Ombudsmen are concerned in Scandinavian States. 
Bulgaria. According to the Bulgarian law, some actors are able to defend the 
“collective interest” of victims in courts. However, it is not clear whether this term should 
be understood as encompassing general interests too. Additionally, the overlap of the 
Code of Civil procedure with the Consumer Protection Act complicates the understanding 
of which law governs what. 
Lithuania. An updated version of the law that regulates collective redress was not 
available in one of the languages that we understand. Moreover, bibliographical sources 
are still scarce on this instrument. These comments equally apply to Denmark. We made 
an exception for Poland: although the law was not available in English, the amount of 
bibliographical sources made the draft of a Table possible. 
Hungary. Hungary do not possess any collective redress system, although the 
Hungarian procedural law allows the defense of consumer interests. Therefore, and in 
absence of more information, we excluded Hungary from this Table. 
Luxembourg. We observed an important bibliographical gap regarding collective 
redress in Luxembourg. It was therefore impossible to include it in our comparative study. 
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A. The Netherlands* 
Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade (WCAM procedure) 
Category Dutch model. 
Legal basis 
Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages (WCAM) of 2005 
and reformed in 2013. This Act materialises in Articles 7:907-
7:910 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) and Articles 1013-1018 of 
the Dutch Civil Code of Procedure (DCCP). 
Description 
Prior to commencing a collective settlement action, a foundation 
or association must enter into a settlement agreement with the 
alleged wrongdoer. The subject matter of the agreement is not 
limited: since 2013, the WCAM procedure is not longer restricted 
to claims for compensation but may encompass other types of 
claims. Accordingly, petitioners submit the agreement to the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal that has exclusive jurisdiction to deal 
with the WCAM settlement. If all conditions are met, said Court 
will declare the agreement binding on the entire group of victims 
referred to in the contract.  
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no regime for certification in the WCAM procedure. 
However, the DCC contains two provisions that look like 
requirements for certification: the first one states that the 
association/foundation must represent the interests of the victims 
according to its statutes (adequacy of representation, Articles 
7:907(1) and 3:305a DCC). However, it is not necessary that the 
                                                
* Bibliography: T Arons and W H van Boom, “Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities 
Claim Settlements from The Netherlands” (2010) European Business Law Review 857-883; MBM Loos, 
Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union 
– Country Report The Netherlands (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm;  J Fleming and 
JJ Kuster, “The Netherlands” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 286-300; F Gascón Inchausti, 
Tutela Judicial de los Consumidores y Transacciones Colectivas (Thomson Reuters-Civitas, 2010), 67-79; 
Government of The Netherlands, The Dutch ʻClass Action Financial Settlement Actʼ (ʻWCAMʼ), available 
at https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/circulaires/2008/06/24/the-dutch-
class-action-financial-settlement-act-wcam/wcamenglish.pdf; B Krans, “The Dutch Act on Collective 
Settlement on Mass Damages” (2014) 27 Global Business & Development Law Journal 281-301; JJ 
Kuipers, “La loi sur le règlement collectif de dommages de masse aux Pays-Bas et ses ambitions dans 
l’espace judiciaire européen” (2012) 64 (1) Revue internationale de droit comparé 213-243; I Tzankova 
and H van Lith, “Class Actions and Class Settlements Going Global: the Netherlands” in D Fairgrieve and 
E Lein (eds), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford University Press, 2012), 67-94; I 
Tzankova, Class Actions in The Netherlands, Netherlands National Reports Parts 1 and 2, available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; I Tzankova et al., Country Report: The Netherlands, available at 
https://www.collectiveredress.org/; WH van Boom, “Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in The 
Netherlands” in M Casper et al. (eds), Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Sammelklage? (Munich, Sellier 
European Publishers, 2009), 171-192; M-J van der Heijden, “Class Actions/les actions collectives” 
(December 2010) 14 (3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1-17, available at https://www.ejcl.org/; 
CH van Rhee and I Tzankova, “Collective Redress in The Netherlands” in V Harsági and CH van Rhee 
(eds), Multi-Party Redress Mechanisms in Europe: Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia, 2014), 209-224.  
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petitioner represents each victim individually. Rather, the 
association/foundation has to be sufficiently representative. The 
second one establishes that the group of affected persons must be 
large enough (numerosity, Article 7:907(3)(g) DCC). 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-out. 
Standing to sue 
Only 3:305a associations/foundations have the power to settle. 
They must sufficiently represent the persons on whose behalf the 
agreement is concluded. 
Remedies The only possible remedy is a court declaration that the collective 
settlement is binding.  
Costs 
Normally, parties to the settlement agreement decide who bears 
the costs (regarding notification, publication of the Court's 
declaration, professional support, etc.). However, the Court may 
decide that the costs arising from the procedure have to be borne 
by one or more petitioners (Articles 1016.2 DCCP and 289 
DCCP). 
Procedure 
(1) Since 2013, petitioners can initiate a pre-trial hearing (Article 
1018a DCC). Thanks to this procedure, parties evaluate if a 
potential settlement can be reached and the Court assists them in 
formulating the main point of the dispute; 
(2) Settlement between the alleged liable party and an 
association/foundation. The agreement must fulfil the conditions 
set forth in Article 7:907.2 DCC;                                                                                    
(3) Parties petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to declare the 
settlement binding (joint petition). The decision is notified to 
interested parties by ordinary letter (for known parties) and 
newspaper announcement (for unknown parties);  
(4) Oral hearings and evaluation of the fairness of the settlement. 
The petitioners can amend the agreement. As for interested 
parties, they have the right to appear in court and present a 
statement of opposition (Article 1013(5) DCCP);                                                                                                                                       
(5) If all the conditions are fulfilled, the settlement is declared 
binding and made public. Injured parties are then offered an 
opportunity to opt-out. Parties that do not make use of this power 
become parties to the agreement. Only petitioners can jointly 
appeal the decision of the Court in cassation.  
(6) Distribution of the compensation proceeds. Petitioners have 
considerable room to negotiate the plan of allocation. Sometimes, 
a separated administrator is entrusted with the task of distributing 
the settlement fund among the injured individuals. 
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Dutch Collective action 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Articles 3:305a to d DCC (introduced by the 1994 Act on 
Collective Action). 
Description 
A foundation/association may commence legal proceedings 
intended to protect the similar interests of third parties or a general 
interest. The foundation must first try to reach an agreement 
before suing. A claim made by a 305a foundation/association is a 
subsidiary claim, which does not impede individuals from 
commencing proceedings.  
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no requirement for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership.  
Standing to sue 
Standing is limited to 305a foundations/associations, which 
statutorily protect the interests it seeks to defend. Additionally, 
entities put on the list referred to in Article 4.3 of the Injunctions 
Directive also have standing to sue (Article 3:305c DCC). 
Remedies 
All remedies are available apart from damages. In practice, 305a 
associations/foundations seek declaratory or injunctive relief 
judgment. Then, parties use the decision in order to obtain 
monetary relief through individual proceedings. 
Costs 
General procedural rules apply. In the Netherlands, a softened 
version of the “loser pays” principle operates: the winning party 
is entitled to recover part of her lawyer’s and expert’s fees, as well 
as court’s fees.  
Procedure 
In principle, general rules of civil procedure apply. The only 
specificity is ruled by Article 305a.2 DCC, which states that the 
foundation/association must try to solve the dispute amicably 
before initiating judicial proceedings. 
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B. Spain*  
Acción colectiva para la defensa de derechos e intereses de los consumidores y usuarios 
(Class action for the defence of consumer rights and interests) 
Category Group/representation model. 
Legal basis 
The Spanish legislator did not create a uniform procedural regime 
for class action proceedings. Instead, dispersed provisions have 
been introduced in the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil (Spanish Law 
of Civil Procedure, SLCP), namely Articles 6.1.7º/8º, 7.7, 11, 15, 
52.1.14º/16º, 76.2.1, 217.4/6/7, 221, 222.3, 249, 250, 256.1.6º, 
519, 711.2 and 728.3 SLCP.  
Furthermore, various sectorial legislations complete this general 
system. Among others, class actions are regulated in the following 
sectors: consumer protection, product liability, competition law 
and environmental law. Notably, Article 53 of the Consumer Act 
(Texto refundido de la Ley General para la Defensa de los 
Consumidores y Usuarios) regulates actions for injunctive relief 
in fundamental areas of consumer law (unfair terms, off-premises 
contracts, distance sales, guarantees in the selling of goods or 
travel package contracts). 
                                                
* Bibliography: MJ Ariza Colmenarejo, La acción de cesación como medio para la protección de 
consumidores y usuarios (Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2012); T Armenta Deu, Acciones colectivas: 
Reconocimiento, cosa juzgada y ejecución (Marcial Pons, 2013); S Corominas Bach, “La legitimación en 
la futura regulación europea de las acciones colectivas de consumo” in E Carbonell Porras and R Cabrera 
Mercado (eds), Intereses Colectivos y Legitimación Activa (Thomson Reuters 2014), 137-161; J Garberí 
Llobregat et al., Los Procesos Civiles, vol I and II (Thomson Reuters Aranzadi, 2nd edn, 2011); MP García 
Rubio and M Otero Crespo, Country Report: Spain, available at https://www.collectiveredress.org/; MP 
García Rubio and M Otero Crespo, “Rebuilding the Pillars of Collective Litigation in Light of the 
Commission Recommendation: The Spanish Approach to Collective Redress” in E Lein et al., Collective 
Redress in Europe – Why and How? (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2015), 
133-151; F Gascón Inchausti, Acciones colectivas e inhibitorias para la protección de los consumidores en 
el proceso civil español: el papel de las asociaciones de consumidores (2005), available at 
http://eprints.ucm.es/; F Gascón Inchausti, La protección de los consumidores en el proceso civil español 
(2005), available at http://eprints.ucm.es/; F Gascón Inchausti, Tutela Judicial de los Consumidores y 
Transacciones Colectivas (Thomson Reuters-Civitas, 2010), 91-145; P Gutiérrez de Cabiedes Hidalgo, 
“Artículo 11” in F Cordón Moreno et al. (eds), Comentarios a la Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, vol I 
(Thomson Reuters, 2nd ed, 2011), 185-234; P Gutiérrez de Cabiedes Hidalgo, Group Litigation in Spain, 
available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; F Malaga, “Spain” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class 
Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 
301-311; D Marcos Francisco, “Nuevas medidas de defensa de los consumidores en materia de acciones 
colectivas, asistencia jurídica gratuita, costas y tasas judiciales” (2015) 4 InDret, available at 
http://www.indret.com/; JJ Marín López, “Las acciones de clase en el derecho español” (2001) 3 InDret, 
available at http://www.indret.com/; A Planchadell Gargallo, Las ʻacciones colectivasʼ en el ordenamiento 
jurídico español (Valence, Tirant lo Blanch, 2014) 37-261; M Requejo Isidro and M Otero Crespo, 
“Collective Redress in Spain: Recognition and Enforcement of Class Action Judgments and Class 
Settlements” in D Fairgrieve and E Lein (eds), Extraterritoriality and Collective Redress (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 309-331. 
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Description 
Through the Spanish class action, claimants act to protect general 
interests or a plurality of homogenous individual rights. Standing 
to sue is restricted to a certain number of players and its allocation 
depends on the interests that are protected. The class action is in 
principle limited to consumer law (except contrary sectorial 
legislation). The SLCP provides dispersed general provisions for 
class actions, which are not covered by a sectorial norm. While 
actions for injunctive relief are usually regulated in sector-based 
legislations, actions for damages should in principle follow the 
general regime established by the SLCP. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no requirement for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
Art. 222.3 SLCP states that the effect of a class action judgment 
reaches the absent class members, although they did not 
personally litigate their rights. However, the Spanish legislator did 
not set up any opt-out procedure. Academics disagree on the 
existence of this option. Notably, some of them argue that opt-out 
is possible through intervention. To sum up, under the Spanish 
collective redress model, absent members apparently can opt-in 
but not opt-out.  
Standing to sue 
(1) If the members of the group are identifiable, an action can be 
brought by consumer associations; legal entities whose purpose is 
to defend consumer interests –including the National Consumer 
Institute, the Prosecutor and listed entities pursuant to the 
Injunctions Directive (Article 54 of the Consumer Act); or the 
group of claimants, in the event that it represents the majority of 
the class (Article 11(2) SLCP). 
(2) If the members of the group are unknown, only sufficiently 
representative consumer associations can bring the action. As far 
as consumer law is concerned, these are members of the Spanish 
Council of Consumers (Article 24.2 of the Consumer Act), and 
the National Consumer Institute or the Prosecutor for class actions 
falling under the scope of Article 54 of the Consumer Act. 
Additionally, listed entities pursuant to the Injunctions Directive 
have standing to sue.  
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs The “loser pays” principle applies. 
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Procedure 
The Spanish law on Civil Procedure does not provide a specific 
procedure for class actions. However, there are some dispersed 
rules on notification (Article 15 SLCP) and res judicata (Articles 
221 and 519 SLCP).  
Specifically, Article 15 SLCP establishes the following rules 
regarding notification:                                                                                           
(1) If the members of the group are identifiable: a notice of the 
intention to bring a claim, as well as a publication in the 
newspapers are required. 
(2) If the members are unknown: a publication in the media is 
necessary to inform potential claimants about the existence of the 
action. Proceedings must be suspended in order to let people opt-
in. 
As far as res judicata is concerned, the SLCP establishes the 
following rules: 
(1) In principle (in case of action for damages or injunctive relief), 
the class action judgment must determine who can benefit from 
its effects. If no individualisation is possible, the judgment must 
establish the data, characteristics and requirements necessary to 
demand payment and, where appropriate, to request enforcement 
or to intervene in it. 
(2) If the object of the judgment consists in declaring a certain 
activity or behaviour unlawful, such a judgment must establish 
whether its effects should reach non parties. 
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C. France*  
Action exercée dans l'intérêt collectif des consommateurs (Action taken in a general 
interest) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Articles L.621-1 to 9 of the French Consumer Code (FCC). This 
action was created by the Royer Act of the 27 December 1973 and 
its scope was broadened in 1988. Eventually, it was codified in the 
FCC of 1993. This type of action is also available in other sectors 
like labour law, finances and environmental protection. 
Description 
The action taken in a collective interest may have three forms: (1) 
When there is a criminal violation, Article L.621-1 FCC states that 
associations have standing to seek civil compensation in criminal 
proceedings.  
(2) When no criminal offence has been committed, the association 
may intervene in individual proceedings. However, it is only 
possible to intervene if the responsibility of the defendant is at 
stake (Article L.621-9 FCC). 
                                                
* Bibliography: S Amrani-Mekki, “L’action de groupe du 21 siècle. Un modèle réduit et réducteur ?” 
(2015) 45 La Semaine Juridique 2029-2031; A Biard and R Amaro, Resolving Mass Claims in France: 
Toolbox & Experience, Working Paper Series No 2016/5, available at 
https://www.esl.eur.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/frg/ESL_Research/Programmes/BACT/2016/Resolving_mass_
claims_Amaro.pdf; L Boré, “Les prémisses d’une consécration générale du droit d’action des associations 
au plan civil” (2008) 47 Revue Lamy de Droit Civil 17-18; J Calais-Auloy and H Temple, Droit de la 
consommation (Dalloz, 8th edn, 2010); C Cerutti and M Guillaume (eds), Rapport sur l’action de groupe 
remis le 16 décembre 2005 aux Ministres de l’économie, des finances et de l’industrie et de la justice, garde 
des sceaux, available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-
publics/054004458.pdf; A de Laforcade, “L’évolution du droit d’agir des associations de consommateurs : 
vers un détachement du droit pénal de leur action en justice” (2011) 4 Revue trimestrielle de droit 
commercial et de droit économique 711-720; D Fairgrieve and A Biard, Country Report: France, available 
at https://www.collectiveredress.org/; F Ferrand, “Collective Litigation in France: From Distrust to 
Cautious Admission”, in V Harsági and CH van Rhee (eds), Multi-Party Redress Mechanisms in Europe: 
Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia, 2014), 127-152; J Franck, “Pour une véritable réparation du préjudice causé 
à l’intérêt collectif des consommateurs” in Études de droit de la consommation – Liber amicorum Jean 
Calais-Auloy (Dalloz, 2004), 409-419; S Guinchard et al., Procédure civile – Droit interne et droit de 
l’Union européenne (Dalloz, 32nd edn, 2014); Institut National de la Consommation, L’action de groupe : 
vers une consécration ? (2005) 1348 INC Hebdo, available at 
http://www.conso.net/sites/default/files/pdf_abonne/1348-action_groupe_255.pdf; M Leclerc, Les class 
actions, du droit américain au droit européen – Propos illustrés au regard du droit de la concurrence 
(Editions Larcier, 2012); V Magnier, Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective 
Litigation Protocol for National Reporters - France, available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; V 
Magnier and R Alleweldt, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress 
Mechanisms in the European Union – Country Report France (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; N Molfessis, 
“L’exorbitance de l’action de groupe à la française” (2014) 16 Recueil Dalloz 947-953; Y Picot, Code de 
la consommation commenté (Dalloz, 2012); V Rebeyrol, “La nouvelle action de groupe” (2014) 16 Recueil 
Dalloz 940-946; C Sportes and V Ravit, “France” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class 
and Group Actions 2017, available at https://iclg.com/.  
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(3) When no criminal offence has been committed, an association 
may start proceedings against illegal practices contravening a 
number of European Directives transposed in the French legal 
order. In particular, associations can seek the suppression of 
unlawful or unfair terms (Articles L.621-7 and 8 FCC). 
Requirements for 
certification 
There are no requirements for certification.  
Opt-in vs. Opt-out The association defends general interests. Therefore, there is no 
class/group. 
Standing to sue 
Technically, only accredited associations have standing to bring 
actions in the collective interest of consumers. Pursuant to Article 
R.811-7, accreditation is subject to the following requirements: 
The association must (1) be declared; (2) have at least one year of 
existence; (3) statutorily and actively defend the interests of 
consumers; (4) have no professional activity, and; (5) be 
representative. The Ministries of Consumer Affairs and of Justice 
grant the approval for a period of 5 years with the possibility of 
renewal. 
However, the French Supreme Court has created significant 
confusion by allowing unaccredited consumer associations to 
bring actions in the general interest. Therefore, it is not clear 
whether accreditation is still a condition to have standing to sue to 
start such actions or not. 
Note that entities listed in the Offical Journal of the EU pursuant 
to Article 4 of the Injunctions Directive may start an action in the 
collective interest under Article L.621-7. 
Remedies 
(1) Damages. The case law recognizes that associations can 
receive a monetary compensation for the detriment caused to the 
collective interest. Often, however, this compensation is vey low.                                                
(2) Ban of an illegal practice or suppression of an illicit contractual 
clause (Article L.621-2 and 8).                                                                 
(3) Publication of the judgment (Article L.621-11). 
Costs 
In absence of specific legislation, we assume that the general 
regime on civil procedure applies (specifically, Articles 695-700 
of the French Code of Civil Procedure). Accordingly, the “loser 
pays” principle usually operates, unless the judge decides 
otherwise. 
Procedure 
The FCC does not establish specific procedural rules for the action 
taken in the collective interest. 
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Action en représentation conjointe (Joint representative action) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Articles L.622-1 to 4 of the FCC (first enacted in 1992). The joint 
representative action has been extended to the financial and the 
environmental sectors. 
Description 
Two or more consumers can appoint an association to commence 
proceedings on their behalf. Their harm must stem from the 
unlawful behaviour of the same professional. Note that 
associations act as representatives of their clients, they do not have 
a claim. 
Requirements for 
certification 
(1) At least two consumers (natural persons) must have suffered 
individual damages;                                                                                                                              
(2) The harm is caused by the same professional; and                                
(3) It has a common origin.                                                                          
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
The system is based on the opt-in mechanism insofar as the 
persons having suffered the damages must duly authorise in 
writing the association to initiate a legal action on their behalf. 
Standing to sue 
(1) Only certified associations have standing to sue according to 
Articles R.811-1 to 7; 
(2) The association must be instructed to bring proceedings by 2 
or more claimants. Note that the only available channel for 
associations to inform consumers about the joint action (apart 
from personal letters) is through the press. 
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs 
In absence of specific legislation, we assume that the general 
regime on civil procedure applies (specifically, Articles 695-700 
of the French Code of Civil Procedure). Accordingly, the “loser 
pays” principle usually operates, unless the judge decides 
otherwise. 
Procedure 
The FCC does not establish specific procedural rules for the action 
taken in the collective interest. 
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Action de groupe (group action) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Articles L.623-1 to 32 FCC govern the group action and were 
introduced by Law No 2014-344 of 17 of March 2014. Although 
the group action was originally limited to certain consumer 
matters, this mechanism has been introduced in the fields of 
health, discrimination, environment and data protection. 
Description 
Only certified associations can bring a group action in order to 
obtain compensation for losses of individuals. The group action 
can be brought in the following situations: 
(1) When the action is connected to the purchase of products or 
the provision of services. 
(2) When a competition law provision has been violated (at the 
national or European level). Note that only follow-on actions are 
possible. 
Requirements for 
certification 
(1) Consumers must be in an identical or similar position; and (2) 
Their harm must have been caused by the same professional and 
stem from the same illegal behaviour.  
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in. 
Standing to sue Only certified associations have standing to sue according to 
Articles R.811-1 to 7. 
Remedies 
Only actions for the compensation of financial losses stemming 
from material damages are available (Articles L.623-2 and 6). 
Costs 
In absence of specific legislation, we assume that the general 
regime on civil procedure applies (specifically, Articles 695-700 
of the French Code of Civil Procedure). Accordingly, the “loser 
pays” principle usually operates, unless the judge decides 
otherwise. 
Procedure 
The FCC contains a few procedural rules that we detail below. For 
the rest, we assume that common rules of civil procedure apply. 
(1) The association brings the group action in the court that will 
determine whether the case is admissible. If so, said court rules on 
the professional’s liability. In competition law case, this step is 
undertaken by a competition authority.  
(2) The court delimits the group entitled to obtain redress and 
prescribes the method to publish the decision. 
(3) The court establishes a period of time during which consumers 
can adhere to the judgment (between 2 and 6 months) and thus, be 
bound by it. 
Articles L.623-14 to 17 set up a simplified procedure: when the 
identity of consumers is known and their damage is of an identical 
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amount, the court can order the defendant to compensate them 
directly. Although the law does not explicitly mentions it, 
consumers should have the possibility to opt-in or refuse to be 
bound by the outcome of the simplified procedure. Indeed, Article 
L.623-15 states that consumers must receive notice in order to 
accept the judgment.  
In all cases, a mediation procedure is available (Articles L.623-22 
and 23). 
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D. Portugal*  
Acção Popular (Popular action) 
                                                
* Bibliography:; M França Gouveia and N Garoupa, “Class Actions in Portugal” in J G Backhaus et al. 
(eds), The Law and Economics of Class Actions in Europe – Lessons from America 
(Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2012), 342-350; C Gonçalves Borges and M Serra Baptista, 
“Portugal” in ” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions 
around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 312-322; J Pimentel and JM Judice, “Portugal” in The 
International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group Actions 2014, available at 
http://www.csassociados.pt/xms/files/PUBLICACOES/CA14_Chapter-21_Portugal.pdf; P Otero, “A 
acção popular: configuração e valor no actual direito português” (1999) 59 (3) Revista da Ordem dos 
Advogados 871-893; J Pegado Liz, “Les premiers pas de l’action collective au Portugal” (1994) Revue 
européenne de droit de la consommation 176-182; AP Pinto Monteiro and JM Judice, “Class Actions & 
Arbitration in the European Union – Portugal” in Estudos em Homenagem a Miguel Galvão Teles, vol II 
(Coimbra, Almedina, 2012), 189-205; M Soto Maior, “O Direito de Acção Popular na Constituição da 
República Portugesa” (1998) 75/76 Documentação e Direito Comparado, available at 
http://www.gddc.pt/actividade-editorial/pdfs-publicacoes/7576-g.pdf; H Sousa Antunes, Class Actions, 
Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation, Portugese Report (2007), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; L Tortell, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union – Country Report Portugal (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; R Vale e Reis 
and M Mesquita, Country Report: Portugal, available at https://www.collectiveredress.org/. 
Category Representative action. 
Legal basis 
Article 52(3) of the Portuguese Constitution (enacted in 1989) and 
Law 83/95 of 31 August 1995 are the general norms that govern 
the Portuguese popular action. This regime is completed by some 
sector-based provisions (like consumer and environmental 
protection). Originally, the Portuguese popular action was 
applicable in administrative law in order to contest public 
authorities’ decisions. Today, this mechanism is available to 
private parties (horizontal application). 
Description 
The Portuguese system of collective redress is a representative, 
opt-out based mechanism. The main objective is to protect diffuse 
interests. However, one may file a popular action suit in order to 
defend collective interests (i. e. a multiplicity of homogeneous 
individual rights). Two types of suits are possible: an 
administrative popular action in front of an administrative court 
against the State or an administrative body, or; a civil popular 
action. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no requirement for certification.  
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
Opt-out. Note that interested claimants can participate in the 
proceedings and influence the outcome. 
Standing to sue 
(1) any citizens in the enjoyment of their civil and political rights; 
(2) any association and foundation whose goal is the protection of 
the rights provided for in Law 83/95, whether or not they have a 
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direct interest in the claim. The law also requires the 
association/foundation to have legal personality. Besides, it 
cannot exercise any professional activity competing with 
companies and liberal professions; 
(3) local authorities also have standing when the litigation relates 
to interests held by people who are resident in the corresponding 
district. 
There is no requirement to ensure that the claimant is sufficiently 
representative. However, the Prosecutor has the power to replace 
the original claimant if s/he withdraws or behaves in such a 
manner that could put the claim at risk. 
Remedies Usual remedies.  
Costs 
Special rules on costs apply to the popular action: the claimant is 
exempt from paying court fees in case of (partial) success. In the 
event of total loss, the claimant will have to pay between 10% and 
50% of the court fees in view of his/her economic situation and 
the formal or substantive grounds of the claim. Parties to the 
popular action bear their own attorneys’ fees.                          
Procedure 
There is no specific procedure established for popular actions. In 
principle, such actions must follow the rules of the Portuguese 
Code of Civil Procedure. However, Law 83/95 establishes the 
following specificities: 
(1) Once the popular action is submitted to the court, parties are 
summoned in order to join the collective proceedings, and accept 
to be represented. The notification takes place through media or 
public notice, without having to identify the claimants.  
(2) The final judgment is published in two newspapers that parties 
are presumed to read at the expense of the losing party. 
Note that the public prosecutor has a general duty of reviewing the 
legality of the actions. 
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E. Italy* 
Azione di classe (class action) 
Category Representative action. 
Legal basis 
Article 140-bis of the Consumer Code (ICC), introduced by Law 
No 244 of 24 December 2007 and replaced by a new Article 140-
bis enacted by Law No 99 of 23 July 2009.  Such a provision has 
been further amended by Article 6 of the so-called “Decreto 
liberalizzazioni” enacted by Law No 27 of 24 March 2012. 
Description 
Consumers and users, as well as mandated associations have the 
power to bring class action suits in the consumer field in order to 
protect homogeneous collective rights (diritti individuali 
omogenei) and general interests (interessi collettivi).  
The class action suit is possible only in 3 cases:                                                                                                                                 
(1) a breach of contract;                                                                                                   
(2) product or service liability;                                                                                         
(3) unfair or anti-competitive business practices. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There are no requirements for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
Opt-in. However, if the representative claimant settles the case, 
absent members can refuse to be bound by the agreement and 
recover their individual right to sue. 
                                                
* Bibliography: N Calcagno, “ʻItalian Class Actionʼ: The Beginning” (2011), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/; Camera di comercio, industria, artigianato e agricoltura di Torino, Li azioni di 
classe (2011), available at https://www.to.camcom.it/sites/default/files/regolazione-
mercato/12301_CCIAATO_952011.pdf; R Caponi “Collective Redress in Europe: Current Developments 
of ʻClass Actionʼ Suits in Italy” (2011) 16 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozess International 1-17; G Cataldi, “La 
nuova azione di classe” (2009) 3 Consumatori, Diritti e Mercato 129-142; G Cataldi, “Le problematiche 
processuali dell’azione collettiva” (2008) 2 Consumatori, Diritti e Mercato 21-32; R Cavani and BA 
Fossati, “Italy” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group Actions 2017, available 
at https://iclg.com/; S Enne, “Italy” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 334-340; A Giussani, “L’azione 
di classe aspetti processuali” (2013) 67 (1) Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile 341-356; M 
Guernelli, “La nuova azione di classe: profili processuali” (2010) 64 (3) Rivista trimestrale di diritto e 
procedura civile 917-934; MC Micklitz and C Poncibò, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of 
Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union – Country Report Italy (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; P Fiorio, 
“L’azione di classe nel nuovo art. 140bis e gli obiettivi di deterrenza e di accesso alla giustizia dei 
consumatori” (2009) 172, available at www.ilcaso.it; G Principe, Italian Class Actions – An Update, 
available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu; E Rajneri and C Poncibò, Country Report: Italy, 
available at https://www.collectiveredress.org; P Schlesinger, “Introduzione” in XXV Convegni di studio 
“Adolfo Beria di Argentine” Problemi attuai di diritto e procedura civile: Class action: il nuovo volto della 
tutela collettiva in Italia (Giuffrè Editore, 2011), 9-22; E Silvestri, Oxford – Leuven Collective Redress 
Project – Italian Report (2016), available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-
collective-redress-europe; M Taruffo, “La tutela collettiva nell’ordinamento italiano: lineamenti generali” 
in XXV Convegni di studio “Adolfo Beria di Argentine” Problemi attuai di diritto e procedura civile: Class 
action: il nuovo volto della tutela collettiva in Italia (Giuffrè Editore, 2011), 25-40.  
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Standing to sue 
Consumers or users whose rights are homogeneous can directly 
sue or mandate an association to do so. However, the consumer 
association cannot start proceedings on its own. 
Remedies Monetary compensation only. 
Costs 
The “loser pays” rule applies in accordance with Article 91 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure, except if the court decides to allocate 
costs between parties. 
Procedure 
The judge has ample discretionary power to build up the class 
action procedure. In any case, different procedural steps can be 
identified: 
(1) During the first phase of the class action, the judge will 
evaluate whether representative plaintiff has standing to sue 
according to the general rules of civil procedure. Then, the 
admissibility of the complaint is examined. In this regard, the 
action will be inadmissible if there is a conflict of interest, the 
representative claimant does not adequately represent the interests 
of the class or if consumers or users rights are not homogeneous. 
If the complaint complies with the admissibility test, the court 
issues a certification order that may be appealed by both the 
defendant and the representative plaintiff; 
(2) If the action is admitted, the court then establishes how other 
potential parties should be summoned. Regarding this particular 
point, the law underlines that the method for providing notice 
should be opportune and that the claimant should bear the costs. 
Besides, the court must establish the period of time during which 
the opt-in is possible;                                                                                                               
(3) Final decision is published and appealable. It will become 
enforceable after 180 days. 
Note that absent members of the class are not considered as parties 
from a procedural perspective. This means that they can neither 
intervene nor participate in the class proceedings. 
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Action to protect consumers’ interests 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis Article 140 of the ICC, introduced by Legislative Decree 206/05. 
Description 
Associations have the power to bring collective suits on behalf of 
consumers whose general interests were violated. 
Requirements for 
certification 
No requirements for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership. 
Standing to sue 
The consumer associations that fulfil the requirements of Article 
137 ICC have standing to bring actions pursuant to Article 140 
(Article 139(1) ICC). This includes entities that have standing 
pursuant to the Injunctions Directive (Article 139(2) ICC).  
Those associations may act in case of violation of interests 
governed by the ICC. 
Remedies 
The competent tribunal may be asked to:                                                                                                                                   
(1) Stop the harmful behaviour/act;                                                                                     
(2) Adopt measures aiming at cancelling the harmful effects of a 
behaviour/act;                                        
(3) Publish the measures adopted. 
Costs 
The “loser pays” principle applies and the consumer association 
bears the costs in case the case does not succeed in court.  
Procedure 
No specific procedural rules apply to actions pursuant to Article 
140 ICC. However, parties may initiate a conciliation procedure 
before going to trial according to Article 140(2) ICC. 
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F. Germany* 
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz, KapMuG (Capital Market Model 
Proceedings Act) 
Category Test case model. 
Legal basis 
Capital Market Model Proceedings Act (Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetz, KapMuG) of 2005. In 2012, the 
KapMuG was amended and extended (until 2020). Specifically, 
its scope was enlarged and the procedure was modified. 
Description 
Through the test case procedure, the Higher Regional Court 
(Oberlandesgericht) selects a lead case that will serve as a model 
to solve similar actions. The Higher Regional Court solves issues 
that are common to those cases and sends its decision back to 
lower courts, which will deal with the remaining individual 
questions like causation and allocation of damages to the 
individual claimants. The KapMuG is applicable to claims for 
damages based on prospectus liability, as well as liability rules 
regarding inaccurate or misleading capital market information. 
                                                
* Bibliography: D Baegte, Class Actions, Group Litigation & Other Forms of Collective Litigation – 
Germany, available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; M Bakowitz, “The German Experience with 
Group Actions – The Verbandsklage and the Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG)” in V Harsági 
and CH van Rhee (eds), Multi-Party Redress Mechanisms in Europe: Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia, 2014), 
153-169; J Buchner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz für Verbraucher in Europa – Die grenzüberschreitende 
Durchsetzung des europäischen Verbraucherrechts bei Bagatellschäden, Schriften zum 
Verbraucherschutz- und Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 3 (V&R unipress, 2015), 72-102; S Einhaus, Kollektiver 
Rechtsschutz im englischen und deutschen Zivilprozessrecht, Schriften zum Prozessrecht, vol 209 (Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot, 2008), 315-456; E Feess and A Halfmeier, “The German Capital Markets Model Case 
Act (KapMuG) – A European Role Model for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Market? Analysis and 
Suggestions for Reform”, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/; C Geiger, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im 
Zivilprozess - Die Gruppenklage zur Durchsetzung von Massenschäden und ihre Auswirkungen (Mohr 
Siebeck, 2015); B Haar, “Investors Protection Through Model Case Procedures – Implementing Collective 
Goals and Individual Rights Under the 2012 Amendment to the German Capital Markets Model Case Act 
(KapMuG)” (2014) 15 European Business Organization Law Review 83-105; B Heil and B Lee, “The Role 
of Private Litigation” Comparative Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, Paper 7, available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/fisch_2016/7; E Lein, Country Report: Germany, available at 
https://www.collectiveredress.org; B Hess et al., Kölner Kommentar zum KapMuG (Carl Heymanns 
Verlag, 2nd edn, 2014); B Schneider and H Heppner, “Germany” in The International Comparative Legal 
Guide to Class and Group Actions 2017, avaiblable at https://iclg.com/; HW Micklitz and A Stadler, “The 
Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure” (2006) 17 (5) 
European Business Law Review 1476-1488; L Röckrath, “Germany” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class 
Actions: A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 
241-251; P Rott, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the 
European Union – Country Report Germany (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; A Stadler, 
Oxford – Leuven Collective Redress Project – German Report (2016), available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe; M Sustmann and R 
Schmidt-Bendun, “Der Referentenentwurf zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes 
(KapMuG)” 2011 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1207-1213.  
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Since 2012, the Act also applies where the alleged wrongdoer 
used, or did not adequately informed investors about the content 
of said information. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There are no requirements for certification. However, the claimant 
who applies for a test case procedure under KapMuG must 
demonstrate to the court that the case shares common questions of 
fact or law with other claims. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
In principle, the system is based on the opt-in mechanism. 
However, once the number of 10 claimants is reached and 
proceedings commence, claimants who file a suit are, however, 
automatically included in the test case proceedings (automatic 
membership). If a settlement is reached, it is binding for all 
involved parties unless they opt-out. This settlement will be void 
if more than 30% of claimants opt-out.  
Standing to sue 
There is no representation system. The court chooses one lead 
claimant, whose case will be used as a model in order to solve 
similar claims. Any investor (individual or institutional) or 
defendant may petition the start of test case model proceedings. 
Remedies 
Declaratory judgment or settlement. Note that the declaratory 
judgment serves as a basis to resolve individual damages actions 
tried in the lower courts. 
Costs 
The “loser pays” principle applies. However, the costs of this 
procedure are spread among the claimants and added to the 
subsequent costs generated by their individual lawsuits. 
Procedure 
(1) Claimants bring a lawsuit at the first instance court or, the 
defendant makes a request for a test case proceedings;                                                     
(2) The court seised publishes the request. If within 6 months a 
minimum of 9 similar claims are filed, the first court seised refers 
the matter to the Higher Regional Court, which starts and leads 
the test case proceedings. Until a judgment is issued, individual 
proceedings are automatically stayed; 
(3) A lead claimant is chosen. Within 6 months since the 
publication of the identity of the lead claimant, potential claimants 
can notify their future claim to the Higher Court in order to stop 
the statute of limitations (§ 10(2) KapMuG). However, it should 
be highlighted that notification does not generate participation to 
the model proceedings. As a result, the decision of the 
Oberlandesgericht or the settlement is not binding on people who 
notified their claims;                                                                                                                                                                   
(4) Proceedings end with a declaratory judgment or a settlement. 
Save where otherwise established by the KapMuG, ordinary rules 
of civil procedure apply. 
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Verbandsklage (Action taken by associations) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Act on Injunctive Relief for Consumer Rights and Other 
Violations (Unterlassungsklagengesetz, UKlaG), which entered 
into force in 2002. The Act has been amended many times and its 
scope extended over the years. 
Description 
Certain consumer associations and qualified interest groups may 
seek injunctive relief against wrongdoers who violate consumer 
laws listed in § 2 UKlaG.  
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no requirement for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership. 
Standing to sue 
A collective action can only be brought by:                                                                
(1) associations representing interests of businesses;                                                
(2) Chambers of Industry and Commerce/Crafts  
(3) qualified entities that fulfil the conditions of § 4 UKlaG. 
Pursuant to this provision, four requirements must be met in order 
for an entity to acquire standing under the UKlaG: specifically, 
the entity must (1) possess at least 3 associations/organisations 
active in a given field or have at least 75 natural persons as 
members; (2) have at least one year of existence; (3) statutorily 
defend consumer interests and continue to effectively fulfil this 
task in the future. Similarly, listed entities pursuant to the 
Injunctions Directive have standing to sue. 
Remedies 
Injunctive relief. Pursuant to § 7 UKlaG, the claimant may also 
request the publication of the judgment at the expense of the 
defendant. 
Costs 
In absence of specific legislation, we assume that the general 
regime on civil procedure applies –i. e. the “loser pays” principle. 
Procedure 
Save where the UKlaG otherwise states, §12 of the Act on Unfair 
Competition  and the general procedural rules of the German Code 
of Civil Procedure apply. 
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Gesetz über außergerichtliche Rechtsdienstleistungen (Legal Services Act) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Gesetz über außergerichtliche Rechtsdienstleistungen (Legal 
Services Act). 
Description 
The Legal Services Act allows non-lawyers to give legal advice 
out of court. According to § 8 of the Legal Services Act, consumer 
centers and other publicly funded entities may provide legal 
advice. Today, § 79(2)(3) of the German Code of Civil Procedure 
(GCCP) enable these actors to act as representative of consumers 
or assignee of their claims.  
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no requirement for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in. 
Standing to sue 
Only publicly sponsored centres for consumer protection or 
consumer associations can represent consumers in courts. § 
79(2)(3) of the Civil Code applies and states that eligible 
consumer associations can bring representative actions “within 
their field of activity and responsibility”. 
Remedies 
In absence of any mention by the law, we suppose that usual 
remedies are available. 
Costs The “loser pays” rule applies.  
Procedure The general rules of civil procedure apply.  
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G. Austria* 
Verbandsklage (Action taken by associations) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis Konsumentenschutzgesetz, KSchG (Consumer Protection Act) 
Description 
Associations listed in § 29 KSchG have a right to file an action in 
the general interest of consumers. The association acts on its own 
behalf and actions for damages are not available. 
(1) Representative action against unfair and illegal clauses in 
general contract terms (§ 28 KSchG);                                           
(2) Representative action against noncompliance with consumer 
protection standards (§ 28a KSchG);                                          
(3) Representative action against violations of the Competition 
law Act. 
Note that, pursuant to § 502(5)(3) ACCP, associations listed in § 
29 KSchG also have the possibility to bring an assigned claim to 
the Supreme Court. This resulting decision will de facto be used 
as a precedent in similar cases by lower courts. In other words, it 
will serve as a guideline, it is not binding on third-parties. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There are no requirements for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership. 
Standing to sue 
The associations mentioned in § 29(1) KSchG, as well as qualified 
entities for the purposes of the Injunctions Directive (§ 29(2) 
KSchG), can initiate a representative action.  
                                                
* Bibliography: J Buchner, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz für Verbraucher in Europa – Die 
grenzüberschreitende Durchsetzung des europäischen Verbraucherrechts bei Bagatellschäden, Schriften 
zum Verbraucherschutz- und Wettbewerbsrecht, vol 3 (V&R unipress, 2015), 111-114; K Hellbert, 
“Austria” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group Actions 2017, available at 
https://iclg.com/; C Klausegger, “Austria” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 252-263; A Klauser, “Von 
der ʻSammelklage nach österreichischem Rechtʼ zur echten Gruppenklage” (2005) Ecolex 744-747; GE 
Kodek, “Möglichkeiten zur gesetzlichen Regelung von Massenverfahren im Zivilprozess” (2005) Ecolex 
751-754; GE Kodek, Report: Austria, available at https://www.collectiveredress.org; P Kolba, 
“Konsumentenschutz vor und mit der Sammelklage” (2010) Ecolex 864-867; P Kolba, “Die Sammelklage 
nach össterreichischem Recht im Praxistext – Schadenersatz für Brech-Durchfall-Epidemie” (2009) 4 
ReiseRecht aktuell 167-169; HW Micklitz and KP Purnhagen, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and 
Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union – Country Report Austria (2008), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; B 
Pirker-Hörmann and P Kolba, Österreich: Von der Verbandsklage zur Sammelklage, Internationales 
Symposium “Verbraucherpolitik: Kollektive Rechtsdurchsetzung – Chancen und Risken”, available at 
https://verbraucherrecht.at/cms/uploads/media/Kolba_Pirker_Bamberg.pdf; WH Rechberger, 
“Verbandsklagen, Musterprozesse und ʻSammelklagenʼ” in C Fischer-Czermak et al. (eds), Festschrift 
Rudolf Welser zum 65. Geburtstag (Vienna, MANZ Verlag, 2004), 871-888; E Scheuba, “ʻSammelklageʼ 
– Einklang mit der ZPO erbeten” (2005) Ecolex 747-750. 
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Remedies Injunctive relief. 
Costs The “loser pays” principle applies (§ 41-55 Austrian Code of Civil 
Procedure). 
Procedure General rules of civil procedure apply. 
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Österreichisches Modell der Sammelklage (Collective redress actions of Austrian 
type) 
Category Class/representation model. 
Legal basis § 227, § 502(5)(3) of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure 
(ACCP). 
Description 
Under this mechanism, potential claimants assign their claims to 
an association which then files a complaint on their behalf. This 
instrument is not restricted to specific areas of law.  
Requirements for 
certification 
(1) The court has jurisdiction to hear all the claims;                                                            
(2) The same procedure applies to the claims;                                                                 
(3) The matter in dispute must be of the same nature with respect 
to the facts and the law. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in.  
Standing to sue Both individuals and associations can start a collective redress 
action, since there are no restrictions on standing to sue. 
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs The “loser pays” principle applies (§ 41-55 ACCP). 
Procedure General rules of civil procedure apply. 
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H. United Kingdom* 
Group Litigation Order (GLO) 
Category Test case model. 
Legal basis Part 19 III of Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) and Practice Direction 
19B. 
Description 
When claims give rise to common or related issues of fact or law, 
the court can issue a Group Litigation Order (GLO) in order to 
manage those claims. The order establishes a register of claims, 
specifies the issues and identifies the court in charge. 
Requirements for 
certification 
5 conditions must be satisfied for a GLO to proceed: 
(1) There must be a number of claims (numerosity); 
(2) Claims give rise to common or related issues of fact or law 
(commonality); 
(3) The GLO must be consistent with the overriding objective of 
the CPR (the court must be able to deal with the case fairly); 
(4) The consent of the Lord Chief Justice, the Vice-Chancellor, or 
the Head of Civil Justice is needed; 
(5) The GLO will not proceed if consolidation or a representative 
action is more appropriate (superiority). 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in. 
Standing to sue 
In principle, the GLO does not trigger any representation 
mechanism and thus, all claimants are parties to the proceedings. 
                                                
* Bibliography: N Andrews, “Multi-Party Litigation in England” in V Harsági and CH van Rhee (eds), 
Multi-Party Redress Mechanisms in Europe: Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia, 2014), 111-125; A Brown and 
I Dodds-Smith, “England and Wales” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group 
Actions 2017, avaiblable at https://iclg.com/; Competition and Markets Authority, Consumer protection 
enforcement guidance: CMA58 (2016), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/consumer-protection-enforcement-guidance-cma58; L 
Harbour and J Evans, “United Kingdom” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 169-185; C Hodges, 
Country Report: England and Wales, available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; C Hodges, 
Developments in Collective Redress in the European Union and United Kingdom (2010), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; C Hodges, Multi-Party Actions (Oxford University Press, 2001); C 
Hodges, Oxford – Leuven Collective Redress Project – British Report (2016), available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe; G Howells, Evaluation of 
the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union – Country 
Report United Kingdom (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; R Mulheron, 
“Some Difficulties with Group Litigation Orders – and why a Class Action is Superior” (2005) 24 Civil 
Justice Quarterly 40-68; V Smith and M Moeiri-Farsi, Country Report: England and Wales, available at 
https://www.collectiveredress.org; J Sorabji et al., Improving Access to Justice through Collective Actions 
– Developing a More Efficient and Effective Procedure for Collective Actions, Civil Justice Council 
(2008), available at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-
institute/files/Improving_Access_to_Justice_through_Collective_Actions_-_recommendations.pdf; A 
Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure – Principles of Practice (Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd edn, 2006), 
508-527. 
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However, if the court adopts a test case approach, then any party 
(defendant or claimant) can become the test claimant.  
(1) Any person with a claim can ask for the start of a GLO. 
(2) A court may discretionarily issue a GLO. 
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs 
The “loser pays” rule applies. Each party remains liable for its 
individual costs and severally for its portion of the common costs.  
Procedure 
(1) The claimant (or the defendant) files an application in 
accordance with Part 23 of the CPR. Alternatively, courts may 
discretionarily issue a group litigation order;  
(2) The GLO is published and a group register is created. Any 
party may apply to enter the register, as long as he/she previously 
brought a claim;                                                                                                                                
(3) Trial and decision. 
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Representative Action 
Category Group/class action model. 
Legal basis Rule 19(6) of Civil Procedure Rules. 
Description 
A representative action can be brought against one or more 
persons by a representative of a group of persons having the same 
interest in the claim.  
Requirements for 
certification 
Two conditions must be satisfied: (1) at least one person must be 
associated to the claim brought by the representative 
(numerosity); (2) these persons share the “same interest” 
(commonality). This requirement has been strictly interpreted by 
case law. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
In principle, the representative action is based on the automatic 
membership system. According to the literature, however, 
represented persons may apply to be excluded from the 
represented class. 
Standing to sue Any party to the class can represent the group of claimants, 
provided that (s)he has a direct cause of action. 
Remedies 
Usual remedies (but damages are rarely sought in practice because 
of the restrictive interpretation of the commonality requirement). 
Costs 
The “loser pays” principle applies. The representative party bears 
the costs. 
Procedure General rules of civil procedure apply. 
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Action for the protection of general consumer interests 
Category Representation model 
Legal basis 
Part 8 of the Enterprise Act of 2002, as amended by the Consumer 
Rights Act of 2015. 
Description 
Some qualified entities –also called enforcers– have the power to 
apply to the courts for an enforcement order against traders who 
infringed listed consumer protection laws. The enforcement order 
enables entities to protect the general interest of consumers. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There are no requirements for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership. 
Standing to sue 
According to Section 213, the following persons may make an 
application for an enforcement order: 
(1) The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (general 
enforcer); 
(2) Other enforcers designated by the Secretary of State 
(designated enforcer). If they want to start civil proceedings they 
must first notify the CMA; 
(3) A qualified entity for the purposes of the Injunctions Directive 
(community enforcer); 
(4) A certain number of entities for the purposes of the CPC 
Regulation (CPC enforcers). 
While the general enforcer may make an application for an 
enforcement order in respect of any infringement, designated 
enforcer have a limited power (depending on the goal they 
pursue). As for community and CPC enforcers, they can only act 
when a community infringement has been committed (212). 
Remedies Injunctive relief. 
Costs The “loser pays” principle applies.  
Procedure 
Save where otherwise provided, the general rules of civil 
procedure apply.  
Note that before taking court action, an enforcer will normally 
attempt to stop and prevent repetition of what it considers or 
suspects to be an infringement by holding discussions with the 
trader (Section 214). 
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I. Sweden* 
Group proceedings 
Category Class/representation model. 
Legal basis Group Proceedings Act of 2002 (GPA). 
Description 
Private individuals or organisations (consumer associations or 
government-appointed authority) may initiate a group action. The 
procedure applies to all fields of law. 
Requirements for 
certification 
(1) Commonality (action is based on common circumstances);                                          
(2) The group proceedings must be an appropriate procedure; 
(3) The larger part of the claims cannot equally be pursued on an 
individual basis; 
(4) The group must be well defined;                                                                                        
(5) The claimant is well-suited to represent the group. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in (Section 14). 
Standing to sue 
According to Sections 4 to 6, the following persons have standing 
to start group proceedings: 
(1) Natural or legal person with a claim subject to the action 
(private group action);                                       
(2) Not-for-profit association that, in accordance with its rules, 
protects consumer or wage-earner interests (organisation action);                                                      
(3) Public authority (public group action).                                                                                           
The group representative is empowered to make settlements on 
behalf of the group, but any settlement must be confirmed by the 
court (Section 26). 
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs The “loser pays” principle applies. 
Procedure 
Some specific rules are provided by the GPA. For the rest, general 
rules of civil procedure apply (Section 2). 
                                                
* Bibliography: L Ervo, “Group Actions in Sweden – A Moderate Start,” in V Harsági and CH van Rhee 
(eds), Multi-Party Redress Mechanisms in Europe: Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia, 2014), 243-259; L Ervo 
et al., Country Report: Sweden, available at https://www.collectiveredress.org; Hammarskiöld & Co, 
Oxford – Leuven Collective Redress Project – Swedish Report (2016), available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe; H Lindblom, “Group 
Litigation in Scandinavia” (2009) 10 (1) ERA Forum 7-35; H Lindblom, National Report: Group Litigation 
in Sweden (2007), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; H Lindblom, National report: Group 
Litigation in Sweden (2008), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/; AH Persson, Evaluation 
of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective Redress Mechanisms in the European Union – Country 
Report Sweden (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; G Sparrman 
and L Göransson, “Sweden” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 198-213. 
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J. Finland* 
Ryhmäkannelaki (444/2007) (Class actions)  
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis Ryhmäkannelaki (444/2007) (Act on Class Actions of 2007). 
Description 
According to the Group Action Act, the Finnish Consumer 
Ombudsman may take legal action and represent a specified group 
of consumers without an express permission of group members. 
The resulting judgment is binding both for and against all the 
members of the group. The scope of application of the Act is 
limited to consumer disputes only (Section 1).  
Requirements for 
certification 
(1) Several persons have claims against the same defendant, based 
on the same or similar circumstances (commonality);                                                                                                    
(2) The hearing of the case as a class action is expedient in view 
of the size of the class, the subject-matter of the claims presented 
and the proof offered in it (superiority); and                                                                                                                                    
(3) The class has been defined with adequate precision. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in. 
Standing to sue 
the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman has exclusive right to take 
legal action on behalf of a specified group of consumers (Section 
4). This means that consumer associations or individual 
consumers do not have even a secondary right of action in cases 
where the Consumer Ombudsman has decided not to start a legal 
proceeding. 
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs The “loser pays” principle applies (Section 17). 
Procedure 
Save where otherwise provided by the Class Action Act, general 
procedural rules apply (Section 1(3)). 
 
  
                                                
* Bibliography: P Kiurunen, “Finland”, in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 214-228; J Pråhl, Oxford – 
Leuven Collective Redress Project – Finnish Report (2016), available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe; M Välimäki, “Introducing 
Class Actions in Finland - Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis” (2007), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/; K Viitanen, Collective Litigation in Finland, available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/.  
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Group action for the protection of general interests 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis The Consumer Protection Act (34/1978), as amended. 
Description 
The Finnish Consumer Ombudsman can take legal action against 
a trader for questions concerning unfair marketing practices or 
unfair standard contract terms in the Finnish Market Court. The 
purpose of these actions is solely the protection of collective 
consumer rights. During this procedure it is not possible to claim 
compensation of damages for individual consumers. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There is no requirement for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership. 
Standing to sue 
The Finnish Consumer Ombudsman has the exclusive right to sue. 
However, there is a secondary right of action for registered 
associations representing interests of traders, consumers or 
employees. The literature clarifies that entities listed in the 
Injunctions Directive also have the right to sue. 
Remedies Injunctive relief. 
Costs The parties –the Consumer Ombudsman and the trader– have to 
bear their own costs. 
Procedure 
The procedure is ruled by the Market Court Act (1527/2001) and 
the Act on Certain Proceedings before the Market Court 
(1528/2001). 
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K. Bulgaria* 
Class Action 
Category Class/representation model. 
Legal basis 
Articles 379-388 of the Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure 
(BCCP), introduced in 2008. 
Description 
A class action may be brought by any persons who claim to be 
harmed by an infringement or any organisations responsible for 
the protection of injured persons or for the protection of general 
interests. This procedural rule is available in all areas of law. 
When an interest covered by the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) 
is at stake, Articles 186-190 must be taken into account. 
Requirements for 
certification 
A class action may be brought on behalf of persons who are 
harmed by the same infringement (commonality). Additionally, 
the circle of persons harmed must, at least, be identifiable (if not 
precisely defined). 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-out (Article 383(2) BCCP). 
Standing to sue 
A person harmed by an infringement or an organisation who 
protects the injured persons or the general interest at stake. 
When an interest falling under the CPA is harmed, specific rules 
on standing apply. In particular, the following actors may start 
proceedings:  
(1) Consumer associations selected by the Ministry of Economy 
and Energy (Article 186(1) CPA); 
(2) Qualified entities from other Member States, provided that the 
infringement adversely affects the interests subject to the 
protection of said entities and that they are included in the list 
approved by the EU and published in the Official Journal –we 
suppose that this is a reference to the Injunctions Directive 
(Article 186a CPA).  
(3) Any consumer association, acting as a representative of at least 
two or more consumers who suffered damage (Article 188-189 
CPA). 
Remedies 
According to Article 385 BCCP, the court may order the 
respondent to perform a specific act, to refrain from performing a 
specific act, or to pay a specific amount. 
                                                
* Bibliography: V Bineva and T Goleminov, Evaluation of the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Collective 
Redress Mechanisms in the European Union – Country Report Bulgaria (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/judicial_redress/index_en.htm; A Katzarsky 
and G Georgiev, “Bulgaria” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group Actions 
2013, avaiblable at https://iclg.com/; Oxford – Leuven Collective Redress Project – Bulgarian Report 
(2016), available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe. 
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Costs The “loser pays” principle applies (Article 78(1) BCCP). 
Procedure 
General Rules of the Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure apply. 
However, Chapter 33 establishes some special procedural rules 
for class actions that must be followed. 
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L. Belgium* 
Action en reparation collective (Collective Action) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis 
Book XVII, title 2 of the Economic Code, introduced by the Act 
implementing a consumer collective redress action in the code of 
economic law of 28 of March 2014.  
Description 
Associations that fulfil the criteria set forth by Article XVII.39 can 
commence proceedings in order to obtain compensation for losses 
suffered by individuals. Alternatively, they can negotiate an 
agreement with the alleged wrongdoer and submit it to the court 
for homologation.  
The necessary requirements are the following: 
(1) Violation by a firm of a contractual obligation, a European 
regulation or legislation listed on Article XVII.37. The scope is 
therefore, limited to consumer law. Mass accidents and 
shareholder disputes are not covered;                                                                                           
(2) Standing to sue and adequacy of representation;                                                                                             
(3) The collective action is the best procedural tool available to 
solve the dispute.                      
Requirements for 
certification 
The representative entity must adequately represent the group of 
victims. The adequacy requirement is assessed by the judge and is 
meant to remove representatives who have conflict of interests. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out 
If victims have their domicile in Belgium, both the opt-in and opt-
out mechanisms are available. In case they do not have their 
domicile in Belgium or if physical or moral damages are claimed, 
the opt-in based collective action is the only available option. The 
choice to opt-in or to opt-out occurs after the decision of the 
certification or the homologation of the agreement and is 
irrevocable. 
                                                
* Bibliography: JP Fierens and B Volders, “Belgium” in PG Karlsgodt (ed), World Class Actions: A Guide 
to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe (Oxford University Press, 2012), 271-285; JT 
Nowak, “The New Belgian Law on Consumer Collective Redress and Compliance with EU Law 
Requirements” in E Lein et al., Collective Redress in Europe – Why and How? (The British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2015), 169-201; ME Storme and E Terryn, Belgian Report on Class 
Actions, available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu; O Vanhulst, Country Report: Belgium, 
available at https://www.collectiveredress.org; J Verlinden and P van Mulders, “Belgium” in The 
International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and Group Actions 2017, avaiblable at https://iclg.com/; 
S Voet, Class Action Developments in Belgium (2016), available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu; 
S Voet, “Consumer Collective Redress in Belgium: Class Actions to the Rescue?” (2015) 16 (1) European 
Business Organization Law Review 121-143; S Voet, “Cultural Dimensions of Group Litigation: The 
Belgian Case” (2013) 41 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 433-479; S Voet, Oxford 
– Leuven Collective Redress Project – Belgian Report (2016), available at 
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe. 
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Standing to sue 
(1) Associations (legal entities) which defend consumers’ interest 
and that, either sit on the Consumer Council or are approved by 
the Minister;                                                                                                                 
(2) Associations (legal entities since at least 3 years) approved by 
the Minister, whose social purpose is connected to the damage 
suffered, and that do not pursue an economic goal;                                                                             
(3) The autonomous public service (Article XVI.5) is only 
competent to negotiate a collective settlement. 
Remedies Monetary or in kind compensation. 
Costs 
The “loser pays” rule applies (Articles 1017-1018 of the Judicial 
Code).  
Procedure 
Procedural steps in case of judicial action: 
(1) The representative plaintiff files an application in accordance 
with Article XVII.42, § 1;                                               
(2) Within 2 months, the judge must rule on the admissibility of 
the application. If all the criteria are fulfilled, the decision is 
published in the “Moniteur belge” and the “SPF Economie”. The 
certification decision can be appealed;                                                                                                             
(3) Within a period of minimum 30 days and maximum 3 months 
following the certification decision, members are invited to opt-in 
or out of the collective action. 
(4) Then, within the time limit fixed by the judge (between 3 and 
6 months, subject to renewal for a period of 6 months), the parties 
try to conclude an agreement (mandatory negotiation phase). If an 
agreement is reached and all the requirements are fulfilled, the 
judge ratifies it. The agreement is published in the “Moniteur 
belge” and the “SPF Economie”. However, if the time limit is over 
or no agreement has been reached, the judicial procedure 
continues and the judge issues a decision;                                                                                        
(5) A claims settler is appointed in order to deal with the 
enforcement phase. First, the claims settler draws a provisional list 
of the class members that the class representative and the 
defendant can challenge. Then, a hearing is set up before the court 
in order to establish the scope of the final list. After the settlement 
or the decision has been enforced, the claims settler writes a final 
report. On this basis, the court allocates funds that were not 
distributed and rules on the costs and fees of the claims settler (that 
will be paid by the defendant). 
Procedural steps for the homologation of the parties’ agreement: 
(1) Parties present a joint request in order to homologate their 
agreement according to Article XVII.42, § 2. The request  must 
fulfil the certification criteria and the agreement must contain all 
the elements mentioned in Article XVII.45, § 3, 2° to 13°; 
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(2) Within 2 months, the judge must rule on the admissibility of 
the request. If all the criteria are fulfilled, the decision is published 
in the “Moniteur belge” and the “SPF Economie”. If the judge 
refuses the homologation (after having offered the parties to 
complete the agreement), the procedure stops here; 
(3) The liquidation phase is the same as described under point (5) 
above. 
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Action en cessation (Action for Injunctive Relief) 
Category Representation model. 
Legal basis Book XVII, title 1 of the Belgian Economic Code. 
Description 
This mechanism enables the President of the Commercial 
Tribunal to sanction the violation of one of the acts listed in 
Article XVII.2. Notably, this provision applies to labour law, 
consumer protection, advertising and intellectual property. The 
Tribunal can only order the termination of an illegal behaviour. 
Requirements for 
certification 
There are no requirements for certification. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Automatic membership.  
Standing to sue 
Only the President of the Commercial Tribunal can order the 
termination of an illegal behaviour. The following persons can ask 
the President to act:                                                     
(1) Interested persons;                                                                                                                
(2) The Minister competent for the matter in question (Article 
XVII.8) and the director of the Contrôle et Médiation du Service 
public fédéral Economie, P.M.E., Classes moyennes et Energie in 
certain cases;                                                              
(3) Professional groups, which possess legal personality;                                                                               
(4) Associations, which possess legal personality and whose 
social purpose is to protect consumers’ interests. Additionally, 
they must be represented in the Consumer Council or approved by 
the Minister. 
(5) Actions for injunctive relief, which aim at protecting consumer 
interests included in Article XVII.26, can be brought by entities 
listed in the Injunctions Directive. These must show that they 
protect the interests that have been harmed. 
Remedies 
Injunctive relief (termination of an illegal behaviour). 
Additionally, the Tribunal can also decide to publish its judgment 
(Article XVII.4). 
Costs The “loser pays” rule applies (Articles 1017-1018 of the Judicial 
Code). 
Procedure 
There is no specific procedure that govern actions for injunctive 
relief. In principle, they follow the rules of the Belgian Judicial 
Code (Article XVII.6). In particular, Articles 1034ter to 
1034sexies of the Judicial Code apply. As regards actions for 
injunctive relief protecting consumer interests, Article XVII.32 
must be taken into account. 
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M. Poland* 
Group proceedings 
Category Group/representation model 
Legal basis Act on Pursuing Claims in Group Proceedings of 2009. 
Description 
The Act regulates civil court proceedings, whereby claims of the 
same type, based on the same or similar factual basis, are pursued 
by at least ten persons. The Act applies to consumer protection, 
product liability, and tort. 
Requirements for 
certification 
(1) The group of claimants must consist of at least 10 members 
(numerosity);                                  
(2) All claims must arise from the same or similar facts and be of 
the same type (commonality). It is not necessary that all claims be 
based on the same legal provision. However, if the action concerns 
monetary claims, the amount claimed by each class member has 
to be made equal to the others. 
Opt-in vs. Opt-out Opt-in. 
Standing to sue 
(1) A group member who has been elected by all other group 
members can bring group proceedings;                                                                              
(2) In consumer protection cases, a group may elect a Municipal 
Consumer Ombudsman to fulfil the role of claimant. 
Remedies Usual remedies. 
Costs 
The “loser pays” principle applies, but discounts on court fees are 
available for group proceedings. 
Procedure 
(1) A statement of claim is filed and the tribunal renders a decision 
on the admissibility of the collective action on the basis of a 
hearing (class certification). This decision can be appealed;        
(2) If the statement of claim is valid, the court announces the 
initiation of the collective proceedings ex officio. The 
dissemination of this piece of information is usually made in the 
national mass media but the law does not limit the means available 
                                                
* Bibliography: R Kos and A Trzaska, “Poland” in The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class 
and Group Actions 2017, avaiblable at https://iclg.com/; R Kulski, “Polish Perspectives and Provisions on 
Group Proceedings” in V Harsági and C H van Rhee (eds), Multi-Party Redress Mechanisms in Europe: 
Squeaking Mice? (Intersentia, 2014), 225-241; Oxford – Leuven Collective Redress Project – Polish Report 
(2016), available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/events/empirical-evidence-collective-redress-europe; M 
Safjan et al., “Taking the Collective Interese of Consumers  Seriously: A View from Poland” in F Cafaggi 
and HW Micklitz (eds), New Frontiers of Consumer Protection: The Interplay Between Private and Public 
Enforcement (Intersentia, 2009), 171-206; M Sengayen, National Report for the Global Class Actions 
Conference at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies (Oxford University, 2007), available at 
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu; M Tulibacka, Country Report: Poland, available at 
https://www.collectiveredress.org; M Tulibacka and R Goral, An Update on Class Actions and Litigation 
Funding in Poland, available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu. 
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to the court in order to spread the information. People who would 
like to opt into the group proceedings must send a declaration to 
the representative. The latter will establish a list of persons who 
joined the action. The defendant can present objections to the list;                                                                                                    
(3) The tribunal examines the claims of all members and makes a 
decision regarding the composition of the group. This decision is 
appealable. 
No procedural rules dictate further steps for the tribunal to take a 
decision on the merits.  
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III. Questionnaire on Cross-Border Litigation and Collective Redress 
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